To this argument it may be said, that each government punishes for violation of duty to itself only. Where a person owes a duty to two sovereigns, he is amenable to both for its performance, and either may call him to account: BRADLEY, J., Ex parte Siebold (1879), 100 U. S. 371, 389. [In this latter case, the learned Justice reviews the cases already decided; that is, the counterfeiter's case of Fox v. The State of Ohio (1847), 5 How. (46 U.S.) 410, where State laws against circulating counterfeit coin were held not to be repugnant to the Federal laws against counterfeiting, Justice MCLEAN dissenting, among reasons, on account of the possible double punishment; it seems (page 440 of the report), that Justice STORY (who had died September 10, 1845) held the same opinion. At the time of the decision, the Court was composed of TANEY, C. J., and MCLEAN, WAYNE, CATRON, DANIEL, NELSON, GRIER and WOODBURY, JJ. Three years later, the same judges went a step further, Justice DANIEL saying for the Court

With the view of avoiding conflict between the State and Federal jurisdictions, this Court, in the case of Fox v. The State of Ohio, have taken care to point out, that the same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offense against both the State and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either, as appropriate to its character in reference to each. We think this distinction sound, as we hold to be the entire doctrines laid down in the case above mentioned, and regard them as being in no wise in conflict with the conclusions adopted in the present case: U. S. v. Marigold (1850), 9 How. (50 U. S.) 560, 569.

[And the Court proceeded to instruct the Circuit Court of the Northern District of New York, that the United States could punish for bringing counterfeit coins into the country and fraudulently circulating them. The Fugitive Slave law. however, brought the doctrine again into Court, where it was affirmed by nearly the same judges, WOODBURY having succeeded to CURTIS: Moore v. Illinois (1852), 14 How. (55U. S) 13, MCLEAN dissenting on the sole ground of double punish

ment.

[In Coleman v. Tennessee (1878), 97 U. S. 509, the principle objected to was invoked in behalf of the State, to try, convict, and punish a murderer, who had already been tried and con

The crime victed for the same murder, by a court martial. had been committed March 7, 1865, by a soldier, who thereby became punishable under the act of Congress of March 3, 1863. 12 Stat. at Large 736. For some reason, the sentence of the court martial had not been executed, and the criminal was convicted in the State Court in 1874. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the criminal was still within the power of the court martial and directed his delivery to the military authorities to be dealt with as required by law. This was upon the express ground that the doctrine did not apply, because the criminal was a soldier serving in a State, whose regular government was, at the time, superseded (p. 519). Justice CLIFFORD dissented, among others, for the express reason that the punishment in one sovereignty is no bar to punishment in the other (pp. 537-9); and he repeated his dissent in Tennessee v. Davis (1879), 100 U. S. 257, 277, where the Court denied to the State Court the right to try an officer of the United States for an homicide committed in the discharge of his duty. This has very recently been affirmed in Neagle's case, and was designed and operates only to shield Federal officers in the performance of their duty: See annotation to Matter of David Neagle, 28 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 624. If Congress commands a State official, over whom they can have no control, the command is void: Comm. of Ky. v. Dennison (1860), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 66, but simply on the ground of want of power, not of clashing authority.

The people of the United States, resident within any State, are subject to two governments: one State, and the other National; but there need be no conflict between the two. The powers which one possesses the other does not. They are established for different purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together, they make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home and abroad. True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and the same act. *** This does not, however, necessarily imply that two governments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with each other. It is, the natural consequence of a citizenship which owes allegiance to two sovereignties, and claims protection from both. The citizen cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to such a form of government. He owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can de

mand protection from each within its own jurisdiction: WAITH, C. J., U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875), 92 U. S. 543, 550.

[This last case was an indictment for conspiracy, under the Enforcement Act of 1870 (16 Stat. at Large 140). The indictment was held insufficient because not stating sufficient particulars to establish that the unlaful combination was to prevent the enjoyment of a right secured by the Constitution, all rights not being secured thereby.

The doctrine that the State and the National Government are co-ordinate and altogether equal, is only partially true. Whilst the States are sovereign as to all matters which have not been granted to the jurisdiction and control of the United States, the Federal Constitution and the constitutional laws thereunder, are the supreme law of the land, and when they conflict with the laws of the States, they are of paramount authority and obligation.

This is the fundamental principle on which the authority of the Constitution is based; and unless it be conceded in practice, as well as theory, the fabric of our institutions, as it was contemplated by its founders, cannot stand: BRADLEY, J., Ex parte Siebold (1879), 100 U. S. 371, 399.

[At the same time, the care exercised in all such cases in Federal Courts is not merely technical, and does not alone spring from the principles of interpretation of Federal criminal statutes; but rather because

It goes without saying, in our dual system of government, that the Federal government cannot take charge of a mere State election, or an election merely for State officers, and no matter what wrongs may be perpetrated in such election, they are beyond the cognizance of the Federal courts. The States, and the States alone, can punish offenses which are merely offenses against the State laws: BREWER, J., in C. S. v. Morrissey, (1887) U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 32 Fed. Repr. 147, 150.

X.

[The doctrine that Congress could enforce State election laws with the same effect as statutes of the United States, was declared to be constitutional in the cases of Siebold and Clarke, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in October Term, 1879, and reported in 100 U. S. 371, 399. In each case, the opinion was delivered by Justice BRADLEY, with the concurrence of Chief Justice WAITE, and Justices MIL

LER, STRONG, HUNT, SWAYNE and HARLAN. Justices FIELD and CLIFFORD dissented.

[An interesting application of this principle appears in the summary of the evidence given in the charge of the District Judge JACKSON, in U. S. v. Carpenter, U. S. Cir. Ct., Dist. Tenn., December 3, 1889, 41 Fed. Repr. 330: the returns showed 43 Republican ballots, while the evidence established that 109 Republican voters had deposited their ballots. Still more interesting is U. S. v. Badinelli, U. S. Circ. Ct., W. Dist. Tenn., December 20, 1888, 37 Fed. Repr. 138, where the election officers were indicted for excluding an elector from witnessing the count as allowed by the State Statutes, but escaped by proving that the manner of making the count was not legal under the State Statute, and hence no violation of the Federal law.

[The doctrine was amplified in 1888, (In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 753) so as to include the enforcement of State election laws by the United States Courts, not only for violation of those laws in respect to the ballots cast for Representatives in Congress, but also to those for State officers, so to prevent any tampering with any ballots at any election where Representatives in Congress are voted for. The decision was by Justice MILLER, with the concurrence of Justices BRADLEY, HARLAN, MATTHEWS, GRAY, BLATCHFORD and LAMAR; Justice FIELD dissented, and Chief Justice WAITE had died before the entry of the final judgment.

[The application of this principle resulted in a conviction for entering upon the book of registration of voters (under the Missouri Statute of 1883, Laws, p. 38), the names of persons who did not apply for registration or take any oath, such as the law requires: U. S. v. Molloy, April 20, 1887, U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 31 Fed. Repr. 19; U. S. v. O'Connor, June 3, 1887, Id. 449.

[In the Clarke case, Justices FIELD and CLIFFORD dissented on the ground

First, that it is not competent for Congress to punish a State officer for the manner in which he discharges duties imposed upon him by the laws of the State, or to subject him in the performance of such duties, to the supervision and control of others, and punish him for resisting their interference; and,

Second, that it is not competent for Congress to make the exercise of its punitive power dependent upon the legislation of the States.

Clarke had been convicted in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio, under Section 5515 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (ante, page 357) for a violation as an officer of the election, of the law of the State of Ohio, regulating an election at which a Representative in Congress was voted for, in not conveying the ballot box, to the county clerk, after it had been sealed up and delivered to him for that purpose, and for allowing it to be broken open.

[Siebold and others were judges of an election at which Representatives in Congress were voted for in the City of Baltimore, on the fifth of November, 1878, and they were convicted in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, under the same Section 5515 and also Section 5522 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, for stuffing the. ballet boxes and preventing the United States Supervisors from performing their duties. The general propositions of the counsel for the prisoners were all denied, though not going so far as the two propositions of the dissenting justices; they were

1. That the power to make regulations as to the times, places and manner of holding elections for Representatives in Congress, granted to Congress by the Constitution, is an exclusive power when exercised by Congress.

2. That this power, when so exercised, being exclusive of all interference therein by the States, must be so exercised as not to interfere with, or come in collision with, regulations presented in that behalf by the States, unless it provides for the complete control over the whole subject over which it is exercised.

3. That, when put in operation by Congress, it must take the place of all State regulations of the subject regulated, which subject must be entirely and completely controlled and provided for by Congress.

To this the Court, speaking by Justice BRADLEY, said—

We are unable to see why it necessarily follows that, if Congress makes any regulations on the subject, it must assume exclusive control of the whole subject. The Constitution does not say so: (100 U. S. 383.)

Coy was convicted in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, of conspiring to interfere with the officers of an election at which Representatives in Congres VOL. XXXVIII.-24.