intend one thing, and the reader underftand another, there is little hope of agreement, be the reasoning what it may. What is here afferted, therefore, is, that this hypothetical neceffity, or, in other words, the truly future certainty of an event, does not infringe moral agency in the accomplishment of that event.

2. Though a great outcry has been made against the antinomian tendency of Calvinism in general, and Calvinistic neceffity in particular, yet all, who have a grain of candour left among heaps of prejudice, must acknowledge, That those who have held the fubftance of the doctrine here maintained, have been uniformly, and equally ftrenuous for the existence of moral obligation, the accountableness of man, and personal holiness, with others who have opposed it; which is at least a fufficient exculpation of them from any immoral defign. That bad men have efpoufed both fides, is no juft impeachment of either. As, for inftance, the religious character of Prefident EDWARDS having never been called in question, our opponents themselves being judges, any more than that of Mr. FLETCHER; it cannot be inferred that the patrons of hypothetical neceffity are avowed oppofers of moral agency and accountableness, or even that it produces ill effects in those who hold it, any more than in those who reject the sentiment. Perhaps, could an estimate be fairly and extenfively made, the hypothetical neceffitarians would not appear to disadvantage by the comparison; and, what is more, perhaps the genuine tendency of both fyftems may be shewn to be decidedly

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decidedly in our favour. It is hoped that this publication may affift in fuch an inquiry.

3. Among all good men, a regard for the honour of God, more than the rights of man, is the matter of holy jealoufy. And it gives me no fmall pleasure to reflect that our oppofing brethren uniformly and openly avow their acquiefcence in these two grand AXIOMS:

I AXIOM. All GOOD is of GOD.

II AXIOM. All EVIL is of OURSELVES.

In the following pages, it is prefumed, it will appear, that no fyftem of religion or morals oppofite to what is here defended, can be made fairly and truly to agree with both axioms.

4. Among modern writers of religious refpectability, no one has appeared, on the Arminian fide of the question, with more polemical acumen, or more open decifion, than the Rev. JOHN FLETCHER, in his numerous controverfial writings. Candour dictates, and the love of real godliness, that Mr. F's. character should be held in great efteem. His ardent love of GOD, and zealous efforts to reform, convert, and fave fouls; his humbling reprefentations of himself, and warm afcriptions of praife to grace and the Saviour; his usefulness as a minister, and in fome respects as a writer; and his worth as a member of fociety demand cordial acquiefcence. With fuch acknowledgments, let it not be conftrued a breach of chriftian charity to examine his pofitions and reasonings on the fubject before us. It has been often faid, 'That if all good men did but rightly understand each other, there would appear

much

much less difference between them than there is; and it is a remark, I am fully perfuaded, founded in truth. Should I therefore fucceed (which may the GOD of love and wisdom grant!) in giving the admirers of this writer a more just, and therefore a more conciliatory view of the matter of difference between what he avowedly held and what I confider as real defenfible Calvinifm; I fhall with heart-felt pleasure infer, that I have not lived or laboured in vain. But,

3. What claims our immediate attention is, the proof of what is propofed, before we come to notice what has been objected to it; which is attempted by the following explanatory Propofitions.

I. Propos. There is a real and important dif tinction between fcience, decree, and præfcience, as applied to GOD.

1. Science relates and extends to all possibles, with all their diverfities and diftinctions, as included in the divine all-sufficiency.

2. Decree, being an act of the divine will, whereby one general fyftem is chofen, in preference to any other, in the numberlefs ranks of poffibles, relates ONLY to the adopted fyftem. And as wifdom is effential to Deity, the fyftem chofen must be a wife one; i. e. the beft calculated to answer the end propofed. Confequently, without a decree there can be no actual or pofitive exiftence.

3. Præfcience relates to the fyftem fo adopted as to its truly certain futurition. Science, therefore, relates to what might have been, had GoD willed it

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to be, with an efficient or decretive will; Decree relates to all actual positive existence, whether past, present, or future; and Prafcience to the certain futurition of fuch objects.

§ 4. II. Propos. There are hypothetical tendencies and refults in the very nature of things, irrespective of all will concerning them. To elucidate this propofition, obferve:

1. The divine intellect beholds all poffibles, as contained in the divine all-fufficiency, individually; and the divine wisdom beholds the fame objects fyftematically.

2. That there is a negative hypothetical tendency and result, both individually and fyftematically confidered, is demonftrative from the confideration of the passive power effential to all created existence. For inftance, IF GOD withdraw all support from a creature, it ceases to exift, &c.

3. That there is also a pofitive hypothetical tendency and refult, relative to the individuals and the fyftem, is equally demonftrative from the confideration of the divine efficience. For instance, IF GOD choose either good or evil, he will certainly choose good; IF he exert creating power, created effects will follow, &c.

§ 5. III. Propos. The more freedom we claim for any creature, the more firmly fhall we establish the confequence, that, in the view of God, the tendency and result of that freedom is foreseen and provided for. In proof of this propofition obferve,

1. The

1. The freedom of a moral fyftem implies the poffibility of a deviation from rectitude. This enters into the very foundation of accountableness.

2. The hypothetical refult of every moral system poffible is included in the divine science. But,

3. If freedom implies defectibility, and the divine science, or all-perfect knowledge, fees the hypothetical refult of all fyftems poffible; it follows, that a decretive fixedness of all the good, from whence refults the certain futurition of all events, is included in our clear and confiftent notion of divine goodness and wisdom.

If a moral system be formed free, in the highest fenfe conceivable, and there be no decretive certainty of the result of it, as far as it is good; that fyftem is liable to perpetual ruin without a poffibility of being retrieved. For, as all good is from God, he muft either decree the result of it, or, on supposition of failure in the fyftem, alter his plan; which alteration to impute to the divine mind is unworthy of our notion of infinite perfection. If therefore it be unworthy of an infinite mind, alike, to operate without a plan, and to alter a plan once formed; and if nothing can be to HIM abfolutely contingent; the confequence is unavoidable, that the more free the fyftem is, the more liable it is to perpetual ruin, without a poffibility of being corrected and retrieved, if the goodness of the result be not decreed; an omiffion which is incompatible with the divine goodness.

Again: To create a fyftem which may rush to ruin, without making a decretive provision for the hypothetical

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