[469] "The Travelers Insurance Co., Claim Department, "Hartford, Ct., March 13, 1883. "S. K. Edwards, Southbridge, Mass. UNITED STATES, Piff. in Err., V. CLEMENT A. AUFFMORDT ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 197-210.) Duties-action to recover value of goods consigned to defendants by the owners-priority of statutes enacted the same day-amendment -object and effect of. "Dear Sir: In reply to yours of 10th inst., would say that we received a letter from agent Phillips, dated February 7, 1883, wherein he writes: 'I found the inclosed upon my table on my return home, and forward the same.' The inclosed were incomplete proof papers relating to the death of Mr. Frank Edwards, and we acknowledged the receipt of same Feb'y 9th, manufacturer, the invoice need only state the fair 1. Where imported goods are the property of their asking for a full report of the analysis of Ed-market value of the goods at the place of manufactwards' stomach, the report to be certified by the chemist who made the analysis. We have no further intelligence respecting the matter. "Yours Truly, Rodney Dennis, Sec'y." On March 20, S. K. Edwards, on behalf of his sister, again wrote to the Company making inquiry if February 9 was the first time they had the proofs of the death of Frank Edwards, to which the following reply was made: "March 21, 1883. 'S. K. Edwards, Esq., Southbridge, Mass. "Dear Sir: Your letter of the 20th inst. is at hand. We received the incomplete proofs of death, to which we alluded in our letter of 13th inst., on the 10th of February for the first and only time. We have only received them once. "Yours Truly, Rodney Dennis, Sec'y." During all the correspondence which passed upon this subject, Mr. Dennis, the officer of the Company, nowhere intimates that these proofs came too late, or that they were rejected by the Company; but the only complaint made was that he had not received the chemical analysis of the contents of the stomach. Under all the circumstances of this case, we are of opinion that the Company treated Phillips as their agent for the purpose of the early notice of the death of Edwards, and also the receipt of the final proofs thereof, and that it is too late for them now to undertake to defeat this action upon the ground that he was not their agent for any of these purposes. We do not deem it necessary to go into a critical examination of the authorities upon the questions so often raised of the powers of agents of this class. We simply hold that whether, upon the face of the policy, and the receipt with its indorsements, taken alone, Phillips can be held to have been the agent of the Company to whom the notices in question could be properly delivered or not, that the action of the Company upon Phillips' communications to its secretary at Hartford of the information of the death of Edwards, and its delivery to him of the blank affidavits and forms which it required to be filled up, together with the subsequent correspondence, show conclusively that the Company considered Phillips as its agent throughout the transaction with regard to these notices, and it is, therefore, bound by what he did. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. ure, and it need not state "the actual cost thereof of goods which belong to their manufacturer is not, at the place of exportation." Therefore, an invoice nor is an entry of such goods, within the purview of section 2839, so as to make the person entering to a forfeiture of their value. them with design to evade payment of duty liable 2. The provision in section 2864, R. S., for the forfeiture of the value of such goods is superseded by 1874, which provides only for a forfeiture of the the enactment of section 12 of the Act of June 2). merchandise, and not for the forfeiture of its value; said Act, although passed on the same day as the Revised Statute, being a subsequent statute there to. 3. The sole object of the amendment to section 2864, R. S., made by the Act of February 18, 1875, was to make said section read as it should have read in force on December 1, 1873. The Act of February in the printed volume, in the shape in which it was 18, 1875, was in no respect new legislation, nor a new law enacted to take effect from the date of its passage, in such wise as to alter any enactment made since the passage of the Revised Statutes. [No. 266.] Argued April 26, 1887. Decided May 27, 1887. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Reported below, 19 Fed. Rep. $93. Affirmed. The case fully appears in the opinion of the court. Mr. G. A. Jenks, Solicitor-Gen., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Charles M. Da Costa and Tremain & Tyler, for defendants in error. [197] This is an action brought by the United States, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, against Clement A. Auffmordt, John F. Degener, William Degener, and Adolph William Von Kessler, composing the firm of C. A. Auff mordt & Co., to recover the sum of $321,519.29, with interest. The complaint alleges violations by the de fendants of Statutes of the United States in re spect to entries of imported merchandise made by the defendants in 1879, 1880, 1881 and 1882, the value of such merchandise being the above named sum, and claims that by reason of the acts of the defendants alleged in the complaint the defendants have forfeited such value to the United States. The defendants put in an answer containing a general denial, and the case was tried in the district court before a jury. After the case was opened to the jury on the art of the United States, and before any testiony was offered, the defendants moved, upon such opening, that the court direct a verdict for the defendants, on the ground that there was no statute of the United States whereby the value of the merchandise could be recovered by reason of the acts alleged to have been com- | 2864 of the Revised Statutes; that the defendmitted by the defendants as consignees of the ants, being agents of the merchandise men. goods, which was the capacity in which they tioned in the complaint, knowingly made entry received and entered the goods, the goods being thereof by means of invoices which did not the property of the manufacturers of them in contain a true statement of the particulars reSwitzerland, and being consigned to the de- quired in that part of the Act of March 3, 1863, fendants for sale on commission. The facts preceding the provision of the Act which was sought to be proved against the defendants re-enacted as section 2864 of the Revised Statwere that they, knowingly and with intent to tutes; that the defendants, being the consignees defraud the revenue, entered the goods at in- of the merchandise mentioned in the complaint, [199] voice prices lower than their actual market knowingly made entry thereof by means of value at the time and place of exportation. false and fraudulent documents and papers; The court ruled that there was no existing stat- and that the defendants, being the agents of ute of the United States under which the plaint the merchandise mentioned in the complaint, iff could recover upon any possible proof, and knowingly made entry thereof by means of that a verdict must be directed for the defend false and fraudulent documents and papers. ants. 19 Fed. Rep. 893. The plaintiff except- These requests being successively denied, the ed to this ruling. plaintiff excepted to each refusal. The jury, under direction of the court, found a verdict for the defendants, to which direction the plaintiff excepted. After a judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff took the case to the circuit court by a writ of error, where the judg ment was affirmed; and they have brought the case to this court by a writ of error. The two sections of the Revised Statutes upon which the United States base their right of recovery in the case are sections 2839 and 2864. Section 2839 was originally enacted as part of section 66 of the Act of March 2, 1799, chap. 22, 1 Stat. at L. 677, and reads as follows: 44 Sec. 2839. If any merchandise, of which entry has been made in the office of a collector, is not invoiced according to the actual cost thereof at the place of exportation, with design [203] to evade payment of duty, all such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered of the person making entry, shall be forfeited." Section 2864 was originally enacted as part of section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1863, chap. 76, 12 Stat. at L. 738, and reads as follows: "Sec. 2864. If any owner, consignee or agent of any merchandise shall knowingly make, or attempt to make, an entry thereof by means of any false invoice, or false certificate of a consul, vice consul, or commercial agent, or of any invoice which does not contain a true statement of all the particulars herein before required, or by means of any other false or fraudulent document or paper, or of any other false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, such merchandise, or the value thereof, shall be forfeited." The main contentions on the part of the defendants are that section 2839 relates only to purchased goods, and not to consigned goods, and that section 2864 is superseded by section 12 of the Act of June 22, 1874, chap. 391, 18 Stat. at L. 188. These contentions were sustained by the district court in its opinion. Section 2839 provides for the forfeiture of merchandise, or the value thereof, "To be recovered of the person making entry," where the merchandise is "not invoiced according to the actual cost thereof at the place of exportation, with design to evade payment of duty." This section, originally enacted in 1799, is applicable only to goods which are required to be invoiced according to their actual cost at the place of exportation. Alfonso v. U. 8. 2 Story, 421, 429, 432. By section 2841 of the Revised Statutes, originally section 4 of the Act of March 1, 1823, chap. 21, 8 Stat. at L. 730, 732, forms of oaths on the entry of goods are prescribed, one for the "consignee, importer, or agent," one for the "owner in cases where merchandise has been actually purchased,” and a third for the "manufacturer or owner in cases where merchandise has not been actually purchased." In the first form of oath, the oath is that the invoice "exhibits the actual cost (if purchased), or fair market value (if otherwise obtained)," at the time and place of procurement. In the second form of oath, the oath is that the oath contains "a just and faithful account of the actual cost In the third form of oath, the oath is that the goods were not actually bought by the importer or consignee, or by his agent, in the ordinary mode of bargain and sale, but that nevertheless the invoice" contains a just and faithful valuation of the same, at their fair market value” at the place of procurement. The bill of exceptions contains the following gain and sale, or belonging to the manufacturer, [204] [206] verified by the oath of the owner or of one of " tice or appliance whatso- any portion thereof, ac- Section 2854, originally a part of section 1 of It is quite clear, from the above provisions, that where imported goods are the property of their manufacturer, the invoice need only state the fair market value of the goods at the place of manufacture, and it need not state "the actual cost thereof at the place of exportation." Therefore, an invoice of goods which belong to their manufacturer is not, nor is an entry of such goods, within the purview of section 2839, so as to make the person entering them with design to evade payment of duty liable to a forfeiture of their value. The most serious question arises in respect to section 2864, which is alleged to have been superseded by section 12 of the Act of June 22, 1874. The two statutes are here placed in parallel columns: Section 2864 Revised Stat- Section 12 of the Act of utes (2d ed.) "If any owner, con- or paper, or of any other June 22, 1874. Assuming that the language of section 2864, feiture of the value may be brought against the Section 13 of the Act of June 22, 1874, pro- "That any owner, im- [208] [209] that all Acts passed since that date are to have date it was made, which was after the passage On a full review of the above recited pro- The considerations covered by the foregoing views are so well discussed and enforced in the opinion of the district judge in this case that it is not deemed necessary further to enlarge upon them. R. WALTER & COMPANY, Judgment Cred- 0. BICKHAM & MOORE. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 820-826.) Section 2864 of the Revised Statutes, when ་ It is contended for the United States that this amendment to section 2864, made by the Act [No. 302.] [210] [320] [321] [822] The history and facts of the case appear in Mr. M. R. Walter, for plaintiffs in error. ately pay to the clerk of this court, and be held Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: September 29, 1883, Bickham & Moore, cred-wise; and the rights of the parties claiming said itors of Lake & Austin, sued out from the court goods and effects to replevy the same or to rebelow an attachment against the property of duce the same or any part thereof upon claim said debtors, directed to the Marshal of the made and the execution of bond, as required by United States for the Northern District of Mis-law, shall be in no wise prejudiced or affected sissippi. The writ came to the hands of that by said sale; nor shall the consent to said sale officer for execution. The attorney of the plaint- in any wise operate as a waiver of or to the iffs informed him that "he wanted a blank prejudice of any right, benefit, or advantage deputization on a writ of attachment to send to now held, possessed or claimed by said parties Grenada," which was the place of the residence or any of them, but all and singular the same of the debtors. This request was at first de- shall be preserved, this being simply a consent nied, but finally the following indorsement was order, and intended to convert the property made on the writ: "I hereby appoint into money in order to protect the same from waste and great depreciation, and to let the [323] money represent the property in all respects in the litigation. It is further ordered that said marshal do keep accounts of his said sales, showing the amount of proceeds of the several assets sold in the several bulks." my special deputy to execute this writ, the plaintiff not holding me for the acts of such deputy. J. L. Morphis, U. S. Marshal." The writ, so indorsed, was delivered to the attorney of the attaching creditors and he proceeded to Grenada with it. A sale was had pursuant to that order, and the sum of $24,550-not more than sufficient to satisfy the claim of the plaintiffs and their costs was realized, and paid over to the clerk of the court. The return of sale shows that so much of the order as required the sale of the books of account and choses in action was rescinded, and the notes levied on were delivered to A. C. Hebron "in accordance with an agreement between counsel for plaintiff and defend ants." The marshal testifies that he made the above took possession of the personal property, which On the second of January, 1884, the same On the 19th day of October, 1883, the following order of sale was made in the cause: "1. Because said alleged levy was not made by the U. S. Marshal or any of his deputies, or by anyone duly authorized to execute said writ of attachment. "2. Because the writ of attachment in this cause was levied and executed by Sam. Ladd, who was not and is not an officer of this court from which said writ emanated and was returnable, said Ladd not being either a regular deputy U. S. Marshal or a special deputy. 8. Because Mr. H. M. Sullivan, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs in this cause, appointed said Sam. Ladd to execute the said writ of at tachment. "Upon the application and consent, by attor- [324] |