appeal may be authorized after the lapse of the time limited therefor, under section 68, 2 G. & H. 597. Barragree v. Cronkhite and others.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

Conversion.-Where one forcibly took possession of certain wheat as it stood in the field, driving the owner away, and harvested and sold it, held, in an action for such taking and conversion, that the value of the wheat at the time of its sale, in the form in which it was sold, was the measure of damages, if the plaintiff was content therewith, though he was entitled to the highest price of the property at any time between the taking and the sale; and the defendant was not entitled to prove the value of his own labor in harvesting and threshing the crop, for the purpose of reducing the damages. Ellis v. Wire.

A. sold to B. a certain woolen factory, for which the latter executed to the former a note, and a mortgage on real estate to secure the same. Soon afterward, B. sold a part of the factory to C., who thereby became indebted to B. in the amount of said note and mortgage. Subsequently, A., B. and C. mutually agreed that A. should take C. for said debt and release B., who, in consideration thereof, should release C., which he then did. Held, in a suit afterward brought by A. against B. on said note and mortgage, that this was a valid novation. Hoffa v. Hoffman.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

A. sold to B. a number of sheep, to be delivered at a certain time and place, of a specified quality, and at a stipulated price per pound. On the day agreed upon for the delivery, B. sent a letter to A., stating that on account of sickness he had sent a man to receive the sheep according to contract, directing A. to weigh the sheep and send the weight thereof, and promising to send the money therefor by express; and B. instructed his said agent to receive none but good sheep, which fact was communicated by said agent to A., who delivered a certain number of sheep to the agent, who had a fair opportunity to judge of their quality, and did so judge, and received the sheep as good sheep. Held, that B. was bound by said action of his agent. Rupp v. Stith.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

1. Official bond.—Where A. was requested to become a surety on a sheriff's official bond by B., a person having no connection with the bond, which was not then present, and A. told B. that the latter might sign the name of the former to the bond, provided that C. and D. first executed it, and, A. never having seen the bond, never having been requested by said sheriff to execute it, and never having had any communication in relation to the bond with said sheriff or any other person, except B., the name of A. was signed by B. to the bond, which was never executed by C. or D., held, that A. was not bound as a surety. Bagot et al. v. The State ex rel. Dennison.

2. Sheriff's return.- A sheriff's return to an execution, showing the collection of the money thereon,

A. shipped from Chicago a quantity of wheat, consigned, according to bill of lading in duplicate taken by him, to B., at Indianapolis, on account of A., who had contracted it to B., but it was not to be his till paid for. A. drew at sight, on the date of the shipment, for the price of the wheat, attaching to the draft one copy of the bill of lading indorsed, and negotiated the draft at a Chicago bank, which transmitted it to an Indianapolis bank for collection. During the forenoon of the day after the shipment, while the wheat was in transit, C. purchased the wheat of B., at Indianapolis, and paid for it, taking from him at the time a bill of lading for the wheat, issued by a railroad company at Indianapolis, on that day, to B., on account of C., who supposed the wheat had then arrived at Indianapolis. The shipping list had been received, but the wheat did not arrive till the night of the following day. C. had no notice of any right of A. to the wheat. Said draft reached Indianapolis at about the hour that B. sold the wheat to C. An attempt was immediately made to present the draft, but B., the drawee, who was insolvent and failed that day, could not be found. In the afternoon, the Indianapolis bank notified the carrier, said railroad company, to hold the wheat for the consignor; and, at a later hour on the same day, a similar notice was given at the express instance of said consignor; and the wheat was held accordingly. Held, in an action of replevin by C., that he had no right to the possession of the wheat. Pattison v. Culton and others.

Where a person, intrusted with a chattel for safe custody, to be restored to the owner when required, is sued in detinue for breach of duty in detaining it after demand, the statute of limitations is no bar to such action if the same be brought within six years after demand and refusal, although more than six years have elapsed since the person so intrusted with the article has wrongfully parted with the possession of it.

Detinue by the church wardens of the parish and parochial district of All Saints, Habergham, within the township of Habergham Eaves, in the county of Lancashire, against the incumbent, for the silver communion service of the church. Pleas inter alia non detinet, and the statute of limitations.

The cause was tried before Mellor, J., at the last Liverpool winter assizes, when it was found by the jury that the communion service, for the detention of which the action was brought, had not been presented to the defendant, as he alleged, as a gift to him, allowing the parish only to use it, but that it had been given to the church wardens in the ordinary way for the use of the parish. The only material point for the purpose of this report is with reference to the statute of limitations. The communion service had been presented at the consecration of the church in 1849, and, from that time to 1859, it had, as often as it was used in the church, been taken backward and forward, for safe custody, to the house of a Mr. Dugdale, who had contributed largely to the building of the church; but, in 1859, the defendant took possession of the service, though, according to the finding of the jury, it is to be considered he did so, not as owner, but for safe custody only, it being for the use of the parish, and to be forthcoming when required. In the course of 1859, and eleven years before the present action was commenced, the defendant sold this service to a silversmith for old silver at 5s. an ounce, and substituted for it some years afterward a brass service, and subsequently another silver service. The defendant | contended at the trial that, this sale by him being a conversion of the property more than six years ago, the statute of limitations was a bar to the present action. There was no evidence that the plaintiffs knew of this conversion at the time, and they proved a demand, made shortly before action, to return the plate in question, and the defendant's refusal to comply therewith. The learned judge ruled that, in this action, the statute of limitations ran from the time of such demand and refusal, notwithstanding the previous conversion, and a verdict was accordingly rendered for the plaintiffs.

The defendant obtained a rule nisi inter alia, for a new trial, on the ground that such ruling of the learned judge as to the statute of limitations was a misdirection. Joseph Browne and Leresche shewed cause. Assuming the sale in 1859 to be a conversion, still the statute of limitations is no answer to this action. Detinue is different from trover. In trover the judgment changes the property and vests it in the tort feasor (Cooper v. Shepard, 3 Com. B. Rep. 206; S. C., 15 Law J. Rep. [N. S.] C. P. 237); but in detinue the gist of the action is the detention, and that is the not returning the chattel when demanded. Jones v. Dowle, 9 Mee. N. W. 19; S. C., 11 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 409. In that case Parke, B., says, in answer to the observation of counsel, that the defendant had parted with the chattel to another over whom he had no control; that was his own fault. It is laid down in Comyn's Digest, detinue A, that the action of detinue lies, though the defendant quitted the possession before the action brought by delivery of the goods to another, and Brook's Abridged Detinue, 1, 2, 33, 40, is cited in support of the position. And in Reeve v. Palmer, 5 Com. B. Rep. (N. S.) 84; S. C., 27 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) C. P. 327; affirmed in Exch. 5 Com. B. Rep. (N. S.) 91; S. C., 28 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) C. P. 168, it was held that if an attorney who has received his client's deed to keep for him, loses it and nothing appears respecting the cause of the loss, he is liable to an action of detinue on the part of his client.

[Willes, J. You say that it would be monstrous if the statute of limitation is to run from the demand, if the bailee has lost the chattel, but not if he has wrongfully parted with it.]

Yes, the defendant has to make out that there was a detention of this plate in 1859, when he sold it, but there was no demand ever made for it before 1870, and certainly there was not until then any detention of it as against the plaintiffs. The case of Plant v. Cotterell, 5 Hurl. & N. 430; S. C., 29 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 198, shews that the right of action in detention is founded on a wrongful detention. There the statute of limitations was held no defense where the demand and refusal were within the six years, though the deeds for which this action of detinue was brought had been in the defendant's possession for more than that time. It is true, however, that the deeds had not been destroyed, and they were assumed to be still with the defendant. There is, in fact, no direct authority in point.

[Wilkes, J. In Williams v. Archer, 5 Com. B. Rep. 327, note d, there is a learned note by the late Serjeant Manning as to detinue lying after the chattel has been destroyed, and the case in the Year Book, M. 20, H. 6, fol. 16, p. 2, there cited, is in favor of detinue being the proper remedy where there has been a bailment, as of a tun of wine which has been drunk by the bailee.]

In Philpott v. Kelley, 3 Ald. & E. 106; S. C., 4 Law J. Rep. (N. S.), K. B. 139, Pattison, J., and Coleridge, J., seemed to be of opinion, that if the bailee of wine draws off and converts part without the owner's knowledge, and at the end of six years is sued for the whole, he cannot, even in trover, set up the conversion of part as conversion of the whole, to support the statute of limitations.

The defendant in person, in support of the rule, contended, that there could be no detainer by him of what he did not have in his possession or under his control, and that, therefore, as after the sale in 1859, he no longer had the plate, he could not be said to detain it when it was demanded of him; that whatever cause of action there was against him in respect of such plate, it arose when he sold it in 1859, and that, therefore, the statute of limitations then began to run, and was consequently a bar to this action. He cited the cases of Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 E. & B. 123; S. C., 27 Law J. Rep. (N. S.), Q. B. 61, and Backhouse v. Benvi, 9 H. of L. Cas. 503; S. C., 34 Law J. Rep. (N. S.), Q. B. 181, to shew that the cause of action first arose when the injury occurred. Cur adv. vult.

The judgment of the court (Coram Willes, J., Montague Smith, J. and Brett, J.) was (on February 13) delivered by

WILLES, J. This was a rule calling upon the plaintiffs to shew cause why the verdict found for them upon the trial before Mellor, J., at the Liverpool winter assize, should not be set aside, and a verdict entered for the defendant, upon the points supposed to have been reserved, or for a new trial upon the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against the evidence.

It appears by the report of the learned judge, that no point was reserved, and that he is not dissatisfied with the verdict, which turned altogether upon the credibility of a witness. There is, therefore, no ground for the rule, unless the alleged misdirection be made out, and we took time to consider that point fully.

The action was one of detinue by church wardens against the incumbent for detaining a service of silver communion plate. The plate was taken possession of by the incumbent before the year 1859, under circumstances in which, upon the finding of the jury, the just inference is that he was allowed to do so, not as

his own, but for safe custody, and, therefore, under an implied stipulation that it was to be forthcoming for the use of the parish when required. Whether for peace sake, or from neglect of the duties of the plaintiff's predecessors, the defendant was allowed to retain it, and he supplied its place at first by a brazen service, and afterward by another silver service purchased by himself. The plaintiffs being minded to recover the custody of the parish plate recently, before action demanded it of the defendant, and he declined to return it, alleging that it was his own, purchased for him and his successors, and not for the parish - a plea negatived by the verdict, and which, if successful, would tend to defeat the admitted object of the donors, namely, that whoever were holders of the plate, it should be for the use of the parish; because the incumbent, as such, being only a corporation sole, could not, without statute or custom, take chattels by succession. Howley v. Knight, 14 Q. B. Rep. 240; S. C., 19 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 3.

Upon this refusal to deliver up the plate, the plaintiffs brought this action, founded upon the established rule of law that church wardens have succession as representing the parish in respect of its movable property, and may maintain actions in such capacity even against the incumbent. Year Book, M. 11 Hen., 4 fol. 12 a.; Com. Dig. English, fol. 3; Turner v. Baynes, 2 H. Bl. 559.

The defendant pleaded, among other pleas, the statute of limitations, that the cause of action had not accrued within six years. At the trial he gave evidence that, in the year 1859, more than six years before action, he had sold the plate out and out as old silver, and he insisted that the action was, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations. 21 Jack. 1.

The learned judge ruled that the statute ran, or, in other words, that a fresh and substantive cause of action in detinue, as upon a bailment determined, accrued to the church wardens upon the demand and refusal to deliver up the plate, notwithstanding the previous unknown conversion thereof by the defendant to his own use more than six years before action, and the question is whether that ruling can be sustained.

The authorities upon the construction of the statutes are collected in a very useful book (Darby and Bosanquet on the Statute of Limitations, p. 28), from which it appears that the point is, in this instance, new; and we must decide it upon reason.

For the defendant it was urged that a complete cause of action arose against him upon the sale in 1859; that the statute thereupon began to run, and that the ignorance of the plaintiff could not avail to stay the operation of the statute in a court of law; and, if this had been an action for damages for the conversion of the plate, in which the demand and refusal would have been only evidence of a conversion, it would have been impossible to contend that the date of the conversion could be excluded, or to deny that the defense upon the statute was sustained. Nor could the ignorance of the plaintiffs, or their predecessors, have prevented its operation.

It is a general rule, that, where there had once been a complete cause of action arising out of contract or tort, the statute begins to run, and that subsequent circumstances which would, but for the prior wrongful act or default, have constituted a cause of action, are disregarded. As, for instance, in the case of a bill of exchange, drawn at so many months after sight, and refused acceptance, the cause of action is complete,

and the statute begins to run upon the refusal of acceptance, and no new cause of action arises upon refusal of payment.

The rule that a cause of action arises once for all upon the first default is, however, not universal; for in cases where a man undertakes to do an act upon a future day, and, before the day arrives, disables himself from performing the act, or positively and absolutely refuses to be bound by or perform his contract, and, so to speak, declares against the bargain himself and absolves the opposite party, it is in the option of such party at his election to treat that conduct as of itself a violation and breach of the contract, or to insist upon holding the repudiating party liable and sue him for non-performance when the day arrives. The misconduct of the party who acts in fraud of the bargain in such cases gives the other party thereto the election of suing, either for the first violation or for non-performance at the day; and it does not furnish the wrongdoer with any answer to the latter. This principle was well maintained in Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678; S. C., 22 Law J. Rep. (N. S.), Q. B. 455. In delivering the judgment in that case, Lord Campbell thus stated the reason of the decision: "It seems reasonable to allow an option to the injured party, either to sue immediately, or to wait till the time when the act was to be done, still holding it (the contract) as prospectively binding for the exercise of this option, which may be advantageous to the innocent party, and cannot be prejudicial to the wrong-doer." The same doctrine was recognized and approved by the court of exchequer chamber in Avery v. Bowden, 6 E. & B. 953; S. C., 6 Law J. Rep. (N. S.), Q. B. 3.

Upon like reasoning, it seems to follow, on the other hand, that where the action of detinue is founded upon a wrongful conversion of the property only, as it needs must where there is a bare taking and withholding of the property by another, without any circumstances to show a trust for the owner or to found an option to sue, either for the wrong or for the breach of the original terms, the statute would run from the time at which the property was first wrongfully dealt with. This, however, as we have already observed, is not like the present case, in which the plate was originally taken for safe custody, to be restored when required.

On the other hand, if the action of detinue is resorted to, as it may be (Com. Dig. Detinue, a) for the purpose of asserting against a person intrusted for safe custody a breach of his duty as bailee, by detention after demand, independent of any other act of conversion, such as would make him liable in an action of trover, it should seem that the owner is entitled to sue at election, either for a wrongful parting of the property (if he discovers and can prove it), or to wait until there is a breach of the bailee's duty, in the ordinary course, by refusing to deliver up on request; and that, in the latter case, it is no answer for the bailee to say that he has, by his own misconduct, incapacitated himself from complying with the lawful demand of the bailor. Such is the effect of the decisions referred to in the course of the argument, in Williams v. Archer, and Reeve v. Palmer, supra, in which latter case a loss of the chattels by negligence, which, though of itself it plainly gave no cause of action of trover or detinue (Williams v. Gesse, 3 Bing. N. C. 849), yet did give cause of a special action for negligence, at the option of the owner, was held to be no answer to an action of detinue founded upon a subsequent demand and refusal, which were held to con

stitute a substantive cause of action, notwithstanding that the property had, before the demand, ceased to be in the possession of the bailee. In that case the principle that a man intrusted with property for safe custody, cannot better his position by wrongfully parting with possession of it, but must be answerable if he retained the possession, was applied both in this court and in the exchequer chamber to the action of detinue. And this is agreeable to the maxim, “Qui dolo desiiet possidere pro posidente damnatur.”

The learned judge's direction was, therefore, unobjectionable, and the rule ought to be discharged. Rule discharged.

NOTES AND QUERIES.

Sir, -Can any of your readers inform me, through your columns, whether a bankrupt can be discharged

under the act of March, 1867, or under any amendments thereto, without paying fifty per cent on the claims proved against his estate?

It has generally been understood, that he can yet be discharged without paying the fifty per cent on debts K. contracted prior to January, 1869.

BOOK NOTICES.

The American Law Review-Quarterly. Little, Brown & Co., Boston.

The July number opens with a very elaborate “History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the United States." The other contents are "The Reporters and Text writers"-a paper made up of the comments favorable and unfavorable of the judges and text writers on various books; "The Scotch Courts"-a very interesting article on the judiciary and judicial system of Scotland; digest of the English law reports; selected digest of state reports; book notices; list of new law books for the quarter; summary of events and correspondence. The fifth volume closed with this number.

Bench and Bar. O'Callaghan & Cockcroft. Chicago. July, 1871.

Mr. J. A. J. Whittier, the new editor of the Bench and Bar, is doing most excellent service for that quarterly. The two numbers that have been issued under his management have been particularly noticeable for the ability and variety of their contents. The present number contains articles on "The Taking of Private Property for Purposes of Utility;" "Trial by Jury;" "Circumstantial Evidence," second paper; also "Digest of Recent Decisions, and of Bankruptcy Decisions," notices of new law books, obituaries, legal memoranda, etc.

Reports of Cases in Law and Equity determined in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. By Oliver L. Barbour, LL. D. Vol. 58. Albany: W. Č. Little & Co., 1871.

The decisions reported in this volume are mainly those of the first and fourth departments, and cover the interval from January, 1870, to April, 1871. The reporting is done after the usually careful style of Mr. Barbour. Indeed, one might suppose that it was sometimes a little too carefully done. His desire to present in the head notes every point passed upon by the court not infrequently has the effect of protracting them to an inconvenient length, as in the case of Hobart v. Hobart, p. 296, the head note to which occupies nearly two pages. So, too, he sometimes gives

with unnecessary fullness the fact and the arguments, as in the case of Graves v. Spier, p. 349, wherein the statement of facts and argument of counsel occupy something over thirty-three pages, while the opinion of the court is contained in less than seven. The arguments of counsel, especially of the losing counsel, are undoubtedly of value in important or doubtful cases, but even there they should be condensed into the smallest compass consistent with clearness.

We believe that most, if not all, of the important cases in the volume have been given by us heretofore in our digest. There is one, however, to which we have at present only tried to allude, but which we shall endeavor to notice more fully hereafter. It is the case of Lappin v. The Charter Oak Insurance Co., p. 325. That was an action brought upon a policy of insurance

against fire to recover loss. The policy contracted to make good any loss or damage happening by fire, between December 7, 1868, and December 7, 1869. It contained a clause providing that the policy shall not be assignable before or after loss without the consent in writing of the company, and provided, among other things, that "in case of any sale, transfer or change of title in the property insured by this company, or of any interest therein, such insurance should be void and cease;" and also: "in case of any levy by another, or the levy of an execution or attachment, or possession by another of the subject insured, without the consent of this company indorsed thereon, this insurance shall immediately cease."

On the 21st of July, 1869, the assured died intestate, and the property insured descended to his heirs. On the 9th of November the property was destroyed. The court held that the death of the insured and the vesting of the title in the heirs at law operated as a 66 change of title" within the terms of the policy; and that the possession of the property insured by the insured, without the consent of the company, was also in violation of the terms of the policy, and that, therefore, the plaintiff could not recover.

This occurs to.us now as being a very strict and hard construction of the language of the policy, and as hardly borne out by the authorities; but we will speak of it at another time.

Curiosities of the Law Reporters. By Franklin Fiske Heard. Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1871.

To the legal profession, at least, this is a useful and entertaining little book, inasmuch as it shows what absurdities we have outlived, and suggests many others that ought to die. Those who believe that the law is not a progressive science should read this book. Those, also, who do not see why certain necessary reforms are not instantly effected should read it. The most formidable obstacle to legal reform is the laziness of those lawyers who have learned their profession, and dislike to be at the trouble of unlearning any part of it. It is this that makes many sigh for the disused juggernauts of the law, on which they were wont to ride, oblivious of the crowd who were crushed by their wheels. We have said that the book is amusing, and so it is, if dead and dying follies can be said to be amusing; but the amusement to be extracted from its pages is of a sober cast. So, when we are told that "an assault was laid twenty-one different ways in an indictment," it seems, at first thought, to be rather a good joke; but such are the jokes that have rendered our profession a reproach to many. Mr. Heard's volume shows a good deal of discursive mousing among the old books, and he has made a good report of the time so spent.

The Science of Legal Judgment. A treatise designed to show the materials whereof, and the process by which, courts construct their judgments, and adapted to practical and general use in the discussion and determination of questions of Law; by James Ram, with extensive additions and annotations by John Townshend. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1871.

We believe the only reprint of this admirable work in this country was one without reference to American cases, in the law library. Mr. Townshend, in his preface, modestly says, that what he has added constitutes one-third of the bulk of the volume. He has certainly added more than a third to the interest and value of the present edition. He has done his work thoroughly and well, adopting, we think, the correct course of embodying his own labor in the body of the text inclosed in brackets. But a very faint idea of the number of cases cited, and the doctrines briefly but lucidly discussed, can be given in a review. The volume must be examined and read to be appreciated. Every lawyer who desires to discuss a law point understandingly and clearly, with a definite idea of the value of reports and text books, particular cases and texts, will not only consult but study it. The fourteenth chapter, containing five sections upon adherence to decisions and overruling them, the fifteenth, "distinguishing one case from another," and the seventeenth, "deciding new cases," are among the best. The only thing which occurs to us which might have materially improved the work would have been a more general giving of the names of the parties to the cases cited, with an alphabetical list of all the cases cited, and a separate one of those overruled, shaken or distinguished. There are so many of each that it is somewhat difficult to find any particular case; but where so much is done, and so well done, perhaps it is hypercritical to find fault with such an omission, particularly as the extensive index will go far to supply the deficiency.

The Federal Government: its Officers and their Duties. By Ransom H. Gillett, formerly member of congress. Woolworth, Ainsworth & Co., New York, 1871; S. R. Gray, Álbany.

To the lawyer, pur et simple, this book will be of but little use, but to a lawyer who has been so unfortunate as to get an office under the United States government, it may serve to give a brief outline of his duties and responsibilities. Its chief usefulness will be in the hands of the rising generation, who ought to, but seldom do, know something about the government under which they live. Mr. Gillett has had a large experience as an officer under the federal government, and has recorded it in a manner likely to prove interesting as well as instructive.

The National Bankruptcy Register has changed its form to an octavo, whereat most lawyers who take it - and every lawyer at all interested in bankruptcy law ought to take it-will rejoice. Ought not the publishers to have commmenced a new series with this change? as the old volumes and the new will hardly keep company well together when bound.

Messrs. King & Baird, of Philadelphia, have in press a new edition of The American Leading Cases, by Hare & Wallace - a work which has for years been deservedly popular.

LEGAL NEWS.

The Pall Mall Gazette thinks that the English judicial system runs great risk of a total collapse.

Joel Prentiss Bishop, the well-known writer on criminal law, has issued the first volume of a treatise on the law of married women.

It is reported that Chief Justice Robertson, of the Kentucky court of appeals, contemplates resigning at an early date on account of continued ill health.

The commissioner of internal revenue is rapidly reducing the number of assistant assessors in the different States.

There were 949 acts passed at the recent session of the legislature of this state, of which number only $2 are what are known as public or general laws.

Hon. W. M. Addington, a leading Baltimore lawyer, and United States District Attorney under President Buchanan's administration, died at White Sulphur Springs, Va., on the 24th ult.

James K. Turner, a member of the Titusville (Penn.) bar, has been convicted of forging pension papers, and sentenced to pay a fine of two thousand dollars and suffer an imprisonment of fourteen years.

It is stated that about one hundred indictments have already been found against members of the Ku-Klux order in North Carolina, and that by the time the present term of the circuit court closes, the number will be doubled.

The following appointments have been made by the president: Hon. D. B. Johnson, associate justice, supreme court of New Mexico; John Glyn, assistant assessor of internal revenue for the second district of New York; Elijah Faulkner, assistant assessor of internal revenue, seventh district of Tennessee.

NEW YORK STATUTES AT LARGE.
CHAP. 84.

AN ACT to authorize the owners and holders of certain railroad mortgage bonds made payable to bearer, to render the same payable to order only. PASSED March 9, 1871. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for any person or persons owning and holding any railroad mortgage bonds, or other corporate bonds (for which a registry is not by law provided), heretofore issued, or which may be hereafter issued, and made payable in this state, and which are made payable to bearer, to render the same non-negotiable by the owner and holder indorsing upon the same, and subscribing a statement that said bond is the property of such owner. And thereupon the principal sum of money mentioned in said bond shall only be payable to such owner or his legal representatives or assigns.

§ 2. The bonds described and referred to in the first section of this act may be transferred by an indorsement in blank, giving name and residence of assignor, or they may be transferred by an indorsement payable to bearer, or to the order of the purchaser (naming him), subscribed by the assignor, giving name and place of residence.

§ 3. This act shall take effect immediately.