CONDITION OF THE FINANCES. rence of nine States to any act appropriating money, had been adopted; and nine States had never been in favor of the measure." It was also well known that the majority of the members of Congress opposed this method of compensating the army officers, and it was but natural that inquietude among the officers should increase as the time for disbanding the army approached.* Meanwhile Congress had been laboring with the finances. It was estimated that $8,000,000 would be required during 1783, beside $1,200,000 to pay the interest on the domestic debt. A call for the latter amount had already been put in, the quota of each State, in the first place, to be applied to the payment of public creditors resident in it, while the Federal Treasury was only to receive the balance. When Congress met in November, 1782, with Elias Boudinot of New Jersey as President, the Pennsylvania Assembly complained of the neglect of Congress in liquidating and providing for the domestic debt, and intimated that the Assembly would apply the receipts from the Federal taxes just levied in that State toward paying the Federal creditors therein resident. Congress thereupon appointed commissioners for each State to audit, settle, and reduce to specie value, in accordance with the official scale of depreciation, all outstanding * Marshall, Life of Washington, vol. iv., p. 580. 289 claims in the old paper currency for supplies furnished, services rendered or money advances made to the government or expended on Federal account. Commissioners were also appointed to settle the accounts of the old treasury, war and marine boards, of the various army departments, and of the agents, commercial correspondents and other commissioners in Europe. Pennsylvania, therefore, in view of the willingness of Congress to settle its accounts, decided to withhold the threatened action. In the meantime the majority of the States had reluctantly assented to the proposed import duty of 5 per cent.* Georgia had just been restored to the Union and had not yet considered the subject. Rhode Island, however, refused to give her assent to the measure, stating that the tax was unequal, that it would bear hardest on commercial States and particularly Rhode Island, and that it was dangerous to trust its collection to Federal officers not known nor even accountable to the State governments.† Hamilton prepared an answer to these objections, and a com * See Dallas, Laws of Pennsylvania, vol. i., p. 890; Wilson, Acts of New Jersey, p. 191; Journal of the [Va.] House of Delegates, May 30, 1781; Hening's Statutes-at-Large, vol. x., p. 459; Journals of Congress, vol. iii., pp. 594, 600, 674; Oberholtzer, Life of Robert Morris, pp. 184–187. Rhode Island Records, vol. ix., pp. 487, 612, 682-684; Bates, Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union, pp. 72-82; Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, p. 400. Journals of Congress, vol. iv., p. 200; Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 39. 290 MORRIS' DIFFICULTIES; ARMY'S MEMORIAL TO CONGRESS. mittee was appointed to proceed to Rhode Island for the purpose of strengthening the arguments contained in Hamilton's answer; but before they had started, word was received that the Virginia Assembly had repealed its act assenting to the proposed duty, also declaring that the State was unable to pay more than a small part of the Federal requisitions made upon her.* The Rhode Island delegation therefore returned, and two days later was discharged from its mission.† By January, 1783, the Treasury had received only $420,000 of the $8,000,000 required by Congress from the States. Morris had $400,000 of outstanding Treasury notes to meet shortly, and as the French and Holland loans had been exhausted he had been forced to overdraw on the American bankers abroad to the extent of 3,500,000 livres or about $600,000. The only resources on which Morris could rely to meet these drafts were the produce of a Dutch loan lately Journal of the House of Delegates, pp. 55-58; Hening's Statutes, vol. x., pp. 459, 451, vol. xi., p. 171; also Oberholtzer, Life of Morris, p. 192; Hunt, Life of Madison, p. 36 et seq. Bates, Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union, p. 82. "Imagine," said Morris, "the situation of a man who is to direct the finances of a country almost without revenue (for such you will perceive this to be) surrounded by creditors whose distresses, while they increase their clamors, render it more difficult to appease them; an army ready to disband or mutiny; a government whose sole authority consists in the power of framing recommendations."- Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iv., p. 203. opened by Adams, and the friendship of France,* which had resulted in the loan already mentioned of $1,100,000, though Morris did not as yet know of this. Before making further drafts, Morris asked the sanction of Congress, which on January 10, 1783, was given, and he was therefore able, by the sale of additional drafts, to send a month's pay to the army. During the interval, however, because the army accounts had remained unliquidated, there was great discontent in the army. It had been sufficiently difficult to provide for the bare subsistence of the army without paying for services rendered, and Morris had been compelled, because of the lack of money, and in order to secure three months' credit, to make an advance of 30 per cent. on his contract for army supplies.‡ Many of the army officers, being destitute of private means, had become deeply in debt and were thus reduced to great distress. Soon after going into winter quarters, the army officers sent a memorial to Congress on the subject of their accounts, General McDougall and Colonels Aaron Ogden and John Brooks being deputized to present the memorial. This occurred in December, 1782. The "Address and Petition" was well calculated to McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 57. Sumner, Robert Morris, p. 88 et seq.; Secret Journals of Congress, vol. i., p. 253. ‡ Oberholtzer, Life of Robert Morris, p. 118. TARDINESS OF CONGRESS; HAMILTON'S ATTITUDE. secure definite action on the part of Congress.* It strongly urged the commutation of the half-pay stipulated in the resolution of October, 1780,† not only because it was right and just, but also because the troops were suffering from extreme hardship through poverty. The Address concluded as follows: "It would be criminal in the officers to conceal the general dissatisfaction which prevails, and is gaining ground in the army, from the pressure of evils and injuries, which, in the course of seven long years, have made their condition, in many instances, wretched. They therefore entreat, that Congress, to convince the army and the world, that the independence of America shall not be placed on the ruin of any particular class of her citizens, will point out a mode of immediate redress." Congress was plainly told that further experiment on the patience of the soldiers would be perilous in the extreme.‡ Undoubtedly some of the members of Congress were disposed to do full justice to the officers, and they felt deeply regarding the treatment accorded them; a large number of the members wished to act in a truly national spirit and manner, and faithfully to discharge all the obligations * See Bancroft, vol. vi., pp. 59-60; Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 168. Journal of Congress, October 21, 1780, vol. vi., p. 336. See also Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 108 et seq. Journal of Congress, April 29, 1783, vol. viii., Pp. 225-228. 291 of the confederacy. But the majority felt otherwise on the subject. They were jealous of State rights and State sovereignty, and opposed the liquidation of debts due the soldiers from the Continental treasury, urging instead that unsettled accounts be transferred to the States for payment.* A resolve was passed recognizing the claims of the public creditors, though no method of making payments of the same was suggested. Throughout the winter, Congress acted in a very unsatisfactory manner, and as late as March, 1783, nothing had been done to adjust the matter.† The army officers were highly indignant at the course pursued by Congress and called for more energetic measures. Hamilton believed that Washington was daily growing more unpopular because he disliked unlawful measures, and that leading characters were doing everything possible to undermine his influence. Hamilton and others were not altogether sorry to see the army restless, because they thought that thus Congress and the States would be brought to their senses. Hamilton wrote patronizingly to Washington that the "claims of the army, urged with moderation, but with firmness, may operate with those weak minds. See note in Curtis, History of the Constitution, vol. i., pp. 194–199. † See Bancroft, vol. vi., pp. 61-69. Hamilton's ed. of Hamilton's Works, vol. i., pp. 346-348. 292 MORRIS SUGGESTS REVOLT; THE NEWBURG ADDRESSES. which are influenced by their apprehensions more than by their judgments, so as to produce a concurrence in the measures which the exigencies of affairs demand." He also hoped that Washington's influence would keep "a complaining and suffering army within the bounds of moderation."* Gouverneur Morris took a more dangerous tone, for he almost hoped the army would revolt. Writing to Jay he said: "The army have swords in their hands. You know enough of the history of mankind to know much more than I have said, and possibly much more than they themselves yet think of. I will add, however, that I am glad to see things in their present train. Depend on it, good will arise from the situation to which we are hastening,* *** although I think it probable that much of convulsion will ensue, yet it must terminate in giving government that power without which government is but a name."+ Evidently the idea of Hamilton and Morris was to have the army threaten in such a way that Congress would take the steps necessary to form a more perfect union and at the same time satisfy the soldiers by paying them. Meanwhile, however, the situation at Newburg was daily becoming more serious. On March 10, 1783, a notice of a meeting was circulated in the camp, not only fixing the time but also setting forth the object. On the Ibid, p. 328. * Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, vol. i., p. 249. same day an anonymous "Address" When the officers convened on the These addresses were written by Major, afterwards General John Armstrong (the younger) aide-de-camp to General Gates. The first and principal one will be found in Appendix II. at the end of the present chapter. See also Thacher, Military Journal, p. 321 et seq.; Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 172; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iv., p. 436 et seq.; Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writ ings, vol. viii., pp. 555-558; Hatch, Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, pp. 161, 197-199; Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, vol. i., p. 253. WASHINGTON'S ADDRESS TO THE ARMY OFFICERS. 66 15th, General Gates was placed in a chair, and Washington then arose to speak to them. 'My eyes," he said, "have grown dim in my country's service, but I never doubted of its justice." He then read the address which he had prepared,* and gave them much wise and earnest advice, saying that they should not tarnish the good name earned in so many hard fought battles by rash and hasty action. Pledging himself to use his utmost endeavors in their behalf, he urged that they rely upon the faith of the United States, which, he said, would undoubtedly be sacredly preserved. When he had finished his address, tears were in many eyes and he was allowed to depart in silence. No word of opposition to his paternal counsel was spoken, and resolves were adopted in accordance with the spirit manifested in his * See Appendix II., at the end of the present chapter. See also Thacher, Military Journal, pp. 325-329; Journals of Congress, vol. viii., pp. 180– 183; Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 361 et seq.; Irving, vol. iv., p. 440 et seq. Lodge, George Washington, vol. i., p. 327. See also Fiske, Critical Period of American History, pp. 109–112. "It was happy for the army and country, that when his Excellency had finished and withdrawn, no one rose and observed: "That General Washington was about to quit the military line laden with honor, and that he had a considerable estate to support him with dignity, but that their case was very different.' Had such ideas been thrown out, and properly enlarged upon, the meeting would probably have concluded very dif ferently." Gordon, History of the American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 361. || Bancroft, vol. vi., pp. 70-74; Quincy, Memoir of Major Shaw, p. 104; Lossing, Life of Schuyler, vol. ii., p. 427, note. 293 address. It was declared that the army still had unshaken confidence in the justice of Continental Congress and the country at large, and " viewed. with abhorrence, and rejected with disdain, the infamous proposition contained in the late anonymous address to the officers of the army.' Mr. Curtis says: "Even at this distant day the peril of that crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the commander-inchief been other than Washington, had the leading officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood of a civil war. But men who had suffered what the great officers of the Revolution had suffered, had learned the lesson of self-control which suffering teaches. The hard school of adversity in which they had passed so many years made them sensible to an appeal, which only such a chief as Washington could make."+ On March 18, 1783, in accordance with his promise, Washington wrote an energetic letter to Congress in which he says: "The result of the proceedings of the grand convention of the officers, which I have the honor of enclosing to your |