level can normally be resolved or coordinated through the existing executive structure; (b) groups operating well below the decisionmaking level tend to become discussion societies. Their written products, if any, seldom reach the decision stage. The vast bulk of our interagency business, at all levels, is done in regular and more or less traditional channels, day after day, week after week. (3) High-level interest in any successful continuing interagency committee must be sustained. If the representation becomes progressively lower and, worse, if the chairing is left to deputies or assistants, the inevitable tendency is to turn prime attention to what appears to be more pressing business. This is in direct contradistinction to the task force. The problem of the continuing committee is to sustain interest in, and to galvanize the resources of the Government to deal with, stubborn, often perplexing problems which may be with us for years. I would cite as an example of a successful continuing group the Inter-Agency Committee on Youth and Student Affairs. This Committee was established on an ad hoc basis to deal with what the Kennedy administration recognized as a specific, continuing, and growing problem-the widespread anti-American and/or proCommunist orientation of youth and students in many nonbloc countries. The Committee is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. His interest and the interest of other agencies at a high level has been sustained. The results have been substantially stepped up and better coordinated U.S. programs for youth and students abroad, continuing attention to countries where students are an important political factor, assignment of additional student affairs officers overseas, specific coordination of activities within most U.S. missions under a designated coordinator for youth and student activities, and widespread recognition in all affected agencies that this administration is determined to continue the effort as long as necessary. The problem is by no means solved-the program may have to be continued for years-but the machinery to grapple with it is functioning. From our point of view these conclusions may be drawn: (1) The device of a continuing interagency committee should also be used sparingly. (2) Its assignment must be of such proportions as to require high-level attention over a considerable timespan. (3) Its area of activity, its authority, and its limitations must be capable of fairly precise definition. (4) The chairmanship must be at a sufficiently high level to induce adequate responses from participating agencies. (5) Interest must be sustained. THE COUNTRY TEAM My evaluation of the country team operation is based in part on direct observation of our field activities, in part on the reports of my senior colleagues and USIA assistant directors who spend much of their time in the field directly supervising our USIS missions. I am convinced that the success or failure of the country team concept depends primarily on the personality, executive methods, and interests of the chief of mission. Some Ambassadors use the country team effectively as such. Others accomplish the purposes embodied in the concept by other means, but still maintain purposeful and coordinated general direction of all programs within their country of assignment. Still others pay service to the concept without achieving central general direction or adequate coordination. To a lesser extent, the success of the country team concept depends on the capability of the team members and—perhaps even more importantly-their willingness to cooperate positively in a coordinated program. Ultimately, Ambassadors have the authority to extract this coordination, but they are generally loath to force an issue that stops short of documented insubordination or malfeasance. USIA strongly favors the country team concept, and active participation by the chief of mission in public affairs programs. An interested and articulate ambassador, skilled in public affairs, is a prime asset for any oversea information program. Close cooperation is not only desirable, it is essential; lack of it may be disastrous in the public affairs field. Fortunately, the utility of the public affairs tool is today widely recognized by U.S. chiefs of mission, and is becoming more so. We believe that the authorities of the chief of mission, specifically as delineated by the letter of the President to American Ambassadors on May 29, 1961, together with the President's statement of mission to USIA of January 25, 1963, adequately define our mutual relationship in the field. We acknowledge the primacy of the Ambassador without reservation; we also expect to carry out effectively our role as public relations counselor to him and other members of the country team. We agree, as your committee study Basic Issues points out, that there are limitations on the Ambassador's powers, particularly in budgeting and programing. In the case of USIA, the allocation of resources country by country and area by area must, of course, rest with the Director of USIA. Yet the ambassador can influence this decision. When it comes to the allocation within his country of the available resources, he has great influence; depending on his interest, he will have much to say in the allocation of money and manpower by media, press versus radio or TV, for example, and in the selection of audiences we attempt to reach, for example the relative emphasis on the ruling elite, labor, youth and students, or whatever sources of influence he deems important. Here, if he desires, the determinations of the Ambassador may approach the decisive for USIA programs. I believe the same is true, or at least could be true, in the relative allocation of various forms of aid within his country, military versus economic, technical versus budgetary. If he desires, the Ambassador can exert a dominant influence on the cultural program; for example, selection of exchangees and performing artists. In addition to our comments on the specific points above, you asked generally what steps might be taken to improve interagency planning and coordination in Washington and the field. I believe the new USIA statement of mission from President Kennedy in his memorandum to Mr. Murrow of January 25 goes far to sharpen the role of the Information Agency vis-a-vis other elements of the Government. The public relations counseling role spelled out there is of great importance and has been fully recognized by the 52-721 0-65-33 administration, both in word and practice. I attach a copy of the memorandum for the information of the committee. In our view, the area now needing most urgent attention is integrated field planning. Current plans of operating agencies and departments in individual countries must be even more closely meshed. Procedures for projections, which for several agencies are based on a 5-year cycle, must be meshed to achieve integration and avoid duplication in reporting. In cooperation with other agencies, the State Department is currently engaged with this problem, and we are hopeful of tangible and constructive results. If you or members of your subcommittee have further questions, I would be happy to submit whatever additional information we may have. Sincerely, DONALD M. WILSON, Acting Director. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, January 25, 1963. Memorandum for the Director, U.S. Information Agency. The mission of the U.S. Information Agency is to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication-personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others. In so doing, the Agency shall be guided by the following: 1. Individual country programs should specifically and directly support country and regional objectives determined by the President and set forth in official policy pronouncements, both classified and unclassified. 2. Agency activities should (a) encourage constructive public support abroad for the goal of a "peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others"; (b) identify the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified for its leadership of world efforts toward this goal, and (c) unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States. These activities should emphasize the ways in which U.S. policies harmonize with those of other peoples and governments, and those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of U.S. policies. The advisory function is to be carried out at various levels in Washington, and within the country team at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. While the Director of the U.S. Information Agency shall take the initiative in offering counsel when he deems it advisable, the various departments and agencies should seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which may substantially affect or be affected by foreign opinion. Consultation with the U.S. Information Agency is essential when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated. U.S. Information Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the chiefs of mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations, and cultural activities—that is, those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion-for agencies of the U.S. Government except for commands of the Department of Defense. Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. JOHN F. KENNEDY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: I apologize for my delay in responding to your letter of November 1. As I am sure you know, this has been a hectic period. You raised two key questions: What makes a good (or bad) interagency task force here in Washington, and what makes a good (or bad) country team operation in the field? My answer on both counts is, on reflection, as simple to enunciate as it is sometimes difficult to execute. It comes down to two things; first, a clear definition of responsibility, and second, the personal effectiveness of the man in charge. The definition of responsibility for the country team is, in my judgment, as clear as it can ever be made, in the form of the President's letter of May 29, 1961. The concept of effective country team operation thus defined requires that the Ambassador exercise the power thus conferred on him. Where he does so, the country team operation is effective. Where he is reluctant to assume the authority that he must assume for matters cutting across agency jurisdictions-for example, the U.S. position with respect to local defense budgets, involving in major cases both AID funds and military assistance assumptions the recommendations of the country team suffer and we in Washington fail to get a true picture. However, having taken that particular example, I would go on to say that the performance of our Ambassadors in the key countries thus affected, notably Greece, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnam, has seemed to me to be of a very high order. In the case of the interagency task force here in Washington, the problem of definition of responsibility is sometimes more acute. Almost necessarily, such a task force operates on the basis that its conclusions will have to be cleared at the top level in the relevant departments. It may in practice be reporting, in effect, to the Secretary of State or in a few instances it may be reporting to the National Security Council, or the executive committee of the National Security Council, and thus, in effect, to the President. The main thing is to be clear which, so that the task force operates as a final staff operation within the Government. As a rough generalization, I would say that task forces have been effective where they knew flatly to whom they were reporting, and for what decisions, and where to refer again to my second criterion-the chairman of the task force was prepared to assume personal responsibility for the result. This is about as far as I can take the subject as a matter of concept. I am well aware that these criteria are hardly novel, but I doubt very much if one could draw up any additional ones that would not be subject to so many exceptions and variations of circumstance that they would in the end not be helpful. It is of course axiomatic in the above that on any major foreign policy question the State Department is the President's senior adviser. Its representative should chair interagency task forces, just as its ambassador, or rather the President's ambassador, heads the country team. I can assure you that we in the Defense Department, both in the Office of the Secretary and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fully understand and operate under this basic principle. Many questions are, of course, so intermixed with military considerations that it is appropriate for us both to present our views strongly as to the final course to be followed and, on occasion, to indicate to higher authority a difference of view with the State Department or the ambassador. Such differences are provided for under existing procedures and may be resolved between the Secretaries of State and Defense personally, by consultation involving other departments, or in the last analysis by the President himself. But failing such appeal to higher authority, we in this Department accept unquestioningly the principle of the primacy of the Department of State, both here and in the field. Sincerely, WILLIAM P. BUNDY. |