plans to pull Brownlow's house down that night. Zollicoffer immediately gave an order that no soldier should leave camp that night, and sent a company of soldiers to guard my house, giving the ladies information of his intention. This was heralded all through the Southern Confederacy as a piece of unheard-of clemency. But I think he did nothing more than his duty. And now that Zollicoffer is dead, I must do him the credit to say that I knew him for more than twenty-five years; that I have battled with him; that he was an honest man, who never wronged another out of a cent; that he never told a lie; that he was in all respects an honorable man, and as brave a soldier as ever died in battle, and that the only mean thing he ever did, was fighting for the Southern Confederacy."

Zollicoffer was killed at the battle of Wild Cat, Kentucky, October 21st, by Colonel Fry. His death was sincerely regretted by the Unionists of Tennessee. He had been cajoled into the Confederate service; his hand, not his heart, seemed to have been the sinner.

THE BRIDGE BURNING.

The burning of bridges in East Tennessee was an act of the Unionists, to prevent the Confederates from throwing reenforcements into that section, while Garland pushed down. through Cumberland Gap to protect the Unionists in their pre-arranged uprising. The story of the burning was never known until the Parson revealed it on his arrival in Nashville, late in February (1861.) The substance of his statements, at that time, was thus reported by the Louisville Journal:

"It appears that Chaplin Carter and Captain Fry, of one of the Tennessee regiments, in the latter part of October, made their way in disguise and over hidden paths to the house of a prominent loyalist, within eight miles of Knoxville. Here they convened about one hundred trustworthy and devoted men, to whom they represented that a Federal division was about forcing its way into the Eastern district, and that, in

order to insure the success of the contemplated expedition, and prevent the reenforcement of the Confederate forces then guarding the Gap from either the West or East, they were authorized by the Federal military authorities to prepare and execute a plan for the destruction of the principal bridges on the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.

"Most of those present at once signified their willingness to co-operate with them, and it was accordingly arranged that parties of fifteen to twenty-five, armed and provided with the necessary combustibles, should proceed as secretly as possible to the vicinity of the bridges selected for destruction. Captain Fry, assuming the character of a Confederate contractor, professedly engaged in the purchase of hogs, under the name of Colonel Walker, traveled from point to point, personally superintending the preparations.

"So well were the plans laid, and so successfully carried out, that, although the most westerly of the doomed bridges was no less than one hundred and seventy-five miles from the most easterly, the guards at all of them were overpowered, and the structures fired within the same hour of the same night, that is, between the hours of eleven and twelve of the night of the 10th of November. The bridges were readily set in flames by means of ropes dipped in turpentine and stretched from end to end. Captain Fry was himself present at the burning of the Lick Creek bridge.

"The guards at that point were not only overcome, disarmed and tied, but also made to swear allegiance to the United States, upon a Bible brought along for the purpose. Captain Fry started for Southern Kentucky immediately after the burning, to return, as the conspirators all believed, in a few days, with a Federal army. His brother was afterward arrested, and hung by the rebels."

It is one of the melancholy episodes of the war that Garland and Schoepf were stayed in their advance upon East Tennessee. The way was open; and the uprising of the Unionists, with the help of the Federal forces, certainly would have given that section up to the Union. The "circumlocution office" had

another way of doing the thing-of gathering a tremendous force, in the course of time-to march down upon Nashville, then to whip the rebels out of West Tennessee; then to advance into East Tennessee. The poor Unionists pined in dungeons through the weary ten months which followed before their deliverance came, by the advance of Mitchell from the South and of Morgan from Cumberland Gap. East Tennessee should have been in the Union, in November, 1861; and, doubtless would have been, if counter orders had not arrested a simple, straight-forward, discreet campaign. This, we believe, is now the opinion of those best qualified to sit in judgment on events in Kentucky and Tennessee.

XIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI. THE FIRST

DISASTER.

THE final defection of General Price and Governor Jackson (June 12th) was followed by their calling out all the troops available to "fight the hireling Dutch," as the United States volunteers were then called. They gathered in strong force at Boonsville, whither General Lyon proceeded with all the available force at his disposition-consisting chiefly of the First, Third, and Fourth Missouri regiments volunteers, with several companies of regulars, two batteries of artillery, and several companies of Home Guards. The battle of Boonsville followed, June 17th, in which Price's forces were routed, and his camp equipage, stores, etc., captured. The Federal loss was two killed and nine wounded. General Price was not in the fight, having gone home the day previous, ill.

The Second Missouri regiment stopped at Jefferson City, where Colonel Boernstein assumed command. He issued his proclamation (June 17th,) announcing the flight of the Governor and other State functionaries, and proclaiming his purpose to co-operate with the civil and judicial authorities to preserve law and order.

On the 18th, General Lyon issued his proclamation to the people of Missouri, in which he set forth the true condition of matters as between the absconding Governor, with his treasonable coadjutors, and the General Government. He assured peace and safety to all who did not bear arms against the Government, and requested all who had been deceived into a co-operation with the treason of their late Executive, to lay down their arms, and return to their homes. He warned those in arms, however, against hoping for clemency, if they persisted in hostility against their country.

On the 18th, the Secessionists from Warsaw and vicinity attacked a body of Home Guards at Camp Cole, and dispersed them-the Guards losing twenty-three killed, twenty wounded, and thirty prisoners. The attacking force was comprised largely of Price's men, who had retired from Boonsville upon Lyon's approach.

Lyon immediately proceeded to dispose his forces so as to command the best points of occupation in the State. Siegel was pushed out toward Springfield, where he arrived June 23d. Learning that Jackson was coming down from the North with the remnant of his forces, through Cedar County, Siegel advanced to Mount Vernon to intercept his retreat. At Mount Vernon he ascertained that Price was at Neosho, and immediately resolved to use him up before striking for Jack

son.

With that object in view, he moved (June 30th) on to Neosho; but Price had retreated before him.

The rebels effected a combination of their forces, under Generals Parsons and Rains, at Dry Fork Creek, eight miles north of Carthage. By orders of Brigadier-General Sweeny-who had then arrived at Springfield and assumed command of the Federal forces operating in South-western Missouri-Siegel,

on the morning of July 5th, pushed out to meet the enemy. His force consisted of eight companies of his own (Third) regi. ment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hassendeubel, Missouri volunteers; seven companies of the Fifth regiment, Colonel Salomon; and eight field pieces under command of Major Backof. The enemy's force comprised State troops and Arkansas volunteers to the number of fifty-five hundrednearly one half mounted-and a battery of five guns. An account of the battle given by one who was present, read:

"Our command was about one thousand two hundred strong, including a part of Colonel Salomon's regiment. We met the enemy in camp, in an open prairie, three miles beyond Dry Fork. We could not discover many infantry, but numbers of cavalry. Approaching within eight hundred yards, we took our position. The artillery was placed in front; we had on our left two six-pounders; in our center, two six-pounders and two twelve-pounders; and two sixpounders on our right. The enemy, who occupied the highest ground in the prairie, had in position one six-pounder on the right and left, and in his center one twelve and two sixpounders. The fight commenced at half-past nine, when large bodies of infantry began to appear. The firing of the enemy was wretched. I have seen much artillery practice, but never saw such bad gunnery before. Their balls and shells went over us, and exploded in the open prairie. At eleven o'clock we had silenced their twelve-pounder and broken their center so much that disorder was apparent. After the first five shots the two secession flags which they carried were not shown. They displayed the State flag, which we did not fire at. At about two o'clock the cavalry attempted to outflank us, on both right and left. As we had left our baggage trains three miles in the rear, not anticipating a serious engagement, it was necessary to fall back to prevent their capture. Colonel Siegel then ordered two six-pounders to the rear, and changed his front, two six pounders on the flanks, and the twelve and six-pounders in the rear, and commenced falling back in a steady and orderly manner, firing as we went. We proceeded,