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precedent and the boundaries of form, where changes are sudden, and men, to be successful, must leap with the hour; the position of lawyers in parliament is widely different. As a rule, they are men of more enterprising and adventurous minds, and of more general attainments, than are their brethren, from whose ranks they have sprung. In practice they do not confine themselves to any fixed branch, but, like American lawyers, are accustomed to take general business. They rather pertain to the class of advocates than that of juris-consults, and as such are enabled to accommodate themselves with greater facility to the exigencies of political warfare. The classes from which statesmen are principally drawn in older established communities, either do not exist at all, or do so in a less proportion here than in Europe. Politics is followed as a calling, as a profession, as an adjunct, but rarely as an art, a duty, or recreation with us. Thus, then, seeing that our houses of assembly can boast of but few who have claims to be either philosophers or statesmen, the lawyer, with his trained mind, his logical reasoning, and his powers of analysis, can hardly be considered to be out of place. The rapid development of the colonies, and the novel circumstances with which their sudden growth has been surrounded, have necessitated the introduction of new laws, which, though originating in the speculative minds of our amateur legislators, require to be drafted into shape at the hands of the technical lawyer. If only for this purpose, the presence of a number of sound, practical and experienced members of the legal profession must prove of immense service in our legislature. It is for them to clothe the ideas of their more practical colleagues with appropriate language, so that the acts of our houses of parliament may express neither more nor less than is intended.

"Turning, however, from this general view of the utility of lawyers in parliament, let us consider how their position in the legislature affects themselves and their professions. What is the meaning of the threatened invasion of parliament by so large a number of members of either branch of the profession? Is it a sign that the calling of law is not a prosperous one, and is the inroad suggestive of rats deserting a sinking ship? We think that this can hardly be asserted, and if asserted can scarcely be supported, if our theory be correct, that parliamentary and professional success are not inimical to each other here, to the same extent that they are at home.

"The other day an experienced lawyer, but a novice in politics, deprecated the scheme for payment of members, alleging, as a valid reason against its introduction, that the house would be flooded with junior barristers. We confess that we are at a loss to perceive what greater evil this would be, than that it should be overrun with youthful merchants, engineers, farmers, medical men, or men of any other business. The fact that young barristers or solicitors should seek places in parliament does not necessarily indicate that they are hopeless of success in their particular callings, but that, pending their attaining the full swing of business, they have more abundant leisure than members of other professions; also, that there are many advantages to be reaped from a parliamentary career, which are with difficulty attained in any other way.

"Thus, for instance, it is the readiest and quickest vehicle for the demonstration of talents which in the slow course of legal preferment must lie hid, or at least dormant, for a long time. Parliament at once

affords a field for the display of technical or general knowledge, of eloquence, of the rare quality of subordination, or of the ability to command. Let a man but show himself a statesman, or even a politician, ...d business in his profession is certain to spring from it. Besides, the representative man necessarily obtains a certain notoriety, and this, it cannot be denied, is to some extent an introduction to business. In some cases, indeed, politicians become members of the legal professions, with the sole object of thus qualifying themselves for office. We only allude to this fact as a proof that in newly-established countries the forum is not a bad introduction to the senate.

"No doubt there are disadvantages to be weighed against any benefit which lawyers may gain by entering into political life, such as the loss of time, and the ties of place or party; yet, if, as we anticipate, the professional men who have sought and may yet seek election show themselves desirous of proving themselves useful members of the legislature, and that they are actuated rather by a sense of duty and laudable ambition, than by the desire of office or personal advancement, we have little doubt but that they will in so doing promote the public welfare, and lend an additional luster to the professions to which they belong."

BOOK NOTICES.

The Practice in Bankruptcy, with the Bankrupt Law of the United States, as amended, and the rules and forms, together with notes referring to all decisions reported to July 1, 1871; to which is added the "Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States." By Orlando F. Bump, Register in Bankruptcy. Fourth Edition. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.

We had occasion so recently to notice this work that we do not feel called upon to again speak of its many excellences in extenso. We desire, however, to give the publishers credit for their enterprise in keeping the work up to the requirements of the profession. Instead of having it stereotyped, and then for years publishing new editions," from the plates, we have now, within a few months of the issuing of the former, a genuine new and revised edition, with the cases decided since the former where they should be in the body of the work.

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As an instance of Mr. Bump's accuracy and reliability we may mention, that, in the case of Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wallace, 81, published since the present edition of Mr. Bump's work, it is shown by the supreme court that the clause in section two of the bankrupt act "hear and determine the case in a court of equity" is erroneously printed in Little, Brown & Co.'s edition of the Statutes at Large (p. 518). That it should read "hear and determine the case as in a court of equity." Mr. Bump seems to have discovered the mistake, for the clause is correctly set out by him (p. 285).

The Code of 1871, with Article VI of the Constitution, and Rules of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, as amended to August, 1871. John D. Parsons, Jr., Publisher, Albany, N. Y.

The plates to the rules were destroyed in the late fire of Weed, Parsons & Co., so that they had to be reset. The present is one of the most elegant volumes we ever saw, neatly bound in leather for the vest pocket, with a new style of tuck. There are three full indexes, one to the code, one to the rules of the court of appeals, and one to the rules of the supreme court. All the

new rules of the court of appeals are given, including those relating to the admission of students. In addition, we are informed, by a note to rule 54 of the supreme court, that, in the third department, the court has designated Tuesday and Friday of the first week, instead of Tuesday and Thursday, as motion days.

It also contains, what we think, an excellent rule, adopted in the third department, on the 7th of February, 1871, providing, that notes of issues shall be filed in appeals from orders, and such appeals be placed upon a separate calendar.

The volume contains every thing relating to the code and rules down to the very day of publication. We notice several additional citations in the court of appeals rules, which are fully annotated by a gentleman of Albany thoroughly conversant with the practice. The annotations to those rules are alone worth the price of the work.

A General Treatise on Statutes: their Rules of Construction, and the proper boundaries of Legislation and of Judicial Interpretation. By Sir Fortunatus Dwarris; with American Notes and Additions, and with notes and maxims of Constitutional and of Statute Construction; also a Treatise on Constitutional Limitations upon the National and State legislative power, with a chapter on Parliamentary Law and Parliamentary privileges, by Platt Potter, LL. D., one of the justices of the supreme court of the State of New York. William Gould & Sons, Albany, N. Y., 1871.

Dwarris upon Statutes has been justly termed "the best book upon the subject ever published." The last -the second-edition published in 1848, is still the standard in England. In this country Mr. Smith's work was published the same year, and Sedgwick's followed in 1857. The latter were excellent works, but gave us extracts from cases rather than principles, so that the lawyer who was fortunate enough to own the three usually started with his principles from Dwarris, and followed them with illustrations and cases from the others.

The want of a collection of American cases to exemplify the text of Dwarris has been admirably and fully supplied by Mr. Justice Potter in the present edition, with the advantage, over Smith and Sedgwick, that they are brought down to the present time.

In addition to the cases cited in the notes, we should judge that over half the body of the present edition is by Judge Potter, who has thus thoroughly Americanized the work. His ability and experience as a jurist will at once give it an authority which others require years to attain.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL AKERMAN.-Attorney-General Akerman first came to the notice of General Grant as state agent of Georgia in Washington. One day, when he had finished some business in the executive office, the president said, animatedly, "I like that man, and as soon as a place is open in his state, I mean to make him district attorney." The time came, and the office was bestowed. In the pursuit of his new duties, the president heard that Mr. Akerman had been refused lodging in a southern city because of his republicanism, and that the court had to be adjourned in consequence. When Mr. Hoar resigned, Mr. Akerman was nominated, entirely without his knowledge, and was at his remote country home a week before the news reached him. Mr. Akerman was born in New Hampshire, and, long before the war, settled in North Carolina, and for a time taught school, but afterward pushed on into Georgia, where the rebellion found him.

THE PATENT LAWS.-At a recent meeting of London patent agents, held to consider the proposed changes in the patent laws, Geo. Haseltine, M. A., chairman, it was resolved: 1. That inventors have a right to the sole use of their inventions, which it is the duty of legislators to harmonize with the interests of the State. 2. That patents should no longer be granted to mere "first importers," but should be confined to actual inventors. 3. That the term of a patent should be twenty-one years- -now fourteen-without provision for extension. 4. That the official fees should be reduced from one hundred and seventy-five to ten pounds for the entire term, which is sufficient to defray the expenses of an efficient patent system. 5. That the French mode of granting patents--without official investigation of the merits of the application— should be adopted. 6. That in patent suits the rights of patentees should be determined by a competent court of equity, dispensing with jurors and "expert" witnesses.-The Globe.

LEGAL NEWS.

Judge Reed, of the Massachusetts superior court, has resigned.

Hon. Charles Francis Adams has accepted the appointment of arbitrator under the treaty of Washington.

The death is announced of Hon. Daniel W. Alvord, a much respected citizen of Greenfield, Mass., and formerly district attorney and United States collector.

The English house of commons, on the 5th inst., voted to postpone till the next session of parliament all questions of reform in the statute laws of the united kingdom.

The name of Hon. Joseph T. Bedle, associate justice of the supreme court of New Jersey, is prominently mentioned in connection with the democratic nomination for governor of that State.

Chief Justice Howe, of Wyoming Territory, has given an opinion which is held by several other members of the court, that women have the right to vote and hold office anywhere in the United States, under the fourteenth amendment.

A commission has been sitting in Versailles to inquire into the steps to be taken in the cases of marriages celebrated under the Commune. It has been decided that while in principle they are not considered valid, they are, nevertheless, now to be registered anew, as being legally consummated, and this registration is to have the effect of legitimizing the children.

An agreement has been signed by Sir I. Collridge and Mr. Sergeant Ballantine, in relation to the Tichborne trial, by which both parties agree that if any thing should prevent the attendance of one or two of the jury, the case shall go on with the diminished number; and also, that if Sir W. Bovill should be unable to preside, another judge may continue the case and employ his predecessor's notes. The plaintiff's solicitors have had some news of the crew of the Bella, and the junior counsel has gone to Australia to advise on the production of additional evidence. On the 26th ult., Lord Chief Justice Bovill signed and issued an order giving effect to the above agreement, which is to remain in force until the seventh of November next.

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The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 26, 1871.

POWER OF PASSENGER CARRIERS TO LIMIT THEIR LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE. The State of New York has the questionable honor of standing nearly or quite alone in the holding of its courts, that carriers of passengers may exempt themselves from all liability for injuries arising from the negligence of their servants.

The question came before the court of appeals in Wells v. The New York Central Railroad Company, 24 N. Y. 181, and it was there held, that a contract exempting the company from all liability to a free passenger for any negligence of their servants was not against public policy. The controlling opinion is devoted mainly to the question, whether the term "gross negligence" is applicable to the acts of servants of a corporation - a question in no wise material in the case - and the policy and legality of the contract is disposed of in a dozen lines. Sutherland, J., wrote a dissenting opinion, in which the question of the legality of contracts exempting passenger carriers from liability for negligence was very elaborately examined, and the conclusion reached that they were against public policy aud void.

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The next case in the same volume, is Perkins v. The New York Central Railroad Company. There the plaintiff's intestate was killed while riding upon a free pass, which contained an indorsement that the person accepting it "assumes all risk of accidents, and expressly agrees that the company shall not be liable under any circumstances, whether of negligence by their agents or otherwise," etc. The accident which occasioned the death was the result of the negligence of defendants' agents. The judge charged at the trial that if the negligence of the agents was gross and culpable it was not embraced in the contract. This charge was held to be erroneous, on the ground that the contract covered all negligence. Smith, J., it seems from the report, wrote two opinions; one for reversal and the other for affirmance, which presents the curious judicial phenomenon of a judge dissenting from his own opinion in the same case and on the same hearing.

The case of Smith v. The New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 222, presented the question in a somewhat different aspect. In that case the person killed was a drover, and was riding on what is known as a drover's pass- that is, a pass furnished to a person in charge of stock transported for a consideration, and which stipulates that the person receiving it takes all responsibility as to injury to himself or stock. The contract for the transportation of the stock also contained this provision: "And it is further agreed, that the persons riding free to take charge of

the stock do so at their own risk of personal injury from whatever cause." The jury found that the death of the intestate was occasioned by gross negligence on the part of defendants or its agents. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and sustained at general term. On appeal to the court of appeals the judgment was affirmed by a divided court. Wright, J., wrote for affirmance, taking the broad ground that a contract limiting the liability of passenger carriers for their own or their servants' negligence was void. Denio and Davies, JJ., were also for affirmance, on the ground that the intestate was not a gratuitous passenger, and that such a contract was void as to paying passengers, though not as to free passengers. Smith, J., was for affirmance on the ground that the negligence was that of the corporation itself—that is, that the corporation could legally contract against liability for its servants' negligence, but not for its own negligence. Sutherland, J., was for affirmance on the ground stated in his dissenting opinion in Wells v. The New York Central Railroad Co., supra, that the contract was void irrespective of the question whether the transportation was gratuitous or for hire. Allen, J., wrote an elaborate opinion for reversal, on the ground that the negligence was that of the servants of the defendant, and, therefore, covered by the contract with him. Selden, Ch. J., and Gould, J., concurred.

It will be observed that the greatest number agreeing to any particular reasoning or grounds were for reversal, while of the five judges for affirmance not more than two agreed on the same grounds.

The facts in Bissell v. The New York Central Railroad Company, 25 N. Y. 442, were substantially the same as in the case last cited. Bissell was a drover, and made a contract with the defendants which recited that, in consideration that the defendants would convey the stock at what were termed reduced rates, the plaintiff would assume the risk of injury to the cattle, and also that the persons riding free to take charge of the stock do so at their own risk of personal injury from whatever cause. The pass furnished Bissell contained a "notice," that the owner of stock receiving this ticket assumes all risks for injuries, whether from negligence of defendants' servants or otherwise. The jury found that plaintiff's intestate met his death through the gross and culpable negligence of defendants' agents. The judgment entered thereon was reversed by the court of appeals. Gould, J., was for reversal, of course, holding that the ticket was a free ticket, and the case within the rule laid down in the Wells case and the Perkins case. Selden, Smith, Davies and Allen were also for reversal, the first two expressly on the ground that Bissell was a free passenger, and Davies presumably on the same ground as he had before declared, that the company could not limit their liability for negligence in case of a paying passenger, and he had put his reason for affirmance in Smith's case, supra, expressly on the ground that he

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was a paying passenger, although his pass was on precisely the same conditions as that of Bissell. Denio, C. J., dissented on the ground that Bissell was not a gratuitous passenger, and Wright and Sutherland also dissented on the ground, it is to be presumed from their former opinions, that such a limitation of a carrier's duty was void.

It appears, therefore, that thus far the court of appeals has stood about in this wise: Gould and Allen, JJ., that passenger carriers could limit their liability for their own and their servants' negligence, absolutely; Denio, Davies and Selden, JJ., that they could limit their liability as to free passengers; Smith, J., that they could limit their liability for the negligence of their servants; Sutherland and Wright, JJ., that they could not so limit their liability in any

event.

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The rule, so far as one can be said to exist, considering this diversity of judicial opinions, is, that carriers can limit their liability for injuries to free passengers, either from their own or their servants' negligence; and that shippers of stock riding on a drover's pass are free passengers. "The fruits of this rule," says Davies, J., in Stinson v. New York Central R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 333, "" are already being gathered in increased accidents, through the decreasing care and vigilance on the part of these corporations, and they will continue to be reaped until a just sense of public policy shall lead to legislative restrictions upon the power to make this kind of contracts." It occurs to us, that if the courts would exhibit a little more of that "just sense of public policy," legislative interference would not be necessary.

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It would not be difficult to cite a great array of authorities to show that these decisions of the New York courts are directly counter to the current of decisions, but we have only space for one - the last one on the subject, we believe-that of the Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Railroad Co. v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1, and to appear in 2 American Reports. That was a case on all-fours with those of Smith and Bissell, before cited. The plaintiff- or defendant in error to explain the inverted title- was a drover, who contracted with the company for the transportation of stock. The contract contained the usual statement, that, in consideration of obtaining the transportation at reduced rates, the plaintiff agreed to assume the risks of injury to the animals from a number of specified causes, and also that the person riding in charge of the stock should do so at his own risk of personal injuries, from whatever cause, etc. The ticket, or "drover's pass," given him at the time of making the contract, contained the following: "The person accepting this free ticket assumes all risk of accident, and expressly agrees that the company shall not be liable, under any circumstances, whether of negligence by their agents, or otherwise, for any injury to the person, or for any loss or injury to the property, of the passenger using the ticket, and agrees

that as for him he will not consider the company as common carriers, or liable as such." The plaintiff accepted and used this pass, knowing its contents, and while so using it was injured by reason of the negligence of defendants' servants. The supreme court held, unanimously, 1. That the plaintiff was not a gratuitous passenger, inasmuch as the pass and the agreement for transporting the stock constitute together a single contract; and 2. That the stipulation in the contract and in the pass, exempting the defendants from liability for negligence, was against public policy and void, and therefore no defense to an action for the injuries. - and it was,

It is worthy of note that in this case no doubt, the same in the New York cases- - the pretense of carrying the stock at reduced rates was merely a sham. The superintendent of the company testified that the contract was "of the kind alone used by the company at the time the said stock was transported, and that the company would not, at any time, have received and transported the hogs except under such contract."

NEGOTIABLE PAPER SIGNED IN BLANK. It has recently been decided, in the exchequer chamber, that if a deed be delivered and a blank left therein be afterward improperly filled up (at least if this be done without the grantor's negligence), it is not the deed of the grantor. Swan v. The North British Australasian Company, 2 Hurls. & C. 175. But this principle, when applied to negotiable instruments, has been limited in its application. These instruments are not only assignable, but they form part of the currency of the country. It has, therefore, been uniformly held that where a man writes his name across the back of a blank bill or note, and parts with it, and it is afterward improperly filled up, he is liable as indorser; if he write it across the face of the bill he is liable as acceptor; or if he sign his name to a blank note he is liable as maker, provided, in either case, the instrument has once passed into the hands of an innocent indorsee, for value, before maturity.

The English cases cited, as holding the improper filling up of a blank instrument to be forgery, were, most of them, criminal prosecutions. For the purpose of obviating the incongruity of allowing a recovery upon an instrument which was itself a forgery, the courts of this country, in civil actions, have placed the liability of the author of the blank signature on the ground of estoppel.

The question was much discussed in Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531, where a blank acceptance had been filled with a sum exceeding that fixed by the acceptor, and the acceptor's liability was vested solely on the ground of estoppel. The principle that when one of two innocent parties must suffer, he should bear the loss whose act has caused the injury has also been generally relied upon in the cases, and in

some of them has ruled the decision. Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C. B. 82.

The paper at delivery may be entirely blank above the signature, or in the ordinary form of a printed bill or note, with the material parts in blank, and if it be filled up consistently with the purport or tenor of the form signed or indorsed, the signer or indorser will be liable. Orrick v. Colston, 7 Grat. 189; Visher v. Webster, 8 Cal. 112; Ives v. Bank, 2 Allen, 236; Moody v. Threlkeld, 13 Geo. 155; Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Conn. 336;. Robertson v. Smith, 18 Ala. 220; Duglass v. Scott, 8 Leigh, 43; Fullerton v. Sturgis, 4 | Ohio St. 529; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; Torrey v. Fiske, 10 S. & M. 590; Bank v. Curry, 2 Dana, 143.

It is now well settled that, in order to impeach the title of a purchaser of current negotiable paper, it must be shown that he acted in bad faith, believing at the time of the purchase that there was some infirmity about the paper. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Adol. & Ellis, 870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. (U. S.) 343; Steinhart v. Baker, 34 Barb. 436; Benior v. Paquin, 40 Vt. 199; Bassett v. Avery, 15 Ohio St. 299. But, if the paper be so filled up as to create a questionable appearance, or not according to the purport and tenor of such an instrument, it is sufficient to put the purchaser on his guard. Crosby v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273; Mehaime Bank v. Douglas, 31 Conn. 170. But if the defect does not appear on the face of the paper, it seems the purchaser may safely rely on the maker or indorser. Merriam v. Rockwood, 47 N. H. 81; Bank v. Guss, 31 Vt. 315; Haskins v. Lombard, 16 Maine, 140; Smith v. Maberly, 10 B. Mour. 266.

A person who has signed a blank instrument for accommodation may revoke it at any time before its inception or delivery to a third party (Smith's Execrs. v. Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77); and the delegated power to fill up such a paper is revoked by the death of the signer, and if it be afterward filled and transferred, it seems the decedent's estate cannot be made liable, even when the instrument is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the death. Smith's Execrs. v. Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt.

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important. In Price v. Taylor, 5 H. & N. 540, merely appending to the signature a word of description, such as "director," secretary," etc., was thought not to be sufficient. It seems, however, that the word as prefixed to the description would properly indicate the agency. In Aggs v. Nicholson, 1 H. & N. 165, a promissory note ran in form: "We, two of the directors of the A. L. A. S., by and on behalf of the said society, do hereby promise to pay," etc. (Signed) Charles Nicholson, H. Wood. The court held the directors not to be personally liable, though Martin, B., hesitated to accede to the judgment. In Alexander v. Sizer, L. R., 4 Ex. 102, the note ran: "I promise to pay," etc., and was signed for M. T. & W. company, J. S., secretary. The court held the defendant not personally liable, although Cleasby, B., dissented. In Dutton v. Marsh, Q. B., 19 W. R. 754, the note ran: "We, the directors of, etc., do promise to pay," etc. (Signed) P. J. Marsh, chairman, J. Higgins, S. | Broadbent, H. Johnson. The note contained no word indicating agency except the word denoting an office in the body, but the corporate seal was affixed. The court held the directors personally liable. In the case of Lindus v. Melrose, 2 H. & N. 293, the note read: "Three months after date we jointly promise to pay S., or order, 600%., for value received in stock on account of the London and Birmingham Iron Hardware Company (limited)—payable at the London Joint Stock Bank," etc. (Signed) James Melrose, H. W. Wood, John Haines, directors, (countersigned) Edwin Guest, secretary. The exchequer chamber held, that the signers were not personally liable, but inserted a denial that "we intend to throw any doubt upon the rule that an agent putting his name to a mercantile instrument is liable as a principal, unless the instrument distinctly shows that he signs as agent, or that we mean to break in upon the rule verba fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem. In this country it has been held, that, where an agent made a promissory note thus: "I promise to pay," and signed it Pro. C. D., A. B., it was the note of the principal and not of the agent. Long v. Coburn, 11 Mass. 97. So where A. and B. wrote a note in these words: "We jointly and severally promise," and signed it A. and B. for C., it was held to be the note of C. Rice v. Gove, 22 Pick. 158; Emerson v. Prov. Hat Manufac. Co., 12 Mass. 237. So a note of like tenor,

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF AGENT FOR NOTES signed "A. B., agent for C. D.," was held to be the

AND BILLS.

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note of the principal. Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461.

Where a promissory note was in these words: "I, the subscriber, treasurer of the Dorchester Turnpike corporation, for value received, promise" etc., and was signed "A. B., treasurer of the Dorchester Turnpike corporation," it was held to be the note of the corporation and not of the treasurer. Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335. So, where a note purported to be a promise by "The president and directors of a corporation," and was signed "A. B.—president,” it was held to be the note of the corporation. Mott v

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