the "original packages" and not the bottles: In re Harmon, U. S. C. Ct., N. D. Miss., Aug. 6, 1890.

The business of running Pullman cars, run wholly within a State, is taxable as a privilege: Gibson Co. v. Pullman Smith Car Co., V. S. C. Ct., W. D. Tenn., April 28, 1890.

The trial and commitment of one who has already been tried and acquitted of the same offense is depriving him of his liberty "without due process of law" within the meaning of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States: Ex parte Ulrich, U. S. D. Ct., W. D. Mo., June 23, 1890.

COPYRIGHT.

There is no infringement of copyright in a picture, where the two are dissimilar, the attitude, general expression, and general appearance of the two figures unlike, and different, the variations being more than coiorable: Munro v. Smith et al., U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y., May 5, 1890.

COSTS.

The costs of printing the bill, subsequent pleadings and other documents in a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States, cannot be taxed, there being no rule, and the fee-bill (Section 823, Rev. Stat.) being silent thereon, even though there be an agreement between counsel to tax the same: Lee v. Simpson, U. S. C. Ct., D. S. C., June 11, 1890.

CRIMINAL LAW.

One, who pleads not guilty, and is put upon his trial for a felony, evidence being introduced by the State, and the case adjourned for the trial of another, and the jury discharged on such adjourned hearing by the judge on the ground of his own ill health without the prisoner's consent, cannot be again tried for the same offense, the discharge being equivalent to an acquittal: Ex parte Ulrich, U. S. D. Ct., W. D. Mo., June 23, 1890.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

A Conveyance of land by a debtor to his wife presumedly in satisfaction of a debt due by him to her, but really with the intention of preserving it from his creditors, and with an agreement to execute a mortgage for his benefit, is void: Marshall v. Whitney et al., U. S. C. Ct., D. Ind., July 30, 1890.

INJUNCTION.

Joint suit for an injunction will not be sustained where persons have been separately indicted for the sale of intoxicating liquors in the original packages, and separately enjoined from making such sales, even though they are agent and sub-agent of the importer: Woolstein et al., v. Welch, U. S. C. Ct., D. Kans., July 18, 1890.

INSURANCE.

An action lies against an insurance company for loss by fire where it has brought action before and recovered its premiums after a fire has occurred, even though the policy provides, In case the assured fails to pay the premium note, this policy shall cease, and remain void during the time said note remains unpaid after its

maturity, and no legal action on the part of this company shall be construed as reviving the policy. The payment of the premium, however, revives the policy, and makes it good for the balance of its term:" Phonix Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson et al., S. Ct. Ind., Sept. 18, 1890.

A baggage checker of a transfer company, who lives in one place, whose business it is to meet and board trains, and check baggage to other lines, is a railroad employe within the meaning of the following condition in an accident policy: "This insurance does not cover entering, or trying to enter or leave a moving conveyance using steam as a motive power * * * railroad employes excepted:" Cotten v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., U. S. C. Ct., S. D. Miss., January 17, 1890.

Warehousemen have an insurable interest in cotton insured by them in their own name and can recover therefor under a policy which provides, "cotton in bales, their own, or held by them in trust, or on commission, or on joint account with others, or sold but not delivered," although the cotton was owned by another and the fact was not disclosed: Pelzer Manufg Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., U. S. C. Ct., S. C., Febry. 4, 1890.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

An express company engaged in business as an independent concern, for its own profit, is not subject to the provisions of the interstate commerce act as construed by the commission: United States v. Morsman, U. S. D. Ct., E. D. Mo., May 21, 1890.

An indictment which does not show that such company is a mere adjunct or bureau of a railroad company or combination of railroad companies, does not bring the company within the act: Id.

Injunction will lie in equity to restrain proceedings by a prosecuting attorney to prevent the agents of non-resident importers selling liquors in the original packages, where the State law is a violation of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, such proceedings being an interference with property rights under the Constitution, Rev. Stat. U. S. § 1979, giving the right of action at law or suit in equity: Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch et al., U. S. C. Ct., D. Kans., July 18, 1890.

Small packages of liquor in any form or size may be sold by the importer or his agent in a prohibition State, the size of the package being of no consequence; and an agent imprisoned for making sales in such original package will be released on habeas corpus, the Kansas Laws being in contravention of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution: In re Beine; In re Jockheck et als., U. S. C. Ct., D. Kans., June 14, 1890.

JURISDICTION.

The State authorities have jurisdiction over a United States marshal arrested, while on his way to serve process of the United States commissioner, under State authority for forgery, it not appearing that his arrest was for an act done pursuant to federal authority, or with intent to interfere with the service of such process: In re Miller, U. S. D. Ct, E. D S. C., May 10, 1890.

NATURALIZATION.

Cancellation of a certificate or decree of naturalization will be decreed in a federal court at the suit of the United States, where such certificate has been obtained by fraud in a State Court: United States v. Morsch, U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Mo., June 12, 1890.

NEGLIGENCE.

It is negligence for a sailing vessel to use a fog-horn sounded by the breath, instead of, by bellows as directed by article twelve of the sailing regulations: The Catalonia, The Rebecca A. Taulane: U. S. D. Ct., D. Mass., Aug. 18, 1890.

It is negligence for a vessel to run at the rate of seven knots an hour in a frequented part of the ocean, and in a fog so thick that a ship's hull and sails can not be seen hardly more than a ship's length distant: Id.

It is contributory negligence for a person, knowing a fast train is due, to get on the track, and he cannot recover should an accident occur: Farve v. Louisville & N. R. Co., U. S. C. Ct., S. D. Miss., March 7, 1890.

PARTNERSHIP.

Where a surviving pariner, under an attachment issued in a suit brought by him for a partnership debt, purchases real estate at the sheriff's sale, such property is not partnership real estate descendible to the heirs of the deceased partner, but may be converted into personal property by sale by such surviving partner: Bright et al. v. Land & River Imp. Co. et al., U. S. C. Ct., W. D. Wis., June 6, 1890.

PATENTS.

A license to use a patent cannot be revoked by the licensor, where the license does not contain a power of revocation, without the consent of the licensee. The licensor's only remedy is by action at law for breach of contract: Chase v. Cox, U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Pa., Jan. 19, 1890.

PRACTICE.

Service of writ by publication may be had on a non-resident, in a suit to establish a trust in real estate, even though the bill also prays an account and other relief: Porter Land & Water Co. v. Baskin, U. S. C. Ct., S. D. Cal., Aug. 8, 1890.

RAILROADS.

The speed of trains is in the discretion of a railroad company, when such trains are not passing through an incorporated city or town, or crossing a public street or highway, and the engineer in such case is not bound to look out for persons on the track: Farve v. Louisville & N. R. Co., U. S. C. Ct., S. D. Miss., March 7, 1890.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Causes may be removed from the State to the Federal Courts on the ground of local prejudice under the Act of March 3, 1887, the amount being over five hundred, but less than two thousand, dollars: Frishman v. Insurance Cos., U. S. C. Ct., D. Kans., March 14, 1890.

Where some of the defendants are residents and others non-residents of the State, a cause, wherein there is only a single controversy, cannot be removed from a State to a Circuit Court under the second section of the act of 1887: Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Cowenhoven et al., U. S. C. Ct., D. Colo., March 6, 1890.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Statute does not apply to an agreement to support a child until he is of age; it not being an agreement "not to be performed within a year," as the child might die within the year: Wooldbridge v. Stern, U. S. C. Ct., W. D. Mo., May 5, 1890.

TRADE-MARKS.

An infringement is made out where the defendants have so placed numbers and words, indicating sizes and quantities, in similarity to those on the orator's labels, as to lead in the direction of the conclusion that methodical imitation was intended, even though defendant use the words "Warranted Hose Supporter " for "Warren Hose Supporter" Frost et al. v. Rindskopf, U. S. C. Ct., E. D. N. Y., April, 1890.

:

Jurisdiction cannot be had in the circuit court of a bill for infringing trade-marks used in foreign commerce under Act of Congress March 3, 1881, both parties residing in the State, and there being no evidence that the trade-mark is used in foreign commerce : Graveley et al. v. Graveley et al., U. S. C. Ct., W. D. Va., April 19, 1890.

The words" Warren Hose Supporter" used in connection with a cut of a hose supporter connected with a stocking, and placed as labels on boxes containing hose supporters, are entitled to protection as a trade-mark, being more than merely descriptive, and sufficiently arbitrary to denote fairly the origin of the goods: Frost et al. v. Rindskopf et al., U. S. C. Ct., E. D. N. Y., April, 1890.

WITNESS.

A witness who is not a party to a suit against executors is competent to give evidence as to transactions between his testator and himself, under section eight hundred and fifty-eight of the Revised Statutes of the United States even though he is interested in the result of such action: Stephens v. Bernays, U. S. D. Ct., E. D. Mo., June 7, 1890. ERNEST WATTS.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

DECEMBER, 1890.

THE LAW GOVERNING AN ORIGINAL PACKAGE. (Concluded from November Number, ante, page 765).

XIX.

The preference of the ports of one State over those of another is forbidden to Congress and not to the States, which are prevented by the commerce clause and not the ninth section of the First Article of the Constitution.

The discrimination between States, and not individual ports, is forbidden to Congress, and therefore incidental advantages can be given to a port in the due exercise of the regulation of commerce.

Until Congress makes some regulation of the charges for the use of grain elevators and such other instruments of interstate commerce as are situate wholly within a State, licenses and charges may be prescribed by that State as matters of local regulation.

While the especial law governing the instruments of interstate commerce must be passed over, one of the Granger Cases should be examined briefly on another question of license, and this by the State and not by the United States.

Munn v. The People of the State of Illinois (1877) 4 Otto (94 U. S.) 113, began by an information filed June 29, 1872, by the State's attorney of the seventh judicial circuit of the State of Illinois, against Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott, for transacting in the City of Chicago, the business of

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