DILLON and CALDWELL construed "officer of election," not to include the Governor of a State: (supra, page 360.) XIII. [There are some rules which may be formulated from the special dangers to the ballot, as shown in the following paragraphs. [In construing those sections of the Revised Statutes which have their origin in Act of Congress whose language has been varied in the revision, care should be taken to observe the principle of interpretation applied in the Munford cases (supra, page 361), where this variation in language was observed in passing upon the constitutionality of sections 2005, 2006 and 5506 of the Revised Statutes. [In the same direction as the thought expressed by Judge WOODRUFF (ante, page 342), but more generally, upon the Eighteenth clause of Section 8 of the Constitution, the language of Justice MILLER may be observed: That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, has no power, by appropriate laws, to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption and of fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the greatest consideration. If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends, from violence and corruption. If it has not this power, it is left helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics,-open violence and insidious corruption. The proposition that it has no such power, is supported by the old argument, often heard, often repeated, and in this Court, never assented to, that when a question of the power of Congress arises, the advocate of the power must be able to place his finger on the words which expressly grant it. The brief of counsel before us, though directed to the authority of that body to pass criminal laws, uses the same language. Because there is no express power to provide for preventing violence exercised on the voter as a means of controlling his vote, no such law can be enacted. It destroys, at one blow, in construing the Constitution of the United States, the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers—a difficulty which the instrument itself recognizes by conferring on Congress the authority to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers expressly granted, and all other powers vested in the government, or any branch of it, by the Constitution; Article I, sec. 8, clause 18: Ex parte Yarbrough (1883), 110 U. S. 657, 658. It was held in this case that Congress can by law protect the act of voting, the place where it is done, and the man who votes, from personal violence or intimidation, and the Congressional election itself from corruption and fraud. That it is the duty of the government to see that the votes by which the members of Congress and its President are elected, shall be the free vote of the electors, and the officers thus chosen the free uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take part in that choice. [While Congress has this power to enact appropriate legislation, the Court will not sustain that which amounts to a net large enough to catch all possible offenders by deciding who are rightfully detained and who are to be set at large; otherwise Congress would encroach upon the powers reserved to the people and the States: U. S. v. Reese (1876), 92 U. S. 214. This case was decided by a divided Court, Chief Justice WAITE writing the opinion with the concurrence of Justices SWAYNE, MILLER, DAVIS, FIELD, STRONG and BRADLEY. Justice HUNT dissented on the ground that the statute (of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at Large 140) should be construed according to the plain intent of Congress, and not so extensively as to include that which Congress could not meddle with; that is. a general violation of the rights of an elector at a State election, which was the case in hand, no candidate for Congress being voted for. Justice CLIFFORD, agreed with the judgment but upon totally different grounds, chiefly technical; Justice MILLER distinguished this judgment of the Court in the Yarbrough case: (Supra, pages 346, 348.) From this principle of interpretation, Justice FIELD also dissented in the Chinese case of Baldwin v. Franks (1887), 120 U. S. 678. Justice MILLER repeated the principle in the Trade Mark Cases of U. S. v. Steffens, et al. (1879), 100 U. S. 82, only to practically recede, so far as laws relating to Congressional elections, in the tax case (supra, page 348). This principle is, therefore, not likely to be applicable to any statute relating to Federal elections, which has been at all carefully drafted. XIV. The contest for a seat in the House of Representatives is a proceeding unknown to State legislation and the State judicatories; and violations of the law of Congress regulating it are offenses against the United States, and not against the State. Of such contests, the Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction: Ex parte Dock Bridges (1875), U. S. Circ. Ct., N. Dist. Ga., 2 Wood, 428. So, when an accused is charged before a State Court with perjury in having testified falsely before a notary public in a Congressional election case under the Revised Statutes, Title 2, Chapter 8, regulating the taking of testimony, he must be discharged, because such an offense is cognizable only to the Federal Courts under Section 5392, providing for the punishment of perjury in any case in which the laws of the United States authorize an oath to be administered, and the second section of the Judiciary Act of August 13th, 1888, 25 Stat. at Large 434, giving the United States Courts exclusive cognizance of all crimes cognizable under the authority of the United States. A notary public is a State officer, having power to administer any oath required by State law, and no other. He has no power to administer oaths required by Congress, unless he is expressly authorized to do so by Act of Congress, in doing which he acts as an officer of the United States, and not as an officer of the State; perjury committed before any officer in a contested Congressional election case is amenable to punishment under the United States law: In re Loney (1889), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Va., 38 Fed. Repr. 101. The United States Supreme Court affirmed this judgment, as the testimony in a congressional contested election case is given in obedience to the laws of the United States and not of the State, and the accused should have been tried before the Federal Court, and not before the State Court. D. H. PINGREY. Bloomington, IU. RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS., Supreme Court of the United States. INHABITANTS OF THE TOWNSHIP OF BERNARDS V. MORRISON ET AL. 1. As against bona fide holders of municipal bonds, which recite that they are issued in pursuance of a certain Act of the legislature which authorizes certain commissioners to borrow money on the faith and credit of the town, and execute bonds thereof, after a majority of the tax-payers had assented thereto, which fact should be proved by the affidavit of the town assessor, the defenses that the consent of a majority of the taxpayers was not given; that the affidavit of the assessor to that effect was not true; and that the commissioners did not borrow money on the bonds, but disposed of them without lawful consideration, are not availing. 2. The fact that the commissioners were special officers appointed for the purpose of issuing the bonds, by the Court, under the Act of the legislature, does not make their acts any less binding on the town. It is sufficient that full control was given them in the matter. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey. A. A. Clark and James R. English, for plaintiff in error. Courtlandt Parker, for defendants in error. BREWER, J., March 3, 1890. This is an action on township bonds. Judgment was rendered against the township, and it alleges error. The bonds were issued under an Act approved April 9th, 1868, and found in the Sessions Laws of New Jersey for that year (page 915 et seq.). Outside of the obligatory words, this was the form of the bond: "This bond is one of a series of like tenor, amounting in the whole to the sum of one hundred and twenty-seven thousand dollars, issued on the faith and credit of said Township in pursuance of an Act entitled “An Act to authorize certain towns in the counties of Somerset, Morris, Essex, and Union to issue bonds and take stock in the Passaic Valley and Peapack Railroad Company," approved April 9, 1868. In testimony whereof, the undersigned, Commissioners of the said township of Bernards, in the County of Somerset, to carry into effect the purposes and provisions of the said Act, duly appointed, commissioned, and sworn, have hereunto set our hands and seals the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine. JOHN H. ANDERSON, (L. S.) Commissioners. Registered in the County Clerk's office. WILLIAM Ross, JR., The first section of the Act provides that, upon the application in writing of twelve or more resident freeholders, the Circuit Court of the county shall appoint three resident freeholders to be Commissioners. Section two reads as follows: That it shall be lawful for said Commissioners to borrow, on the faith and credit of their respective townships, such sums of money, not exceeding ten per centum of the valuation of the real estate and landed property of such township, to be ascertained by the assessment rolls thereof, respectively, for the year eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, for a term not exceeding twenty-five years, at a rate of interest not exceeding seven per centum per annum, payable semi-annually, and to execute bonds therefor under their hands and seals respectively; the bonds so to be executed may be in such sums, and payable at such times and places, as the said Commissioners and their successors may deem expedient; but no such debt shall be contracted or bonds issued by said Commissioners, of or for either of said townships, until the written consent shall have been obtained of the majority of the tax-payers of such township, or their legal representatives, appearing upon the last assessment roll, as shall represent a majority of the landed property of such township (including lands owned by non-residents) appearing upon the last assessment roll of such township; such consent shall state the amount of money authorized to be raised in such township, and that the same is to be invested in the stock of the said railroad company, and the signatures shall be proved by one or more of the Commissioners. The fact that the persons signing such consent are a majority of the tax-payers of such township, and represent a majority of the real property of such township, shall be proved by the affidavit of the assessor of such township endorsed upon, or annexed to such written consent, and the assessor of such township is hereby required to perform such service. Such consent and affidavit shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which such township is situated, and a certified copy thereof in the town-clerk's office of such township, and the same, or a certified copy thereof, shall be evidence of the facts therein. contained, and received as evidence in any court of this State, and before any judge or justice thereof. By Section three these Commissioners were authorized to dispose of the bonds, and invest the money in railroad stock |