Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB
[graphic]

For fourteen years there has been a received and established interpretation of this statute in the district courts of this city, and among the justices and attorneys and counselors of the supreme court practicing therein, and to disturb it now would be dangerous. It is the conclusion of the court, for the above reasons, that the undertaking should be deemed sufficient, and that the justice could acquire jurisdiction therefrom. Judgment affirmed. Van Loon v. Lyons. Opinion by J. F. Daly, J. Also, see Appeal.

REFERENCE.

1. When a plea of payment is made.-On appeal by the plaintiff from an order of reference, this action is brought to recover the sum of $4,500, for professional services as attorney and counselor at law in divers suits in the courts of New York city, disbursements made and services rendered in examination of titles, etc. The complainant alleges "that the items of plaintiff's demands and accounts exceed twenty in number." The answer denies that the defendant was indebted in the sum of $4,500 or any sum whatever, and sets up by way of set-off moneys advanced to plaintiff, and property of defendant taken by him. It also avers that, on May 21, 1860, defendant paid to plaintiff $275 in full of all demands to the date last mentioned, and demands that said sum shall be set off against plaintiff's claims, and defendant have judgment for the balance. The plaintiff raises the point that, the defendant having pleaded payment, that issue must be tried before the account or items of claim or counterclaim can be inquired into, and as the issue as to payment must be tried by a jury, and is not a referable issue, except by consent, the order of reference is premature; and, if made at all, cannot be made until the question of payment is disposed of by trial in court: Held, that the investigation of the plaintiff's claim involves the examination of a long account. An attorney's bill of charges, invoking items of services in nearly every department of the profession, if disputed as to correctness of items, or value of each service, or the aggregate value, presents a question which is within the province of a referee. The reasoning, in the case of Townsend v. Hendricks, 40 How. Pr. 143, applies to this case. Inasmuch as the payment of a smaller sum is no satisfaction of a larger, the allegation that, on May 21, 1860, defendant paid to plaintiff $275, in full of all demands to that date, is not a plea of payment to a claim of $4,500 for professional services due February 11, 1862. And no plea of payment is made or intended, since defendant sets off the sum of $275, as stated. There is no plea of payment, in a legal sense, in the answer. The issue as to whether the defendant paid the sum named on May 21, 1860, in full of all demands to that date, cannot be first tried in this action, because it could not, if found in defendant's favor, determine the action against the plaintiff. Order affirmed. Schermerhorn v. Wood. Opinion by J. F. Daly, J.

2. When fraud is alleged.-The appellant insisted that questions of fraud might or would arise on the trial, because he intended to show that receipt, etc., which the defendant may produce are false or forged. Held, that this will not avail against the order of reference. This action is, in its nature, ex contractu, and there is no issue invoking fraud; and any such issue arising is incidental merely, and does not alter the character of the action. This point not having been raised below, is, however, not reviseable on appeal. Ib.

3. When payment is alleged by the answer, that ques

tion must be disposed of before the accounts can be examined, because, if proved, it disposes of the whole case, and there are no accounts to be examined. The allegation of payment must, however, be such, as, if proved, will dispose of the plaintiff's whole claim. Ib. 4. An order referring the issue, de novo, must be sustained without regard to any former order of reference in the case. Ib.

SERVICE. See Executors and Administrators. SET-OFF. See Reference. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. See Executors and Administrators.

TORTS. See Contracts.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY.*

ACTION.

[graphic]

1. A party who, by contract, is entitled to all the articles to be manufactured by an incorporated company-he, such party, furnishing the raw materials, cannot maintain an action against a wrong-doer, who, by a trespass, stops the machinery of such company, so that it is prevented from furnishing, under said contract, manufactured goods to as great an extent as it otherwise would have done. Dale et al. v. Grant, 142. 2. The rights of the plaintiff in such case all arise out of contract, and the damages resulting from an indirect injury to such rights are too remote to form the groundwork of an action at law. Ib.

3. A railroad company, whose roadbed is so constructed as to expose its employees to a latent danger, is liable to such of said employees as are injured thereby. If such danger is not obvious, it is the duty of such company to warn those who are to incur it of its existence. Paulmier, Adm'r, v. Erie Railway Co., 152. 4. Where the track over a trestlework was not capable of supporting an engine, and the engineer in charge had orders not to put his engine thereon, which orders he disobeyed, and the intestate of the plaintiff, who was a fireman on said engine, and who was unaware of said orders or of the danger, was thereby killed, the said trestlework giving way,- held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, on the ground that such death was occasioned in part by the want of care in the defendant, the railroad company, with respect to said trestlework. Ib.

5. Where a servant receives an injury occasioned in part by the negligence of his master, and in part by that of a fellow-servant, he can maintain an action against his master for such injury. Ib.

AGENT.

[graphic]

1. Authority to agent to make executory contract for the sale of land may be by parol. If, in such case, he makes contract under seal, it is not valid as a sealed instrument, but is good as a simple contract. Long v. Hartwell, Adm'x, 116.

2. An agent of a railroad company cannot expel a passenger from a ferry-boat for a violation of the rule of the company, requiring such passenger to deliver his ticket at a certain gate, without first notifying such passenger that, unless he leaves the boat, such extreme measure will be resorted to. Compton v. Van Volkenburgh and N. J. R. R. Co., 134.

*From 34 New Jersey.

[ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors]

AGREEMENT.

A valid agreement between the holder of a note and the maker to extend the time of payment will discharge an indorser who is not a party to such agreement. Nightengale v. Meginnis, 461.

BANKRUPT AND BANKRUPTCY.

The remedy by audita querela having fallen into disuse, the practice has been adopted of giving relief on summary application, when the person or property of a bankrupt is taken under process issued on a judgment recovered before the discharge, and upon which the discharge operates; and the remedy is in the court out of which the execution issued. But the court will not discharge without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to show that the discharge is inoperative as against his debt, and will, in its discretion, determine the question on affidavits, in a summary manner, or direct an issue to ascertain the facts. Linn et al. v. Hamilton, 305.

[ocr errors]

CONSIDERATION.

1. A written promise to pay money on some contingency is not a promissory note, implying a consideration on the face of it. To support it as a contract, a legal consideration must be shown. Conover y. Stillwell, 54. 2. To give a consideration value sufficient for the support of a promise, it must be either such as deprived the person, to whom the promise was made, of a right which he before possessed, or else conferred upon the other party a benefit which he would not otherwise have had. Ib.

3. What is a sufficient consideration? Cases reviewed applied to the present case. Ib.

CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The legislature has not the power, under the constitution of this State, to authorize a market to be held in a public street of a city, without providing compensation to the proprietors of the contiguous

lands who own to the center of such street. State v. Laverack, 201.

2. The general principle is, that when land is acquired by the public for one particular use, no additional burden can be superadded without compensation to the land owner. Ib.

CONTRACT.

1. An entire contract is a contract the consideration of which is entire on both sides. A contract to pay a gross sum for a certain definite consideration is an entire contract, and is not apportionable. Beach v. Mullin, 343.

2. A contract to pay sixteen dollars for a month's service is as entire in its consideration as a contract to pay a certain sum for a single chattel or for a specified number of chattels. Ib.

3. The reservation of wages, payable monthly or weekly, will not control the contract so as to destroy its entirety, when the parties have expressly agreed for a specified term -as a year; but if the payment of monthly or weekly wages is the only circumstance from which the duration of the contract is to be inferred, it will be taken to be a hiring for a month or a week. Ib.

4. Where a servant, whose wages are due and payable periodically, as quarterly, monthly or weekly, refuses to serve in the manner contracted for, or is rightfully discharged at any intervening period between the days when his wages are due, he can recover nothing for

that portion of time during which he has served since the last periodical payment of wages. Ib.

5. Where a contract for purchase and sale is without stipulation for time of payment, such payment is due immediately, and the purchaser has not all the time given for the removal of the article purchased to make payment, nor can he make such payment proportionally as the thing sold is received in parcels, but the seller may sue upon his independent contract for payment. Brehen v. O'Donnell, 408.

6. A contract that, in consideration of a free passage, a passenger will assume the risk of injuries to his person from the negligence of the servants of the railroad company, is valid in law. Kinney et al., Adm'rs, v. Central Railroad Co., 513.

7. A passenger who receives knowingly a free ticket with an indorsement of such contract upon it, will be bound by the terms of such contract, and cannot recover for injuries from such negligence. Ib.

INSURANCE.

1. In contracts of insurance a representation differs from a warranty, and from a condition expressed in the policy, in that the former is part of the preliminary proceedings which propose the contract, and the latter is part of the contract when completed. The validity of the entire contract depends upon the truth or fulfillment of the warranties and conditions expressed therein; and non-compliance is a breach of the contract which makes it void; but a misrepresentation, to avoid the policy, must have been in a material matter, or have been made with a fraudulent intent. Dewes v. Manhattan Insurance Co., 244.

2. Conditions of insurance annexed to a policy, and by the terms of the policy made part of the contract, have the same force and effect as if contained in the body of the policy. Ib.

3. An accident policy provided that "the insured is required to use all due diligence for his personal safety and protection;" held, that the fact that the insured was killed by falling from the second story of a barn which he was having built, in consequence of the breaking of a joist having a secret defect, did not conclusively show a breach of this stipulation, but was properly left to the jury. Stone's Adm'rs v. The United States Casualty Co., 371.

4. The policy also provided that it should be void if the assured changed his occupation, without notice, to a more hazardous one; held, that the term changing his occupation" meant engaging in another employment as a usual business. Ib.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

A tenant who holds a mortgage on the demised premises, the money secured by which is due on the day on which his lease expires, may continue to hold the premises under the mortgage, the mortgage money not being paid, without first surrendering the premises to his landlord, although in the lease he has covenanted to yield up and surrender possession of the premises to his landlord at the expiration of his term. Shields v. Lozear, 496.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. A note fraudulent in its inception cannot be invalidated in the hands of a party taking it for value, before maturity, unless actual fraud can be shown in such party so taking it. Hamilton v. Vought, 187.

2. That such note was taken under suspicious circumstances will not avail to defeat it, unless such cir

[graphic]
[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]
[ocr errors]

FIXTURES. No. III.

[ocr errors]

But of cases decided under this head some of old date have been thought to have gone to an extreme limit in allowing the ornamental character of the thing to outweigh the essential character of the annexation. Among cases in which the decision has been in favor of the executor against the heir are Harvey v. Harvey, at nisi prius, 2 Str. 1141, tapestry and hangings, and Squier v. Mayer, 2 Free. 249, hangings nailed to the wall. The one, however, which has been most challenged is that of Beck v. Rebow, 1 P. W. 94, where the plaintiff, under a settlement of a house made upon his marriage by his father-in-law, the defendant's testator, claimed chimney glasses, pier glasses and hangings, the argument in favor of his claim being that these things were in lieu of wainscot. The decision was against his claim; but the ground of it was that these things were only matter of ornament and furniture." The ground of the decision, therefore, is clear and distinct; and it may be doubted whether the mere allegation that they were as wainscot, and that there was no wainscot under them," was enough reason to take out of the category of " ornament and furniture things which in their nature so strictly belonged to it, and which were fastened in no more permanent way than by nails and screws. At the same time that argument was in Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. 508, allowed to carry to the heir pictures and glasses fixed in lieu of wainscot, upon the authority, but by an extension of the rule, laid down in Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 64, a, where it was said that wainscoting will pass to the heir, and that it makes " no difference in law if it be fastened by great nails or little nails, or by screws or irons put through the post or walls, * ** and so by the lease or grant of the house (in the same manner as the ceiling and plastering of the house), it shall pass as parcel of it." This last-mentioned statement of the rule at any rate seems such good sense, and so agreeable to the more recent authorities, that there is no reason why we should discard it because it was denied to be law in the curt note of Squier v. Mayer, 2 Free. 249, in which case, inasmuch contradiction to the earlier decision of Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. 508, and to recent authorities, a fixed furnace was held to go to the executor.

The most recent case on this subject (D' Eyncourt v. Gregory, 15 W. R. 186, L. R. 3 Eq. 382) tends strongly in favor of the fixed character of articles attached like wainscoting, and occupying a similar position

with respect to the general design of the room; for there a picture and tapestries, inclosed in moulding which were fixed to the walls in the manner of wainscoting, were held fixtures. In the same cases statuary and vases, not affixed, but resting by their own weight, were held fixtures, on the ground that they were "strictly and properly part of the architectural design of the hall and staircase, and put in there as such, as distinguished from mere ornaments to be afterward added." The house there had been erected by the person who placed the statuary in it, a fact which seems reasonably taken into account when the question of design is considered; and such a consideration (quo ædes perficiantur) may perhaps be taken to harmonize D. xxxiii, 7, 12 (23) and (25) with D. L. 16, 245, which appear, at first sight, not to be reconcilable with one another.

In considering this part of the question, it must be remembered that the inquiry here is, not whether a thing is a removable fixture, but whether it is a fixture at all. If a consideration of the purpose is wholly excluded, then it may perhaps be laid down that if a thing is so fixed, no matter by how slight a connection, that an act of unfastening is necessary as distinct from an act of removal, and before the act of removal can be commenced, the thing so annexed is a fixture. If, however, the mode of annexation is not so solid as to preclude an inquiry into its purpose, then the nature and use of the thing annexed, compared with the nature and use of that to which it is annexed, may prevent the thing from coming within the class of fixtures, and cause it still to remain a movable chattel so as to form no part of the immovable for the purpose of ejectment, conveyance, mortgage, descent, or settlement, and so as to be the subject-matter of an execution against the owner of the freehold, of trover, and of the "order and disposition" clause in bankruptcy. Some observations must here be made (which could not be conveniently made earlier) with respect to the requisites postulated above in regard to the original ownership of the movable, and the circumstances under 'which it is affixed. It was said the movable must be affixed by the owner of it, and affixed in the course of his general use and occupation of the immovable.

First, then, there is no authority whatever for stating that the consequences above described follow if the movable thing is affixed wrongfully and against the will of its owner. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 15 W. R. 186, L. R. 3 Eq. 394. It must be fixed by the owner. If, however, it is not affixed by him, but is affixed with his consent, but without any intention of transferring the property in it, what results will ensue? The answer to this must depend upon the circumstances under which the question arises. The property right, as between the owner of the thing and the person affixing it, or those taking through him, cannot certainly be affected. The latter cannot transmit, alienate, or in any way make title to it, more than to any other object of property which is not his. It is not a question, for instance, between the heir and executor of the latter, but between the true owner and whichever of the two wrongfully detains it from him. But Horn v. Baker may be taken to show that, being in fact a fixture, it would not be within the order and disposition clause, although in the bankrupt's possession with the consent of the true owner. By the same rule, it would seem trover could not be maintained for it, but that it must be recovered in the appropriate special action. Neither could it be the subject of larceny at common law. If

[ocr errors][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][ocr errors]

the annual value in situ of the thing so affixed were required to raise the annual value of a tenement or of a lodging to £10, so as to confer a settlement as the lodger franchise, would the claim be allowed? Why should it not? since, if it added to the annual value, it would certainly increase the ratable value. With respect to the right of distress, if the tenant can, by affixing his own things, take them out of the class of distrainable objects, he can equally do so with those of other people. On the other hand, as between landlord and consenting owner, both with respect to goods irremovably fixed, and with respect to those which the tenant has lost his right to remove by not exercising it in due time, it must be taken that the owner, in consenting to their annexation, has consented also to the proper consequence of annexation, and, if he loses his goods, can only complain (if at all) of the tenant who has neglected his interests.

On the whole, it may probably be said that in the case of things being affixed with the consent merely of the owner, no change of property is effected as between the owner and the person affixing them, but that for other purposes, and as concerns third persons, all the usual consequences of annexation follow. Gregg v. Wells, 10 A. & E. 90. Secondly, however, it makes no matter that the owner of the immovable, who affixes it, is a trespasser in respect of the immovable he affixes it to. His trespass on the land may cause him to lose the things he annexes to it; though he cannot, by his wrongful annexation of another's goods, acquire a title in them himself, or give it to a third person. Thirdly, the annexation must be made in the course of the general use and occupation of the immovable, and as part of it. This is opposed to affixing of things in the exercise of a special right of use, as in the case of an easement. Such was the case of Lancasteriv. Eve, 7 W. R. 260; 5 C. B. (N. S.) 717, where the question arose as to the property of a pile fixed in the bed of the Thames. Now, the plaintiff who claimed title to the pile had no property in, nor any general use or occupation of, the soil of the Thames; but the circumstances showed that he had a right to the exclusive use of that pile to moor his barges to, and it was inferred that he had placed it there in virtue of a special right to use the bed of the river for that purpose. A similar inference was drawn with respect to a fender upon a stream in Wood v. Hewitt, 8 Q. B. 913. The case would be the same with respect to any similar easement, such as the right to lay pipes for a watercourse, etc.-Solicitor's Journal.

(To be continued.)

IMPORTANT DECISION.

SUPERVISORS HAVE NO POWER TO FIX SALARY OF COUNTY JUDGE.

The plaintiff was elected county judge of Wyoming county in the fall of 1867, for four years from January 1, 1868.

In November 1, 1867, the supervisors of Wyoming county fixed the salary of said judge at $1,200 per annum, from January 1, 1868. On November 17, 1869, the said supervisors fixed the salary of said judge at $1,700 per year, from the 1st January.

On November 18, 1870, the same board passed a resolution that $1,700 be levied and assessed on the property of said county, to pay salary of said county judge for 1871, and $500 for arrears of said judge's salary.

The above sums were raised. On the 14th December, 1870, the said board passed a resolution, the preamble to which recited, that doubts were entertained as to the legality of a county judge's salary from January 1, 1870, and it was resolved that the resolution of November 17, 1870, be amended, so as to establish the salary of said judge at $1,700 from January 1, 1871.

The plaintiff demanded of defendant, as county treasurer of said county, the said sum of $500, for arrears of salary, etc., which the said defendant refused to pay. The plaintiff then demanded that defendant pay him his salary at the rate of $1,700 per annum, from November 14, 1870, and defendant refused.

The parties agreed upon a case and submitted it to this court with the following propositions: first, whether the act of the legislature, authorizing board of supervisors to fix the salaries of county judges, is constitutional? And, second, if it is not, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the $500, which has been raised and paid into the county treasury for his benefit? Held,

1. That it was the intention of the constitutional court, judging from their debates, etc., and is the true construction of the judiciary act, as it now stands in the constitution, not to permit the boards of supervisors to establish the salary of the county judges, but, on the contrary, to impose that duty on the legislature.

2. That section seventeen of the third article of the constitution, which provides "that the legislature may confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties such further powers of local legislation and administration as they shall from time to time prescribe," etc., does not in any way conflict with the section of the new judiciary article above cited; that section seventeen only gives the legislature power to confer upon boards of supervisors power to make such local laws, etc., as they (the legislature) may from time to time prescribe. That an act in reference to the salary of a county judge is not a local act, within the true intent and meaning of the term "local," but general.

3. That the act of the legislature, conferring the power on boards of supervisors to establish the salaries of county judges, is not authorized by section seventeen, article three of the constitution, and is in direct conflict with the new judiciary act, and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void.

4. That when the agent of a town, etc., has money in his hands, which has been appropriated by the proper authorities, to pay a debt not legally chargeable upon the town, etc., a mandamus will issue against such agent, in favor of the party to whom the money was appropriated. But when such officer has not received such money, but it is sought to compel him to apply to some other officer or persons to get the money, the party must show that he is legally entitled to the money or a mandamus will not lie. That, in this case, the resolution of December 14, having, by implication, annulled that of November 14, appropriating to plaintiff, for arrears, $500, defendant is not entitled to a mandamus for the $500, or for the balance of his salary at the rate of $1,700 from November 14, 1870.

Judgment for defendant, with costs. Healy v. Dudley. Decided, Rochester general term, September, 1871.

[graphic]

The Cincinnati grand jury have indicted Maurice W. Myers, late law librarian of that city, for forgery and for having obtained money under false pretenses.

[graphic]

A BARRISTER'S GUILD.

A section of the bar is doomed, unless redeemed, to sink beneath the contempt of the public. Malpractices may go on for a time unchecked, because undetected. The older men may put their consciences in their pockets, or intrust them to that convenient individual the clerk; and younger men, finding that by some process business is showered upon those who have so intrusted their consciences to their pockets or their clerks, may gradually become accustomed to view the possession of a conscience, and too nice a regard for professional respectability, as forming a barrier to advancement. Advancement is the end and object of a barrister's existence, and in pursuit of this desirable consummation a path already well trodden is followed, and the number of "shady" men at the bar gradually increases, until now, at this present moment, in the particular class to which we refer, the dark elements predominate, and will continue to predominate to the enormous detriment of all concerned, unless steps are taken to stop the abuse by the only available means moral coercion.

Now there is, undoubtedly, a moral coercion of limited influence existing at the present time. Men who do questionable things, and excite the suspicion of their brethren of the same cloth, are avoided and made extremely uncomfortable. But this does little. A man who finds that he has excited suspicion, and has become a marked man, is likely to rush into extremities rather than attempt to amend his waysto drag down the reputation of the profession rather -than clear his own. This ought not to be possible. There ought to be such cohesion among the members of the bar that a man who could venture on bold malpractices could be extinguished spontaneously as it were. A society outside the tribunals of the inns of court should be formed, before which complaints against barristers should be carried, previous to any petition being preferred before the benchers. Many things may be done which tend to degrade the bar and lower the profession in the eyes of the world, but which fail to amount to a crime cognizable by the benchers of the inns of court. And it would not be difficult to constitute such a society. The legal is unlike any other profession. It is at present pretty much centralized or concentrated. In term time a square mile near Temple Bar would inclose nearly all practicing barristers. There is nothing, therefore, to prevent all practicing barristers from joining a society or guild, which shall have a committee for the purpose of investigating the proceedings of members of the bar, and determining whether they are to be upheld or condemned. We at once admit that this would complete the trades unionism of the bar.

The fact is that the bar must resort to trades unionism to protect itself - the honest must avail themselves of it to check the dishonest; and there is a great deal more reason in barristers seeking to prevent other barristers from accepting smaller fees than the etiquette of the profession allows, than in workmen saying, where no etiquette exists, and there is no tacit mutual obligation universally imposed on entry into the particular society, that none but fixed limits of remuneration shall be observed, that work shall not be done under certain wages, arbitrarily fixed upon by a particular clique. For centuries the regulations hemming in the bar have been observed. They are known to everyone who puts horsehair on his head and a

gown on his back. On entering the profession a man is presumed to take an oath of allegiance to the traditions of it, to respect its etiquette, to cherish its fair fame, and to resent and repel any invasion or aspersion upon its honor. How this presumption is rebutted by evidence of what is done daily under the public eye we now know, and every honorable member of the profession blushes for his order. But blushing is of little use; strong measures must be taken to place honorable men above suspicion and to utterly exterminate those practitioners who lower their intellect and their attainments to undermining honest business and rendering vain the patience of honest men.

In answer to the proposition to form a guild, it may be said that circuits and the benchers' courts are sufficient for all purposes. To this it is surely sufficient to reply that the very fact that such gross abuses exist shows that these courts are, to a large extent, impotent. The jurisdiction of the circuit mess embraces those only who belong to the mess, and the extent to which its punishment is carried does not go beyond expulsion, the effect of which may, or may not, be appreciable. The benchers' court, on the other hand, is a tribunal before which it is impossible to go without the fact being generally known, and the unlucky supposed delinquent bearing, in his mind at least, the brand of the indignity, while it is a fact in his history which his considerate neighbors and friends are not likely to forget. We are not surprised, therefore, that petitions to the bench should be discouraged. They are weapons which may be maliciously used to effect personal objects of the meanest character.

While, therefore, we have the partially operative court of a circuit mess on the one hand, and the dangerous and ponderous machinery of thé bench on the other, it is quite clear that some sort of preliminary inquiry should be possible, by means of which an abuse should be investigated, and the blame, if any found to exist, placed on the right shoulders. If a society of the nature we have indicated were formed, no difficulty could be experienced in carrying out inquiries in a secret and delicate manner. If offenses were ascertained to have been committed of a trifling character, a communication with the offending party would satisfy the requirements of the case. Should the offense turn out to be more serious, he would be sent before the bench, while the violation of the laws of the society, brought home to him, would be sufficient to induce all other barristers to refuse to hold a brief with him in any case whatever.

We believe we are proposing nothing Utopian. A society, formed as we suggest, would be the best security which could be provided for the preservation of the honor and reputation of the bar. It would also serve as a useful check upon the irregular practices of attorneys in instructing barristers, which, as a matter of course, would also be brought before the society. We should be glad to receive the names of the barristers anxious to join the Guild, and a number of consentients being obtained, the matter might be placed in private hands to be brought to maturity.-Law Times.

Ex-United States Attorney-General Stanberry, of Ohio, Hon. Reverdy Johnson, of Baltimore, and David Dudley Field, Esq., of New York city, have been engaged to defend men to be tried under the Ku-klux act of congress, at the approaching session of the United States court, to be held in Columbia, S. C.

« AnteriorContinuar »