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was recognized in Semmes v. U. S. supra, and other cases above noticed. This oversight of the Supreme Court, as to the jus in re, was the pebble that turned the stream of decisions the wrong way, and caused the Court to treat civil proceedings as criminal; proceedings in rem as in personam; confiscation of enemy property under the law of nations limited by statute, as a prosecu. tion for the punishment of an offender, whether citizen or alien. This is all virtually acknowledged by the Court in Kirk v. Lynd.
In Avegno v. Schmidt (1885), 113 U. S. 293, and Shields v. Schiff (1888), 124 Id. 351, the Court followed the Wallach, Pike and French cases, and held that nothing was left in the former enemy owner (or "offender," as their theory has it), which he could convey by deed, will, or in any way, with no reference to the effect of their previously received pardons for treason. They held, under the authority of Day v. Miccu, and Marcuard's Intervention, that the default of a mortgagee, and final judgment as res adjudicata (quoad omnes) was of no effect-contrary to Semmes v. U. S. on the same point, as well as in the teeth of the statute above cited.
In this last case, Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Bosworth's Heirs, the criminal theory is reiterated; some twenty different times the Court applies criminal terms to Bosworth, (though he may have been an alien not capable of treason, so far as the record shows) and to the civil proceedings against his property (charged in the libel as enemy property,) such terms as "offenders," 66 'offense," "conviction," "punishment," "pardon," etc., etc., are repeatedly employed; but the point of the decision is that the fee of confiscated property, under the Act of 1862, is in abeyance till the "offender (the bereft enemy), be dead or pardoned, when it becomes vested in him or his heirs, eo instanti.
General pardon was granted to all who had committed the crimes of treason and rebellion, by proclamation in 1868, which is printed in the opinion: why then could not all living persons, who had had lands confiscated under the Act of 1862, immediately have power to sell or devise the fee, subject to the life usufruct awarded by the Supreme Court to the purchaser? Why, from that date, could not creditors attach the interest of such a person for debt, in a suit against him?
It is well settled that pardon is personal and does not affect property forfeited as a fictitiously guilty thing, or confiscated as a fictitiously hostile thing, by proceedings in rem—against it. The Supreme Court, to take Bosworth's land out of the general rule, had to treat the four confiscation sections of the Act of 1862, as providing for the conviction of traitors without indictment, arrest, jury or any personal trial, in order to make the Joint Resolution apply. But quere? Are we now to understand that the constitutional provision, requiring a personal trial for treason, is abrogated? It would seem that the questions touching the whereabouts of the fee simple of confiscated property, are themselves in nubibus. It is clear enough, however, that the Court was right in reversing the decision below, for the railroad company, which bought the property from Edgar, who had bought of Burbank, (the purchaser of the property at the confiscation sale), had acquired the ownership of it: Miller v.U. S. (1871), 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 292; Tyler v. Defrees (1871), Id. 331; Semmes v. U. S. (1875), 91 U. S. 21; Confiscation Cases (1874), 20 Wall. (86 U. S.) 92; all of which (the Court still cites with approval,) sustain confiscation.
Ann Arbor, Mich.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Marks of extreme violence, apparently recently inflicted, upon the back of a person who is insured by an accident policy, and whose injuries ultimately produce death, constitute prima facie evidence of death resulting from bodily injuries "through external, violent and accidental means." Cronkhite v. Travelers' Ins. Co., S. Ct. Wis., Nov. 5, 1889.
Maritime lien, created by a collision, takes precedence of liens for repairs and supplies, although the latter liens arose prior to the collision, The John G. Stevens, U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Oct. 31, 1889.
Steam dredge, which is a floating scow fitted with appliances for deepening channels of navigation, is a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. Aitcheson v. The Endless Chain Dredge, U. S. D. Ct., E. D. Va., Oct. 17, 1889.
Real estate agent is not entitled to a commission upon the price of a property sold by the owner to a purchaser not procured by such agent, unless the agent has been given an exclusive right to sell the property. Dole v. Sherwood, S. Ct. Minn., Nov. 1, 1889.
BILLS AND Notes.
Material alteration of a promissory note by a joint maker, after another joint maker has signed it, and without his consent, will render the note void as to the latter. Flanigan v. Phelps, S. Ct. Minn., Dec. 20, 1889.
Purchaser of a promissory note, who has knowledge that it was given in a speculative wheat deal, is not a bona fide holder for value. Goodrich v. McDonald, S. Ct. Mich., Nov. 8, 1889.
Mortgagee, who takes the mortgaged goods into his possession after a default, but tenders them back upon payment of the debt, is not required to deliver them to the mortgagor upon his own premises, but the latter must take them at the place where the mortgagee has stored them for safe-keeping. Gale Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, S. Ct. Mich., Nov. 15, 1889.
Certification of check is not constituted by a verbal statement of the bank, upon which it is drawn, that it is good and will be paid. Farmers' and Traders' Bank v. Bank of Allen Co., S. Ct. Tenn., Dec. 19, 1889.
City ordinance in regard to meat inspection, providing that the animal must be inspected before slaughtering, and must be slaughtered within one mile of the city limits, the effect of which is to exclude dressed meat brought from a distance, is void, as interfering with free commerce between the States. Ex parte Kieffer, U. S. C. Ct., D. Kan, Nov. 28, 1889.
Dentists may be required by a State statute to obtain a certificate from a board of examiners, as a pre-requisite to continuing practice within the State; such requirement is a proper exercise of the police power of the State and is not unconstitutional. Gosnell v. State,
S. Ct. Ark., Nov. 9, 1889.
Limited Liability Act of June 19, 1886, which extended the benefit of limited liability legislation to vessels engaged in inland navigation, is valid, in view of the power of Congress to regulate comThe Katie, U. S. D. Ct., S. D. Ga., Nov. 12, 1889.
Foreign corporation, by its failure to comply with the statutory conditions entitling it to do business in a State, does not render a conveyance to it of property located in such State void, so that it may be attacked collaterally by a private person. Fritts v. Palmer, S. Ct. U. S., Nov. 25, 1889.
Forgery is constituted by a letter, falsely purporting to come from the owner of a diploma and requesting the custodian of such diploma to deliver it to bearer, the alleged forger. Alexander v. State, Ct. App. Tex., Nov. 9, 1889.
Notice of loss was requested by the insured to be given to the company by the local agent the day after the fire, but the agent replied that he had already sent notice, in consequence of which statement the insured did not notify the company; the notice sent by the agent, which did not purport to be given on behalf of the insured, was duly received by the company; the requirement of the policy as to notice was sufficiently complied with. Loeb v. American Cent. Ins. Co., S. Ct. Mo., Nov. 18, 1889.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAW.
Refusal to transport stock in the cars of a certain live-stock transportation company at the same rate as in the cars of another such company, when the railroad has different contracts with the two companies and can use the cars of the latter to its own better advantage, is not an “unjust discrimination" within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act. U. S. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., U. S. C. Ct., N. D. N. Y., Oct. 18, 1889.
Federal courts have no jurisdiction of proceedings in rem, taken under a State statute against the property of a non-resident defendant, who has not been personally served or appeared. Harland v. United Lines Tel. Co., U. S. C. Ct., D. Conn., Nov. 14, 1889.
"No Man's Land," so-called, is subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the United States Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In re Jackson, U. S. C. Ct., D. Kan., Nov. 28, 1889.
Suit to set aside sale of lands forfeited to a State, the parties being citizens of different States, is within the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts, and a deed for such lands, although made in pursuance of the order of the State court, may be avoided by the former tribunals. De Forest v. Thompson, U. S. C. Ct., D. W. Va., Nov. 14, 1889.
Agent of insurance company, after being informed by an applicant for a policy that he held certificates of membership in certain cooperative societies, told him that such certificates were not considered insurance, and wrote, in answer to the question whether the applicant had any other insurance on his life, no other;" the policy contained a condition rendering it void, if any of the statements in the application were untrue; the act of the agent in making such answer was the act of the company, and the latter was estopped from alleging that insurance in co-operative societies was insurance of the kind to which the question referred. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, S. Ct. U. S., Nov. 25, 1889.
Mutual benefit society is subject to the same rules of law in the interpretation of its contracts as a mutual life insurance company, in the absence of any statutory distinction. Block v. Valley Mut. Ins. Asso., S. Ct. Ark., Nov. 9, 1889.
Adverse possession will not affect the holder of a certificate of purchase of land from the United States, until his patent is issued, as his right to maintain ejectment against one wrongfully in possession of the land does not accrue until the issuance of the patent. Redfield v. Parks, S. Ct. U. S., Nov. 18, 1889.
Timber, unlawfully severed from public mineral lands and purchased by a railroad company for use upon its locomotives and cars, can be recovered for in a suit by the United States against the railroad. U. S. v. Eureka & P. R. R. Co., U. S. C. Ct., D. Nev., Nov.
Driving for two miles on a railroad track, after entering it upon a crossing which was maintained by the railroad company in a negligent manner, is such contributory negligence as will excuse the latter from liability for injuries sustained by the person so driving, and the drunkenness of the person thus injured will not affect the question of his negligence. McDonald v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., S. Ct. Wis., Nov. 5, 1889.
Look-out for stock upon its track need not be kept by a railroad company; the extent of its duty is that the engineer shall use reasonable care, after the stock is discovered by him, to prevent injury to it. Memphis & L. Ry. Co. v. Kerr, S. Ct. Ark., Nov. 2, 1889.
REMOVAL OF Causes.
Extension of time to answer beyond the limit expressly provided in a State statute, does not extend the time to file a petition for removal to the Federal Court. Velie v. Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co., U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Wis., Dec. 18, 1889.
that of Richardson
ddy day of rest. [e. g.] The same bell that called the great mean invited the neighborhood all around, and prociamed a holiday to the wry. Hurd. Dial. Age of Eliz.)
Worcester indicates the true definitica in words which supplementing, in legal language, though still adhering At sunction of Noah Webster which is the only reliable ▲ correct solution of the practical prociem, as to what ene upon an American Legal Holiday
ays are considered, in England, to be those days, exclusive of Sun treguar public business is transacted a panic mess. They are ... -. The variable are seven, v: 4 Weinesday, Good sice Januay and Tuesday, Holy Thursday. War Monday and Tues
Correct understanding is barred icwever, to the unicute feincons of
nuwe afer quang Webster,
om auor; a day of amusement; a ds, ember of released from his every-day labors gine, et.
io Vaughan Abbott's Dictionary of Terms and Puragives an imperfect definition, but also explanaxy much value
pon which the usual obligations of labor, attendance upot count, eves and service in legal proceedings, are, by law, remitted.