Article 1, Section 4; Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299. Further, although voters' qualification may be the legitimate concern of state legislation, they cannot be so devised as to abridge a citizen's right to vote because of race, color or previous condition of servitude, Federal Constitution, Fifteenth Amendment, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347. In Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, the Supreme Court held no more than that a requirement of a literacy test fair on its face was not repugnant to the Constitution. The Court clearly indicated, however, that the literacy test used as a device to permit racial discrimination would not be tolerated. In the light of these facts, the English language literacy test as a requirement for voting in this particular state becomes specious and works as a device to disenfranchise. Moreover, the racial motive for enacting the law, judging from the debates in the Constitutional convention in the State of New York of 1915, on Pages 3015 and 3016, in support of the proposal for an English language literacy voting requirement, was clearly stated by Mr. Bell: "Gentlemen, we must stop to think of what we are. This is not a question of nations, it is a question of races, and when all is said and done, there is not a man in this room who dares deny that we are an English race, born and bred and brought up with the traditions of the men of England; of Anglo-Saxon stock." The petitioner, who is a native of Puerto Rico, also relies on the treaty of Paris, executed the 10th day of December, 1898. Article 9 thereof establishes the guiding principle relating to the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress." The meaning of the above is clear, that only Congress may legislate with respect to the civil rights and status of the natives of Puerto Rico. This provision has never been changed or superceded, rather it has been implemented in accord with Article 6, Section 1, Paragraph 2, of the Federal Constitution, which states: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The English language literacy requirement was enacted in 1921 and made effective January 1st, 1922. This was a very trying time during the history of our country, and the meaning of Americanization was confused by many well-meaning American citizens with the use of our English language as our official language, Meyer v, Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 "*** One claim put forward is that the statute forwards the works of Americanization. But in our desire for the Americanization of our foreign born population we should not overlook the fact that the spirit of America is liberty and toleration-the disposition to allow each person to live his own life in his own way, unhampered by unreasonable and arbitrary restrictions * * *. *** The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." That the above has become a guiding norm of our Government and society is further corroborated as we search on to make the rule of just law available to all of mankind through the international body of the United Nations, of which the United States is a member, pursuant to a treaty, and virtue of said treaty, the supreme law of the land, the city of New York must also be guided. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter states in part: "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: "* ** a.b.c. universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. "Article 56. * * * All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." In further implementation of the above, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2, of which states: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, nonself-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. "Article 21. *** Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. "2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. "3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government: this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." In Sei Fujii v. State, 213 Pac. 2nd 595 in reference to the United Nations Charter appears the following: "The Charter has become the supreme law of the land: and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding." "A perusal of the Charter renders it manifest that restrictions contained in the Alien Land Law are in direct conflict with the plain terms of the Charter above quoted and with the purposes announced therein by its framers, it is incompatible with Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights which proclaims the right of everyone to own property. * * *" In the matter of Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, in a matter involving the constitutionality of a law of the State of California, which prohibited the acquisition of title to land by persons of the Japanese race, the Court said on Page 673; in striking down the said legislation: "Moreover, this nation has recently pledged itself through the United Nations Charter to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion. The alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that national pledge. It is inconsistent with the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United States and is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned ***." **** And So, in origin, purpose, administration and effect the alien Land Law does violence to the high ideals of the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations. It is an unhappy facsimile, a disheartening reminder of the racial policy pursued by those forces of evil whose destruction recently necessitated a devastating war. It is racism in one of its most malignant forms. Fortunately, the majority of the inhabitants of the United States and the majority of those in California reject the racism and all of its implications. They recognize that under our Constitution all persons are entitled to the equal protection of the laws without regard to their racial ancestry. Human liberty is in too great peril today to warrant ignoring that principle in this case. For that reason, I believe that the penalty of unconstitutionality should be imposed on the alien Land Law." The United Nations Charter is specific in prohibiting discrimination on the ground of a person's language. The history of language discrimination is indeed a painful one and the law of the State of New York is dangerously similar to the situation which prevailed in Germany in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. This similarity is in some degree brought out by the following excerpt from the book "Germanizing Prussian Poland" by Richard Tims, Columbia University Press, 1941, page 133: "*** What they were seeking was nothing less than the complete disappearance of the sight and husking of the sound of the Polish language, not alone from the schools, but from the marketplace as well; in short, from every place publicly frequented by Germans. They wished to see these annoying syllables and suspicious looking words retreat forever into the privacy of Polish homes, there preferably to die out in time, while the language of the ruling nationality entirely occupied the place in the sun. Otherwise the legend so comforting to nationalist patriots that Germany already was a unified national state, would continue to run head on into irritating exceptions on the very street corners. "At home inside his four walls and association with his kind the Pole may speak Polish as much as he wishes. But in the whole of civic life, especially in the group, as well as in dealing with the authorities, and in school, it must be a fundamental rule that only the German language shall be used, for we live in a German State." The concept of equality of American citizens must necessarily preclude the existence of a ruling nationality over and among equal American citizens because of ethnic differences manifested by their different languages. CONCLUSION The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint should be dismissed and the plaintiff's motion for the convocation of a three judge Court should be granted. Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your request for the views of the Department of Commerce with respect to section 5 of S. 2979, a bill to further secure and protect the rights of citizens to vote in Federal and State elections. The views of this Department are confined to section 5 of the proposed legislation. It would appear that the only practical way for the Bureau of the Census to obtain the information relating to the registration of voters in each State would be by taking a sample of the total population rather than a sample from voter registration records. After such a sample of the population had been completed, these records would be checked against registration records for completeness. Subsection (2) refers to "any election since January 1, 1960." We believe it would be necessary to have a reference made to specific elections rather than the present language of the bill. It is assumed that the reference in subsection (1) to "national origin" would have the same meaning as presently used in census statistics; that is, the country of birth of the person enumerated and place of birth of that person's parents. An estimate on the cost of collecting this information on a single-time basis would run anywhere from $2.5 to $5 million. To collect the information as a part of the decennial census would run approximately $500,000. We have been advised by Bureau of the Budget that it would interpose no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the administration's program. Sincerely yours, EDWARD GUDEMAN, Under Secretary of Commerce. APPENDIX JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION CONCERNING VOTING CASES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: This is in response to your letter of March 17, 1962, inquiring on behalf of the subcommittee which of the cases listed in my letter of March 15 involved the use of literacy tests. It is my understanding that the bill (S. 2750) on which the subcommittee is holding hearings this week is not limited to the abuse of literacy tests as such, but extends also to other and similar performance examinations concerned with testing an applicant's capacity to read, write, or understand or otherwise meet this kind of qualification imposed by a State. An example is the use of a complicated form not as a method of seeking information about an applicant, but as a test to see whether that applicant makes any mistake in filling out the form without assistance. On this basis, I believe that literacy and other performance tests which would be covered by the bill are involved in the cases designated as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 14-17, 18, 20, 21, 24, and 25. The use of literacy tests was also involved in Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y., 1961), and performance standards may in the future become involved in the cases designated as Nos. 9, 13, 22, and 23 in the list attached to my letter of March 15. Those cases are presently confined to obstacles in making initial applications to register. If the subcommitee desires any further detail concerning these cases, I would be most happy to furnish it. Very truly yours, BURKE MARSHALL, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: With further reference to my letters to the subcommittee of March 15 and March 19, 1962, I am enclosing a set of brief memorandums setting forth the status and essential facts or charges in the 25 cases brought under the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts which were listed in an attachment to my letter of March 15. I am sure that the subcommittee recognizes that, in the case of the lawsuits which have not come to trial or in which no decision has been rendered, the summaries are of the essential facts which the Government intends to prove. Presumably in each case there will be defenses offered which will give another side of the picture in the particular county. 515 |