will not hold itself responsible for loss on property so transferred until such assignment so made and undertaking given." Jerdee v. Cottage Grove Fire Ins. Co., S. Ct. Wis., Jan. 7, 1889.

FIXTURES.

Mortgagee of real estate, in order to establish a claim to chattels as fixtures, must show, (1) that the chattels were actually annexed to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto; (2) that they were applied to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which they were connected was appropriated; and (3) that the person who annexed them intended to make them a permanent accession to the freehold. Speiden v. Parker, Ct. Err. and App. N. J., Feb. 6, 1890.

Railroad cars, used in a quarry, are not fixtures. Id.

GIFTS.

Bill of sale of life insurance policy, made out to the niece of the insured, who was seventy years of age and had suffered two strokes of paralysis, and given by him to his attorney with the direction to give it to the niece in case of the insured's death, which soon occurred, from a third stroke, was not a valid gift inter vivos, as the donor had not relinquished control of his property, but will be sustained as a gift causa mortis. Williams v. Guile, Ct. App. N. Y.,

Nov. 26, 1889.

Deposit in savings bank by a father of money to the credit of his infant son, who died sixteen years after attaining his majority, without knowledge of the deposit, the father retaining possession of the deposit-book and on one occasion drawing from the account and receipting in his own name, does not constitute a gift, as the facts show no intent to give and there was no delivery. Beaver v. Beaver, Ct. App. N. Y., Nov. 26, 1889.

JURISDICTION.

Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction to review the decision of a State Court that a party was not liable in damages for the reason that he was acting, in the matters complained of, within the scope of judicial authority conferred upon him by Act of Congress. Manning v. French, S. Čt. U. S., Jan. 27, 1890.

LIFE INSURANCE.

Beneficiary named in the certificate of a mutual benefit society has no vested interest in such certificate until the death of the insured member, and the insured may change his designation of the beneficiary at will and against the latter's consent, provided that he makes such change in the manner pointed out by the policy and by-laws of the society; but there are three exceptions to this rule: (1) If the society has waived a strict compliance with its own rules, and in pursuance of a request of the insured to change his beneficiary, has issued a new certificate, the original beneficiary will not be heard to complain that the course indicated by the regula

tions was not pursued; (2) If it be beyond the power of the insured to comply literally with the regulations, a court of equity will treat the change as having been legally made; and (3) If the assured has followed the course indicated by the regulations, and has done all in his power to change the beneficiary, but dies before the new certificate is actually issued, a court of equity will treat such certificate as having been issued. Supreme Conclave, Royal Adelphia v. Cappella, U. S. C. Ct., F. D. Mich., Jan. 20, 1890.

LIMITATION.

Culvert under a railroad embankment, which injures adjoining land by discharging water on it, is a continuing nuisance, and an action of damages for maintaining such nuisance is not barred by the lapse of the statutory period of limitation since the completion of the structure.

Feb. 25, 1890.

Wells v. New Haven & N. Co., S. Jud. Ct., Mass.,

LIQUOR LAWS.

Purchase for minor of intoxicating liquor by a by-stander with the minor's money, such purchase being made at the suggestion of the liquor-seller, is in effect the same as if the sale had been made directly to the minor. Lilas v. State, S. Ct. Ala., Jan. 16, 1890.

MASTER AND Servant.

Board of Commissioners, incorporated as a municipal agency to furnish a city with water, and not having power to levy taxes indefinitely, but only an equitable water rate, is not liable for injuries received from the negligence of its servants. O'Leary v. Board of Fire and Water Commissioners, S. Ct. Mich., Jan. 24, 1890.

Negligence of foreman, who is ordered to remove a barge from the water without directions as to the means to be used, and who selects unsafe ropes, by the breaking of which a laborer is injured, will render the master liable for the injuries, and such laborer is not a fellow-servant with the foreman. Lund v. Hersey Lumber Co., U. S. C. Ct., D. Minn., Jan. 6, 1890.

Unskilled employe who is selected to run an elevator must be provided by his employer for a reasonable length of time with a competent instructor, and the employer will be liable for any injury to his servant arising from the incompetency or negligence of such instructor. Brennan v. Gordon, Ct. App. N. Y., 2d Div., Feb. 25, 1890.

MORTGAGES.

State statute, enacting that certain railroad stock held by the State shall be pledged, together with any dividends that may be declared thereon, to the payment of certain bonds and interest coupons issued by the State, does not create an actual pledge, but, at most, a mortgage, which cannot be enforced, as the State is a necessary party, and cannot be sued. Christian v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R. Co., S. Ct. U. S., Jan. 27, 1890.

NEGLIGENCE.

Contributory negligence is chargeable to one who stands after dark between two tracks of a cable company, which are so near together that cars going in opposite directions would pass within two feet of each other, and there waits for and attempts to board a car coming on one track, without paying any attention to see whether any cars are approaching in dangerous proximity on the other track. Miller v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., S. Ct. Minn., Feb. 7, 1890.

Defective bridge, which has been opened by a municipality for public travel, renders such municipality liable for any damages caused by its defective condition, although the defects were entirely upon one side of the bridge and the other was perfectly safe for travel. Walker v. City of Kansas, S. Ct. Mo., Feb. 10, 1890.

Discharge of fire-works from a veranda in front of the second story of a building in the center of a public square, from troughs so arranged that the fire-works would pass over the assembled people, who were there for the purpose of witnessing the display, is not of itself an unlawful act, in the absence of a statute or ordinance making it so, but where it is shown that a large quantity of fire-works was placed on the floor of a narrow veranda and the persons who had charge of the display, smoked cigars during the entire performance, towards the close of which some loose Roman candles on the floor of the veranda were discovered to be on fire and throwing out balls of fire in every direction, which ignited the sky-rockets, thereby causing spectators, to be hit and injured, there is sufficient evidence that the injuries were the result of the negligence of the persons in charge of the fire-works, to sustain a verdict for damages against them. Dowell v. Guthrie, S. Ct. Mo., Feb. 10, 1890.

Notice to owner of the dangerous condition of a building is not necessary, in order to charge him with liability for injuries sustained by reason of the falling of such building; he is bound to know the condition of his own property. Tucker v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., S. Ct. La., Jan. 29, 1890.

Shipper of Stock is not guilty of contributory negligence in using the only platform provided by the railroad company for that purpose, although he knows it to be unsafe, if he exercises reasonable care in its use. White v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., Ct. App. Ky., Jan. 25, 1890.

TELEGRAPHS.

Unfavorable atmospheric conditions do not excuse the dropping out of words in the transmission of a telegraphic message. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Goodbar, S. Ct. Miss., Feb. 3, 1890.

JAMES C. SEllers.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

MAY, 1890.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE COMMON LAW.

In many of the cases that have occupied the courts, involving religious questions, the proposition has been advanced and reasoned from, that Christianity is a part of the common law. It will perhaps be useful briefly to examine the doctrine in its development to discover, if possible, in what sense it may be considered true in those jurisdictions that have not altogether repudiated it.

I. ENGLAND.

The first formal statement of the doctrine was by Sir MATTHEW HALE in Rex v. Taylor (27 and 28 Car. 11), 3 Keble 607. The case was an information for blasphemy for saying "Christ is a whoremaster and religion is a cheat

Christ is a bastard, and damn all Gods of the Quakers, etc." The Chief Justice, in sustaining the conviction of the blasphemer, is reported to have said:

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"These words though of ecclesiastical cognizance, yet that religion is a cheat, tends to dissolution of all government and therefore punishable here, and contumelious reproaches of God or the religion established. An indictment lay for saying the Protestant religion was a fiction, for taking away religion, all obligations to God by oaths, etc., ceaseth, and the Christian religion is a part of the law itself, therefore injuries to God are as punishable as to the king or any common person."

The authority for this statement of the Chief Justice seems to have been certain language in Year Book 34 Henry VI., 40, where the judge, PRISOT, Says

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"A tielr leis que ils de Seint Eglise ont en ancien scripture, covient a nous a doner credence; car ceo (est) common ley sur quel touts mans leis sont fondes. Et auxy, Sir, Nous sumus obliges de conustre lour ley de St. Eglise et semblablement ils sont obliges de conustre nostre ley."

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(Translation. To such laws as they of the Holy Church have in ancient writings, it is fit that we should recognize as authority, for this is common law or custom, upon which all kinds of laws are founded. We are obliged to recognize their Holy Church law and equally they are under obligation to recognize our law, i. e., the civil law.)

The case was a quare impedit, by Humfhrey v. Bohun against John Broughton, Bishop of Lincoln. Commenting on this, Thomas Jefferson writes

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A question was, How far the ecclesiastical law was to be respected in this matter, by the Common Law Court? Finch mis-states this in the following manner: "To such laws of the Church as have warrant in holy scripture, our law giveth credence," and cites the above case, and the words of PRISOT in the margin. Finch's Law, bk. 1, chap. 3, published in 1613. Here we find "ancien scripture" converted into "holy scripture;" whereas it can only mean the antient written laws of the Church. * In truth, the alliance be.

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tween Church and State in England, has ever made their judges accomplices in the frauds of the clergy; And thus they incorporate into the English Code, laws made for the Jews alone, and the precepts of the Gospel, intended by their benevolent Author as obligatory only in foro conscientiae; and they arm the whole with the coercions of the municipal law. (Jeff. Rep. App.)

The utterance of Chief Justice Hale in Taylor's case was considered sufficient basis for the doctrine thereafter, and accordingly all the cases in which it was subsequently adopted rely on that judgment as authority. In Rex v. Hall (7 Geo. I.) a charge of libel against the doctrine of the Trinity was maintained, and in Rex v. Woolston (2 Geo. II.), 2 Str. 834, Sir ROBERT RAYMOND, sitting as Chief Justice of the King's Bench, in an indictment for blasphemous discourses on the miracles of Christ, the Court, citing Taylor's case, declared they would not suffer it to be debated whether to write against Christianity in general was not an offence punishable in the temporal court at law.

King v. Williams (1797), 26 Howell's State Trials 653, was the celebrated case of the indictment of the publisher of Paine's "Age of Reason" for blasphemy in publishing the work. It was tried before Lord KENYON. He charged the jury that Christianity was part of the law of the land. In the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice ASHHURST, (p. 714,) said: