MAY 9, 1832.] Case of Samuel Houston. [H. OF R. In pursuit of his argument, in denying the power of the It cannot be doubted that challenging a person to fight a House to act without a statute of Congress, my colleague duel is an offence, or that bribery, or an attempt to com must have been at war with what before must have been mit bribery, is also an indictable offence; and if the power his deliberate habit of thinking. Being displeased with of this House extends to the punishment of such offences, something that appeared in one of the journals of this I presume that power must rest on the same foundation city, he submitted a resolution to prohibit the publication with that now asserted here-that it is a violation of the of our proceedings during the present trial, and, being rights of the constituent body, either to intimidate a mempressed as to the means of punishing any infraction of the ber, to prevent him from acting freely, or to corrupt him, so rule proposed, I understood him to say that any disobedi- as to prevent him from acting fairly, or to maim or kill him, ence of the rule would be a contempt, and, of course, so that he cannot act at all. Such, Mr. Speaker, are the liable to be punished by summary proceedings, that is, by precedents at home, so far as this House is involved. The arrest and imprisonment. In that opinion I agree with power in question has been exercised here for an attempt him; but how does he agree with himself? In the case to commit bribery; in New York for challenging a memunder consideration, the accused has assaulted a member ber. If in such cases the power has been sustained, who for that which, by the constitution, he shall be held ac- can question its existence where the member has been countable nowhere except in this House. He is accused actually assaulted and rendered incapable of performing of violating the freedom of debate expressly guarantied his duty honestly or corruptly, or performing it at all? by the constitution. In the case supposed, the violation But, Mr. Speaker, there is a race of politicians, so wise would be of that which is enacted by a rule of this House in their own conceit, so self-sufficient, that they refuse to only. The House will have perceived that I carry this be instructed by the opinions, or enlightened by the expower no further than to violations of its privileges by perience, of the whole world before them--on whom the acts in themselves unlawful, and always punishable. And lights of history are shed in vain; a tribe of restless men, does any one think that a rule of this House can create a who cannot be satisfied with the constructions of the race crime, and make it punishable, of its own authority? of statesmen who made and first administered the GoBut the doctrine contended for is plainly this: that vernment of this country; to whom it passes for nothing while, for the violation of that which is enacted by rule of if every Congress before the present exercised a given this House, we have power to arrest and imprison, yet, power, or sustained a particular principle of construction. until a statute of Congress shall pass, you may walk Yet these same politicians are so vain as to imagine that through this District, treading in the blood of our mem- they, in the short life of their power, can decide for all bers, and this House is powerless, either to punish or posterity. Thus it is, that, while now they are scattering prevent the enormity. Of so much less force is the pro-to the winds all precedents set before them in times anvision of the constitution than a mere rule of the House cient or modern, they call upon us to be cautious of our of Representatives. To the arithmetic which thus appor-doings, because we are now called on to decide the most tions the magnitude of the offence to the power of enact-important principle ever yet decided under this Governing and the power to punish, I am a stranger; as I am to ment, and to decide it, too, for all posterity; forgetting all that reasoning that renders us powerless to repress the that, if their posterity shall bear any resemblance to themgreater evil, yet all-powerful to punish the lesser. I will selves, they will feel as little respect for their opinions take occasion to say here that a power to punish by imprisonment implies the power to arrest the person of the offender in the first instance, in order to subject him to that punishment in case of conviction; and that the exercise of the power to arrest implies the power to imprison. Every arrest, made by authority of a tribunal, is an act by which that tribunal asserts a power to imprison. and principles, as they themselves possess for those of all the world besides, past, present, or to come. This race of restless statesmen have appeared in every country, and only appeared in each to disturb its repose. They pass off the political stage and of life, soon to be forgotten, leaving the state of society and Government more unsettled than they found it, with no monuments but such as bear testimony to their ceaseless strifes. If there be among us politicians of the kind I have described, I will even yet venture to quote them one precedent from the journals of the Virginia House of Delegates, of May session, in the year 1784. It is the case of a proceeding for contempt against John Warden, of Hanover county. The first entry will be found in page 46. It is in these words: "Information being given to the House, by a member in his place, that John Warden, of the county of Hanover, hath been guilty of a high contempt and breach of the privileges of this House, in uttering certain expressions derogatory to the honor and justice of the same, A gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. MITCHELL] declared, the other day, that he had looked to the precedents in cases of breach of privileges, and found the uniform practice had been to summon the party first, or, as my colleague contended, serve him with a rule nisi. To this a gentleman from New York replied that he, too, had examined the precedents, and found that, since the sixteenth century, an arrest was the first process, and that he believed not an instance to the contrary could be. found. The gentleman from South Carolina produced no case; he contented himself with a declaration of the fact. The gentleman from New York instanced the cases of the Earl of Shaftesbury and of Sir Alexander Murray. These took place in the latter part of the seventeenth century, "Ordered, That the subject-matter of the same be renot many years before the great revolution of 1688, and ferred to the Committee on Privileges and Election; that at a time when the public mind in England was nearly they do examine the matter thereof, and report the same, ripe for that revolution; one of the first glorious fruits of with their opinion thereupon, to the House. which was an independent judiciary. The latter gentle- "Ordered, That the Sergeant-at-Arms attending this man also mentioned the cases of Randall and Whitney, of House take into his custody the body of the said John Jarvis, and of John Anderson, in this House, and of a Warden, and Mr. Speaker is desired to issue his warrant person in New York, for challenging De Witt Clinton, a accordingly." Senator, for words spoken in debate. In all these cases, Here, the House will observe, there is no oath, nor an arrest by the Sergeant, by authority of the Speaker's even written statement of the words spoken. The memwarrant, was the first process. There was no rule nisi ber who, tradition has informed me, was the celebrated in these cases, nor do I presume there ever has been in Patrick Henry, merely stated in his place that words had any case whatever. been spoken derogatory to the honor and justice of the House. There was no division, no yeas and nays called; nor was the fact charged a violation of the person of a member for words spoken, nor his legal arrest, nor any All the precedents referred to in Congress, as well as that in New York, were cases in which the act charged was an offence at common law, and indictable somewhere. MAY 9, 1832.] Case of Samuel Houston. [H. OF R. thing within the legal operation of the act I have men- and Henry, if, in your opinion, they favor you-I rely on tioned, nor of any written law whatever. The proceed- their practice. The time of the proceeding against Waring was simply founded on a supposed inherent right in den was propitious to a fair and deliberate consideration the body to protect itself against calumny. Nor were the of the question of power--in 1784, just after the acknowforms of proceeding, or punishment to be inflicted, found-ledgment of our independence-just after a glorious, suced on any written law. There was no such law then, nor cessful struggle against prerogatives and privilegesis there now. For beating a member, or for killing him, when our liberty was young and uncorrupted-while we for words spoken, the Senate and House of Delegates of were yet poor, but honest and frank, and before party Virginia would, to this day, have to proceed according to passions had placed themselves in the judgment seat. their own discretion. I had this precedent in view, when, Mr. Speaker, I hold in my hand a fragment, torn from the other day, I answered the gentleman from South Ca- the Washington Globe, inserted no doubt for the purpose rolina that, in voting for the arrest in this case, I ground- of affording, as every good citizen should do, all the ed myself on the written statement of the member from lights in its power to guide our feet in the dark path of Ohio, and not on his affidavit, the production of which I our duty. It reads thus: then regretted, and yet do. John Warden was a Scotch gentleman, of extensive literary acquirements, much esteemed, and whose society was sought in all polished circles. He was, too, a very profound jurist, yet, like many of his countrymen, he was loyal to his sovereign. He took no part, however, in the revolution on either side, and was subject to no censure. The Assembly was passing an act, or had passed it, which operated to prevent the recovery of British debts. His Scotch temper was excited, and, in a moment of loyal excitement, he exclaimed, that if the House had passed such an act, some of them had refused to pay for the coats on their backs! He apologized to the committee in the following words: "I do acknowledge that, on a mistaken opinion that the House of Delegates had voted against the payment of British debts, agreeably to the treaty of peace between America and Great Britain, I said that, if it had done so, some of them had voted against paying for the coats on their backs. A committee of the House judging this expression derogatory to the honor and justice of the House, I am sorry for the offence I have given, and assure the committee that it never was my intention to affront the dignity of the House, or insult any member of it." "Parliamentary privilege.-Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, in England, in the case of Lord Abingdon, who took occasion to print a speech made in Parliament, in which he charged Mr. Sermon, an attorney, with gross fraud, laid down the following law: That the privilege of Parliament, in the case, extended to words spoken in the House of Lords, and confined to its walls.' He also laid down the following posi tion: That a member of Parliament had certainly a right to publish his speech, but that speech should not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual; if it was, it was a libel.'"-[1 Espinasse's Rep. 227.] In the constitution of the United States, the provision of parliamentary privileges in debate is as follows: "For any speech or debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any other place." The commentary by Mr. Jefferson is, "But this is restrained to things done in the House, in a parliamentary course. For he is not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium to exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty." In the case of Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass. Reports, page 1, Chief Justice Parsons, of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, lays down the following positions on this subject: This apology, though really a deep sarcasm, was deem- "When a representative is not acting as a member of ed sufficient, and Mr. Warden was discharged. But if the House, he is not entitled to any privileges above his he had refused to apologize, and been guilty of contuma- fellow-citizens; nor are the rights of the people affected if cious behavior, the House must have committed him, he is placed on the same ground on which his constituents and, as I have already shown, their arrest affirmed their stand. power to do so, notwithstanding no breach of the peace had happened, nor any thing in the presence of the House, or elsewhere, to disturb, interrupt, or disquiet their proceedings. These proceedings were founded on no written law. They were maintained as pertaining of right to the body, and maintained without a division. In the front of this journal will be found the names of members composing the standing committees. Among them will be found those of Patrick Henry, Richard H. Lee, John Marshall, now Chief Justice, James Madison, late President, John Taylor, of Caroline, late a Senator in Congress, John Nicholas, who afterwards settled and became distinguished in New York, with many others whose memories we fondly cherish. Mr. Madison was one of that very Committee on Privileges and Elections who considered verbal scandal a contempt and breach of privilege, and concurred in the arrest and proceedings. "But, to consider every malicious slander uttered by a citizen, who is a representative, as within his privilege, because it was uttered within the walls of the Representatives' chamber to another member, but not uttered in executing his official duty, would be to extend the privilege further than was intended by the people, or than is consistent with sound policy, and would render the Representatives' chamber a sanctuary for calumny--an effect which never has been, and I confidently trust never will be, en. dured by any House of Representatives of Massachusetts. "A struggle for privileges, in this State, would be a contest against the people, to wrest from them what they have not chosen to grant. And it may be asserted that the grant of privileges is a restraint upon rights of private citizens which cannot be in the least restrained, but by some constitutional law." There is no doubt that the quotations are right, and How vain is the attempt to torture the arguments of the doctrine. The privilege extends to words spoken in Henry and Madison about the necessity of exclusive juris- debate, in the course of business, and not to words spoken diction in this District, in order to protect Congress from otherwise, though within the walls. The doctrine laid what had happened in Philadelphia, when their Hall was surrounded by a military force, into an argument to prove their belief that they can only shield themselves from any breach that may happen here, and, in that case, only by virtue of our general exclusive jurisdiction. The cases are the same; and if they were not, I would apply the remark of a great Connecticut statesman, Roger Sherman, to this case, with a little variance: "Give me," said he to Mr. Giles, "your vote, and you are welcome to the argument." You may resort to the theories of Madison VOL. VIII.-181 down by Chief Justice Parsons is, that, where the member is not acting as a member of the House, he is not entitled to any privileges above his fellow-citizens. The facts of his being a member, and that he is within the walls of the House, constitute no defence, unless, as Mr. Jefferson says, they were "uttered in executing his official duty." The doctrine here asserted by Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice Parsons, and Mr. Jefferson, is precisely what I have contended for, that is, that all personal or prerogative privileges have ceased, and no freedom of speech is protected H. OF R.] Case of Samuel Houston. [MAY 9, 1852. but the freedom of speech in debate, and of proceedings -to be truly informed. Information and misinformation in the House in the execution of his duty; that, for any are not convertible terms. While it is the right of the voluntary slander within the walls, and for every thing constituent that the acts of his representative should be else, except official debate, a member is just as responsi- reported to him, it is the interest of both that he should ble as any of his fellow-citizens. be truly reported. For this purpose, notes of our speeches But it is said that a member has an undoubted right to are not taken by stealth. They are taken by permission. publish his speech; yet, if it contain libellous matter, he Permission is granted to editors to sit near the Speaker's is responsible. This is also true in England, in the sense chair, and take notes of proceedings and debates for pubin which the judges use it. It is not true here. A repre-lication. Cui bono is this permission granted? Is it granted sentative here is at liberty to make a true report of his for the good of the printer, that he may have profit therespeech, and, in doing this, he is entitled to the protection by? The public good, and not individual profit, is the of the constitution. In England, no one is privileged to object. But no editor can take notes himself of all that publish the speeches and proceedings of Parliament. is said and done, in order to a faithful report. He is per When this is done, it is a contempt, and a breach of the mitted, therefore, to employ, with or without compelisaprivileges of the House. In modern times, speeches are tion, so many and such persons as he pleases, to aid him. published in violation of the rule, which remains unchang- In doing this, he has as perfect a right to ask the aid of ed. Public opinion requires the publication of speeches the member who has delivered a speech, as any other there, and the practice is permitted; but the notes of person. From him he will be most likely to procure the speeches are yet taken by stealth. The liberty of the most and the safest aid. This is every day's practice. press is precisely the same thing in England as here. It A member feeling a desire to be truly reported to his conis the liberty to publish, without censorship or previous stituents, which is his undoubted right, must attend to restraint, any matter whatever, the party being responsi- it himself, and either write out his speech, furnish his own ble for the publication when made. notes, or correct those taken by another. This I mean to Thus, it is said, a member of Parliament is at liberty to do in the present case. I have been informed, in such a publish his speech; but if it contain libellous matter, it is manner that, strange as it may appear, I suppose it true, actionable or indictable. By this is meant neither more that there is but one man in the United States so perfectly nor less than that a member has, in respect of his speech, master of the stenographic art as to be able to make a true the same right of publication with every fellow-subject. report of the debates. If there be such a person in the His privilege, as a member, is to address what matter he United States, I am told he is the only one in the world. pleases to the ear of the House, within its walls, with a However this may be, it is evident that those who note our view to affect its judgment. In doing this, alone, he is debates and proceedings either have not this art, or are privileged. The publication of his speech being forbid- extremely negligent in the use of it. As an instance of den, he is responsible for any injury done by it. Every this, in one of the morning papers I am represented as individual member of Parliament has an undoubted right having made yesterday the discussion I am now engaged to demand that the galleries be cleared, and the doors in. In truth, a member has a right to furnish notes of his shut. This, indeed, is seldom done. The power of the speech; to write it out, or correct it, when done by anomonarch, and the hereditary privileges of the nobles, are, ther; and is obliged to do it for his own vindication ami according to our notions, encroachments on popular right protection from those inaccurate, garbled, and false re-the immunities of the hierarchy not less so. Yet these ports with which our journals abound. have to be maintained, and, therefore, an absolute right to publish speeches and proceedings in Parliament is not granted. The people have no right to hear them without permission. The right of the nation, of the constituent, of the minber, concur in demanding a true report. The interest, too, of each, requires it; and when a member has exer cised his right in this particular, the question is reduced An attempt is made to refute these positions, by a criti-to this, that he has or has not made, or caused to be male, cism on the words "right to publish." It is said that a true report. That, and that alone, is the question. Of what a man has a right to publish, it must be lawful to pub- this the learned counsel was so sensible, that he interra lish. Hence, it is inferred that there can be no rule ed the member from Ohio, most particularly, whether the against publication. It is contended that it would be ab- publication in question was a true report of what he had surd to say a member has a right to publish that which, said or not. Had the witness answered in the nep when published, will subject him to indictment as for an he would have been unquestionably divested of his philunlawful act. This, when examined, will be found to be lege, which could never protect falsehood. Whethe nothing more than an equivoque. Referring to the free-answered affirmatively, however, the counsel assumed the dom of the press, considered as the great bulwark of pub-ground, until then new as to him, that a member is lic liberty, the supposed difficulty vanishes. Right to swerable for a true report of his speech, as the printer publish means nothing more than exemption from previous would be for a false one. But it is but justice to the c restraint. This freedom of publication is precisely the sel to acknowledge that this ground of defence, like the same in both countries. The difference is in the security one suggested by the member from New York, was h for its enjoyment; that, in England, rests on law and po-made here; the latter of which the learned counsel, after pular opinion; here, on these, and a constitutional prohi-a few days' reflection, afforded by his indispostion bition to legislate against it. wholly omitted, when going through his legal defes This Government has nothing hereditary in it. It is the second time. But if the learned counsel yet thinks nothing more than public opinion, expressed in certain member responsible for the true publication of his speed prescribed forms. The franchise of free election lies at I presume he must mean that he may be made respons the root of all government here. A government, thus in court. For it would be a monstrous obliquity, event resting wholly on public opinion, cannot be well adminis- this defence, to suppose him liable to be knocked in tered, nor long maintained, without public information, and head without judge or jury. Were I to vote for the public virtue. To the safe exercise of the electoral fran-charge of the accused, on the legal ground of a publ chise, not only is intelligence necessary, but a knowledge tion as contended for, I should fear much that I suffere of public measures, with the views and opinions of public myself to be led into such an error as a means or excuse men. This is the life-blood of this Government. The to still the murmurings of a conscience ill at ease. N constituent body have an actual, unquestionable right to could I find any thing in the evidence to justify sucki know the conduct of their immediate representatives. vote, if I believed the law to be as contended for. They, and the whole nation, have a right to be informed On the part of the defence, it would be a quest'on MAY 9, 1832.] was not. fact, that the outrage in question was perpetrated in re- the charge. It should be recollected, however, that the venge for the publication, and not the speech; or that it note asked no such thing. It very frequently happens Now, there is not a sentence in the testimony that a party accused wants as little to do with the evidence even tending to show that it was for the former. That as possible; that, in most cases, it is precisely that which which would, in other cases, be conclusive, would be is not wanted. I do not pretend to say, or insinuate, that damning proof, is, that at the time of committing the atro- such was the case here, for I know nothing about the truth cious act complained of, the accused was profoundly igno- or falsehood of the charge. I only know that the evidence rant of the fact that the member had written out his own was not asked for. The member was placed in this situaspeech. This only appeared after the investigation com- tion: he must answer that he was truly reported, and thus menced. The speech was made on Saturday. At the re- waiving his privilege, accept a challenge, or, claiming his quest of the editor, it was written the next day and hand-privilege, run the hazard of a personal attack. He chose ed to him, and it appeared in the Intelligencer of Monday, the latter; and, except with duellists, or the advocates of in the morning. From the course of examination, of the club law, his course will be approved. defence generally, and of remarks elsewhere, it is appa- The next ground of defence is, that all jurisdiction, as rent that this occasion is to be made use of to raise from well over the privileges of this House, as of contempts infamy and contempt the crime of duelling--a crime which of its authority, is vested in the federal courts by those is at once a violation of the laws of God and man--a relic clauses in the constitution which define and vest the juof barbarous times--the refuge and resort of the base cow-dicial power, (see note 1;) and that the exercise of jurisard, more frequently than the deliberate brave. The diction by ourselves is prohibited by the fourth, fifth, counsel relies on three provocations: the speech; second, and sixth amendments to the constitution. These provithe publication; and, third, the refusal to answer the ques- sions so plainly relate to the jurisdiction of the federal tion propounded by the letter of Mr. Houston. The courts, and to regular criminal proceedings in them, that learned counsel first satisfied himself that the first was not the argument under consideration merits no more than the cause of the outrage; and that if the second, or third this notice, which is taken out of respect to the learned operated, or both of them combined, then the accused counsel who makes it. (See note 2.) ought to be discharged, as the member was, in his view, But, in sustaining the last argument, the counsel had only privileged while making the speech. To prove that recourse to analogies drawn from the course of proceedthe publication was that which gave the first offence, he ings and of punishment for contempts of court. So far urges that the member himself never armed in his own as, in cases of proceedings here and there, the principles defence until he made the publication, when he immedi- of self-defence are relied on, the analogy holds; but when ately did so, from a consciousness that that act would give the counsel relies on the legislation of Congress, on the suboffence, and expose him to an attack. Houston, he con- ject of contempts of court, he defeats himself most effecttends, was perfectly quiet, and took no offence at the ually. He overthrows the argument drawn from the speech until its publication. positive enactments of the constitution, (as he calls them,) and from the prohibitions contained in the amendments. Congress have twice legislated on this subject. In the judiciary act of 1789, passed by the first Congress, penned by one of the most conspicuous members of the federal convention, the following section will be found: Now, this misuse of testimony, in itself so plain, would be scarcely pardonable before the meanest tribunal. The member from Ohio was not apprehensive of violence on publishing his speech, nor until the gentleman from Tennessee delivered him Houston's note; when he returned to that gentleman his answer, denying the right of Houston to make the request contained in his note. Then, and not until then, was he advised by his friends to arm himself. For what was that note but the usual precursor of a duel? -sent not by the mail, but by a friend. What did that note request? Nothing but this: whether his name had been used in debate; and if so, whether the member had been truly reported. This was all, and in usual form. A prompt answer was required. It is evident the gentleman from Tennessee understood the note in this light, from the terms on which alone he consented to bear it. The answer given was a claim to the privileges of this House, not to be questioned elsewhere. The parties to the res gesta so considered it. The gentleman from Tennessee, and those he consulted, so considered it; and so I understand him, he explained it to Houston; when, as a member should have done, he declined all further agency. Houston said he was right, but that he would chastise the member, even if it were in the court of heaven! "SEC. 17. All the said courts shall have power (among other things) to punish by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of such courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same." Here the power to punish contempt of courts is given in express terms, to be exercised in a summary manner-and this, notwithstanding the constitution had disposed of the judicial power in the manner mentioned. The first Congress, therefore, did not think, as the counsel does, that the constitution had vested power over contempts of court in such a manner as to be proceeded in by indictment and jury trial, according to the regular course of criminal proceedings. The next act of legislation on this subject is the act of the twenty-first Congress. It is in the following words: "An act declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court.-[ March 2, 1831.] "SEC. 1. That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments, and inflict summary Is it to be established as the opinion of this body, or of punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construthe society we represent, that to claim what the constitu-ed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any tion of our country confers upon us for the protection of person or persons in their presence, or so near thereto as ourselves and our constituents is a disgraceful act? Yet to obstruct the administration of justice; the misbehavior the counsel considers the provocation of the refusal to an- of any of the officers of the said courts, in their official swer Houston's note as the greatest of insults, and as the transactions; and the disobedience, or resistance, by any principal if not the sole cause of the attack made on the member. This refusal, we are told from christian lips, before the representatives of a christian people, was such an outrage as, although not certainly to justify what happened, yet sufficient to excuse, if not justify it to the feelings of honorable men. The learned counsellor says the member should have answered this note in a frank manner, disclosing all the acts and circumstances--the evidence on which he made officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts. "SEC. 2. If any person or persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall corruptly, by force or threats, obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of H. OF R.] Case of Samuel Houston. [MAY 9, 1832. justice therein, every person so offending shall be liable to bers." This argument does not appear to mean any thing prosecution therefor by indictnrent, and shall, on convic- else than that the people, in the exercise of the elective tion thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding five hun- franchise, cannot be trusted to elect men fit for the prodred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three tection of their rights. months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the said offence." This act grew out of the impeachment of Judge Peck. I heartily concurred in its passage. The object was to quiet, by declaring and defining the cases to which the act of 1789 extended, that obloquy and reproach which demagogues never failed to cast on the judges whenever they were compelled, in self-defence, to exercise this unpopular power. Such, however, were my views; and I wished, for the same purpose, to limit the punishment, both as to fine and imprisonment. This act was passed after the amendments to the constitution, and proves that the twenty-first Congress did not understand them as the counsel does. In our enlightened days, however, such disagreements with all that have gone before us, even in the interpretation of their own acts, are of but little importance. The learned counsel, and the party accused, have availed themselves of the liberty given them to try this House, and to repeat the lectures and censures of the Globe, and other high authority. Nine different reasons have been urged to prove this House an improper tribunal for the present investigation. Some of these have more meaning than at first meets the eye; others seem to be used but as expletives to lengthen out a speech, according to the prevailing taste of the place. I will state them in the order in which they were made, as well as I could gather them. First. It is said that "our numbers are too great for a judicial body." Seventh. "Our powers are limited to imprisonment during our session." This objection proceeds on an erroneous assumption. The order for imprisonment is made for protection, and is not considered as a punishment for a breach of the public peace; and, whether the remainder of the session be long or short, the confinement, during its actual continuance, suffices for its only end, which is the preservation of freedom of debate and of the press. Eighth. "If we punish a person for a violation committed within this District, we might exercise the same power if committed in Maine or elsewhere." This is, doubtless, true, and the counsel was right in so considering it; and yet it is impossible to feel the force of this objection, unless it be really desirable to attack members wherever found without the lines of the District of Columbia. The ninth objection was merely an attempt at ridicule. The learned counsel, at first, complained of the incarce ration of his client, which had not happened, and then ridicules an indulgence in permitting the accused to remain in the mere personal custody of the marshal, eating the public bread and drinking the public wine. This notice of the imprisonment, actually inflicted, reminds us of the complaints with which the defence was opened. It was then said that the party accused ought to be confronted with his accuser, to hear and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, and the aid of counsel to assist him in his defence. One listening to this complaint would have supposed that all, or, at least, some of those requisites for fairness of trial, had been denied to the party, whereas, at the very moment, he was in the actual enjoyment of all of them. The counsel complained further that he ought to be informed of the nature of the charge made against him, which he was not, and was, therefore, ignorant what privilege or law he had violated until brought to the bar to answer. Now, it was well According to this argument, the freedom of debate and known to every one present, that, at the very beginning, the rights and liberties of the citizen are nothing; and this a copy of the letter of the member from Ohio, which conHouse would be better employed in passing salary and ap-tained the charge, on which alone the House was pro propriation bills, while the pistol and the club are em-ceeding, had been furnished him; was then, and ever since ployed in disposing of refractory members. had been, in his possession; and it was too much to sup If this be true, our numbers must be too great for all deliberation, and the objection must grow with the growth of population. I cannot really perceive the force of this objection, unless it be one for dispensing with this body, altogether, as useless. Second. "In attending to such subjects, we neglect the other great business of the nation." Third. "The business in which we are engaged is new pose that the party accused, or his counsel, had never to us." It must be admitted that cases of assault and vio-read the constitution of the United States to discover what lence in the street, and in the night time, for exercising privilege the accused had violated. the freedom of speech, have not often happened; but I But the great end of the argument of the learned coungreatly mistake the signs of the times if they will not be sel was to persuade this House to rely on another depart matters of frequent occurrence unless some speedy cor- ment of Government for the protection of that committed rective can be applied, or unless the Executive shall frown to its charge. This House, holding the purse of the naon the practice. tion, is strong enough to protect its own privileges and Fourth. "We are the parties ourselves." This ob- those of its constituents, and would deserve universal exejection certainly deserves some notice. If this House cration if it surrendered that protection to other hands. claimed jurisdiction in cases of libel on itself as a body, We heard, on this occasion, a most eloquent and beautithere would be some force in the argument. In the case ful encomium on the wisdom, purity, and safety of the before us, the members of this House, except the mem- judicial department-of its adequacy to the protection of ber assaulted, (who does not vote,) are no more interested, all rights, political and civil-of property, of person, of nor are they otherwise parties, than a juryman who is em- fame, and all that is dear to freemen--dispensing justice pannelled to try those charged with murder or other equally to the rich and the poor, to the strong and the breach of the peace. Judges, jurors, and all, are concerned in the general protection of society. All are, likewise, concerned in the protection of public liberty, and each man in the nation as much so as a member of this House. Fifth. A fifth reason against this tribunal is "the embarrassment of counsel appearing before judges who are interested in the case." This argument may be noticed merely as operating to swell the list of proofs that the House is a useless body, and, especially, as no one could perceive the embarrassment spoken of. Sixth. "There may be among us some captious mem weak. This eloquent encomium on that department has the merit of being strictly true; but whence comes it on the present occasion? Is the judiciary, for the present purpose, extolled by those who are endeavoring to tread it under foot, and to destroy its weight and influence? I do not accuse the learned counsel of this; but the same argument is used by others, whose feelings towards the judidiciary are well known. Mr. Speaker, both by the learned counsel and his client we have been lectured n the language of certain prints, |