to predeftinate whom he pleafed of his rational creatures to eternal glory. It has been proved before, that the decree of election, or merciful predeftination, is not inconfiftent with equity; and in the foregoing paffages it has been proved that GOD has, effentially, an abfolute right to will and to do whatever is not inequitable; whence the corollary follows; that he has a right to predeftinate to eternal glory whom he will.

§ 9. 2. Coroll. That GOD had an absolute right to redeem fome of the human race with a decretive Speciality. It has been proved before, that to extend redemption decretively to some more than to others is perfectly confiftent with equity; and it has been now proved, that GoD's right extends to every íuch object; whence the confequence is inevitable, that particular redemption, in the sense before explained, is an object worthy of God as a fovereign.

§ 10. 3. Coroll. That GOD has an abfolute right to confer special grace upon, and infuse gracious habits into whom he pleases. That to do this, is confiftent with equity, has been fhewn before; and we have been now proving that GOD's right is abfolute as to every thing which is not inequitable; from whence it follows, that his right includes the conferring of Special grace.

$ 11.

*Sect. II. § 9. + Ibid. 10, &c.

Ibid. 21, &c.

§ II. 4. Coroll. That GOD has an abfolute right to determine the will by his gracious influence. To do this, we have shewn before, is not inequitable; and now it has been demonftrated, that GOD's right extends to every fuch object; confequently, there lies no ground of complaint againft his determination of the human will by gracious influence on the mind.

§ 12. 5. Coroll. That GOD has an abfolute right to caufe, effectually, all those who are faints to perfevere in a state of grace unto eternal falvation. We muft obferve, as before, that the perfeverance of faints has been proved to be not inconfiftent with any principle of equity; and GOD's right includes every fuch object, as now proved; therefore the truth of the Corollary cannot be impeached.

Ibid. § 26, &c.

+ Ibid. § 30, &c.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Whether the certainty, or hypothetical neceffity of future events, be confiftent with that freedom which is effential to moral agency.

§ 1. Introduction. The fubject not exhausted. § 2. General Remarks. § 3. The difference between fcience, decree, and præfcience. § 4. That there are hypothetical tendencies and refults independent of all will. § 5. The more freedom is claimed, the more certain the refult of it. § 6. The just limits of the liberty of moral agents, and its confiftence with hypothetical neceffity demonftrated. §7-10. The rife and progrefs of the controverfy between the Calvinifts and Arminians, in which Mr. FLETCHER took fo active a part. § 11. Arminian conceffions. § 12. Obfervations on them. § 13. The chief caufe of the different conclufions. § 14. The charge of God being made the author of fin retorted. § 15. The nature of fin. §.16. Self-perverfion is not the origin of fin. § 17. Its true origin proved and explained. § 18. The confiftency of certainty and moral agency proved from the acknowledged certain futurition of events. § 19. The Arminian account of fore-knowledge infufficient. § 20, 21. A fuller explanation of the prefent fyftem.

fyftem. §22-35. Mr. FLETCHER's most powerful and popular objections against Calvinistic neceffity, anfwered; whereby is fhewn more fully the truth and importance of the fyftem here maintained, and the weakness of its oppofite. § 36. Conclufions from the premifes.

§ I.

OF

F the three pillars before mentioned, (Sect. I. § 1.) on which the fabric of Arminian ifm refts, this is one, That the certainty, or, as the Arminians choose to reprefent the cafe by a ftronger term, the neceffity of future events is not confiftent with that freedom which is effential to moral agency. Dr. WHITBY ftrenuously contends that the will is free "as well from Neceffity, as from coaction," to which he appropriates feveral chapters; and one in particular is entitled, "Propounding Arguments from Reafon to evince this freedom of the will from Neceffity."+ Later Arminians, especially Mr. FLETCHER, have faid much on the subject, though candid conceffions have fometimes been made, amounting nearly to all for which we contend, in the midft, or at the more fedate close, of the most violent oppofition. Mr. JONATHAN EDWARDS, without the Materialism and mere philofophic mechanism of PRIESTLEY, or the unguarded bluntnefs and fevere farcafms of TOPLADY, made a noble effort to fhew that the freedom of the will and moral agency are not inconfiftent

* On the Five Points,
p. 328.

+ Ibid. p. 344.

inconfiftent with all neceffity. But if we judge from the effect it has produced, we must infer either that his "Inquiry," is not rightly understood by our Arminian friends, or that there is fome defect in his mode of representing the fubject, fince Mr. FLETCHER has often conceded the whole of what Mr. EDWARDS profeffedly contended for, i. e. That Freedom is confiftent with fome neceffity. The present writer has long thought, and ftill thinks, that the fubject has by no means been exhaufted, notwithstanding all he has met with in fcholaftic and modern divinity, moral philofophy and metaphyfics. If any additional or new light is, in these pages, thrown upon the subject, whereby may be discovered, that the frightful gulfs, which were fuppofed by good people on the oppofite fides to be impaffable, are fordable and perfectly fafe; by which means there may be among fuch people a more free exchange of Chriftian love and evangelical fentiments; the author will have reason to confider the circumftance as one of the greatest favours conferred upon him by providence, and one of the higheft gratifications of his life.

§ 2. Before we proceed to inveftigate the fentiments propofed, I would offer a few general

remarks.

1. The reader ought not to overlook the definitions given of the terms under confideration; efpecially the terms "moral agency" and "neceffity." If by these terms the writer should