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For fourteen years there has been a received and estab tion must be disposed of before the accounts can be
lished interpretation of this statute in the district examined, because, if proved, it disposes of the whole
courts of this city, and among the justices and attor case, and there are no accounts to be examined. The
neys and counselors of the supreme court practicing allegation of payment must, however, be such, as, if
therein, and to disturb it now would be dangerous. It is proved, will dispose of the plaintiff's whole claim. Ib.
the conclusion of the court, for the above reasons, that 4. An order referring the issue, de novo, must be sus-
the undertaking should be deemed sufficient, and that tained without regard to any former order of reference
the justice could acquire jurisdiction therefrom. in the case. Ib.
Judgment affirmed. Van Loon v. Lyons. Opinion by SERVICE. See Executors and Administrators.
J. F. Daly, J. Also, see Appeal.

SET-OFF. See Reference.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. See Executors and Admin-

1. When a plea of payment is made.- On appeal by
the plaintiff from an order of reference, this action

See Contracts. is brought to recover the sum of $4,500, for professional services as attorney and counselor at law in divers suits in the courts of New York city, disbursements DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. made and services rendered in examination of titles,

SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF ERRORS AND etc. The complainant alleges “that the items of plain

APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY.* tiff's demands and accounts exceed twenty in number.” The answer denies that the defendant was indebted in

ACTION. the sum of $4,500 or any sum whatever, and sets up by 1. A party who, by contract, is entitled to all the way of set-off moneys advanced to plaintiff, and prop

articles to be manufactured by an incorporated comerty of defendant taken by him. It also avers that, on pany-he, such party, furnishing the raw materials, May 21, 1860, defendant paid to plaintiff $275 in full of cannot maintain an action against a wrong-doer, who, all demands to the date last mentioned, and demands by a trespass, stops the machinery of such company, so that said sum shall be set off against plaintiff's claims, that it is prevented from furnishing, under said conand defendant have judgment for the balance. The tract, manufactured goods to as great an extent as it plaintiff raises the point that, the defendant hav otherwise would have done. Dale et al. v. Grant, 142. ing pleaded payment, that issue must be tried 2. The rights of the plaintiff in such case all arise out before the account or items of claim or counter of contract, and the damages resulting from an indirect claim can be inquired into, and as the issue as to injury to such rights are too remote to form the groundpayment must be tried by a jury, and is not a referable work of an action at law. Ib. issue, except by consent, the order of reference is prem 3. A railroad company, whose roadbed is so conature ; and, if made at all, cannot be made until the structed as to expose its employees to a latent danger, is question of payment is disposed of by trial in court : liable to such of said employees as are injured thereby. Held, that the investigation of the plaintiff's claim If such danger is not obvious, it is the duty of such involves the examination of a long account. An company to warn those who are to incur it of its attorney's bill of ges, ivoking items of services in existence. Paulmier, Adm'r, v. Erie Railway Co., 152. nearly every department of the profession, if disputed 4. Where the track over a trestlework was not capable as to correctness of items, or value of each service, or of supporting an engine, and the engineer in charge the aggregate value, presents a question which is within had orders not to put his engine thereon, which orders the province of a referee. The reasoning, in the case he disobeyed, and the intestate of the plaintiff, who of Townsend v. Hendricks, 40 How. Pr. 143, applies was a fireman on said engine, and who was unaware of to this case. Inasmuch as the payment of a smaller said orders or of the danger, was thereby killed, the sum is no satisfaction of a larger, the allegation that, on

said trestlework giving way,- held, that the plaintiff May 21, 1860, defendant paid to plaintiff $275, in full of was entitled to recover, on the ground that such death all demands to that date, is not a plea of payment to a

was occasioned in part by the want of care in the claim of $4,500 for professional services due February defendant, the railroad company, with respect to said 11, 1862. And no plea of payment is made or intended, trestlework. Ib. since defendant sets off the sum of $275, as stated. 5. Where a servant receives an injury occasioned in There is no plea of payment, in a legal sense, in the part by the negligence of his master, and in part by answer. The issue as to whether the defendant paid that of a fellow-servant, he can maintain an action the sum named on May 21, 1860, in full of all demands against his master for such injury, Ib. to that date, cannot be first tried in this action, because it could not, if found in defendant's favor, determine the action against the plaintiff. Order affirmed.

1. Authority to agent to make executory contract for Schermerhorn v. Wood. Opinion by J. F. Daly, J.

the sale of land may be by parol. If, in such case, he 2. When fraud is alleged.The appellant insisted that

makes contract under seal, it is not valid as a sealed questions of fraud might or would arise on the trial,

instrument, but is good as a simple contract. Long v. because he intended to show that receipt, etc., which

Hartwell, Adm'x, 116. the defendant may produce are false or forged. Held,

2. An agent of a railroad company cannot expel a that this will not avail against the order of reference.

passenger from a ferry-boat for a violation of the rule This action is, in its nature, ex contractu, and there is

of the company, requiring such passenger to deliver his no issue invoking fraud ; and any such issue arising is

ticket at a certain gate, without first notifying such incidental merely, and does not alter the character of

passenger that, unless he leaves the boat, such extreme the action. This point not having been raised below,

measure will be resorted to. Compton v. Van Volkenis, however, not reviseable on appeal. Ib.

burgh and N. J. R. R. Co., 134. 3. When payment is alleged by the answer, that ques

*From 34 New Jersey.



that portion of time during which he has served since A valid agreement between the holder of a note and

the last periodical payment of wages. Ib. the maker to extend the time of payment will dis

5. Where a contract for purchase and sale is without charge an indorser who is not a party to such agree

stipulation for time of payment, such payment is due ment. Nightengale v. Meginnis, 461.

im liately, and the purchaser has not all the time

given for the removal of the article purchased to make BANKRUPT AND BANKRUPTCY.

payment, nor can he make such payment proportionThe remedy by audita querela having fallen into dis- | ally as the thing sold is received in parcels, but the ase, the practice has been adopted of giving relief on seller may sue upon his independent contract for paysummary application, when the person or property of a

ment. Brehen v. O'Donnell, 408. bankrupt is taken under process issued on a judgment

6. A contract that, in consideration of a free passage, recovered before the discharge, and upon which the a passenger will assume the risk of injuries to his perdischarge operates; and the remedy is in the court out son from the negligence of the servants of the railroad of which the execution issued. But the court will not company, is valid in law. Kinney et al., Adm’rs, v. discharge without giving the plaintiff an opportunity Central Railroad Co., 513. to show that the discharge is inoperative as against his 7. A passenger who receives knowingly a free ticket debt, and will, in its discretion, determine the question with an indorsement of such contract upon it, will be on affidavits, in a summary manner, or direct an issue bound by the terms of such contract, and cannot to ascertain the facts. Linn et al. v. Hamilton, 305. recover for injuries from such negligence. Ib.



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'1. A written promise to pay money on some contin-

1. In contracts of insurance a representation differs gency is not a promissory note, implying a consideration

from a warranty, and from a condition expressed in on the face of it. To support it as a contract, a legal

the policy, in that the former is part of the preliminary consideration must be shown. Conover v. Stillwell, 54.

proceedings which propose the contract, and the latter 2. To give a consideration value sufficient for the

is part of the contract when completed. The validity support of a promise, it must be either such as deprived

of the entire contract depends upon the truth or fulthe person, to whom the promise was made, of a right

fillment of the warranties and conditions expressed which he before possessed, or else conferred upon the

therein; and non-compliance is a breach of the conother party a benefit which he would not otherwise

tract which makes it void; but a misrepresentation, to have had. Ib.

avoid the policy, must have been in a material matter, 3. What is a sufficient consideration? Cases reviewed

or have been made with a fraudulent intent. Dewes applied to the present case. Ib.

v. Manhattan Insurance Co., 244.

2. (Conditions of insurance annexed to a policy, and CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

by the terms of the policy made part of the contract,

have the same force and effect as if contained in the 1. The legislature has not the power, under the constitution of this State, to authorize a market to be

body of the policy. Ib.

3. An accident policy provided that “the insured is held in a public street of a city, without providing compensation to the proprietors of the contiguous required to use all due diligence for his personal safety lands who own to the center of such street. State v.

and protection;" held, that the fact that the insured Laverack, 201.

was killed by falling from the second story of a barn 2. The general principle is, that when land is acquired

which he was having built, in consequence of the by the public for one particular use, no additional

breaking of a joist having a secret defect, did not conburden can be superadded without compensation to

clusively show a breach of this stipulation, but was the land owner. Ib.

properly left to the jury. Stone's Adm'rs V. The

United States Casualty Co., 371.

4. The policy also provided that it should be void if 1. An entire contract is a contract the consideration the assured changed his occupation, without notice, to of which is entire on both sides. A contract to pay a

a more hazardous one; held, that the term “ changing gross sum for a certain definite consideration is an

his occupation ” meant engaging in another employentire contract, and is not apportionable. Beach v.

ment as a usual business. Ib. Mullin, 343.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. 2. A contract to pay sixteen dollars for a month's

A tenant who holds a mortgage on the demised service is as entire in its consideration as a contract to

premises, the money secured by which is due on the pay a certain sum for a single chattel or for a specified

day on which his lease expires, may continue to hold number of chattels. Ib. 3. The reservation of wages, payable monthly or

the premises under the mortgage, the mortgage money

not being paid, without first surrendering the premises weekly, will not control the contract so as to destroy

to his landlord, although in the lease he has coveits entirety, when the parties have expressly agreed for

nanted to yield up and surrender possession of the a specified term - as a year; but if the payment of

premises to his landlord at the expiration of his term. monthly or weekly wages is the only circumstance

Shields v. Lozear, 496.
from which the duration of the contract is to be
inferred, it will be taken to be a hiring for a month or

a week. Ib.

1. A note fraudulent in its inception cannot be intal4. Where a servant, whose wages are due and payable idated in the hands of a party taking it for value, periodically, as quarterly, monthly or weekly, refuses before maturity, unless actual fraud can be shown in to serve in the manner contracted for, or is rightfully such party so taking it. Hamilton v. l'ought, 187. discharged at any intervening period between the days 2. That such note was taken under suspicious cirwhen his wages are due, he can recover nothing for cumstances will not avail to defeat it, unless such cir


cumstances are sufficient to prove mala fides in the with respect to the general design of the room; for holder of the paper. Ib.

there a picture and tapestries, inclosed in moulding 3. Mere carelessness in taking such note will not, of which were fixed to the walls in the manner of wainitself, impair the title; but carelessness may be so gross scoting, were held fixtures. In the same cases statuary that bad faith may be inferred from it. Ib.

and vases, not affixed, but resting by their own weight, were held fixtures, on the ground that they were

“strictly and properly part of the architectural design 1. Where a person agrees to sell real estate, and is of the hall and staircase, and put in there as such, as prevented from complying on account of a latent flaw distinguished from mere ornaments to be afterward in his title, the vendee cannot recover damages for the added.” The house there had been erected by the perloss of his bargain. Drake v. Baker, 358.

son who placed the statuary in it, a fact which seems 2. But if the vendor is aware, at the time of entering reasonably taken into account when the question of into the contract, that his ability to comply depends design is considered; and such a consideration (quo upon a contingency, upon breach, under these condi

ædes perficiantur) may perhaps be taken to harmonize tions, the vendee will be entitled to substantial dam D. xxxiii, 7, 12 (23) and (25) with D. L. 16, 245, which ages to the extent of a full indemnity. Ib.

appear, at first sight, not to be reconcilable with one another.

In considering this part of the question, it must be FIXTURES.

remembered that the inquiry here is, not whether a

thing is a removable fixture, but whether it is a fixture No. III.

at all. If a consideration of the purpose is wholly exBut of cases decided under this head some of old cluded, then it may perhaps be laid down that if a date have been thought to have gone to an extreme thing is so fixed, no matter by how slight a connection, limit in allowing the ornamental character of the that an act of unfastening is necessary as distinct from thing to outweigh the essential character of the annex an act of removal, and before the act of removal can ation. Among cases in which the decision has been in be commenced, the thing so annexed is a fixture. If, favor of the executor against the heir are Harvey v. however, the mode of annexation is not so solid as to Harvey, at nisi prius, 2 Str. 1141, tapestry and hang- preclude an inquiry into its purpose, then the nature ings, and Squier v. Mayer, 2 Free. 249, hangings nailed and use of the thing annexed, compared with the to the wall. The one, however, which has been most nature and use of that to which it is annexed, may challenged is that of Beck v. Rebow, 1 P. W. 94, where prevent the thing from coming within the class of fixthe plaintiff, under a settlement of a house made upon tures, and cause it still to remain a movable chattel so his marriage by his father-in-law, the defendant's as to form no part of the immovable for the purpose testator, claimed chimney glasses, pier glasses and of ejectment, conveyance, mortgage, descent, or settlehangings, the argument in favor of his claim being ment, and so as to be the subject-matter of an executhat these things were in lieu of wainscot. The decis tion against the owner of the freehold, of trover, and ion was against his claim; but the ground of it was of the “order and disposition" clause in bankruptcy. that these things were only matter of ornament and Some observations must here be made (which could furniture.” The ground of the decision, therefore, is not be conveniently made earlier) with respect to the clear and distinct; and it may be doubted whether the requisites postulated above in regard to the original mere allegation that they were “as wainscot, and that ownership of the movable, and the circumstances under there was no wainscot under them,” was enough rea 'which it is affixed. It was said the movable must be son to take out of the category of “ornament and affixed by the owner of it, and affixed in the course of furniture" things which in their nature so strictly his general use and occupation of the immovable. belonged to it, and which were fastened in no more First, then, there is no authority whatever for statpermanent way than by nails and screws. At the ing that the consequences above described follow if the same time that argument was in Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. movable thing is affixed wrongfully and against the 508, allowed to carry to the heir pictures and glasses will of its owner. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 15 W. R. fixed in lieu of wainscot, upon the authority, but by | 186, L. R. 3 Eq. 394. It must be fixed by the owner. an extension of the rule, laid down in Herlakenden's If, however, it is not affixed by him, but is affixed with Case, 4 Co. 64, a, where it was said that wainscoting will his consent, but without any intention of transferring pass to the heir, and that it makes no difference in the property in it, what results will ensue? The answer law if it be fastened by great nails or little nails, or by to this must depend upon the circumstances under screws or irons put through the post or walls,

which the question arises. The property right, as beand so by the lease or grant of the house (in the same tween the owner of the thing and the person affixing manner as the ceiling and plastering of the house), it it, or those taking through him, cannot certainly be shall pass as parcel of it.” This last-mentioned state affected. The latter cannot transmit, alienate, or in ment of the rule at any rate seems such good sense, any way make title to it, more than to any other object and so agreeable to the more recent authorities, that of property which is not his. It is not a question, for there is no reason why we should discard it because it instance, between the heir and executor of the latter, was denied to be law in the curt note of Squier v. but between the true owner and whichever of the two Mayer, 2 Free. 249, in which case, inasmuch contra wrongfully detains it from him. But Horn v. Baker diction to the earlier decision of Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. may be taken to show that, being in fact a fixture, it 508, and to recent authorities, a fixed furnace was held would not be within the order and disposition clause, to go to the executor.

although in the bankrupt's possession with the consent The most recent case on this subject (D' Eyncourt v. of the true owner. By the same rule, it would seem Gregory, 15 W. R. 186, L. R. 3 Eq. 382) tends strongly trover could not be maintained for it, but that it must in favor of the fixed character of articles attached be recovered in the appropriate special action. Neither like wainscoting, and occupying a similar position could it be the subject of larceny at common law. If


the annual value in situ of the thing so affixed were The above sums were raised. On the 14th December, required to raise the annual value of a tenement or of 1870, the said board passed a resolution, the preamble a lodging to £10, so as to confer a settlement as the to which recited, that doubts were entertained as lodger franchise, would the claim be allowed? Why to the legality of a county judge's salary from January should it not? since, if it added to the annual value, it | 1, 1870, and it was resolved that the resolution of Nowould certainly increase the ratable value. With vember 17, 1870, be amended, so as to establish the salrespect to the right of distress, if the tenant can, by ary of said judge at $1,700 from January 1, 1871. affixing his own things, take them out of the class of The plaintiff demanded of defendant, as county distrainable objects, he can equally do so with those of treasurer of said county, the said sum of $500, for other people. On the other hand, as between landlord arrears of salary, etc., which the said defendant refused and consenting owner, both with respect to goods irre to pay. The plaintiff then demanded that defendant movably fixed, and with respect to those which the pay him his salary at the rate of $1,700 per annum, from tenant has lost his right to remove by not exercising it November 14, 1870, and defendant refused. in due time, it must be taken that the owner, in con The parties agreed upon a case and submitted it to senting to their annexation, has consented also to the this court with the following propositions: first, proper consequence of annexation, and, if he loses his whether the act of the legislature, authorizing board goods, can only complain (if at all) of the tenant who of supervisors to fix the salaries of county judges, is has neglected his interests.

constitutional ? And, second, if it is not, whether the On the whole, it may probably be said that in the plaintiff is entitled to the $500, which has been raised case of things being affixed with the consent merely and paid into the county treasury for his benefit? of the owner, no change of property is effected as be Held, tween the owner and the person affixing them, but 1. That it was the intention of the constitutional that for other purposes, and as concerns third persons, court, judging from their debates, etc., and is the true all the usual consequences of annexation follow. Gregg construction of the judiciary act, as it now stands in v. Wells, 10 A. & E. 90. Secondly, however, it makes the constitution, not to permit the boards of supervisno matter that the owner of the immovable, who ors to establish the salary of the county judges, but, on affixes it, is a trespasser in respect of the immovable the contrary, to impose that duty on the legislature. he affixes it to. His trespass on the land may cause

2. That section seventeen of the third article of the him to lose the things he anuexes to it; though he can constitution, which provides “that the legislature may not, by his wrongful annexation of another's goods, confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several acquire a title in them himself, or give it to a third counties such further powers of local legislation and person. Thirdly, the annexation must be made in the administration as they shall from time to time precourse of the general use and occupation of the im scribe,” etc., does not in any way conflict with the secmovable, and as part of it. This is opposed to affixing tion of the new judiciary article above cited; that of things in the exercise of a special right of use, as in

section seventeen only gives the legislature power to the case of an easement. Such was the case of 'Lan confer upon boards of supervisors power to make such casteriv. Eve, 7 W. R. 260; 5 C. B. (N. S.) 717, where the local laws, etc., as they (the legislature) may from time question arose as to the property of a pile fixed in the to time prescribe. That an act in reference to the salbed of the Thames. Now, the plaintiff who claimed ary of a county judge is not a local act, within the title to the pile had no property in, nor any general true intent and meaning of the term “local,” but use or occupation of, the soil of the Thames; but the general. circumstances showed that he had a right to the ex

3. That the act of the legislature, conferring the power clusive use of that pile to moor his barges to, and it

on boards of supervisors to establish the salaries of was inferred that he had placed it there in virtue county judges, is not authorized by section seventeen, of a special right to use the bed of the river for that article three of the constitution, and is in direct conpurpose. A similar inference was drawn with respect flict with the new judiciary act, and is, therefore, unto a fender upon a stream in Wood v. Hewitt, 8 Q. B.

constitutional and void. 913. The case would be the same with respect to any

4. That when the agent of a town, etc., has money in similar easement, such as the right to lay pipes for a

his hands, which has been appropriated by the proper watercourse, etc.-Solicitor's Journal.

authorities, to pay a debt not legally chargeable upon (To be continued.)

the town, etc., a mandamus will issue against such agent, in favor of the party to whom the money was

appropriated. But when such officer has not received IMPORTANT DECISION.

such money, but it is sought to compel him to apply to

some other officer or persons to get the money, the SUPERVISORS HAVE NO POWER TO FIX SALARY OF

party must show that he is legally entitled to the COUNTY JUDGE.

money or a mandamus will not lie. That, in this case, The plaintiff was elected county judge of Wyoming the resolution of December 14, having, by implication, county in the fall of 1867, for four years from January | annulled that of November 14, appropriating to plain1, 1868.

tiff, for arrears, $500, defendant is not entitled to a In November 1, 1867, the supervisors of Wyoming mandamus for the $500, or for tb balance of his salary county fixed the salary of said jud ge at $1,200 per an

at the rate of $1,700 from November 14, 1870. num, from January 1, 1868. On November 17, 1869, the Judgment for defendant, with costs. Healy v. Dudsaid supervisors fixed the salary of said judge at $1,700

ley. Decided, Rochester general term, September, 1871. per year, from the 1st January.

On November 18, 1870, the same board passed a resolution that $1,700 be levied and assessed on the prop The Cincinnati grand jury bave indicted Maurice W. erty of said county, to pay salary of said county judge Myers, late law librarian of that city, for forgery and for 1871, and $500 for arrears of said judge's salary. for having obtained money under false pretenses.

gown on his back. On entering the profession a man A BARRISTER'S GUILD.

is presumed to take an oath of allegiance to the traA section of the bar is doomed, unless redeemed, to ditions of it, to respect its etiquette, to cherish its fair sink beneath the contempt of the public. Malpractices fame, and to resent and repel any invasion or aspersion may go on for a time unchecked, because undetected.

upon its honor. How this presumption is rebutted by The older men may put their consciences in their evidence of what is done daily under the public eye we pockets, or intrust them to that convenient individual now know, and every honorable member of the profesthe clerk; and younger men, finding that by some sion blushes for his order. But blushing is of little process business is showered upon those who have so

use; strong measures must be taken to place honorable intrusted their consciences to their pockets or their men above suspicion and to utterly exterminate those clerks, may gradually become accustomed to view the practitioners who lower their intellect and their attainpossession of a conscience, and too nice a regard for ments to undermining honest business and rendering professional respectability, as forming a barrier to ad vain the patience of honest men. vancement. Advancement is the end and object of a In answer to the proposition to form a guild, it may be barrister's existence, and in pursuit of this desirable said that circuits and the benchers' courts are sufficient consummation a path already well trodden is followed, for all purposes. To this it is surely sufficient to reply and the number of “shady” men at the bar gradually that the very fact that such gross abuses exist shows increases, until now, at this present moment, in the that these courts are, to a large extent, impotent. The particular class to which we refer, the dark elements jurisdiction of the circuit mess embraces those only predominate, and will continue to predominate to the who belong to the mess, and the extent to which its enormous detriment of all concerned, unless steps are punishment is carried does not go beyond expulsion, taken to stop the abuse by the only available means the effect of which may, or may not, be appreciable. moral coercion.

The benchers' court, on the other hand, is a tribunal Now there is, undoubtedly, a moral coercion of lim before which it is impossible to go without the fact ited influence existing at the present time. Men who being generally known, and the unlucky supposed do questionable things, and excite the suspicion of delinquent bearing, in his mind at least, the brand of their brethren of the same cloth, are avoided and the indignity, while it is a fact in his history which his made extremely uncomfortable. But this does little. considerate neighbors and friends are not likely to forA man who finds that he has excited suspicion, and get. We are not surprised, therefore, that petitions to has become a marked man, is likely to rush into the bench should be discouraged. They are weapons extremities rather than attempt to amend his ways - which may be maliciously used to effect personal to drag down the reputation of the profession rather objects of the meanest character. than clear his own. This ought not to be possible. While, therefore, we have the partially operative There ought to be such cohesion among the members court of a circuit mess on the one hand, and the danof the bar that a man who could venture on bold mal

gerous and ponderous machinery of thé bench on the practices could be extinguished spontaneously as it other, it is quite clear that some sort of prelimi

A society outside the tribunals of the inns of nary inquiry should be possible, by means of which court should be formed, before which complaints an abuse should be investigated, and the blame, if against barristers should be carried, previous to any any found to exist, placed on the right shoulders. petition being preferred before the benchers. Many If a society of the nature we have indicated were things may be done which tend to degrade the bar and formed, no difficulty could be experienced in carrylower the profession in the eyes of the world, but which ing out inquiries in a secret and delicate manner. If fail to amount to a crime cognizable by the benchers of offenses were ascertained to have been committed the inns of court. And it would not be difficult to con of a trifling character, a communication with the stitute such a society. The legal is unlike any other offending party would satisfy the requirements of the profession. It is at present pretty much centralized or case. Should the offense turn out to be more serious, concentrated. In term time a square mile near Temple he would be sent before the bench while the violation Bar would inclose nearly all practicing barristers. of the laws of the society, brought home to him, would There is nothing, therefore, to prevent all practicing be sufficient to induce all other barristers to refuse to barristers from joining a society or guild, which shall hold a brief with him in any case whatever. have a committee for the purpose of investigating the We believe we are proposing nothing Utopian. A proceedings of members of the bar, and determining society, formed as we suggest, would be the best security whether they are to be upheld or condemned. We at which could be provided for the preservation of the once admit that this would complete the trades union honor and reputation of the bar. It would also serve ism of the bar.

as a useful check upon the irregular practices of attorThe fact is that the bar must resort to trades union neys in instructing barristers, which, as a matter of ism to protect itself — the honest must avail themselves course, would also be brought before the society. We of it to check the dishonest; and there is a great deal should be glad to receive the names of the barristers more reason in barristers seeking to prevent other anxious to join the Guild, and a number of consentbarristers from accepting smaller fees than the eti ients being obtained, the matter might be placed in quette of the profession allows, than in workmen private hands to be brought to maturity.-Law Times. saying, where no etiquette exists, and there is no tacit mutual obligation universally imposed on entry into the particular society, that none but fixed limits of Ex-United States Attorney-General Stanberry, of remuneration shall be observed, that work shall not be Ohio, Hon. Reverdy Johnson, of Baltimore, and David done under certain wages, arbitrarily fixed upon by a Dudley Field, Esq., of New York city, have been enparticular clique. For centuries the regulations hem gaged to defend men to be tried under the Ku-klux act ming in the bar have been observed. They are known of congress, at the approaching session of the United to everyone who puts horsehair on his head and a States court, to be held in Columbia, S. C.


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