THE SEAMEN'S ACT OF 1915

HENRY W. FARNAM

Yale University

Whoever takes a broad view of the history of the seas during the past half century must be profoundly impressed by two striking facts. One is the wonderful progress made by man in his domination of nature; the other is the lack of progress made by man in governing himself. He has built steamers of a speed and power thought impossible a generation ago. Waves and wind have comparatively little effect on the regularity with which our ocean greyhounds cross the Atlantic on a schedule of seven, six, and even less than five days. Progress in the preservation of food gives us a variety and luxury of diet which half a century ago could not have been commanded on the most expensive steamers and which the great majority even of first-class ocean travellers seldom enjoy upon land. Wireless telegraphy has made it possible to flash the S. O. S. call across the waste of waters and to bring to a ship in distress within a few hours a swarm of helpers. Safety appliances and signalling devices have been multiplied.

And yet in spite of all this wonderful progress the number of lives lost on the water seems to have gone up steadily. In a table reprinted by the Senate Committee on Commerce it appears that, taking the disasters by five-year periods, the number of lives lost at sea and on the Great Lakes has gone up from 1,018 in the period 1860 to 1864, to 5,445 in the four years and five months beginning with 1910. Even if we allow for defects in the statistics of the earlier years, and disregard them, we still find the same tendency during the past twenty years. The number of lives lost has more than doubled since 1895. It may be objected that these figures do not take account either of the number of passengers and sailors navigating the seas, or of the mileage, and an exact statistical comparison should undoubtedly allow for these. But

the bald fact stands out clearly that during a period in which immense progress has been made in all the mechanical methods of saving life, the number of lives lost has increased.

The story is made more impressive if we turn from these gross figures and consider the individual disasters which have done so much to swell the totals. The depressing fact is that in many of these cases the cause of the disaster lay in some imperfection of human nature, and not in the elements. The General Slocum went down in 1904 in the North River destroying 955 lives, in consequence of a fire caused by somebody's carelessness. The Titanic went down with 1,517 lives in a perfectly calm sea. The Empress of Ireland sacrificed 1,027 lives in the St. Lawrence River within a few miles of shore, and more recently the Eastland turned turtle in the Chicago River and nearly a thousand more perished. It is not necessary to assign blame to any individual in reviewing the history of these disasters. Whether an accident has been due to bad judgment on the part of a commander, to an excessive fondness for profits on the part of the directors, to insufficiency or inefficiency of seamen, the broad fact remains that with the elements at rest, and with every opportunity for estimating their force and their behavior, some failure of the human mind has either brought about the disaster or stood in the way of saving life.

The leading thought of the act of March 4th, 1915, which we are to discuss is that it lays stress upon the human element as distinguished from mechanical contrivances. It tries to secure better seamen with better training to do the work and to provide for the emergencies at sea. This is only the central aim. The act itself is a long act, dealing with many different subjects. It is a technical act. It has been fully discussed in the proceedings of Congress, in the public press, in the publications of the Seamen's Union, on one hand, and by various commercial bodies, on the other. It would be hopeless and needless for one who is neither a sailor nor a naval officer, nor the manager of a steamship company nor a diplomat, to try to contribute any new facts to the discussion. But it may not be useless to emphasize a point of view, which, if not new, is not generally heard, and to represent that diffused interest of the general public which, though broad in extent, is lacking in concentration and was typified by the late Professor

Sumner in the phrase "the forgotten man." The general public, of course, includes some who are sailors, some who are officials, some who are stock-holders or directors of steamboat companies, but, as a mass, we are more interested in results than in methods, and there are few of us who are not either directly or indirectly concerned in the subject. If we go abroad, or travel along the Atlantic or Pacific coast, or on the great inland waterways, we are interested as passengers in reaching our destination safely. If we use any imported articles, as when we drink a cup of coffee, or read a foreign book, or wear an imported fabric, we are interested as consumers of what was at one time freight. If we produce anything which is exported-wheat, cotton, typewriters we are interested as producers. Finally, we all have as Americans an interest, which may be called sentimental, if you please, but which is none the less real, in seeing the American flag on the ocean, and in desiring that those who sail under that flag, whether passengers or crew, get better treatment than those who sail under any other flag. We would like to see on American ships something like that broad white line which still records on every British ship the heroic fight made a generation ago on behalf of the British sailor by Samuel Plimsoll. Moreover, we are, I believe, willing to pay for what we want. Neither the American traveller nor the American consumer is niggardly. We are not asking for favors, or for an addition to our income, but we are asking for standards and we are willing to pay the cost.

To see the act of 1915 in its proper perspective we must take at least a glance at what has preceded it. Legislation for the protection of American seamen goes back to the very beginning of our history. In the very first session of the First Congress a resolution was passed on July 20, 1789, "that a Committee be appointed to bring in a bill or bills providing for the establishment of hospitals for sick and disabled seamen." The committee did not complete its work until nine years later, but in the meantime a law was passed, July 20, 1790, for the government and regulation of seamen in the merchant service. On one hand it aimed to protect the seaman against bad treatment and injustice; on the other hand it aimed to protect the owners and captains against desertion and wrongdoing on the part of the seamen. The basis of its regulation was the requirement of a formal contract in writing between the

seaman and his employer. In the absence of such an agreement the master was required to pay the highest wages paid at the same port for a similar voyage during the previous three months. In case a seaman did not sign the agreement, he was not subject to the regulations or penalties of the act. Provision was made for an investigation of unseaworthiness on the part of the ship. If a chief mate and a majority of the crew thought the vessel too leaky or unfit in respect to tackle, provisions, or stores, the master was required to stop at the nearest port and make a careful investigation. The payment of wages was secured by requiring the captain to pay one-third of the wages due at every port at which the ship should discharge her cargo, and the balance at the end of the voyage. Every ship was to carry a medicine chest and a certain minimum of supplies such as sixty gallons of water, 100 pounds of "salted flesh meat," and 100 pounds of wholesome ship bread for each person on board. In case of a short allowance the master was to pay each one of the crew one day's wages for every day of short rations. On the other hand, penalties were put upon the seaman for absenting himself from his duty and for desertion. If he failed to render himself on board at the hour and on the day set in his contract, he forfeited one day's pay for each hour of tardiness. If he absented himself from the ship without leave, and returned within forty-eight hours, he forfeited three days' wages for each day of absence, but after forty-eight hours he forfeited all wages due him and all his property which might be on shipboard. If he deserted at any port, a justice of the peace might issue a warrant and have him arrested, and on conviction he might be committed to a house of correction or common jail, until the vessel was ready to sail or until the master required his discharge, and the costs might be deducted from his wages.

These provisions constituted what has been recently called "involuntary servitude" for the sailor, but it should be remembered that this was the legal status of the ordinary wage worker in England at that time, and that even in the United States mechanics could be indicted for a combination to raise their wages. Therefore, as compared with the legislation of the time, this act represented progress, inasmuch as it did provide special standards for the treatment of sailors and for their protection from abuse.