[207]

distinctly marked on the ground so that its
boundaries can be readily traced. R. S. § 2324.
They have also the exclusive right of possession
and enjoyment "of all veins, lodes, and ledges
throughout their entire depth, the top or apex
of which lies inside of such surface lines ex-
tended downward vertically, although such
veins, lodes or ledges may so far depart from
a perpendicular in their course downward as to
extend outside the vertical side lines of said sur
face locations." The surface side lines ex-
tended downward vertically determine the ex-
tent of the claim, except when in its descent
the vein passes outside of them, and the out-
side portions are to lie between vertical planes
drawn downward through the end lines. This
means the end lines of the surface location, for
all locations are measured on the surface.

right to follow them outside of the side lines of
the location must be bounded by planes drawn
vertically through the same end lines. The
planes of the end lines cannot be drawn at a
right angle to the courses of all the veins if they
are not identical.

It is also a fact of importance, that the Land
Department has, since the Act of 1872, followed
the end lines as marked on the surface, and has
limited the extra lateral right of patentees by
vertical planes drawn down through such end
lines; as in the patent to Wood in this case.
Any decision that the department erred in that
respect, and that the rights of the patentees
were different, would disturb titles derived from
such patents, and lead to great confusion and
litigation. If it is expedient to change the rule,
legislative action should be invoked, as it would
operate only in the future, and not judicial de-
cision which would affect past cases as well.

This view of the controlling effect of the end lines of the surface location is also sustained by the decision of this court in the Flagstaff Case, Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463 [Bk. 25, L. ed. 253]. There the court said that "The most practicable rule is to regard the course of the vein as that which is indicated by surface outcrop, or surface explorations and workings;" and that "it is on this line that claims will naturally be laid, whatever be the character of the surface, whether level or inclined," and that the end lines of the claim, properly so called, "are those which are crosswise of the general course of the vein on the surface." The court suggested that the law might be imperfect in this respect, and that perhaps the true course of the vein should correspond with its strike or the line of a level run through it; but it added that this "can rarely be ascertained until considerable work has been done, and after claims and locations have become fixed."

The difficulty arising from the section grows
out of its application to claims where the course
of the vein is so variant from a straight line
that the end lines of the surface location are
not parallel, or, if so, are not at a right angle
to the course of the vein. This difficulty must
often occur where the lines of the surface loca-
tion are made to control the direction of the
vertical planes. The remedy must be found,
until the statute is changed, in carefully making
the location, and in postponing the marking of
its boundaries until explorations can be made to
ascertain, as near as possible, the course and
direction of the vein. In Colorado the statute
allows for this purpose sixty days after notice
of the discovery of the lode. Then the location
must be distinctly marked on the ground, and
thirty days thereafter are given for the prepara-
tion of the proper certificate of location to be
recorded. Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527, 533
[Bk. 28, L. ed. 1113]. Even then, with all the
care possible, the end lines marked on the surface
will often vary greatly from a right angle to
the true course of the vein. But whatever in-Under the Act of 1866, parallelism in the end
convenience or hardship may thus happen, it is
better that the boundary planes should be defi-
nitely determined by the lines of the surface
location than that they should be subject to
perpetual readjustment according to subter-
ranean developments made by mine workings.
Such readjustment at every discovery of a
change in the course of the vein would create
great uncertainty in titles to mining claims.
The rule, whatever hardship it may work in
particular cases, should be settled, and thus pre-
vent, as far as practicable, such uncertainty.

lines of a surface location was not required;
but where a location has been made since the
Act of 1872, such parallelism is essential to the
existence of any right in the locator or patentee
to follow his vein outside of the vertical planes
drawn through the side lines. His lateral right
by the statute is confined to such portion of the
vein as lies between such planes drawn through
the end lines and extended in their own direc-
tion; that is, between parallel vertical planes.
It can embrace no other portion.

The exterior lines of the Stone Claim form a
If the first locator will not or cannot make curved figure somewhat in the shape of a horse-
the explorations necessary to ascertain the true shoe, and its end lines are not and cannot be
course of the vein, and draws his end lines made parallel. What are marked on the plat
ignorantly, he must bear the consequences. He as end lines are not such. The one between
can only assert a lateral right to so much of his numbers 5 and 6 is a side line. The draughts-
vein as lies between vertical planes drawn man or surveyor seems to have hit upon two
through those lines. Junior locators will not parallel lines of his nine sided figure, and, ap-
be prejudiced thereby, though subsequent ex-parently for no other reason than their parallel-
plorations may show that he erred in his loca-
tion.

The provision of the statute, that the locator is entitled throughout their entire depth to all the veins, lodes or ledges, the top or apex of which lies inside of the surface lines of his location, tends strongly to show that the end lines marked on the ground must control. It often happens that the top or apex of more than one vein lies within such surface lines, and the veins may have different courses and dips, yet hie

ism, called them end lines.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the objection that, by reason of the surface form of the Stone Claim, the defendant could not follow the lode existing therein in its downward course beyond the lines of the claim, was well taken to the offered proof. Besides, if the lines marked as end lines on the plat of that claim can be regarded as such lines of the location, no part of the Gilt Edge Claim falls within vertical planes drawn down through those lines

[208

[20

continued in their own direction. In either | Congress of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 292,
view of the location of the Stone Claim, the re-
jected proof would have established no defense.
The premises in controversy are admitted to be
under the surface lines of the Gilt Edge Claim
eastward from the defendant's claim, and the
plaintiffs were therefore entitled to recover
them.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Gray did not hear the argument nor take any part in the decision of this case.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite dissenting:

I cannot agree to this judgment. In my
opinion the end lines of a mining location are
to be projected parallel to each other and cross-
wise of the general course of the vein within
the surface limits of the location, and when-
ever the top or apex of the vein is found within
the surface lines extended vertically down-
wards, the vein may be followed outside of the
vertical side lines. The end lines are not nec-
essarily those which are marked on the map as
such, but they may be projected at the extreme
points where the apex leaves the location as
marked on the surface.

Mr. Justice Bradley concurs.
True copy. Test:

chap. 278; March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. at L. 573,
chap. 122, and May 2, 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 59,
chap. 132, the defendant "became, and ever
since has been, a federal corporation, and has
held its franchises and exercised all its corpo-
rate powers under the Government of the United
States;" or "if, by virtue of the several Acts of
Congress * referred to, it did not be-

come a federal corporation, yet it holds under
the Government of the United States all the cor-
porate powers and franchises granted to it by
the said several Acts of Congress as the trustee
for the government, and for the governmental
uses and purposes specified in said Acts;" "that
the Government of the United States has never
given to the State of California the right to lay
any tax upon the franchise, existence, or opera-
tions of defendant;" that the "value of all the
franchises held and corporate powers exercised
by defendant under said Acts of Congress" were
included in the valuation of the property of the
Company upon which the taxes sued for were
assessed, and that by reason of the premises the
taxes are illegal and void.

2. That the property of the Company, for
which the taxes sued for were levied, was and
is incumbered by a mortgage securing an in-

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. debtedness of the Railroad Company, exceeding

$3,000 a mile, and that it was valued for taxa-
tion without deduction on account of such in-
cumbrance, because such was the requirement

[109] SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COM- of the statute with respect to railroad Corpora

[110]

PANY, Piff. in Err.,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFOR-
NIA.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 109-113)

tions owning railroads within the State, and [111]
operated in more than one county; and this cor-
poration was and is of that class.

3. That the statute under which the taxes
were levied is repugnant to article XIV of the
Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States, inasmuch as it deprives railroad corpo-
Removal of causes-controversy arising under the ations of the State operated in more than one
Constitution and laws of the United States.
ounty of the equal protection of the laws: (1)
by providing that the property of such corpo-
In an action by a State to recover money claimed rations shall be valued for taxation to them
to be due as taxes, where the right to recover was without deduction on account of mortgage in-
made, by the pleadings, to depend: (1) on the power cumbrances, while the mortgaged property of
of the State to tax the franchises of the corporation other corporations and of natural persons is
derived from the Acts of Congress, which were
especially referred to, as well as the property used taxed to its owner only on its value after the
in connection therewith; and (2) on the effect of arti- value of the mortgage has been deducted; and
cle 14 of the Amendments of the Constitution on the (2) by failing to provide a tribunal for the cor-
validity of the statutes under which the taxes sued
for were levied, the defendant had the right to re-rection of errors in the valuation of the proper-
move the cause to the federal court, under the Act
of March 3, 1875, on the ground that the action "is
a suit at law, of a civil nature and arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States."
[No. 841.]

Submitted Dec. 11, 1886. Decided Apr. 26, 1886.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State

of California.

ty of such railroad corporations for taxation,
when such a tribunal is provided for all other
corporations and for natural persons.

4. That the statute is still further repugnant
to the same Amendment, because it deprives
such corporations of their property without due

process of law; there being no provision for
tice to them of a time, place or tribunal for a
hearing in defense of their rights in the valua-
tion of their property for taxation.

Upon the filing of this answer, the Railroad
Company presented its petition, accompanied
by the necessary security, for the removal of
the suit to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of California, under the Act of
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. at L. 470, chap. 137, on
the ground that the action "is a suit at law of
a civil nature and arising under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States." This peti-
tion was filed in time. The state court pro-
ceeded with the suit, notwithstanding the peti-
tion, and gave judgment against the Pailroad

[112

[113]

Company for the full amount of the tax and the
statutory penalty. From this judgment the
Corporation appealed to the supreme court,
where the only question presented for decision
was "Whether the Federal Constitution and
the Act of Congress authorized a removal of an
action from a state to a federal court, brought
by a State to recover taxes levied under its laws
on the property of a being created by its power,
in one of its own courts.' This question was
decided against the Corporation, and the judg-
ment of the court below affirmed. To this judg-
ment of affirmance the present writ of error was
brought, on the allowance of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the State.

(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 97-109.)

Statute of Limitations—partnership accounts— indebtedness of firm to surviving partnerstatute does not run against surviving partner in possession of firm assets-lien of surviving partner on assets.

In New Orleans, M. & T. R. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 141 [Bk. 26, L. ed. 98], it was decided that a suit brought by a State in one of its own courts against a corporation of its own creation can be removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, under the Act of March 3, 1875, if it is a suit arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, although it 1. Where real estate was in fact partnership asmay involve questions other than those which sets, and the interest of heirs and the right to dower therein were subject to the lien of partnership depend on the Constitution and laws. The case debts, but dower was actually assigned nearly of Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449 [Bk. 28, L. three years before the filing of a bill to enforce the lien, the court refused to disturb the assignment. ed. 482], is to the same effect; and in Starin v. 2. Where real estate held as partnership assets is New York, 115 U. S. 257 [Bk. 29, L. ed. 388], sold under a decree and purchased by a firm credit was stated, as the effect of all the authorities itor who thereupon cancels his indebtedness, and on the subject, that if, from the questions in- such sale is subsequently held void, its incidents and consequences are also void. volved in a suit, "it appears that some title, 3. A surviving partner in possession of partnerright, privilege or immunity on which the re-ship property, real or personal, has a right to hold it until the debts of the firm are paid, including any covery depends will be defeated by one con-existing indebtedness to him; nor will his neglect to struction of the Constitution or a law of the wind up the concern relieve the partnership assets United States, or sustained by the opposite con- in his hands from the lien of the partnership debts, struction, the case will be one arising under the nor permit the Statute of Limitations to run in favor of the heirs of the deceased partner so as to enable Constitution or laws of the United States, with them to obtain an interest in the property without in the meaning of that term as used in the Act payment of the indebtedness. of 1875; otherwise not." [No. 677.]

Applying these rules, which must now be considered as settled, to the present case, it is

apparent that the court below erred in deciding,

that the suit was not removable; for it distinct-
ly appears that the right of the State to recover
was made by the pleadings to depend: (1) on the
power of the State to tax the franchises of the
Corporation derived from the Acts of Congress
which were specially referred to, as well as the
property used in connection therewith; and (2)
on the effect of art., XIV of the Amendments
of the Constitution on the validity of the stat-
utes under which the taxes sued for were levied.
The first depended on the construction of the
Acts of Congress, and the second on the con-
struction of the constitutional Amendment. If
decided in one way the State might recover, if
in another it would be defeated, at least in part.
The right of removal does not depend upon the
validity of the claim set up under the Constitu-
tion or laws. It is enough if the claim involves
a real and substantial dispute or controversy in
the suit. In this case there can be no doubt
about that. The Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of California has already
decided more than once, in other cases involv-
ing precisely the same questions, that the stat-
ute on which the recovery depends was uncon-
stitutional and void, and some of these cases are
now pending here on writs of error. Already
much time has been devoted in this court to
their argument under special assignments.

The judgment of the supreme court is re-
versed and the cause remanded, with directions
104

Submitted Jan. 11, 1886. Decided Apr. 26, 1886.

APPEAL from the District Court of the
United States for the Northern District of
Mississippi. Reversed.

The case is stated by the court.

Mr. William L. Nugent, for appellants. Messrs. Frank Johnston and J. E. McKeighan, for appellees.

[9

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion [98 of the court:

This case was commenced by bill in equity filed in the court below in July, 1882, by Pattie A. Clay and Brutus J. Clay, her husband, citizens of the State of Kentucky, against Lucy C. Freeman and C. L. Freeman, her husband, and David I. Field, citizens of the State of Missouri. As the bill was dismissed on demurrer, and the appeal is from the decree of dismissal, it is necessary to state its principal allegations. The facts alleged are substantially as follows:

In 1855 Christopher I. Field (of whom the complainant, Pattie A. Clay, is only child and heir at law) and his brother, David I. Field (of whom the defendant, Lucy C. Freeman, is the widow, and the defendant, David I. Field, is only child and heir at law), jointly purchased a plantation in Bolivar County, Mississippi, called the Content Place, for the purpose of carrying it on in partnership, under an agreement by which said David was to possess, manage and control the partnership property for the firm, and the partners were to be equally inter

[99]

ested in the property and business. They were | paid. On the 12th of December, 1859, C.
also equally to bear losses and expenses, and to I. Field probated and registered his claim against
share equally the profits realized; but Chris- the estate of D. I. Field, and to the proof there-
topher, being a man of large wealth, did not of annexed the following memorandum, to
have the same necessity for calling upon the wit:
firm profits as David did. The style of the
partnership, as advertised by the partners, was
David I. Field & Co., or D. I. Field & Co. The
plantation and its equipment of slaves and im-
plements cost from $60,000 to $70,000, the lands
alone costing about $54,000. Of this capital
Christopher advanced $15,541.26 more than Da-
vid, which advance was made in the years 1856,
1857, 1858 and 1859, and four partnership notes
were executed by David and delivered to Chris-
topher as evidence of these advances, which
notes were as follows, namely:

1. "$7, 385. On or before the first day of January, 1858, the concern of David I. Field & Co. will be owing C. I. Field the sum of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-five dollars for money advanced the concern for payment for the Leach land and cash advanced for the purchase of negroes in K'y in the summer of 1856, and to bear six per cent interest from maturity, or when due. This 23d Dec'r.,

1856.

"D. I. Field & Co. [seal.]"

"David I. Field & Co. is a firm consisting of
the estate of David I. Field and C. I. Field,
partners in the Kirk Plantation, known as the
Content Place. All the within notes are join!
notes of the firm to C I. Field; consequently
one half of the within claim is chargeable to
the estate of D. I. Field. This the 10th Dec'r.
1859.
(signed) C. I. Field."

Nothing was realized from the plantation dur-
ing the years 1859, 1860, and 1861, more than
sufficient to keep it up. In 1859 there was a bad
overflow of the river; in 1860 there was barely
sufficient for expenses, and the crop of 1861 was
destroyed by the confederate soldiers under
military orders.

Christopher I. Field then took the slaves. (about thirty in number) to Texas to prevent their being dispersed and, after the war was ended, brought them back and endeavored to work the plantation again; but as few of the slaves, after obtaining their freedom, were willing to remain on it, very little could be done, and the place was worked at a loss. Christopher I. Field died on the 18th of July, 1867, leav ing his daughter Pattie, the complainant, his

2. "The concern of David I. Field & Co. is
owing to C. I. Field the sum of five thousand
six hundred and sixty-six and two thirds dollars
(it being that amount advanced by him of pay-sole heir at law, who came of full age on the
ment to Kirk, balance on concern note due him
1st day of January last); he is to be paid six
per cent for said amount from date until
paid. This 20th March, 1857.

"D. I. Field & Co. [seal.]"
"Bolivar, June 13th, 1859.
"Due C. I. Field, or order, one thousand
three hundred and eighty-nine dollars 120%, for
value rec'd, on settlement to this date (to this
date).

"D. I. Field & Co."

David I. Field (whom for the sake of brevity we will call D. I. Field) conducted the plantation, and lived on it until his death, which took place on the 11th of September, 1859; and from that time until the commencement of the [100] late war, it was conducted by his administrator, one E. H. Field. His widow, Lucy, the now defendant, soon after his death removed to Lexington, Kentucky, with her infant son, David I. Field, Junior, one of the defendants in this suit; and after her marriage with her present husband, C. S. Freeman, she removed to Missouri to reside with him, and neither she nor her son has ever lived in Mississippi since. At the time of his death, D. I. Field owed individually (including his half of the firm debt due to his brother, C. I. Field) $11,000 or $12,000, all of which debts, and all the firm debts except the debt due to C. I. Field, were

22d of November, 1869. A few months before
his death he was appointed administrator de
bonis non of his brother David, but nothing
came to his hands as such administrator, and
he filed no account. After his death, Brutus
J. Clay, Senior (father of Brutus, one of the
complainants), was appointed administrator,
both of the estate of Christopher and of his
brother David, and assumed the management
of the plantation; but by reason of dilapidation,
growth of brush, and overflows of the river,
realized nothing beyond taxes and expenses as
long as he had the charge.

On the 2d of November, 1868, Brutus J.Clay,
Senior, as administrator of David I. Field, pre-
sented a petition to the probate court of Bolivar
County, Mississippi, representing the estate of
said David to be insolvent, and praying for an
order to sell his property, real and personal,
for the payment of his debts. Schedules were
annexed to the petition, showing that there was
no personal property, that the only real estate
was the said David's half interest in the planta-
tion of Content, and that his debts consisted of
one half of the notes given to Christopher as be-
fore mentioned. The petition stated that Da-
vid's widow, Lucy, and his only child and heir,
David, Jr., and his guardian, one Scott, resided
in Lexington, Kentucky, and prayed an order
of publication citing all parties interested to ap-
pear, etc. Upon this petition and the proceedings
had in pursuance thereof, a decree was made by
the probate court in March, 1869, declaring that
the estate was insolvent, and authorizing and
directing the administrator to sell the lands de-
scribed in the petition. In pursuance of this de-
cree and advertisement, duly published, D. I.
Field's one half interest in the plantation was
sold at public auction on the 20th day of Decem-
ber, 1869, and struck off to the complainant,
then Pattie A. Field, by her attorney, for the
sum of $6,000. The complainant gave her re-

[101]

[102]

[103]

ceipt for the amount of purchase money, less | still pending at the time of filing the bill in this
the costs, which was credited on the notes by case.
the administrator, and she received a deed for The bill states that shortly after the sale made
the property purchased, and went into posses- on the 20th of December, 1869, Brutus J. Clay,
sion, and has remained in possession, by herself Senior, made his final settlement as administra-
and her husband or her tenants, ever since that tor of the estates of David I. Field and Chris-
time, except as to the dower of the defendant, topher I. Field, in the chancery court of Boli-
Lucy C. Freeman, hereafter mentioned. The var County aforesaid, and was discharged;
sale was made in good faith and in the belief that and that there has since beeu no administrator
it was valid. On the first day of December, 1869, of either of said estates. E. H. Field also set-
shortly before the sale took place, a new Consti- tled his accounts as administrator of David I.
tution of Mississippi went into operation, Field's estate and was discharged. All of the
which abolished the probate court and estab-personal property of the partnership of David
lished a chancery court for each county, hav-I. Field & Co. was lost or destroyed without
ing, amongst other things, the former jurisdic- any negligence of Christopher I. Field, surviv-
diction of the probate court; and, by a law ing partner, as the result of the war, at the end
passed the 4th of May, 1870, it was enacted that of which the only property of the partnership
all causes and proceedings remaining undis- left was the Content Plantation; that no part of
posed of in the court of probate of each county the partnership notes given to Christopher as
should be transferred to the chancery court. aforesaid has ever been paid. The complainant
The proceedings in this case were not formally insists that this debt is a charge on the property
transferred, but are actually on file in the prior to any claim of the widow, Lucy, or of
clerk's office of the chancery court for Bolivar the heir, David I. Field, Junior. D. I. Field's
County aforesaid.
estate is insolvent, the one half of said lands
being now insufficient to pay said notes and the
interest thereon. C. I. Field, at the time of his
death, owed nothing, or if anything, all his
debts are paid off and discharged. All the part-
nership debts, except the said debt due to the
estate of C. I. Field, have been paid off and dis-
charged. The complainant, Pattie A. Clay, now
holds said debt as his sole heir at law and dis-
tributee.

The bill then states the results of the working
of the plantation from 1870 to the time of the
filing of the bill, showing that no profits were
realized, but that the complainant incurred a
loss of from $2,500 to $3,000, in consequence
of the dilapidations consequent upon the war,
severe overflowing of the river, and other causes
for which the complainant was not responsible.
Vouchers are exhibited with the bill for taxes,
expenses, and repairs by her paid and incurred. The prayer is that an account of the part-
In 1873 Lucy C. Freeman (then Lucy C. nership may be taken, and that the assets may be
Field) filed a petition in the chancery court of marshaled, and the said debt paid out of the
Bolivar County for her dower in one undivided assets of the partnership, including said planta-
half of the Content Plantation; and in 1875 a tion-the complainants proffering an account of
decree for allotment of dower was made, which all moneys received therefrom, and claiming
decree was affirmed by the supreme court of credit for all taxes, expenses and repairs. The
the State in 1876, so far as said Lucy's legal prayer then proceeds as follows: "Or if this hon-
right to dower was concerned. The complain-orable court should adjudge and determine that
ant and Brutus J. Clay, Senior, by way of de-
fense to the suit, set up the partnership, the in-
debtedness to Christopher I. Field, the fact that
the plantation was partnership property, and
liable for the partnership debts before any dower
could be had therein, and also set up the sale of
David I. Field's interest by order of the or-
phans' court. But this defense was overruled
as not a good defense at law. The supreme
court in affirming the decree, however, declared
that the right of C. I. Field's estate arising out
of the partnership and the partnership debts
was not affected by the proceedings in dower,
and that the defendants, or tenants, in that suit
were left free to litigate the same with the said
Lucy. Her dower was thereupon set off to her
in November, 1879, and complainants hoped she
would be therewith content, and did not further
resist her taking possession of her dower. But
in September, 1880, she filed a bill for damages
in dower, which is now pending in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Mississippi.

On the 27th of November, 1880, David I. Field, Junior, who had then come of age, commenced an action of ejectment in the said circuit court for an undivided half of said plantation, as heir of his father, David I. Field, Senior, and demands $20,000 for mesne profits. The complainant filed a plea, and the suit was

the said proceedings in the probate court of
said county of Bolivar constitute an election
binding upon her, and that they estop her from
proceeding otherwise than as against the undi-
vided half interest of said David I. Field, de-
ceased, in said plantation for the half of said
partnership debts due to her ancestor, your ora-
tors in that event pray that after the amount
due her as such heir at law and distributee upon
such accounting shall be ascertained and fixed;
the said undivided half interest of said David
I. Field in said plantation shall be sold under
the proper decree of this court, thus carrying
into execution the decree of said probate court
of Bolivar County, rendered in the matter of
the administration of the estate of said David
I. Field, deceased; but if this honorable court
should adjudge and determine that your ora-
tors are not entitled to either of the special re-
liefs herein before prayed, they then pray that
this honorable court may decree that your ora-
tors have a lien upon the said undivided half in-
terest of said David I. Field, deceased, in said
plantation for the said sum of $6,000, and the in-
terest thereon from the 20th day of December,
1869, lessened by any balance that may be
found due by her upon such accounting to be
had in the cause as may be adjudged to be fair
and equitable; and if it be determined that your
oratrix has lost her right to proceed against

[104]