No desertion conceivable could be the cause of sin. For had Adam been totally deserted, this could not have constituted him a sinner without his free choice. To make an act of desertion, however total, to influence Adam's wrong choice, rather than his own passive power, is to confound cause and occasion. By the bye, the R. understands TURRETTIN to mean, that Adam lost CONFIRMING grace! However accurate TURRETTIN's distinctions might be,-potentia non peccandi and efficax gratia, and I do not dispute their accuracy, they leave the immediate cause of sin untouched.

I had asserted, while stating the respective causes of sin and holiness, "that the will, in the exercise of its freedom, when producing moral effects, is the instrument of the disposition; and that the character of the effect bears an infallible and exact proportion to that of the pre-disposing cause.' (EDW. vol. i. p. 400.) The connection shews my meaning to be, that a disposition under more or less benevolent influence, in the exercise of free volition, produces more or less holiness, in an infallible and exact proportion; and that the disposition which is more or less under the influence of passive power, is more or less the cause of sin, in a similar proportion. Here are two causes, and also two effects, of different characters, exactly corresponding and propor tionate. Benevolent influence cannot be the cause of sin, nor can passive power be the cause of holiness, in any measure; but the contrary is true in the exactest degree. What then can more plainly express the sentiment than the words I have employed, "that the character of the effect," as either sin or holiness, "bears an infallible and exact proportion to that of the pre-disposing cause," as either benevolent influence in the disposition, or passive power? But who, possessing candour and discernment, would infer thence, that my statement implies a simularity of moral character between sin and the cause of sin? May there not be an exact proportion

proportion between sin and its cause, without that cause being sinful? Or, who would ingraft on my words the absurd sentiment, that, because the character of the effect is moral evil, and because there is an infallible and exact proportion between the character of an effect and its cause, therefore the character of the cause of moral evil, is moral evil!-I had also asserted, that "a suspension of sovereign, holy influence, towards a moral agent, is to deal with him in mere equity; (DOD. vol. v. p. 210.) and, in another connection, (PRED. p. 46.) "that then alone can moral agents fall into sin, when dealt with in pure equity." Here the R. fancies a contradiction between my assertions and Mr. GILBERT'S statement of them; but it is nothing more than fancy. For any one who chooses may see that "mere equity" and " "pure equity," are in their respective connections, very differ. ent ideas. The former expresses the supposed absence of sovereign benevolence towards a moral agent; the latter, the comparative influence of equity and sovereignty when combined. They therefore are a direct answer to these very different questions: What may we call that perfection of the divine nature which is exercised towards a moral agent, when sovereign benevo lence is supposed to be absent? Mere equity. When equity and sovereignty are exercised, in any supposed proportion, towards a moral agent, and he falls into sin by his abuse of liberty, which of them is concerned in the affair, equity alone, sovereignty alone, or both combined? Pure equity-only equity. If needful, it would be easy to illustrate my meaning from objects in nature. Were I speaking of the quantity of matter, to the exclusion of magnitude, the subject of the definition would be

mere quantity of matter." But were I to speak of the quantity of matter and of magnitude in a combined form, and which of the two had an influence on gravitation, I might say, "quantity of matter only." Again; were I speaking of vital air, to the exclusion of all other air,

the

the subject of my definition would be "mere vital air." But were the enquiry respecting different airs combined, and which of them respectively had an influence in promoting combustion; the answer might be, vital air only; or, it was purely vital air.

How any one could suspect, from my sermon on Predestination, or from any thing I have written, that I did not acknowledge the divine purpose to comprehend all events, is to me a mystery; except sin, or the sinfulness of acts be included in the term "events." But the idea of God purposing the sinfulness, the obliquity, the moral pravity of the act, is what my soul abhors, as the first born of heresies; as what, in its just consequences, is demonstrably subversive of all religion and morality. The R. speaking of human volitions, asserts, "if they are foreknown, they must be included in the divine purpose." But though all human volitions are included in the divine purpose, the mere fact of their being foreknown is no sufficient proof of it; for the sinfulness of an act is forcknown; is it therefore purposed? He adds, "every thing which has a beginning is an effect of a pre-existing cause and effects must flow from the divine will fore. ordaining them." Does the sinfulness of human voliti ons, then, "flow from the divine will?" But there is another exception. Passive power has a beginning no less than the sinfulness of actions; but does it flow from the divine will? Prior to created existence it could have no place; nor could a creature exist without it. Therefore it does not follow, that what does not flow from the First Cause "must be necessary and eternal." Nor is it true, that "there is no necessity without divine forcordination." He who does not comprehend. the falsity of that assumed idea, does not comprehend the true origin of evil. To maintain "the divine precourse or premotion of human actions, and the foreordination of them" as actions, is one thing; but to maintain the for cordination of the moral evil of those actions, is ano

ther.

ther. The former I believe, with all consistent Calvinists: the latter I deny, as an error equally unphilosophical, unscriptural, and impious. But he who rejects the origin of moral evil as before stated, cannot hold this distinction without virtually contradicting himself. I had said, that "the moral evil which attaches to any act is equitably permitted." From this the R. infers that it was purposed. But the inference is not just; for permission cannot imply purpose, except on the false assumption that passive power is not the true cause of the perversion of a free act. Allow this cause, and to purpose the permission of sin appears at once a contradictory idea, adopted for the sake of avoiding a more obvious absurdity, that is, a direct, voluntary, and eternal necessitation of moral evil. But the idea is a mere sub

terfuge, for want of an open and fair solution of this infinitely interesting and tremendous phenomenon.—Į remain, Sir, your's, &c.

Rotherham, June 14, 1808.

E. WILLIAMS.

Eddowes, Printers, Shrewsbury.

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