action by the same plaintiff on the second note, that he gave it upon a condition which never was fulfilled, but not to set up a total or partial failure or want of consideration in the original note. Hooker v. Hubbard.

EVIDENCE.

1. There is no presumption of law that a drop-letter was deposited in the post-office on the day of the date of its post-mark. Shelburne Falls National Bank v. Townsley.

2. A copy, sworn to be correctly made from a press copy of a letter, is admissible, as secondary evidence, to prove its contents, without producing the press copy. Goodrich v. Weston.

3. In an action on a written contract for the manufacture and delivery of "horn chains," oral evidence is admissible to show that the parties intended by "horn chains," chains made of hoofs and horns. Sweet v. Shumway.

4. In a question whether in a contract for the manufacture of horn chains, by "horn chains," were intended chains partly of hoofs, or chains wholly of horn, admission of the testimony of one of the parties to the contract, that he had experimented by putting horn rings and hoof rings together, and that almost invariably the horn would break, forms no ground of exception, though the witness had previously testified that he was not a practiced manufacturer, had only put together rings made by others, and claimed to know no more as to hoof or horn than any one else. Ib.

FIXTURE.

The owner of a house and barn put up in the house several marble slabs, laid upon, but not fastened to, brackets screwed into the walls, and also in 1855 placed in the cupola of the barn a bell hung on an axle resting upon a wooden frame, which was placed on the platform of the cupola, and secured to it by cleats fastened by nails. In 1864 he conveyed the house and barn, but remained in possession as tenant of his grantee. Held, that, on leaving the premises in 1867, he might remove the slabs, but not the bell. Weston v. Weston.

INSURANCE.

1. Life insurance. - In an action on a policy of insurance of the life of a person who voluntarily killed himself, which was provided to be void if he should "die by suicide," the plaintiff, "in order to take the death out of the proviso," offered to prove that "the assured at the time of committing the act of self-destruction was insane; that he acted under the influence and impulse of insanity, and that his act of self-destruction was the direct result of his insanity;" but the judge ruled that such proof would not entitle the plaintiff to recover, and directed a verdict for defendant. Held, that the plaintiff had no ground of exception. Cooper v. Massachusetts Insurance Co.

FIRE INSURANCE.

A policy insuring the mortgagor of a chattel against loss thereof by fire, expressed to be void "if the title of the property is transferred or changed," and providing that "the entry of a foreclosure of a mortgage shall be deemed an alienation of the property," is avoided by an act which of itself, and without any further formality or process on the part of the mortgagee, will deprive the assured of all right and title in the chattel unless he shall pay the debt, such as the giving and recording, under the Gen. Sts. ch. 151, §§

6, 7, by notice of intention to foreclose the mortgage for breach of its condition. McIntire v. Norwich Insurance Co.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

The fact that very near where a workman is voluntarily employed in a manufactory, machinery not connected with his work is in motion, the dangerous nature of which is visible and constant, is not conclusive that he has taken on himself the risk of being injured by it, in modification of the implied contract of his employer to provide for him a reasonably safe place in which to do his work; and if through inattention to the danger he meets with such an injury, while doing his work, and sues his employer therefor, the questions whether he met with it with due care on his own part, and by reason of the the neglect of his employer to give him suitable notice of the danger, are for the jury; and the facts of his youth and inexperience, and the directions previously given to him by agents of the employer about the manner of doing the work, are to be considered upon the question of due notice; but the fact that the cost of covering the dangerous machinery with a box would have been slight, and that it was so covered soon after the accident, are immaterial. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. The payee of a promissory note, who indorses it for the accommodation of the maker, may take it up at maturity without waiting for demand and notice as indorser, and sue the maker thereon. Pinney v. McGregory.

2. When notice of the protest of a promissory note, addressed to the several indorsers, are sent by the notary by mail, from the place where the note was payable, in one inclosure, addressed to the last indorser, in order to charge a prior indorser by forwarding such notice to him through the post-office, in a drop-letter addressed to him, at said last place (there being no system of letter delivery by carriers in that place), must deposit the drop-letter in the post-office on the same day he receives it from the notary. Shelburne Falls National Bank v. Townsley.

TRUST AND TRUSTEE.

A fund bequeathed in trust to pay the income to one until his death, and then the capital to another, included shares in the stock of a railroad corporation. This corporation, out of its net earnings, accumulated during the term of the trust, bought in the market part of its own stock; invested other such earnings to an amount equal to twenty per cent of the par value of the residue of its stock in property, a large portion of which was not required for the use and improvement of the railroad; and voted to create a number of new shares of the same par value, to be issued and disposed of as the directors should deem proper. The directors then voted to offer to the individual stockholders the right to take part of the new stock at par, in the proportion of twenty per cent of a new share for each old share held by the taker, and that if any individual stockholder should not avail himself of his right, they would dispose of it as they might see fit; and at the same time after a preamble reciting that, "whereas there is a large amount of surplus earnings invested in the shares and property of this company, which the stockholders have instructed the directors to divide," they declared a dividend of forty per cent on the old shares held by individual stockholders, payablo

"twenty per cent in the shares of the company, which were purchased or held by this corporation in its corporate capacity, and twenty per cent in cash derivable from the shares which the stockholders entitled to this dividend shall respectively pay for the new stock taken by them under the terms of the preceding vote." Held, that of the avails of the dividend to the trustees and so much as was derived from the first twenty per cent was payable as income to the life tenant; and so much as was derived from the second twenty per cent accrued to the capital of the trust fund. Leland v. Hayden.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

JUNE DECISIONS, 1871.
BAILMENT.

1. Rights of bailor and bailee: sale of pledge without notice.-The plaintiff specifically pledged certain bonds to the defendant, a banking association, to secure the payment on demand of $15,000. Subsequently the defendant sold these bonds at private sale, and from the amount received repaid the loan and applied the balance toward the settlement of an over-draft which plaintiff had made upon it. No demand was made upon plaintiff for the $15,000, and no notice was given him of the sale, which notice and demand it was claimed was impracticable, on account of plaintiff having absconded. Subsequently the defendant, for a sum less than the face, transferred their whole claim for the over-draft, without deduction for the balance received on the bonds, to one White. This action was brought to recover the bonds or their value. Held, that it is not sustained by the authorities that the inability of a pledgee to make a demand and give notice of the time and place of a sale entitles him to sell without such demand and notice, and without judicial proceedings. Strong v. National Banking Association. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. Even if demand and notice could be dispensed with, a private sale in such a case cannot be sustained unless the parties have stipulated for such a sale. Ib.

3. The sale of the bonds having been unauthorized, the plaintiff had the right, on becoming informed of it, to elect whether to ratify it, and claim the benefit of the surplus in reduction of the over-draft, or to repudiate the sale and the credit of the surplus, and hold the defendant responsible for the bonds. Ib.

4. Having made his election, and repudiated the sale and credit, he became liable to White for the amount of the over-draft and entitled to demand of the bank the bonds or their value on paying the $15,000, and interest for which they had been pledged. Ib.

BILLS AND NOTES.

1. Bona fide holder, who is: practice.-In an action upon a note diverted from the purpose for which it was given by the maker, the onus is cast upon the plaintiff of showing that he is a bona fide holder. Farmers & Citizens National Bank v. Noxon. Opinion by Grover, J. 2. A bank is a bona fide holder where it receives in the ordinary course of business from a depositor who is embarrassed, and keeps an account as agent, but who is in the habit of procuring notes to be discounted by it, a note of no larger amount than he had before presented, if there is nothing to excite the suspicion of the bank, and put it on inquiry. Ib.

3. In this court exceptions to the findings of a referee

raise only the question whether there was any evidence in support of the finding in the supreme court, whether the finding is against the weight of evidence. Ib.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

1. Neglect to file: rights of judgment creditor: how waived. Actual notice to plaintiffs, in an execution which has been levied upon personal property, of the existence of a chattel mortgage thereupon, does not supply the omission to properly file such mortgage. Barker v. Doty. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. But where the sheriff, under such execution, offers the property for sale, subject to an unfiled chattel mortgage the execution creditor standing by and not dissenting, the creditor, if he purchases, gets no more than the debtor's equity of redemption. Ib.

CONTRACTS.

1. Verbal, when not merged in written: common carriers. The rule that prior negotiations are merged in

a subsequent written contract does not apply to a verbal contract for the carriage of goods for which a bill of lading is subsequently made when the contract has been acted upon, and the shipper has parted with all control over his goods before the receipt of the bill, unless such shipper expressly assents to its terms. Bostwick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. The defendants' agent agreed to transport to New York certain bales of cotton by "all rail" for a specified rate (which was higher than the part rail and part water rate), and took possession of the cotton for that purpose, giving the plaintiff receipts, but no bill of lading. Two days after the bill of lading was delivered. The bill contained printed conditions to the effect that the goods should be transported by certain railroad companies to Columbus, Ohio; there delivered to the railroad company; by it transported to Bellaire, and there delivered to the agents of the next connecting steamboat,railroad or forwarding line, and that the railroad and steamboat companies, etc., should not be liable for loss or damages by the dangers of navigation while on the sea or rivers, etc., and that by accepting the bill of lading the shipper agreed to its stipulations and conditions. The cotton was carried to Baltimore, and a part of it shipped by one vessel, and arrived safely in New York. Upon its receipt the freight upon the whole at the "all rail" rate was paid by the plaintiff's consignors. Part of the cotton was shipped by another vessel, which was lost at sea with its contents. This action was brought to recover damages for the cotton lost. Held, that the goods having been shipped under an agreement that they should be carried "all rail," a loss at sea is no excuse for their non-delivery to the plaintiff. Ib.

3. The non-delivery of the goods was a breach of duty on the part of the defendant unless excused. Ib. 4. The verbal agreement having been consummated and rights having accrued thereunder, the mere receipt of the bill of lading, inadvertently omitting to examine the conditions, was not sufficient to conclude the plaintiff from showing what the actual agreement was under which the goods were shipped. Ib.

See Practice, 8.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. Rights of, as to lands owned by them in fee for a specific purpose: opening of streets through. The legislature, by an act (laws of 1869, chap. ), provided for

the widening of Ninth avenue and Fifteenth street, Brooklyn. Said Ninth avenue bordered upon private owners and also upon Prospect Park, which was owned in fee simple by the city of Brooklyn, for the purposes of a park. The act provided for the appointment of commissioners to estimate the expense of such widening, and the amount of damages to be sustained by the owners of land, etc., and, after their report should be confirmed, to apportion and assess the same upon the lands and premises benefited, etc., and that, in making the assessment for Ninth avenue, they should assess three-fifths of the expense upon the lands lying south-east (Prospect Park) and two-fifths upon lands north-west (which belonged to private owners) of said avenue. Commissioners were appointed, the avenue widened and a portion of Prospect Park taken. No objection was made to the action of the commissioners, except that they allowed, in assessing the damages, the full value of the park lands taken. Held, that, in so doing, the commissioners acted properly; that the city held the lands taken for the purposes of a park, and as it had no right to sell or dispose of the lands, or appropriate them to another use without the consent of the legislature, it was the duty of the commissioners to treat them the same as lands belonging to other owners. Matter of widening Ninth avenue v. Nichols. Opinion by Grover, J.

And it would not be sufficient to grant the city merely nominal damages, on the ground that the lands taken were as valuable to it in the form of a street as of a park. The legislature and not the court are to determine that. Ib.

PRACTICE.

1. Special proceedings for collection of tax: appeal from order in. - Proceedings were undertaken against the defendant to collect a tax on personal property which could not be collected, and which he refused to pay, as for a neglect or violation of duty within the statute entitled "Proceedings for contempts," etc. (2 R. S. 534), and an order to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him was granted by the Westchester county judge. On the return of the order the proceedings were dismissed by the county judge on the ground of irregularity, from which decision an appeal was taken to the general term of the supreme court where the decision was reversed, and the proceedings submitted to the county court, from which general term decision an appeal was taken to this court. Held, that if the county judge had denied the motion to dismiss the proceeding for the cause alleged, an appeal could not have been taken to the supreme court, for the order would not have affected a substantial right. Matter of Ackerman, assessors, etc. v. Bussing. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. It is not a matter of right to have a proceeding of this character dismissed in limine, and without a hearing on its merits. Ib.

3. The order of the supreme court reversing the order of the county court, etc., left the matter in the latter court in the same situation in which it would have been had that court denied the motion, and an appeal cannot be taken therefrom to this court. Ib.

value of his services. Robinson v. Weil. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

6. Venue, when right to change waived: injunction: effect of reservations in deeds.-The trial of an action in one county without a jury, when it should be tried in another county with a jury, is proper, if the party entitled to object does not do so at the trial. If he does not then assert his rights he will be deemed to assent to the place and mode of trial. West Point Iron Company v. Raymert. Opinion by Allen, J.

7. Mines, quarries and timber are protected by injunction, upon the ground that injuries to and depredations upon them are causing or may cause irreparable damage, and also to prevent a multiplicity of actions for damages that might accrue from continuous violation of the rights of the owners. Ib.

8. A reservation in a deed will not give title to a stranger, but it may operate, when so intended by the parties, as an exception from the thing granted, and as notice to the grantee of adverse claims as to the things excepted and reserved. Ib.

See Bills and Notes, 3.

RAILWAYS.

1. Bonding towns for: requirements of act authorizing bonding.-In an act delegating power to a portion of the tax payers of a municipality to charge the property of all, and subject it to taxation for a purpose foreign to those for which local governments are authorized, and with respect to contingent benefits, the power given can only be exercised in strict conformity to the letter and spirit of such act, and nothing can be taken by implication. People ex rel. Harris v. Smith. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. And where such act confers upon a judicial officer special and extraordinary power, giving his orders thereunder upon the local governments to raise money by tax, the effect of judgments of courts of record, it must receive the strict construction which is given to all laws of that character. Nothing will be intended in support of his acts, but they must be brought clearly within the statute to be sustained. Ib.

3. The petition demanded by chapter 907 of the laws of 1869, providing for bonding municipal corporations, etc., in aid of railway companies, must be that of the tax payer, and it is not satisfied by that of an agent, and the county judge has no jurisdiction for the purpose of appointing commissioners to issue bonds except upon the petition of the tax payers. Ib.

4. Where a petition was presented in which the names of a portion of the tax payers of a town had been subscribed by persons who had received verbal authority so to do, held, that such subscribing was not in accordance with the law, and that it did not give the county judge jurisdiction to act thereunder and to appoint commissioners to bond such town. Ib.

5. The power conferred is personal to the tax payer and cannot be delegated by him. Ib.

A number of Boston banks intend to contest the legality of the tax on dividends between August 1 and

5. Bill of particulars.-The insertion of the words "per agreement," in a bill of particulars in an action for the value of services, does not restrict the party furnishing such bill to proof of a special agreement fixing the price, but he may prove and recover the

as their counsel.

Judge Stanley, of the San Francisco county court, lately permitted a Chinese defendant to testify in his own behalf, and then decided the case, which had been appealed from a lower court, in the defendant's favor. reversing the decision of the court below.

CODIFICATION IN THE STATES.

The New York Evening Mail, in an extended article on codification, gives a synopsis of the information procured by Mr. Benj. Vaughan Abbott, one of the commissioners for revising the United States statutes, in regard to the commissions for revision and codification in the various States.

In California there is a commission consisting of I. C. Burch, Creed Haymond and Charles Lindley. These gentlemen are now engaged in the work at the State capital. They have made considerable progress, and have issued and circulated a number of titles for examination by the public.

In Florida, Hon. A. H. Bush, of Jackson county, has prepared a new digest of the laws, which is in the hands of the State printer.

In Georgia, a commission has been recently authorized and commissioners have been appointed.

In Illinois, Messrs. H. B. Hurd, of Chicago, Wm. Schafer, of Salem, and W. E. Nelson, of Decatur, have been appointed revising commissioners.

In Iowa, Messrs. W. H. Seevers, Oskaloosa; William J. Knight, Dubuque, and W. G. Hammond, Iowa City, are the revising commissioners.

In Michigan, Hon. James S. Dewey, judge of the sixth judicial circuit, has been chosen to compile the laws under an act of the legislature passed in 1871.

In Mississippi, Messrs. A. R. Johnson, Jackson Lovering and J. P. Campbell are a revising commission.

In New York, Messrs. Charles Stebbins, Nelson J. Waterbury and Montgomery H. Throop are a revising statutory commission. They have made reports to the legislature covering the subject of classification.

In North Carolina there is a revising commission originally composed of Messrs. A. W. Tourgee of Greensborough, Victor C. Barringer, Concord, and W. B. Rodman of Washington, Beaufort county. But upon the appointment by President Grant of Mr. Barringer to serve as one of the national commission, he resigned his place, and W. H. Bailey, of Salisbury, was appointed thereto. This commission has made reports, but it is understood that political changes have delayed action upon them.

In Pennsylvania, a commission, composed of Hon. David Derrickson, of Meadville, and William M. Hall, Esq., of Bedford, have recently reported a revision of civil statutes, which it is believed now awaits consideration by the legislature.

In Rhode Island there is a commission at work composed of Messrs. W. P. Sheffield, Abraham Cayne, and Wingate Hayes.

In South Carolina, D. T. Corbin, W. J. Whipper, of Charleston, and C. W. Montgomery, of Newberry, have been appointed a revising commission.

In Tennessee there is no official board of commissioners. But private individuals, it is understood, are engaged on a complete revision of the code of Tennes

see.

West Virginia has lately had a code prepared, which has probably been issued.

In Wisconsin the last legislature (1871) authorized the purchase of a compilation of the general laws of Wisconsin from Hon. David Taylor, of Sheboygan. Mr. Taylor was for years one of the circuit judges. His compilation is understood to be well advanced. It is to be submitted, when completed, to the governor, chief justice and attorney general, and, upon their approval, may be accepted by the secretary of state.

The following States have no revising commissioners

now at work; but revisions are deemed needed, and measures for instituting them have lately been urged before the legislatures of Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Nevada, Texas and Virginia.

The laws having been recently revised in the following States, they have now no revising process on foot. Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire and New Jersey.

POST-DATED CHEQUES.

The effect and validity of post-dated cheques have been made the subject of much controversy in courts of law, and we are tempted to say a few words concerning them, because our attention has been directed to a recent case in the supreme court of Victoria, of much interest to the holders and payees of such instruments. We are indebted for a report of the case to our able contemporary the Australian Jurist.

Before, however, detailing this case, we may recall two modern cases in our own courts, viz.: Forster v. Mackreth, 36 Law J. R. (N. S.), Exch. 94; 2 Law R., Exch. 163; and Bull v. O'Sullivan, 40 Law J. R. (N. S.), Q. B. 141. In the former case the defendant and one Tucker carried on business together as attorneys, and the cheque sued on was drawn by Tucker in the name of the firm, was dated July 20, and delivered by Tucker to the plaintiff on July 13, in exchange for the plaintiff's cheque. The court thought that a post-dated cheque was in effect for all practical purposes a bill of exchange, if post-dated deliberately and intentionally, so as to make it have the legal and practical effect of a bill at so many days' date. As there was no evidence of special or general authority to Tucker to bind his partner by a bill of exchange, judgment was given for the defendant. The value of the decision consists in the explanation given of the effect of a post-dated cheque. In Bull v. O'Sullivan, which is reported in the current number of our reports, the declaration was upon a cheque for fifty pounds, drawn by the defendant, payable to Edward Myers or order, and indorsed by Myers to the plaintiff. the trial the plaintiff produced the cheque, which he had received on November 4, 1868, at which time he saw that it bore the date of November 5. Counsel for the defendant objected that the cheque ought not to be received in evidence, as it bore only a penny stamp, whereas it ought to have been stamped as a bill of exchange. The court, in an elaborate judgment for the plaintiff, following Whistler v. Forster, 32 Law J. R. (N. S.), C. P. 161, held, that in determining what is the requisite stamp the instrument alone must be looked at, without reference to any collateral condition affecting its apparent operation, the word date in the stamp acts meaning the date on the face of the bill, note or cheque. The court further held that there was no enactment making it illegal to post-date a cheque or other order for the payment of money, whatever might be the effect of the post-dating on the instrument itself.

At

We now come to the Australian case, which was argued on appeal from the county court of Ballarat. The plaintiff Hinchcliffe sued the Ballarat Banking Company for dishonoring a cheque for 11. 5s. The facts were that the plaintiff banked with the defendants, and, on June 25, 1870, gave to a clerk in the office of the Magdala Mining Company a cheque for 4l. 10s. on the defendants for calls. The cheque was post-dated July 13; but it was paid in by the Magdala Company

on June 29 to its account at the London Chartered Bank, was by that bank sent on to the defendants, and was paid June 30. On July 6 plaintiff gave a cheque for 1l. 5s., which was presented on the 10th, and dishonored for want of funds. Plaintiff contended that

by the wrongful payment of the post-dated cheque for 41. 10s. before its date his funds were improperly reduced, and if that cheque had not been paid there would have been sufficient to meet his cheque for 11. 5s. The jury gave the plaintiff a verdict for 125l.; but Mr. Cope, the judge, afterward nonsuited him, on the ground that he had no legal right to post-date a cheque, and thereby impose a duty on others to carry out his wishes not expressed in the ordinary form; that he ought not, under the guise of an instrument in the form of a cheque payable on demand, to issue what would really be a bill of exchange, and calculated to deceive, as in fact it did deceive, the person to whom it was paid, and two bankers through whom it had passed. The court, consisting of Sir W. F. Stawell, C. J., Mr. Justice Barry, and Mr. Justice Williams, held that the point raised was concluded by the case of Forster v. Mackreth, and that it would be impossible, in the face of it, to hold that a banker was at liberty to disregard the date of the cheque. If it were so held, he would also be permitted to pay a bill of exchange before it was due. There was, therefore, evidence to go to the jury of negligence on the part of the bankers. If there is no date on a cheque the banker is bound to pay on presentment, but where there is a date which has not yet arrived it must be treated as a bill of exchange not yet due.

Lest our readers should imagine that the court approved of the damages awarded, we may add that the verdict for 125l. was allowed to stand merely because the defendants had never asked for a new trial. But the court, to mark its opinion on that point, gave no costs of the appeal.-London Law Journal.

THE EGYPTIAN LEGISLATURE.

Colonel James Morgan, of South Carolina, gives the following account of the life and death of the Khedive's attempt to follow European fashions in lawmaking:

When the viceroy returned from France, he called his prime ministers together and said: "In order to have a great country we must have a legislating body," and he then made known his plans. Delegates were selected from various districts, and informed that they must be divided in opinion; that every measure should be debated; and the minister who called them together said, "Now, all who favor the government will stay on the right, those who oppose it will cross over to the left, and those undecided will remain in the center." No sooner was the division called than all the delegates made a rush for the right. There was no opposition or no medium party.

''This won't do," said the minister, "there must be an opposition ;" and he called to him an old sheik,named Ibrahim, and said:

"You must lead the opposition." "What is it?" asked Ibrahim.

"Well, then, when the government introduces a law you must protest and argue against it."

'Hum," said the sheik, "then if the Khedive says he wants so-and-so, I am to say, No, you shan't have it." "Yes," said the minister.

A jovial smile lighted up the tanned-leather face of old Ibrahim; he shook his head and said, "None for Sheik Ibrahim; too much bastinado.”

After a time, by liberal bribery, an opposition was established. One day, when the minister, Hassan Bey, was absent, one of the opposition violently opposed a measure of the Khedive's. A government member from Pama jumped up and moved that the opposition member be bastinadoed for treasonable conduct. The motion was carried, and the recusant Egyptian was knocked down and bastinadoed on the floor of the house. That was the last session of the Egyptian corps legislatif.

LAWYERS IN COLONIAL PARLIAMENTS. The Australian Jurist has the following: "The number of lawyers at present in parliament, and the anticipated rush of others into the political arena, may make it worthy of thoughtful consideration, whether so large an influx of the class will prove advantageous to the country and to the professions themselves. It is not so much our province to speculate as to what the effect of this will be upon the general welfare, as to consider the manner in which it will affect the interests of the legal profession; yet, in discussing the question from one point of view, it will be impossible to ignore the other. In older established countries, and especially in England, it has been held that parliament is any thing but a stepping-stone to the bench, and that success as a politician is little likely to lead to success as a jurist.

"Those who follow the calling of the law in countries where all trades and professions have their settled courses, are prone to take narrow views of things; more likely to be guided by precedent, than to listen to the promptings of reason; and in their strict observance and adherence to words and forms, to fail to grasp broad principles. In political life these toilers in certain fixed grooves find themselves placed at an enormous disadvantage. Their ponderous and profound learning is rather a clog upon their thoughts and actions, than an assistance in the struggle. They find themselves with their precedents and cases, their established forms and quibbling technicalities, pitted against men their inferiors in special knowledge and mental balance, but immensely their superiors in a general knowledge of the world. All their legal training is valueless, and the fact has to be, to a certain extent, unlearnt ere they can hope to cope with their more versatile, if shallower, opponents. Even in debate they fight at a disadvantage. The most impassionate efforts of oratory are mere words spoken with more or less emphasis in the interests of a client, according to the amount of the honorarium. The most logical utterances are only sentences strung together by the art of the advocate. Nothing that the lawyer says or does is held to be natural or disinterested. If he be successful as a lawyer, why should he strive after the sweets of statecraft? If he be an unsuccessful one, then he is seeking to gain distinction in one line of life, after having failed in another. By the general public he is looked upon with distrust, and his fellow-politicians regard him rather as a redoubtable opponent than as a trusty ally.

"But here, in this young country, where things are necessarily as yet in a transition state, where trades and professions are not hedged in with the barriers of