power and the principles of government"" with the passage of the Stamp Act. It is more nearly true to say that the Stamp Act and others which followed it were the result of disputes which arose in connection with every phase of the war with France. It is not contended that all of the anti-imperial and independent ideas of the colonists originated during this war, for many of them appeared earlier; but never before had the Americans so thoroughly elucidated their ideas on constitutional questions, and never before had they so clearly defined the position which they meant to maintain.

Hardly an issue which disturbed the relations between colonies and mother country between the passage of the Stamp Act and the Declaration of Independence was new. These issues had in one form or another been thrashed over in the controversies of the various assemblies with their governors, and the opinions of the colonists concerning them were formed and crystallized. The grounds upon which the colonists claimed exemption from British taxation and restrictions in the later period were by no means new; they had been asserted again and again in substantially the same terms during the war with France. The conditions in the two periods were similar and they called forth similar ideas, protests, and demands on the part of the Americans. In both cases the mother country attempted to procure assistance and to exact obedience from the colonies, and these attempts were resisted by the latter, who contended that such interference by England was an attack upon their long cherished "rights." That a declaration of independence and a separation did not come in the earlier period was due more to the want of a well-defined policy on either side of the Atlantic than to an absence of independent ideas in the colonies. This tendency to resist authority was more pronounced in some colonies than in others, and it took some time to develop a policy of concerted action; but it existed, nevertheless, in all of them, and it needed only additional pressure on the part of crown officials to develop this tendency into armed resistance.

1 McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, 313-314.

The object of attack depended upon the character of the colonial government, in other words, upon the source of outside restraint. In proprietary colonies it was the alleged usurpations of the proprietor which must be opposed and defeated. If the proprietor could be overthrown entirely, so much the better. In these colonies there were usually unstinted professions of loyalty to the king, whose good will might be of service in overthrowing the proprietor. In royal colonies it was the governor who was continually accused of trampling under foot the "rights of his Majesty's faithful and loyal subjects." In the charter colonies there was little friction between the legislative and executive branches of government, for both were elected by and responsible to the people, but there was the same determination to preserve all charter rights and to acquire others if possible. Whatever the source, all outside authority must be resisted. When, at the close of the French and Indian War, Parliament became the instrument for enforcing such authority, the colonies at last united in common effort to resist and finally to overthrow all British control.

But coupled with this tenacious insistence upon acquired rights was another trait of the colonists which weakened materially their power of resistance. This was their utter lack of unity, their limited horizon, and their jealousy of one another.2 The spirit of patriotism and national loyalty in the modern sense seems to have been almost entirely lacking. In a sense they gloried in being Englishmen and they hated the common enemy; but whenever the general welfare of the empire required them to sacrifice any of their cherished rights (however small) or to abandon a profitable trade with the enemy, they invariably chose the policy best suited to their own individual interests. This want of unity continued during the period which followed the war with France, but it was overcome in part on the eve of

2 Burnaby, whose account of actual conditions is more valuable than his prophecies, wrote in 1759: ". fire and water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies in North America. Nothing can exceed the jealousy and emulation which they possess in regard to each other." Travels, in Pinkerton, Voyages, xiii, 751-752.

us

the Revolution by the efficient work of the committees of correspondence. These committees were effective instruments of agitation. They aroused public opinion and centered it upon the common danger. They caused local grievances, such as the closing of Boston harbor, to be adopted by other colonies. By spreading information and molding public opinion they created enthusiasm for the cause and overcame, for a time at least, the indifference which was so apparent during the French war.

When Governor Dinwiddie' of Virginia learned from the defiant answer given to Major Washington in 1753 that the French meant to back their pretensions by force, he called upon the other colonies for assistance. "But the colonies, alas!" exclaimed a contemporary writer, "were sunk into a profound lethargy; and, resigned to stupidity and slumbering, appeared insensible of the threatening danger."'s This charge, though severe, is substantiated by the records of the various colonies. They underrated the power of the French. They knew little and cared less about the western country, and they even questioned the title of the British crown to these lands.*

None knew better than the French the unprepared condition of the English colonists and their want of unity. The French considered early occupation and a defensive position of greater importance than the larger numbers of the English. "They declare without reserve,' wrote Governor Dinwiddie, "that altho' we are vastly superior to them in Numbers, yet they can take and secure the Co't'y before we can agree to hinder them. Still stronger evidence is found in a letter from Duquesne himself in which he said "The Governors of New England [mean

8 Review of Military Operations, in Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc., ser. 1, viii, 72, 73. 4 Ibid.

5 Dinwiddie to Secretary Robinson, June 8, 1754. Col. Rec. of N. C., v, 129. In writing to Governor DeLancey of New York for troops, Dinwiddie says that if the colonies concur "I shall hope the Consequences will be to show our Enemies how far they were mistaken in their Sarcasm they threw out, that tho' they owned, We could bring two men to their one, yet, that we were too slow, and disconnected, to hinder the progress of their Undertakings.”’ Jan. 29, 1754. Pa. Arch., ser. 2, vi,

179-180.

ing, probably, all the English colonies], besides being independent one of the other, cannot levy troops without an order of the King of Great Britain, and you will have observed by Mr Washington's Journal that all the Provinces have furnished a quota to his detachment. I know, moreover, that the Quakers, who never make war, have also furnished their contingent."" The obvious meaning of this letter is that he considered such measures illegal, and mere bluster on the part of the colonists.

The French colonists and army were more directly under the control of the king, and, as they did not possess so many "rights" which must be defended, their military operations could be conducted with secrecy and dispatch. In the British colonies every plan had to be fought over in the assemblies before it could even be attempted, and the enemy always had ample opportunity to learn its details in advance.R

As Virginia took a greater interest in the Ohio country than the other colonies, she was naturally the first to act in its defense, and her governor, Dinwiddie, at once took steps to repel the invaders. But his enthusiasm was checked from the beginning by his reluctant assembly. They voted £1000 for raising and equipping three hundred men for defending the frontier, but the governor complained that they "were much divided" and failed to do as much as he had asked. The surrounding colonies, however, were still less generous, for Dinwiddie had written only a week before to Secretary Robinson that "every Gov't except No. Caro. has amus'd me with Expectations that have proved fruitless, and at length refused to give any Supply, unless in such a manner as must render it ineffectual.

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The Pennsylvania assembly answered their governor's appeal for aid with a reply that was characteristic of their attitude throughout the war. They refused to vote assistance because

6 War was not formally declared until May, 1756.

7 Pa. Arch., ser 2, vi, 173. Duquesne to DeMachault, Oct. 28, 1754.

8 Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc., ser. 1, vii, 161-162.

Col. Rec. of N. C., v, 110. To President Rowan of North Carolina, March 23, 1754.

10 Ibid., 129.

it had not been made clear to them that the subjects of a foreign prince had erected forts "within the undoubted Limits of this Government." The limits "had not been ascertained to your satisfaction." As the war progressed it seemed difficult to prove this or anything else to their satisfaction.12

The assembly of New York required equally strong proof of ownership before they would vote aid to the king. "It appears," they said in an address to the lieutenant-governor, "by papers your Honor has been pleased to communicate to us, that the French have built a fort at a place called French Creek, at a considerable distance from the river Ohio, which may, but does not by any evidence or information appear to us to be an invasion of any of his Majesty's colonies.''18 This was rather an impertinent stand to take when the British government had already decided that its territory had been invaded. The assembly finally decided to vote £1000 for the purpose of sending two companies to Virginia, but the money was to be raised in a manner which the council declared contrary to the king's instructions and therefore refused to allow. The perennial quarrel over a permanent salary for the governor was also in progress, and when the present bill was not allowed by the council, the assembly refused to pass another. DeLancey thought that the council was also at fault in not waiving its grounds during this critical situation, but the king severely criticised the assembly for their declaration and their refusal on such "trifling" grounds to grant aid.14

11 Pa. Arch., 1748-56, ii, 235. Resolution of the assembly, March 8, 1754.

12 Another excuse given for refusing aid was that the Earl of Holdernesse had asked for aid against the French within their respective provinces, and as the boundary line between Pennsylvania and Virginia had never been settled, they feared that they might invade Virginia in pursuit of the enemy. They would wait, therefore, to see what Virginia would do. The governor explained that the earl had meant to ask for aid to defend all of the king's lands, and that the governor of Virginia had asked for assistance, but the assembly refused to be convinced and adjourned without granting the aid. Pa. Col. Rec., v, 763-765.

18 Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc., ser. 1, vii, 72-73. Address of the New York Assembly, April 23, 1754.

14 Pa. Arch., ser. 2, vi, 188, 192, 196. Letters of DeLancey and Secretary Robinson.