situation creates hazards for a Secretary of State, who is trying to take the most general view of the national interest. Then, too, a Secretary of State's duties put him in a world of knowledge different from the world the Congress inhabits. Members of Congress know a lot about what is happening abroad, but they know it differently from the Secretary and the State Department, at a different time, and they see it first from their own perspective. In addition, a Secretary of State is the bearer of bad tidings to Congress. He interprets complaints of foreign governments to its committees, and he often presses the case of a foreign government because he thinks it has a case and that Congress has in fact acted unwisely. A Secretary and his Department, thus, come to Capitol Hill as a kind of counsel for "the vast external realm" beyond our borders. There they confront members of Congress who are, in effect, counsels for the "folks back home" with the duty to represent them and to take care of their interests. The differences of concern and perspective separating Congress and the State Department lie at the root of many past difficulties. They will remain a source of trouble. Fortunately, most members of Congress agree with Edmund Burke's counsel to his Bristol constituents: "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment"; furthermore, there are a great many Senators and Representatives with long experience and good sense in national security matters; and, traditionally, Congress has handled vital defense and foreign policy issues in terms of our national interests. Fortunately, also, some officials in State-though too few--understand not only foreign policy, but Congress. Other things can be done. For example, the State Department can do more to inform members of Congress in advance of a crisis condition. There is always a tendency in the Executive Branch to let matters slide until trouble occurs. It is then too late, more often than not, to build the understanding needed in support of a line of policy. In a crisis the appeal is for unity, and the appeal is almost always answered, but the consequences may be undesirable in terms of long-run cooperation, for Congress should not be put under the gun as a normal routine of Executive-Legislative relationships. Better use can be made of informal meetings for full, frank, and frequent exchanges. Some Secretaries and Under Secretaries of State in the recent past have been skillful and effective in building an understanding of national security policies through informal consultations with key members of Congress, especially in connection with matters too delicate for public discussion. Legislative liaison staffs cannot do this job. Better opportunities should be created for Congress to see national security issues "in the round." As things now stand, defense and foreign policies are cut into jigsaw-puzzle pieces which are never put together. Except in the general terms of the State of the Union message and the Budget, national security information and program requests are presented to Congress in fragments. Congressional procedures compound the problem. The authorization process separates things that are, or should be, indivisible. At least five major Senate committees handle pieces of national security policy. If the domestic economic implications of national security are taken into account, as they should be, at least seven major Senate committees are involved. A similar situation exists in the House. To help meet this situation, Congress might create suitable occasions for the Secretaries of State and Defense and other high officials to make over-all presentations of national security policies and programs, and to respond to questions. One good time for such a joint appearance would be early in each session. An effort should be made to avoid imposing on Cabinet officials repeated presentations of the same material. Other useful steps could be taken to meet the problem of fragmentation. Main committees can undertake to obtain more comprehensive testimony on policies and programs before they are divided up among subcommittees for detailed analysis. Closer working relationships between revenue and expenditure committees can be encouraged. In some cases, committees may need additional competent help from staff and consultants. For But procedural improvements cannot solve the basic problem of Executive-Legislative relationships in national security affairs. genuine differences of perspective stem from differences of responsibility. It is incumbent on members of Congress to recognize that these differences do exist and that both perspectives are legitimate. One cannot and should not ask Congressmen to ignore their own responsibilities, but one can ask that in this twentieth year since the onset of the cold war, members of Congress take pains to see the Secretary of State's situation, his dilemmas and his legitimate concerns and to respect his perspective, even though often it will and must differ from theirs. And vice versa. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JACK MILLER, Iowa DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director LAUREL A. ENGBERG, Minority Consultant |