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Similarly, in a country where our Ambassador finds himself dealing with a commander of NATO forces or United Nations forces-his personal relationship with the commander may be a key to accomplishment.

NEXT STEPS

If the Ambassador is to play the supervisory and coordinating role which postwar Presidents have verbally assigned him, the time has arrived to strengthen his hand. The following steps commend themselves:

First: Arrangements could be made which permit an Ambassador, as part of a State Department review at Budget Bureau invitation, to comment on proposed annual and supplemental budget and program requests for activities of all departments and agencies affecting his assigned country. He could be permitted to raise objections regarding the foreign policy implications of the programs, where appropriate. This would bring the Ambassador into one of the key coordinative processes in government, the budget process. Such a possibility is now under study in the Executive Branch. The arrangement would reinforce an Ambassador's authority by increasing the dependence of the various mission elements on him. At the same time, such advance information would help him in his forward planning.

Second: It should become standard practice to consult with an Ambassador prior to the assignment of key representatives of other agencies to his embassy and prior to the designation of a commander of U.S. forces who will be stationed in the country. Such advance consultation is a sensible form of insurance where the quality of the relationship between an Ambassador and an appointee is a critical factor.

Third: President Kennedy's 1961 letter to Chiefs of Mission includes this paragraph:

If in your judgment individual members of the Mission are not functioning effectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Department of State.

To enhance an Ambassador's authority in this connection, Ambassador Merchant made this useful suggestion:

*** when an Ambassador is appointed to his post, and periodically when he is back in Washington, I think that he should go around and talk to the heads of the other departments and agencies who have representatives attached to his embassy, and establish the understanding that the head of that other department or agency will without argument withdraw and replace an individual representative of his department or agency if the Ambassador discreetly and privately communicates to him that he is dissatisfied with his performance or his attitude or his cooperation in the mission. *** then you give effectively to representatives of the other agencies a sense of uncertainty as to whether their sole source of future preferment is the head of their own agency. Fourth: Ways should be found to give an Ambassador more freedom to use the good officers in his own mission where they are most needed. Under present practices, with each department and

agency staffing its own overseas posts, each Washington headquarters tries to put its best people in its most critical spots around the world. As a result, talents are unevenly distributed and any one mission will have a limited number of first-rate officers. It is obviously important that an Ambassador have considerable flexibility to use his best people in the most urgent tasks. In recent years, Washington agencies, like mother hens, cluck too much when an Ambassador dares reassign one of their chicks.

Fifth: Chiefs of Mission should take the lead in jogging Washington to trim excess field staff and consolidate overlapping jobs. In particular, the administrative complement in a mission-often more generous than is needed-should be held down. Understaffing can be the best staffing. If officers have more to do than they can possibly do, they are more likely to do what is important.

Sixth: In some missions economic activities can be further integrated. For example, an embassy's economic section and the AID mission can be placed under the direction of a single officer who is both Minister for Economic Affairs and director of the AID mission. This practice has proved its worth in many posts.

Seventh: Too many military representatives report directly to the Ambassador-a situation which tends to weaken rather than strengthen their position in the mission. Serious thought should be given to a single Defense Attaché designated by the Department of Defensewho could be an officer of the U.S. military service that was also the most important U.S. service in the country or area-with such assistants as needed from the three services.

Eighth: In missions where military problems are important, Foreign Service Officers with relevant experience and other qualifications to assist with politico-military problems are being assigned to the Ambassador, sometimes as special assistants. This appears to be a helpful approach to problems of political-military coordination, and should be encouraged.

Ninth: On many fronts our government is seeking to accomplish its goals through regional programs and international agencies, but it has not yet taken adequate steps to relate the American country mission and program (AID, MAAG, USIA and Cultural Exchange) to multilateral efforts. This is a complicated and emotionally charged area that warrants careful appraisal.

Tenth: If an Ambassador is to meet his responsibilities, he needs swift, secure and survivable communication with Washington and with our Ambassadors at other posts. But the State Department has been tardy in making use of modern communications equipment and personnel. As things stand, an Ambassador may not have immediate access to as rapid, reliable and sophisticated means of communication as other American elements in his country of assignment.

The State Department recently commented:

In the fall of 1962 the full pressure of the Cuban crisis overwhelmed the technical capabilities then available leading to the initiation of basic and sweeping improvement in planning and action. A start has been made; much more remains to be done.

In designing and operating the National Communications System (NCS), Executive Branch officials should ensure that the needs of our Chiefs of Mission in every part of the world are fully met.

VI. The Ambassador in the Nation's Service

As the personal representative of the President of the United States *** you are part of a memorable tradition which began with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and which has included many of our most distinguished citizens.

President John F. Kennedy, Letter to American Ambassadors,
May 29, 1961

There is, of course, no ideal Chief of Mission. In the modern circumstances, there is heavy emphasis on the Ambassador as Executive. Strong executive leadership is important. But perhaps the most valuable attributes an Ambassador can possess are the capacity to understand the forces building up in a society and the skill to influence events in some degree in accordance with our national policy.

Today, the caliber of our Chiefs of Mission is high. The American people should be thankful for the ability and dedication of those who now head our missions abroad. But there is still room for improvement in matching persons and posts, and in keeping a competent Ambassador on the job long enough for him to become fully effectiveand longer.

CAREER AND NONCAREER AMBASSADORS

In appointing an Ambassador, there is no good alternative to reliance upon the Secretary of State-working with the Director General of the Foreign Service and other top Department officersto give the President a short slate of candidates for his consideration and choice of a nominee for proposal to the Senate for "advice and consent."

Time was when an ambassadorial post was a normal means of rewarding men for their services or contributions to a political party. It has almost passed. Today two out of three Ambassadors have risen through the ranks of the career service, and a substantial proportion of the rest qualify as professionals by virtue of long diplomatic service or experience in closely related fields.

The old argument about the merits of career versus noncareer appointments is getting a hollow ring. At present and in future most American Ambassadors will come from the career Foreign Service, although there will continue to be room for noncareer Ambassadors with special qualifications. There is no justification for the appointment of noncareer men and women who lack such qualifications, for there are no "safe" posts left in today's world.

In this matter, the occasional exception will prove the rule, and the rule is to choose an individual of unquestioned competence for the particular post.

All Embassy posts should be open to the ambition of a professional officer. In this connection Ambassador Bruce commented:

*** to have it known that the American Government does not make it possible for a career officer, unless he has outside resources, to be Ambassador to Great Britain, I think, is almost a national shame.

Funds should be provided and allocated for maintenance allowances, entertainment, salary, etc. so that no Ambassador need draw on private means to meet the legitimate financial burdens of his post. Again, Congress take note.

If career appointees are to constitute a substantial proportion of our Chiefs of Mission, the Foreign Service must produce more senior officers of great ability. One important approach is to give promising officers throughout their career roughly a 50-50 division of service between Washington and the field, thus exposing them regularly to the wider perspectives of American government at home. Other useful steps include: the recent emphasis on more rapid promotion of outstanding younger officers; giving potential Chiefs of Mission consular posts and managerial jobs in operating agencies like AID and USIA-to test their mettle as executives; and reserving the post of deputy chief of mission to potential candidates for ambassadorial assignment. Ambassador Samuel D. Berger made this point to the Subcommittee:

The deputy position is the final testing and training ground for Ambassadors, and this assignment should be reserved for officers whose record clearly indicates that they are promising material for ambassadorships. The deputy chief of mission position should not be filled by any officer who is clearly not promising in this respect, nor should it be offered as a reward to an officer for long service, when it is clear that he cannot make the grade to Ambassador.

TOURS OF DUTY

Experience is a priceless asset, yet it is constantly thrown away by the government's traditional here-today-gone-tomorrow attitude toward Ambassadors.

We do not yet make good use of retired Ambassadors who possess particular competence in problems and areas of emerging importance. The government has only begun to tap this special reservoir of skills and experience.

The talents of our active Ambassadors are wasted by unduly abbreviated tours. The average tour of duty of Chiefs of Mission is now about 2 years and 10 months-but the shakedown period eats. up about a year. In Ambassador Merchant's words:

One usually has to be at a post at least a year before one has gotten one's bearings, and established one's relationships, and sensed the important people that you want to cultivate and develop, and established your own rating system for the validity of the information and the soundness of the judgments that you extract, and learned the country and its problems.

Testimony to the Subcommittee was unanimous that the average ambassadorial term abroad should be longer-except in hardship posts. Ambassador Briggs said this:

No single move in the field of foreign affairs would pay greater dividends than leaving American envoys at their posts for sufficient time to capitalize on their knowledge and their experience.

Ideally, 4-year tours for Ambassadors would seem desirable, but the President and Secretary of State need to decide in each individual case when an Ambassador's service in a country passes the point of full effectiveness.

In the case of other officers working abroad, the turnover has tended to be too rapid. There is much to be said for 3 to 4 year terms for deputy chiefs of mission so arranged as to overlap with a new Ambassador for a year or so when this seems helpful-for it is highly important to have at least one experienced man in one of these two top jobs. In general, knowledgeable Foreign Service Officers who have special training in a particular area should not be yanked out short of a 3 to 4 year stay. In some posts, our performance has been strengthened by returning an able officer for a second tour of duty at a senior level.

Also, a really long-time officer can be useful. As Ambassador Berger expressed it:

In many countries it is desirable to keep a superior intermediate officer for longer than 4 years, so that he can develop language facility, wide contacts, and an encyclopedic knowledge of the country that can be tapped by his colleagues. One such long-time officer, with another being readied to take his place when he is transferred, can be invaluable in order to provide continuity in an embassy.

A further point: The government should move fast to fill an ambassadorship that becomes vacant. And, above all, the departure of an incumbent should not be announced until the last possible moment, and should be accompanied by the designation of his successor. An Ambassador loses influence from the moment it becomes known that he is leaving-and the longer the gap between then and the arrival of his successor, the more we invite trouble in a world where trouble always seems to be waiting on the doorstep.

A GREAT TRADITION

The American Foreign Service has a long and proud tradition dating from the diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin for the 13 colonies and continued to the present. Members of the Service have made distinguished contributions to the conduct of our foreign relations despite long periods when the nation was little aware of their existence and paid little heed to their sound advice. As recently as the 30's the nation would have greatly benefited had it listened to the warnings of some of its soldiers and diplomats, and the world might even have been spared what Winston Churchill has called "The Unnecessary War." More recently, our diplomats gave notice of the hardening of Soviet policy, long before Stalin launched the Cold War.

At any period the Foreign Service inevitably reflects in some degree the points of view and prejudices characteristic of the times. There are always some members of the Service who cannot keep up with the continuous succession of new problems and new requirements. But our Foreign Service has come a long way in recent years and it has first-rate officers who can hold their own in any company and in any country in the world.

In the swift moving currents of the 60's the nation needs as much as it ever has, the cool, professional advice and skill of those Americans who are devoting their lives to the study and practice of diplomacy.

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