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Halleck to
Stanton,
April 26,

1862, W. R.

Vol. X., Part II.,

pp. 128, 129.

The Administration expected more energetic CHAP. XIX. campaigning from a commander of Halleck's reputed skill and the brilliant results realized since his advent. The country seemed at the culmination of great events. Since the beginning of the year success had smiled almost continuously upon the Union cause. As the crowning inspiration, in the midst of his march there had come the joyful news of Farragut's triumph and the capture of New Orleans. "Troops cannot be detached from here on the eve of a great battle," telegraphed Halleck to Stanton. We are now at the enemy's throat." To such encouraging assurances the Administration responded with every possible exertion of reënforcement and supply. But days succeeded days, and the President's hope remained deferred. Nearly a month later, when reports came that Halleck was awaiting the arrival of a fourth Union army,- that of Curtis from Arkansas,—and these reports were supplemented by intimations that he would like to be joined by a fifth army from somewhere else, Mr. Lincoln sent him a letter of such kindly explanation, that, in the actual condition of things, every word was a stinging rebuke:

"Several dispatches from Assistant Secretary Scott, and one from Governor Morton, asking reënforcements for you, have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us and General Banks

Lincoln to
Halleck,
May 24,

1862. W. R.

Vol. X.,
Part I.,

CHAP. XIX. put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the vicpp. 666, 667. tory at Corinth." In reply Halleck resorted to the usual expedient of reading the Secretary of War a military lecture. May 25 he wrote: "Permit me to remark that we are operating upon too many Stanton, points. Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategical points of war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards."

Halleck to

May 25,

1862. W. R.
Vol. X.,
Part I.,
p. 667.

His herculean effort expended itself without corresponding result, when, a week later, he marched into the empty intrenchments of Corinth, only to find that the fifty thousand men composing Beauregard's army-the vital strength of rebellion in the West—were retreating at leisure to Baldwin and Okolona, railroad towns some fifty miles to the south. It had required but two days for the rebel army to go from Corinth to the Shiloh battlefield. Halleck consumed thirty-seven days to pass over the same distance and the same ground, with an army twice as strong as that of his adversary. Pope had reached him April 22, and it was the 29th of May when the Union army was within assaulting distance of the rebel intrenchments. The campaign had advanced with scientific precision, and attained one object for which it was conducted: it gained the fortifications of Corinth. In the end, however, it proved to be but the shell of the expected victory. Beauregard had not only skillfully disputed the advance and de

ceived his antagonist, but at the critical moment CHAP. XIX. had successfully withdrawn the rebel forces to wage more equal conflict on other fields. The enemy evacuated Corinth on the night of the 29th, May, 1862. and beyond the usual demoralization which attends such a retrograde movement suffered little, for Halleck ordered only pursuit enough to drive him to a convenient distance. The achievement was the triumph of a strategist, not the success of a general. Instead of seizing his opportunity to win a great battle or to capture an army by siege, he had simply manœuvred the enemy out of position.

In reporting his success to Washington, Halleck of course magnified its value to the utmost,1 and for the moment the Administration, not having that full information which afterwards so seriously diminished the estimate, accepted the report in good faith as a grand Union triumph. It was indeed a considerable measure of success. Besides

1 "Pope, condensing into one dispatches received from Rosecrans, Hamilton, and Granger, telegraphed to Halleck : 'The two divisions in the advance under Rosecrans are slowly and cautiously advancing on Baldwin this morning, with the cavalry on both flanks. Hamilton with two divisions is at Rienzi and between there and Boonville, ready to move forward should they be needed. One brigade from the reserve occupies Danville. Rosecrans reports this morning that the enemy has retreated from Baldwin, but he is advancing cautiously. The woods, for miles, are full of stragglers from the enemy, who are coming in in squads. Not less than ten thou

sand men are thus scattered about
who will come in within a day or
two.' General Halleck dispatched
to the War Department: 'General
Pope, with 40,000 men, is thirty
miles south of Corinth, pushing
the enemy hard. He already re-
ports 10,000 prisoners and desert-
ers from the enemy, and 15,000
stands of arms captured.' This
dispatch of General Halleck's
made a great sensation. The
expectation that the stragglers
would come into the National
camp was disappointed; the pris-
oners taken were few, and Pope
was censured for making a state-
ment of fact which he neither
made nor authorized." Force,
"From Fort Henry to Corinth,”
pp. 190, 191.

CHAP. XIX. its valuable moral effect in strengthening the patriotism and confidence of the North, and the secondary military advantage that the combined Western armies gained in the two months' strict camp discipline and active practical instruction in the art of field fortification, there was the positive possession of an important railroad center, and the apparent security of Western and Central Tennessee from rebel occupation.

1862.

In addition to these it had one yet more immediate and valuable military result. The remaining rebel strongholds on the upper Mississippi were now so completely turned that they were no longer tenable. Forts Pillow and Randolph were hastily evacuated by the enemy, and the Union flotilla took possession of their deserted works on June 5. Halleck had been looking somewhat anxiously for help on the river, and had complained of the unwillingness of the gunboats to run past the Fort Pillow batteries and destroy the river fleet of the rebels. Flag-officer Davis had considered the risk too great and had remained above Fort Pillow, occupying his time in harassing the works by a continuous bombardment. Now that the way was opened he immediately advanced in force, and at night of June 5 came to anchor two miles above the city of Memphis. His flotilla had lately received a notable reënforcement. One of the many energetic impulses which Stanton gave to military operations in the first few months after he became Secretary of War was his employment of an engineer of genius and daring, Charles Ellet, Jr., to extemporize a fleet of steam-rams for service on the Western rivers.

The single blow by which the iron prow of the CHAP. XIX. Merrimac sunk the Cumberland, at the time of the famous sea-fight between the Merrimac and the Monitor, had demonstrated the effectiveness of this novelty in marine warfare. Ellet's proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, to try it on the Western rivers, was not favorably entertained; probably because the Navy Department already had its officers and its appropriations engaged in other more methodical and permanent naval constructions. But the eager and impatient Secretary of War listened to Ellet's plans with interest, and commissioned him to collect such suitable river craft as he could find on the Ohio, and to convert them post-haste into steam-rams, "the honorable Secretary," reports Ellet, "expressing the hope that not more than twenty days would be consumed in getting them ready for service." Ellet received his orders March 27.1 On May 25 he joined the flotilla of Davis with a fleet of six vessels, formerly swift and strong river tugs and steamers, but now strengthened and converted for their new and peculiar service, and these accompanied the gunboats in the advance against Memphis. On the morning of June 6 the rebel flotilla of eight gun

and a half feet beam in the
widest part, and eight feet hold.
At New Albany I secured a
boat of about the same length
but rather less beam, and subse-
quently I selected another at
Cincinnati, of about the same
class as the last, and sent her to
Madison to be fitted out."-Ellet
to McGunnigle, April 27, 1862.
W. R. Vol. X., Part II., pp. 621,

1 "In response to that order I selected three of the strongest and swiftest stern-wheel coal tow-boats at Pittsburg, of which the average dimensions are about one hundred and seventy feet length, thirty feet beam, and over five feet hold. At Cincinnati I selected two side-wheel boats, of which the largest is one hundred and eighty feet long, thirty-seven 622.

1862.

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