amined the Atrato River route in Colombia, far south of Panama, and secured from the Colombian government a concession for a canal there. This he took to Paris in the fall of 1876, and with it roused the enthusiasm of the "Old Imperialists," who were still hoping for a Bonapartist restoration, and caused them to organize "La Société Civile Internationale du Canal Interocéanique." A concession was secured from Colombia for a canal at any point on the isthmus. An International Scientific Congress was held in Paris in 1879, with 136 delegates, of whom a majority were Frenchmen, though the United States had two official and nine unofficial representatives in it. The outcome was the organization of the Universal Interoceanic Canal Company, under the lead of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal. Work was begun at Panama in February, 1881.

American suspicion and opposition were instantly aroused by what was apparently a menace to the Monroe Doctrine and to American interests. To counteract these feelings, if possible, Lesseps organized an American committee and spent vast sums of money for the development of American sentiment in his favor. He personally visited this country and had an interview with the President, Rutherford B. Hayes, but quite failed to conciliate him. Indeed, his visit had an effect exactly contrary to that which he had hoped, for a few days after their interview Hayes sent to the Senate a message in which he said:

"The policy of this country is an American canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European powers. If existing treaties between the United States and other nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations, stand in the way of this policy, suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy on this subject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it. . . . No other great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interest and welfare."

It is pertinent to recall that these memorable words-the most advanced, radical, and aggressive ever uttered on the subjectwere written in March, 1880, by one of the most calm, temperate, and conservative of our presidents. They meant, unmistakably,

that we were to control the canal as a part of our own domestic coast waterways; that no European power was to have any share in it; that if the Clayton-Bulwer or any other treaty stood in the way, it must be modified or abrogated; that if any alien power had acquired property rights on the isthmus, it must surrender them; and that even the sovereignty of the Central American States across whose territory the canal might extend, must yield to the imperative demands of American interests.

Two rival schemes of isthmian transit arose in this country. One was for a canal at Nicaragua. A company was formed, work was begun, and millions of dollars were spent; and then the enterprise became bankrupt and was abandoned. The other was for a gigantic ship railroad at Tehuantepec, designed by the great engineer James B. Eads; but political influence at Washington denied it the government encouragement which was necessary, and it never got beyond the stage of plans and estimates. It was evident, then, that diplomatic measures must be taken to defeat the French scheme at Panama, or to bring it under American control. Accordingly in the succeeding administration of President Garfield the secretary of state, James G. Blaine, undertook negotiations with Great Britain for getting rid of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

Unfortunately, with his love for a "vigorous and aggressive" foreign policy, and his marked antipathy toward Great Britain, he began this work with more zeal than discretion. He first sent out a note to American ministers in Europe, advising them of what was being done by the French at Panama, denouncing the purpose to establish a European guarantee over an American canal, arguing that all guarantees and control must proceed from the United States, and practically serving notice upon the world that any attempt to supersede such American guarantee and control with such functions exercised by European powers, would be regarded as a hostile act. In all that, beyond doubt, Blaine was exactly right. But he was premature. He should first have got rid of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which, by the solemn guarantee of the United States, gave to Great Britain the same measure of control over the canal that we ourselves should enjoy. It was a grave tactical mistake to ignore that fact, which after all was the salient fact of the whole situation. He strove to

strengthen his position by cultivating closer relations with the Central American States, and invited them to join in a "PanAmerican Congress" to be held at Washington in 1882, an invitation which all but Costa Rica accepted. The congress was not held, however, Blaine having retired from the cabinet long before the date set for it.

The British reply to this first move of Blaine's was prompt and telling. Pressure was put upon Nicaragua for confirmation of the British claim upon the canal route there, and that country's failure to fulfil some of the terms of the Managua treaty of 1860 was referred to the arbitration of the Emperor of Austria; whose verdict was against Nicaragua. The result was that Great Britain gained title to the Caribbean terminal of any possible canal at Nicaragua, and reëstablished her authority over the Mosquito coast.

Then Blaine did what he should have done first. He moved for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, through notes to James Russell Lowell, our minister in London. The gist of his argument was that, owing to changed conditions, the ClaytonBulwer treaty was obsolete, and was an obstacle to the building of the canal instead of the aid that it was meant to be; and that therefore Great Britain ought to consent to the abrogation of it` and relinquish all her rights and privileges under it, in return for a promise that the United States would neutralize the canal to all powers. In other words, America was to be released from the treaty while Great Britain was still to be bound by it. In a second note Blaine argued that there had been a misunderstanding in the very making of the treaty, and that therefore it should be abrogated. To this the British foreign minister, Lord Granville, replied that Buchanan, twenty-five years earlier, had declared that in spite of that misunderstanding he was quite satisfied and desired the treaty to stand; while now Blaine, on exactly the same ground, declared himself dissatisfied and asked that the treaty be annulled. He added that the British government had already offered to abrogate the treaty and to let affairs be returned to the status quo ante, but the United States had demurred; wherefore now the British government did not purpose to let the treaty be annulled or modified just to suit the pleasure of the United States. In this, it must be confessed,

Granville scored. Both Buchanan and Blaine had aimed to "eat their cake and have it, too," by retaining for this country all its advantages under the treaty while releasing it from all its obligations.

Blaine then retired from office, and the controversy was continued with Granville by his successor, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, with perhaps more diplomatic prudence but with no better results. To his argument that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ought to be abrogated because it was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, the effective reply was that the Monroe Doctrine was in existence and had been for many years when the treaty was made, but was then not regarded as a bar to the making of it. The controversy at last ended, at the very point at which it had begun, with nothing gained. Frelinghuysen then determined to defy the treaty which he had failed to get rid of, and accordingly negotiated with Nicaragua, in 1884, a convention directly traversing that of Clayton and Bulwer. This Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty provided that the United States should construct a' canal at Nicaragua, to be owned by it and Nicaragua jointly, that there should be a perpetual alliance between the two countries, and that the United States should guarantee the territorial integrity of its ally. A bolder or more direct challenge to Great Britain could scarcely have been made. It was intended as such; as a deliberate violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, so flagrant and extreme that Great Britain would be compelled to take cognizance of it. The result would probably have been abrogation of the treaty, an attempt by Great Britain to return to the status quo ante, and a protracted and exacerbated struggle between that country and the United States, diplomatic if not military, over the sovereignty and control of the Nicaraguan or Mosquito coast.

But this was not to be. Before the Senate could or would ratify the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty the administration of President Arthur was succeeded by that of Grover Cleveland, and a radical change occurred in the foreign as well as the domestic policy of the nation. This treaty with others was immediately withdrawn from the Senate and was not again submitted to that body. It may have been well that this was done, since ratification and execution of the treaty would almost cer

tainly have caused grave complications, and subsequent events, as we shall see, showed that the controversy was susceptible of satisfactory settlement in a far easier and more amicable way. We cannot censure Arthur and Frelinghuysen for their frank and courageous resolution to retaliate upon Great Britain for her former violations of the treaty. Their policy was in accord with elemental human nature; there was abundant provocation for it; and it would assuredly have been expeditiously effective for some sort of settlement. Yet it was probably far better, even at the expense of years of delay, to await the more diplomatic and really more effective and profitable course which was pursued by John Hay.

Cleveland did, however, much more than to withdraw that treaty. He announced a complete reversal of government policy concerning the canal; probably the most radical reversal of a great foreign policy in the history of America. He directly repudiated the doctrine of Grant and Hayes, for "an American canal under American control," declared that the canal "must be removed from the chance of domination by any single power,' -even, of course, by the United States-and added:

"An engagement combining the construction, ownership, and operation of such work by this Government, with an offensive and defensive alliance for its protection, with the foreign State whose responsibilities and rights we would share, is in my judgment inconsistent with such dedication to universal and neutral use."

This was a reversal and repudiation, not alone of the canal policy of Grant and Hayes, but equally of that of Polk in 1846, in making the treaty with Colombia for control of the Panama Railroad. Happily this strange and deplorable lapse lasted no longer than the four years of Cleveland's administration, and was immediately followed by a return to the former and true American policy, which was thereafter consistently maintained. In 1889 Congress chartered an American company for the construction of a canal at Nicaragua, under concessions from that country and from Costa Rica, and much work was done; but the enterprise ended in bankruptcy in 1893. For years thereafter a battle royal was waged in Congress, one party seeking to secure government aid for the moribund Nicaragua project, and