committed within their own territory, against their own laws, and in enabling a federal judge or court, by an order in a habeas corpus proceeding, to deprive a State of its power to maintain its own public order, or to protect the security of society and the lives of its own citizens, whenever the amenability to its courts of a federal officer or employe or agent is sought to be enforced. We have not entered upon that question because, as arising here, its suggestion is sufficient, and its consideration might involve the extent to which legislation in that direction may Constitutionally go, which could only be properly determined when directly presented by the record in a case before the court for adjudication. For these reasons, as briefly stated as possible, we think the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and the prisoner remanded to the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin county, Cal.; and we are the less reluctant to express this conclusion because we cannot permit ourselves to doubt that the authorities of the State of California are competent and willing to do justice, and that, even if the appellee had been indicted and had gone to trial upon this record, God and his country would have given him a good deliverance. FULLER, C. J., concurred in this dissent. When the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California ordered Neagle's discharge, the opinion of Circuit Judge SAWYER was printed in 28 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 585, with an extended annotation on the summary relief which a Court of the United States could extend to an officer of the United States arrested by State authorities for some act done in the performance of his duty. Such collisions ought not to occur, but the incidents of the cases cited, as well as of this Neagle case, show that they will occur as long as popular feeling is not restrained by knowledge of the law and of the consequences of disobedience; see U. S. v. Doss (1872), II AMER. LAW REG. (N. S.) 320 and 28 Id. 647 The judgment of affirmance in Neagle's case was unanimous upon the power to release Neagle; supra page 696. It was the importance of this point together with the im probability of another ex-judge or any citizen, so far forgetting the necessary respect to the judiciary. which caused the annotation in 28 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 624-53 to be confined to this fundamental point. There could not have well been any dissent, after the long line of cases which had been actually decided, and for this reason, no doubt, Justice MILLER does not go fully into a review of them. And this is made the more plain by the confession of sovereign power in the United States, even if not expressly, but only necessarily implied from the language of the Constitution, which is made in the dissenting opinion, supra, pages 696–7. The uncertainties which this judgment will eventually remove are presented by Justice LAMAR (dissenting) as merely a construction of the law in pursuance of which Neagle acted. From this narrowness of view, no doubt the Chief Justice and Justice LAMAR failed to apply to one of the two important questions into which this construction is divided by Justice MILLER, the rule to which they assented in the Original Package Case. That is, in the latter case, these Justices construed a power conferred upon Congress, without any words affecting the States, to be so exclusive as to prevent the States from acting,even if Congress should refuse to act. But here, the execu tive power, broadly conferred upon the President amongst other things, but not in terms exclusively for the faithful execution of the laws, would be restrained to such ways and means as have been specifically indicated by Congressional action. That has not been the rule of construction since MARSHALL, in McCulloch v. Maryland (see the quotation, supra, pages 423, 706), pointed out that a Constitutional necessity was not an absolute necessity, nor one to be remedied by the most simple and direct means alone, but by those which were useful and advantageous. In other words, the question of necessity related to the end and only to that extent controlled the means. Want of space near the close of a volume, compels the postponement of an examination into the executive power, and the rights and duties of United States Marshals. The latter will assume a greater importance in the event of the passage of an act or acts of Congress, further regulating the election of Representatives in Congress. JOHN B. UHle. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. CONTRACTS. Public policy forbids the organization of an association for the purpose of increasing the price or decreasing the production of a commodity in general use, such as candles, and a claim based upon an agreement under which such an association has been formed, can receive no aid from a court of justice. Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., S. Ct. Ohio, May 6, 1890. DECEIT. Diligent inquiry as to the truth or falsity of representations made by a person seeking to exchange certain stock of a corporation owned by him, for property of another, need not be made by the the latter, in order to enable him to maintain an action of deceit based upon the falsity of such representations. Cottrill v. Crum, S. Ct. Mo., May 19, 1890. Deeds. Covenant of warranty is not constituted by a habendum clause in the following form: "to have and to hold the said land unto the said grantee, his heirs and assigns, forever, as a good and indefeasible estate in fee-simple," nor does the word "grant," when used alone, constitute such a warranty. Wheeler v. Wayne Co., S. Ct. Ill., April 22, 1890. Delivery after grantor's death of a deed previously executed, in pursuance of instructions given to his agent, conveys no title. Weisinger v. Cocke, S. Ct. Miss., May 5, 1890. Voluntary conveyance from father to a favorite son, who has remained at home and managed the father's farm for many years, is not void as induced by undue influence, although obtained by the son by threatening to leave his father if the deed was not given, where the father, though of advanced age, feeble health and impaired memory, was sound in mind and not so influenced by his son as to be deprived of freedom of will. Burt v. Quisenberry, S. Ct. Ill., March 31, 1890. FIRE INSURANCE. General agent of an insurance company, having authority "to transact the business of insurance" within a State, may bind the company, after a loss, by a parol waiver of conditions as to proofs of loss, notwithstanding a provision of the policy that a waiver shall be void unless in writing and endorsed thereon. Phænix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Bowdre, S. Ct. Miss., May 5, 1890. TELEGRAPHS. Erection of poles and stringing wires by a telegraph company along a highway already dedicated to the public, is an additional servitude, and constitutes a taking of private property for public use; the public have merely the right of passage along and over a highway, the absolute property remaining in the owner of the soil from whom the right of passage was secured. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Williams, S. Ct. App. Va., March 27, 1890. WILLS. Devise over, after a devise to the wife of testator of all his estate with "full and ample authority to dispose of the whole of it as she pleases," of any property not alienated by her before her death. will take effect upon whatever property has not been so disposed of. McCullough's Adm'r v. Anderson, Ct. App. Ky., April 10, 1890. Devise to wife of all testator's estate, "to have and to hold the same for her own use and benefit, and also to make such disposition of the same that she, in her judgment, may deem best, should it become necessary that a part or all should become necessary for the support of herself and W." was followed by a provision that, after the death of the wife, "any and all property remaining unused shall be given to said W."; the wife took only a life estate, with a power of disposition for the purpose mentioned, and the devise over was valid. Miller's Admr. v. Potterfield, S. Ct. App. Va., May 18, 1890. JAMES C. SEllers. THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER. NOVEMBER, 1890. THE LAW GOVERNING AN ORIGINAL PACKAGE. (Continued from July-August Number, ante, page 483). XII. The next case, in the order of time, was that of U. S. v. Holliday, decided in 1866, and reported in 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 407. The subject for decision was the extent of the power to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes, and must be omitted here, from developing no new principles, as may be seen from an examination of the case just alluded to, with those of U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey (1876) 3 Otto (93 U. S.) 188, and s. c. (1883) 108 U. S. 491; U. S. v. LeBris (1887) 121 U. S. 278; Bates v. Clark (1877) 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 204. XIII. An original package is one which has been brought from another State or Nation, and not merely one which has paid a tax to the United States. A license granted under the taxing powers of the United States does not necessarily authorize the carrying on of the business, trade or manufacture licensed; thereby differing from a license under the commerce powers. An internal revenue license, obtained by a lottery ticket dealer or a retail liquor dealer, does not authorize sales of lottery tickets or liquor. The licensee has merely paid a tax to the United States. VOL. XXXVIII.—46 721 Each State has authority over the business, trade and manufactures of its citizens, until its regulations conflict with the commerce or other Constitutional powers of the United States. The License Tax Cases (1867), 5 Wall. (72 U. S.) 462, did much towards defining the power of a State over the business or trades of its citizens. The first of these cases was an indictment of Rufus B. Vassar, in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York, October 20, 1863, for carrying on the business of a lottery ticket dealer without the license required by the Act of Congress: Chap. CXIX. An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, and to pay interest on the Public Debt. (Approved July 1, 1862; 12 Stat. at Large 433.) SEC. 57. And be it further enacted, That from and after the first day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, no person, association of persons, or corporation, shall be engaged in, prosecute, or carry on, either of the trades or occupations mentioned in section sixty-four of this Act, until he, she, or they shall have obtained a license therefor, in the manner hereinafter provided. This Section was re-enacted in Section seventy-one of the Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. at Large 248), and again by the Act of July 13, 1866 (14 Id. 113), where the word license was changed to special tax. This was considered by Chief Justice CHASE to be conclusive as to the intention of Congress, when originally imposing this tax, of not intruding upon the strictly internal affairs of a State. The penalty inflicted by Section fifty-nine of the Act of 1862, (12 Stat. at Large 453) was three times the license; to it was added imprisonment, by Section twenty-four of the Act of March 3, 1863 (Id. 727); and then converted into payment of the license, with fine or imprisonment or both, by Section seventy-three of the Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Id. 249). This was again changed to fine, or imprisonment, or both, by Act of July 13, 1866 (14 Id. 113), and to a fine only by Act of March 2, 1867 (Id. 473). But there was no immunity from punishment under State laws, in any of these Acts. The Act of 1862 also contained the express disclaimer of |