Cocoa Cocoa, in casks in double bale - 3 rottoli . 3 do. 2 ad. per cent. - real tare. Cassia lignea, cochineal, and bark. chantman quarantine is performed at Nisita, an island about 6 miles, Pimento, in bags, each Shipping Port Charges, &c.-In 1831, there entered the port of Naples 202 foreign vessels. Of these, 101 were British, 44 French, 35 Sardinian. 6 Spanish, 5 Tuscan, &c. Tonnage not stated. The charges of a public nature on a national ship of 300 tons burden entering and clearing out from the port of Naples, are as under: D. gr. Banking. The principal merchants of Naples are all, more or less, baukers, inasmuch as they advance money on letters of credit, and deal in foreign exchanges, and other financial operations. But the only banking establishment at present in existence, is the Bank of the two Sic lies, founded by government, and guaranteed by the posse-sion of landed property. It is not a bank for the issue of notes on credit, like the Bank of England, but for their issue on deposits, somewhat on the principle of the Bank of Hanburgh. Govern ment makes all its payments by means of notes or orders on the bank; and they are issued to individuals for whatever sums they desire, on their paying an equivalent sum of money to the bank. These notes or orders form a considerable part of the circulating medium of Naples; they are paid in cash on demand. Governme: t has also established a discount office, where bills indorsed by 2 persons of good credit, and not at more than 3 months' date, are discounted at 4 per cent. Prices of Provisions.-Naples is a favourable place for obtaining supplies of fresh, but not of salt provisions. The prices of the priacipal articles of consumption in 1831 were as follows: On entering.-For expediting On clearing out.-Expediting Tonnage duty at 4 grains per ton (Equal to about 17. 4s. 4d. sterling.) On clearing out.-Passport Expediting Stamp 6 60 0 14 Bill of health 2 40 Beef 0 60 0 20 Butter - 120 10 224235624T 18 7 Tonnage duty at 40 grains per ton. (Equal to about 211. 178. 1d. sterling.) D. 131 14 Brokers, Commission, &c.--No person can legally act as a broker unless authorised by government. All patented brokers are obliged, by way of security, to hold funded property producing 500 ducats of "rente," or a dividend of 831 6s. Sd. sterling. Many persons, how. ever, act as brokers without being patented, but no contract made by them is admitted in a court of law. Any person may set up as a merchant, by giving due notice to the Camera di Commercio. The rates of commission generally established at Naples are as under : Rates of Commission and Charges established by the Merchants at Coffee Warehousing System.-The whole policy, if we may so term it, of the Neapolitan government, with respect to commerce, is such as would disgrace a nation of Hottentots. We believe that it is entitled to the not very enviable distinction of being the only go ernment that has suppressed, after having established, the warehousing system, or scala franca. This was done in 1824. At present, all goods imported into Naples, may be deposited, on paying rent, in warehouses under the joint locks of the king and the importer, for 2 years. At the end of the 1st year, half the import duty must be paid, and at the end of the 21 year, the other half. Whether sold or not, the goods must then be removed from the warehouses; and in paying the duties no deduction is made on account of damage in the warehouse, unless certain forms be complie! with, the observance of which is invariably reckoned more burdensome than the payment of the duties. No drawback of the import duty is allowed on the exportation of any sort of foreign produce: on the contrary, should it happen to be of 'he same species as native produce subject to a duty on export, it is charged, in addition to the duty it had paid on importation, with an export duty equal to that laid on the corresponding native pro fuct! The influence of this system is most disastrous. So large a city as Naples, and so advantageously situated for the commerce with the Black Sea, the Levant, Greece, Spain, Northern Italy, Northern Africa, &c., would, had it been allowed to avail itself of its natural advantages, have become a most important entrepôt. But, in consequence of the regulations now specified, no goods are carried to it except those destined for home consumption, and these are always supplied sparingly; for, however much the price of an article may be depressed at Naples, it is impossible, owing to the oppressive duties charged on its importation not being drawn back on exportation, for the nierchant to send it to Leghorn, Genoa, Trieste, or any other place where it is more in demand. It would really seem as if the government had been exerting its ingenuity to find out the means of driving commerce, and with it enterprise and industry, from its shores; and it has not been denied that it has been, in so far, successful. Credit, &c.-Goods are universally sold at long credits, mostly from 4 to 8 months; and for manufactured goods sometimes longer. On sales of indigo, from 12 to 18 months' credit is given. Discount for ready money is at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. Merchants are arranged by the Chamber of Commerce in'o 5 different classes; and a 6 month's credit is given at the Custom-house for duties to the extent of 60,000, 40,000, 30,000, 20.000, and 15,000 ducats, to individuals, according to the class in which they happen to be enrolled. But this is of little importance. Unless the transactions of a merchant be very limited indeed, the duties he has to pay amount to much more than the credit he is allowed. Tariff.-The duties on exports and imports are such as might be expected from a government that has suppressed the warehousing system, and allowed no drawbacks. The duties on most sorts of imported articles are extremely oppressive, being seldom under 100, and often above 150 per cent. ad valorem! On coffee, the duty is no less than 46s. 8d. per cwt.; on sugar it varies from 41. 10d. to 62s. 9d. per do.; on tea it is 30s. per do. ; on cotton wool it varies from 19s. 8d. to 37s. 4d. per do. The duty on cotton and woollen manufactures is imposed by the piece, and is, in common with all the other duties, most exorbitant. Even the indispensable article, iron, is charged with 8s. 4d. per cwt.! These duties have been imposed partly for the sake of revenue, and partly in the view of encouraging domestic manufactures; but they have not accomplished either object. The inordinate extent to which they have been carried has made them advantageous only to the smuggler, and ruinous to every one else. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? The coast of Naples, exclusive of Sicily, stretches from 800 to 1,000 miles; in many places it is uninhabited, while, in a great number of others, the people are not more than half civilised. The facilities for smuggling are, therefore, incalculably great; and, combined with the inadequate remuneration of the customs' officers, and the ease with which they are corrupted, our only wonder is, not that smuggling is in a thriving state, but that there should be any legitimate traffic. The latter, indeed, is principally con→ fined to Naples, where a stricter police is established; for it is not uncommon to find the same articles, in country towns at no great distance from the capital, selling for or of their cost in it. In a country subjected to such a commercial code as Naples, the smuggler is a great public benefactor. He is, in fact, the natural enemy of oppressive duties and prohibitions. These bring him into the field, and make him put forth all his enterprise and energy: and it is fortunate for the best interests of society that he is uniformly victorious over penalties, confiscations, racks, and gibbets; and cannot be defeated otherwise than by the adoption of enlarged and liberal principles of commercial policy. The following are the duties charged on the principal articles of export from Naples :Tariff of the principal Articles of Export in force at Naples in 1833. Of these duties, that on oil is by far the most objectionable. Even though Naples enjoyed a monopoly of this valuable product, the imposition of such a duty would be wholly indefensible on any sound principle. But when, instead of having a monopoly of the oil trade, the Neapolitans are exposed to the keen competition of the Tuscans, Genoese, Spaniards, &c., the imposition of a heavy export duty is in the last degree destructive. It depresses that branch of industry which is more suitable for the country, and gives a corresponding encouragement to its extension amongst foreigners. The increased duty of 30s. a tun on oil exported in foreign ships, is, of course, intended to force the employment of native ships but it has not had, and could not rationally be expected to have, any such consequence; its only effect being to tempt foreigners to make a corresponding addition to the duties on oil, when imported in Neapolitan ships. Such regulations are never, in fact, productive of any thing except injury to those by whom they are enacted. Of the direct taxes, the most productive is the fondiaria, or tax on rent, producing about 1,240,000l. a year. It was imposed during the French occupation, when it was fixed at 25 per cent. of the sum received by the landlord. It has not been altered since; and as agricultural produce has materially declined in price, while the rents of houses in towns, and particularly in the capital, have very much increased, its unequal pressure is much complained of. The perverse policy we have thus endeavoured to develope, cannot surely be permitted to exist much longer. The reasonings of Filangieri, and other able native economists, might have forewarned the government of the real nature of that system of prohibition and restriction which it has laboured, ever since its restoration, to protect and defend. But facts have now taken the place of theory; and the results of the system are too obvious and too mischievous not to arrest the attention of every one, and to impress the necessity of some radical alterations. Considering the great natural fertility, varied productions, and advantageous situation of Naples and Sicily, it is plain that nothing more than freedom and security are required to render them among the richest, most industrious, and flourishing countries of Europe. But instead of this, the fetters laid upon commerce, by depriving the inhabitants of a market for their productions, and, consequently, of the most powerful stimulus to industry and invention, have paralysed all their energies, and immersed them in poverty, sloth and barbarism. It is surely high time that a different line of policy were adopted. At Naples, a reform may be undertaken without (which is not always the case elsewhere) endangering any thing either useful or valuable. Its political economy is such that no change, be it what it may, can make matters materially worse than they are at this moment. But it would be the easiest thing in the world to lay the foundations of a great and rapid improvement. To effect this, government has only to abolish all duties and restrictions on exportation, to establish the warehousing system, and to reduce the duties on importation to or part of their present amount. If it do this, it will add prodigiously to its own revenue; at the same time that it will do 10 times more to rouse the dormant energies, and to augment the wealth of its subjects, than it is possible to do by any other means. (A Statement of the Number and Tonnage of British Vessels which entered and cleared from the Port of Naples; distinguishing the Nature of their Cargoes, and the Trade with each Country, in the Year 1835.-(Consular Return.) A Statement of the Number, Tonnage, and Crews of British and Foreign Vessels, distinguishing the Countries to which they belonged, which entered and cleared from the Port of Naples in the Year 1835. them communicate any information from which any just idea can be formed of the state of industry and commerce, the financial system of the country, &c. The statistical works of the Neapolitans are equally defective. They are overlaid with insignificant details, while they neglect altogether, or pass slightly over, the more important departments. This may arise from the jealousy of government; but the English travellers can make no such apology for their defects. In In compiling this article, we have been much indebted to the carefully drawn up, and generally judicious Answers of the British consul, (Mr. Goodwin) to the Circular Queries, to Millenet, Coup d'Eil sur le Royaume de Naples, and to some valuable private communi. cations. We have also looked into the works of a good many Eng. lish and foreign travellers, but seldom with much advantage. They are filled with accounts, a thousand times repeated, of antiquities, Vesuvius, the churches, theatres, lazzaroni, &c.; but few among NAVIGATION LAWS. These laws form an important branch of Maritime Law. this country they are understood to comprise the various acts that have been passed, defining British ships, the way in which such ships are to be manned, the peculiar privileges enjoyed by them, and the conditions under which foreign ships shall be allowed to engage in the trade of the country, either as importers or exporters of commodities, or as carriers of commodities from one part of the country to another. Sketch of the History and Principles of the Navigation Laws.-The origin of the Navigation Laws of England may be traced to the reign of Richard II., or perhaps to a still more remote period. But, as no intelligible account of the varying and contradictory enactments framed at so distant an epoch could be compressed within any reasonable space, it is sufficient to observe, that, in the reign of Henry VII., two of the leading principles of the late navigation law were distinctly recognised, in the prohibition of the importation of certain commodities, unless imported in ships belonging to English owners, and manned by English seamen. In the early part of the reign of Elizabeth (5 Eliz. c. 5.), foreign ships were excluded from our fisheries and coasting trade. The republican parliament gave a great extension to the navigation laws, by the act of 1650, which prohibited all ships, of all foreign nations whatever, from trading with the plantations in America, without having previously obtained a licence. These acts were, however, rather intended to regulate the trade between the different ports and dependencies of the empire, than to regulate our intercourse with foreigners. But in the following year (9th of October, 1651) the republican parliament passed the famous Act of Navigation. This act had a double object. It was intended not only to promote our own navigation, but also to strike a decisive blow at the naval power of the Dutch, who then engrossed almost the whole carrying trade of the world, and against whom various circumstances had conspired to incense the English. The act in question declared, that no goods or commodities whatever, of the growth, production or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America, should be imported either into England or Ireland, or any of the plantations, except in ships belonging to English subjects, and of which the master and the greater number of the crew were also English. Having thus secured the import trade of Asia, Africa, and America, to the English ship owners, the act went on to secure to them, as far as that was possible, the import trade of Europe. For this purpose, it further enacted, that no goods of the growth, production, or manufacture of any country in Europe, should be imported into Great Britain, except in British ships, or in such ships as were the real property of the people of the country or place in which the goods were produced, or from which they could only be, or most usually were, exported. The latter part of the clause was entirely levelled against the Dutch, who had but little native produce to export, and whose ships were principally employed in carrying the produce of other countries to foreign markets. Such were the leading provisions of this famous act. They were adopted by the regal government which succeeded Cromwell, and form the basis of the act of the 12th Car. 2. c. 18., which continued, to a very recent period, to be the rule by which our naval intercourse with other countries was mainly regulated; and has been pompously designated the Charta Maritima of England! In the statute 12 Car. 2. c. 18., the clause against importing foreign commodities, except in British ships, or in ships belonging to the country or place where the goods were produced, or from which they were exported, was so far modified, that the prohibition was made to apply only to the goods of Russia and Turkey, and to certain articles, since well known in commerce by the name of enumerated articles, leave being at the same time given to import all other articles in ships of any description. But this modification was of very little importance; inasmuch as the enumerated articles comprised all those that were of most importance in commerce, as timber, grain, tar, hemp and flax, potashes, wines, spirits, sugar, &c. Parliament seems, however, to have very speedily come round to the opinion that too much had been done in the way of relaxation; and in the 14th of Charles II. a supplemental statute was passed, avowedly with the intention of obviating some evasions of the statute of the preceding year, which, it was affirmed, had been practised by the Hollanders and Germans. This, however, seems to have been a mere pretence, to excuse the desire to follow up the blow aimed, by the former statute, at the carrying trade of Holland. And such was our jealousy of the naval and commercial greatness of the Dutch, that, in order to cripple it, we did not hesitate totally to proscribe all trade with them; and, to prevent the possibility of fraud, or of clandestine or indirect intercourse with Holland, we went so far as to include the commerce with the Netherlands and Germany in the same proscription. The statute of the 14th Car. 2. prohibited all importation from these countries of a long list of enumerated commodities, under any circumstances, or in any vessels, whether British or foreign, under the penalty of seizure and confiscation of the ships and goods. So far as it depended on us, Holland, the Netherlands, and Germany were virtually placed without the pale of the commercial world! And though the extreme rigour of this statute was subsequently modified, its principal provisions remained in full force until the late alterations. The policy, if not the motives which dictated these statutes, has met with very general eulogy. It has been said, and by no less an authority than Dr. Smith, that national animosity did, in this instance, that which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended. "When the act of navigation was made," says he, "though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations. It had begun during the government of the long parliament, which first framed this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars during that of the Protector and of Charles II. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended,-the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England. The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation in its commercial relations to foreign nations is, like that of a merchant with regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap and to sell as dear as possible. But the act of navigation, by diminishing the number of sellers, must necessarily diminish that of buyers; and we are thus likely not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.”—(Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 293.) * It may, however, be very fairly doubted, whether, in point of fact, the navigation law had the effects here ascribed to it, of weakening the naval power of the Dutch, and of increasing that of this kingdom. The Dutch were very powerful at sea for a long period after the passing of this act; and it seems natural to conclude, that the decline of their maritime preponderance was owing rather to the gradual increase of commerce and navigation in other countries, and to the disasters and burdens occasioned by the ruinous contests the Republic had to sustain with Cromwell, Charles II. and Louis XIV., than to the mere exclusion of their merchant vessels from the ports of England. It is not meant to say, that this exclusion was altogether without effect. The efforts of the Dutch to procure a repeal of the English navigation law show that, in their apprehension, it operated injuriously on their commerce.* It is certain, however, that its influence in this respect has been greatly over-rated in this country. Excessive taxation, and not our navigation law, was the principal cause of the fall of profits, and of the decline of manufactures, commerce, and navigation, in Holland. "Les guerres," says the well-informed author of the Commerce de la Hollande, "terminées par les traités de Nimeguè, de Ryswick, d'Utrecht, et enfin la dernière par le traité d'Aix-laChapelle, ont successivement obligé la République de faire usage d'un grand crédit, et de faire des emprunts énormes pour en soutenir les fraix. Les dettes ont surchargé l'état d'une somme immense d'intérêts, qui ne pouvoient être payés que par une augmentation excessive d'impôts, dont il a fallu faire porter la plus forte partie par les consommations dans un pays qui n'a qu'un territoire extrêmement borné, et par conséquent par l'industrie. Il a donc fallu faire enchétir infiniment la main-d'œuvre. Cette cherté de la main-d'œuvre a non seulement restreint presque toute sorte de fabrique et d'industrie à la consommation intérieure, mais elle a encore porté un coup bien sensible au commerce de frêt, partie accessoire et la plus précieuse du commerce d'économie: car cette cherté a rendu la construction plus chere, et augmenté le prix de tous les ouvrages qui tiennent à la navigation, même de tous les ouvrages des ports et des magasins. Il n'étoit pas possible que l'augmentation du prix de la main-d'œuvre ne donnât, malgre tous les efforts de l'économie Hollandoise, un avantage *In the treaty of Breda, agreed upon in 1667, between the States General and Charles II., the latter undertook to procure the repeal of the navigation law. But the subject was never agitated in either house of parliament. sensible aux autres nations qui voudroient se livrer au commerce d'économie et à celui de frêt."-(Tome ii. p. 211.) This extract, which might, were it necessary, be corroborated by others to the same effect from all the best Dutch writers, show that it is not to our navigation law, nor to the restrictive regulations of other foreign powers, but to the abuse of the funding system, and the excess of taxation, that the decline of the commercial greatness and maritime power of Holland was really owing. Neither does it appear that the opinion maintained by Dr. Smith and others, that the navigation law had a powerful influence in augmenting the naval power of this country, rests on any better foundation. The taste of the nation for naval enterprise had been awakened, the navy had become exceedingly formidable, and Blake had achieved his victories, before the enactment of this famous law. So far, indeed, is it from being certain that the navigation act had, in this respect, the effect commonly ascribed to it, that there are good grounds for thinking it had a precisely opposite effect, and that it operated rather to diminish than to increase our mercantile navy. It is stated in Roger Coke's Treatise on Trade, published in 1671 (p. 36.), that this act, by lessening the resort of strangers to our ports, had a most injurious effect on our commerce; and he further states that we had lost, within 2 years of the passing of the act of 1650, the greater part of the Baltic and Greenland trades.— (p. 48.) Sir Josiah Child, whose treatise was published in 1691, corroborates Coke's statement for while he decidedly approves of the navigation law, he admits that the English shipping employed in the Eastland and Baltic trades had decreased at least two thirds since its enactment, and that the foreign shipping employed in these trades had proportionally increased.-(Treatise on Trade, p. 89. Glasg. edit.) Exclusive of these contemporary authorities, it may be worth while to mention, that Sir Matthew Decker, an extensive and extremely well-informed merchant, condemns the whole principle of the navigation act; and contends that, instead of increasing our shipping and seamen, it had diminished them both; and that, by rendering the freight of ships higher than it would otherwise have been, it had entailed a heavy burden on the public, and been one of the main causes that had prevented our carrying on the fishery so successfully as the Dutch.—(Essays on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade, p. 60. ed. 1756.) There does not seem to be any very good grounds on which to question these statements; and they are at all events sufficient to show, that the assertions of those who contend that the navigation laws had a prodigious effect in increasing the number of our ships and sailors, must be received with very great modification. But, suppose that all that has been said by the apologists of these laws were true to the letter; suppose it were conceded, that, when first framed, the Act of Navigation was extremely politic and proper;—that would afford but a very slender presumption in favour of the policy of supporting it in the present day. Human institutions are not made for immortality: they must be accommodated to the varying circumstances and exigencies of society. But the situation of Great Britain and the other countries of Europe has totally changed since 1650. The envied wealth and commercial greatness of Holland have passed away: we have no longer any thing to fear from her hostility and," he must be, indeed, strangely influenced by antiquated prejudices and by-gone apprehensions, who can entertain any of that jealousy from which the severity of this law principally originated." London has become, what Amsterdam formerly was, the grand emporium of the commercial world-universi orbis terrarum emporium: and the real question which now presents itself for our consideration is, not what are the best means by which we may rise to naval greatness? but-what are the best means of preserving that undisputed pre-eminence in maritime affairs to which we have attained? Now, it does not really seem that there can be much difficulty in deciding this question. Navigation and naval power are the children, not the parents-the effect, not the cause-of commerce. If the latter be increased, the increase of the former will follow as a matter of course. More ships and more sailors become necessary, according as the commerce between different and distant countries is extended. A country, circumstanced like Great Britain in the reign of Charles II., when her shipping was comparatively limited, might perhaps be warranted in endeavouring to increase its amount, by excluding foreign ships from her harbours. But it is almost superfluous to add, that it is not by any such regulations, but solely by the aid of a flourishing and widely extended commerce, that the immense mercantile navy we have now accumulated can be supported. But it is extremely easy to show, that to have continued to enforce the provisions of the old navigation law, in the present state of the world, would have been among the most efficient means that could have been devised for the destruction of our commerce. The wealth and power to which Britain has attained, has inspired other nations with the same envious feelings that the wealth of Holland formerly generated in our minds. Instead of ascribing our commercial and manufacturing superiority to its true causes,―to the comparative freedom of our constitution, the absence of all oppressive feudal privileges, the security of property, and the fairness of our system of taxation,-our foreign rivals contend that it has been entirely owing to our exclusive system; and appeal to our example to stimulate their respective governments to adopt retaliatory measures, and to protect them against British competi |