ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S LETTER CONTAINING WASHINGTON'S REFUSAL TO SUBMIT THE PAPERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE JAY TREATY TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. DEBATE ON THE TREATY. * But he considered it his duty to act otherwise, and on March 30 sent a message to the House in which he positively refused to accede to the demands for the executive papers. This message was received with very ill grace by the opposition,† and, on being referred to the Committee of the Whole, was very freely and sharply criticised. On April 7 by a vote of 57 to 35, two resolutions were adopted: first, that the President and Senate had the exclusive power to make treaties, and that the House did not claim many agency in making or ratifying them; and second, that when a treaty had been made, it must depend for the execution of its various articles upon a law or laws to be passed by Congress, the House having the right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carry ing treaties into effect.‡ On April 14 the subject of the British treaty was again taken under consideration. The friends of the Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., pp. 194–196; Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, pp. 760-761; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 550-551; Sparks, Life of Washington, pp. 469-470; Lodge, George Washington, vol. ii., pp. 204-206; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. v., pp. 267–268. See the opinion of the various members of Washington's first Cabinet regarding this power, in Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. i., pp. 189-190. Madison said that the absolute refusal was as unexpected as the tone and tenor of the message are improper and indelicate."- Letter to Jefferson, April 4, 1796, Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., pp. 89-90. See also pp. 96–97. Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, pp. 770-783; Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. i., pp. 696-702; Stevens, Albert Gallatin, p. 119; Hunt, Life of Madison, p. 233. 277 treaty urged that the question be decided immediately, for it was said that every member had already made up his mind and that dispatch was necessary inasmuch as the posts were to be delivered by Great Britain on June 1, which transfer required previous arrangements on the part of the United States. They appeared to believe that the majority would hardly dare to accept the reponsibility of breaking the treaty without previously ascertaining that the great body of the people were willing to take the consequences of such action. But the opponents of the treaty, though confident of their power to reject, the resolution, called for its discussion. The minority soon desisted from urging an immediate decision of the question, and the discussion of the treaty was entered into with equal thoroughness by both parties.* Among those freely discussing the merits and demerits of the treaty and opposing its execution were Madison, Gallatin, Giles, Nicholas, and Preston, while Fisher Ames, Dwight, Foster, Harper, Lyman, Dayton, and others set forth their weightiest arguments in its favor. *As Madison said: "The progress of this business throughout has been the most worrying and vexatious that I ever encountered; and the more so, as the causes lay in the unsteadiness, the follies, the perverseness, and the defections among our friends, more than in the strength, or dexterity, or malice of our opponents."- Letter to Jefferson, May 1, 1796, Madison's Works (Congress ed.) vol. ii., pp. 99–100. See also Gay, Life of Madison, p. 227. Stevens, Albert Gallatin, p. 121 et seq. 278 DEBATE ON THE TREATY. The chief objections were that the treaty lacked reciprocity; that claims for compensation for negroes carried away and for the detention of the western posts were abandoned; that it was wholly in the interests of Great Britain; that it interfered with the legislative powers of Congress, especially by prohibiting the sequestration of debts; that the United States would receive few commercial advantages, etc. Some of the Republicans did not advocate an unconditional refusal to carry the treaty into effect. In defining his position, Gallatin said: "The further detention of the posts, the national stain that would result from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, were the three evils which struck him as resulting from a rejection of the treaty; and when to these considerations he added that of the present situation of the country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of the advantages that would arise from union of sentiments; however injurious and unequal he conceived the treaty to be, however repugnant it might be to his feelings, and perhaps, to his prejudices, he felt induced to vote for it, and would not give his assent to any proposition which would imply its rejection." He thought that, considering England's conduct since the negotiation of the treaty, it would be advisable to postpone the enactment of laws carrying the treaty into effect until England should manifest a more friendly spirit toward us. Madison arraigned the treaty in three leading particulars: First, want of reciproc *Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, p. 1196. ity with reference to the treaty of 1783, since the principal and interest of the British debts were to be paid, while Great Britain did not compensate the United States for carrying off the negroes or detaining the posts, but even hampered the surrender of the posts by keeping her Indian influence on the continent still open; secondly, lack of reciprocity in the neutral and international rules, since we yielded on the sequestration of debts and the principle that free ships make free goods - a principle so desirable to neutral commerce and which all our other treaties have recognized, while the clauses concerning contraband were even still more disadvantageous; and thirdly, the lack of commercial reciprocity, for, while the Mississippi and Indian trade was to be open to Great Britain, she surrendered no such privileges in the West Indies, and even our rights in the East India trade were doubtful.* Others spoke of the injustice done France and of the possibility of an immense award of the British debt, while, on the other hand, American spoliations might fail altogether. The advocates of the treaty, on the other hand, contended that, though doubtless not perfectly satisfactory in all respects, the best interests of the country demanded that the treaty be carried into effect. They said that many disputes of long standing, which it was important that the United *Speech of April 15, Annals, pp. 975-987. See also Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 326-327. DEBATE ON THE TREATY. States should bring to a close, were settled by the treaty; that provision was made for settling other disputes of more recent date in which the commercial interests of the country had much at stake; that the rights of France were not abrogated; that the question of contraband, though not settled, was left as before the treaty, etc. Goodhue, from the Salem district, assured the House that the clause relating to the East India trade positively benefited the mercantile community.* Members from the frontier districts of New York asserted, upon their own knowledge, that the Indian traffic, after the actual surrender of the Western posts, would fall principally into American hands. Hillhouse scouted the idea that the American government should reject advantages from one nation for the sake of pleasing another. The advocates of the treaty asserted also that the sequestration of private debts was contrary to every principle of morality and good faith and ought never to take place; that, should the United States reject the treaty, the only alternative was-war. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the principal cause of the Federalist opposition to every measure that might lead to war with Great Britain, was the fear that such a war would not only throw their country into the arms of France, but that it *Annals, pp. 1053-1059. Ibid, pp. 1077-1094; Benton, Abridgment, vol. i., pp. 721-726; Schouler, p. 327. VOL. IV 19 279 would also place in power in the United States the same anarchical elements that had deluged France with blood. Marshall says: "That war with Britain, during the continuance of the passionate and almost idolatrous devotion of a great majority of the people to the French republic, would throw America so completely into the arms of France as to leave her no longer mistress of her own conduct, was not the only fear which the temper of the day sug gested. That the spirit which triumphed in that nation, and deluged it with the blood of its revolutionary champions, might cross the Atlantic, and desolate the hitherto safe and peaceful dwellings of the American people, was an apprehension not so entirely unsupported by appear. ances as to be pronounced chimerical. With a blind apprehension which treated reason as a criminal, immense numbers applauded a furious despotism, trampling on every right, and sporting with life as the essence of liberty; and the few who conceived freedom to be a plant which did not flourish the better for being nourished with human blood, and who ventured to disapprove the ravages of the guillotine, were execrated as tools of the coalesced despots, and as persons who, to weaken the affection of America for France, became the calumniators of that republic. Already had an imitative spirit, captivated with the splendor, but copying the errors of a great nation, reared up in every part of the Continent self-created corresponding societies, who, claiming to be the people, assumed a control over the people and were loosening its bands." A bare abstract of the debates in Congress can give no idea of the force and eloquence of the speeches delivered on this occasion. Madison and Gallatin were the principal speakers on one side, and ably advocated the Republican views;* but on April 28, just as the debate was closing, Fisher Ames delivered what was undoubtedly the most eloquent of all the speeches. *Stevens, Albert Gallatin, p. 125. |