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are insinuating that the bar has enjoyed the monopoly PRACTICAL LOCATION OF DIVISION LINES. of judicial nominations long enough.

The profession should not surrender, without a zealous struggle, the rights and responsibilities with which the people have intrusted them, and which they have hitherto so beneficently exercised. They should guard jealously against the introduction into judicial conventions of professional politicians and office-mongers, and should claim as against them, and in behalf of their clients, the prescriptive right to control judicial nominations.

In conclusion, we would respectfully submit certain considerations by which, in our judgment, the profession should be guided in making their choice:

1. We ought always to retain the present incumbent if he has in the main satisfactorily discharged his duties. This rule should not be departed from except for most grave and unquestionable cause. It certainly ought not to be to gratify the ambition of some aspiring rival. In Vermont, where the term of the highest judicial office is only one year, all the evils of short terms and elective judges are averted by the invariable custom of a reëlection as of course, and the retirement of a judge from the bench, except by his own will and accord, is extremely rare if not wholly

unknown.

2. When, for any reason, a new selection is necessary to be made, a candidate who pushes himself should be jealously scrutinized, and men who have been prominent party managers and office-seekers quietly ignored. This for many reasons; not the least prominent, this: Every lawyer who has busied himself with politics knows how impossible it is to attain that standard of professional learning and accuracy necessary to a judge while engaged in the distracting diversion or absorbing occupation of politics: and again, that the habits and associations of political life being once formed how difficult it is to break away from them, and a judge, surrounded by political influences and intrigants, with ambitious aspirations and a head full of plots and schemes, even if he succeed in holding the scale with an even beam and keeping the bandage over both eyes, can scarcely be expected to bestow upon the duties of his office that engrossing and exhaustive attention so essential to their proper performance.

We have attempted no profundity in this article, nor novelty either, but only "to tell you that which you yourselves do know," lest "lapsed in time and passion" the profession awake too late to find that they have permitted a sacred trust to be ravished from them, and proven recreant to their grave responsibilities.

The bill passed by the New Hampshire lower house for the protection of the rights of married men relieves the husband of liability for debts contracted by his wife before marriage, makes the wife liable to pay debts incurred previous to marriage, and sets apart all property which she may obtain in her own right for the payment of such debts.

(Continued from p. 2.)

AGREEMENT.

Let us next inquire what kind of an agreement is necessary to effect a practical location.

As we have seen, a majority of the court in Jackson v. Dysling thought that a parol agreement to abide by a certain division line will be sufficient to prevent either party from claiming in ejectment, though it will not pass the lands. But this was an agreement that had been recognized for forty years.

Sellick v. Adams, 15 Johns. 197, was an action of trespass for cutting timber. There had been a general submission by bond, seven years before, of all controversies and demands, and under this the arbitrators had fixed a boundary line. This, the court said, would have enabled the defendant to maintain ejectment, and justified the trespass.

Shepard v. Ryers, 15 Johns. 497, was assumpsit to recover damages for breach of an agreement under seal, by which the plaintiff and defendant appointed certain persons to partition certain lands between the parties. The defendant had refused to abide by the award. It was held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any part of the consideration in a deed of the premises which he had executed, his grantee never having been evicted, and his liability being merely contingent; and they further remark, "the partition made by the persons appointed for that purpose might be considered in the nature of an award of arbitrators, which, though it might not have the operation of conveying the land, might estop the defendant."

In Jackson v. Gager, 5 Cow. 383, an action of ejectment, the question was of location. This depended on a submission of the boundaries to arbitration by R. H., deceased, as attorney. It was undertaken to prove the execution of the power of attorney, and the court also admitted proof of a parol submission under it, and of a parol award. On review, the court held the power not properly proved, and granted a new trial for that reason. Then the court remarked, "without, however, intending to express a definitive opinion upon the subject, that the submission and award, though relating to real estate and by parol, were valid, and not within the provisions of the statute of frauds," and continued so to remark for a page and a half, citing Jackson v. Dysling.

In Robertson v. McNiel, 12 Wend. 578, tried in 1831, there was a submission in writing, not under seal, in 1830, to arbitrators concerning a division line, and a written award. This was held conclusive on the ground of estoppel. The cases relied on were those above cited. This seems to be the first decision necessarily involving the question.

Davis v. Townsend, 10 Barb. 333, tried in 1850, was an action of trespass, involving a division line and fence between two farms, which had stood for thirty years. The plaintiff showed title to the locus in quo, but the

16 N. Y. 354, that such an agreement, where there was no uncertainty in the grants, and no adverse possession, was void, and this was approved in Vos

grantors having possessed land on both sides of a ditch for more than twenty years, under claim of title by deed, A. by parol agreed with B., who claimed some of the land so possessed on one side, that the ditch should constitute the division line, and B. entered and kept possession accordingly for five years. Held, not to affect the title, and that A. could recover possession.

The substance of these authorities seems to be

defendant showed an oral agreement on the part of the plaintiff, that the fence might be straightened, in pursuance of which defendant, about six years before, moved the fence eighteen inches over upon the plain-burgh v. Teator. In the former case, A. and his tiff's inclosure. For that act this action was brought. It was proved that the plaintiff objected pending the removal, and no consideration was paid. Verdict for defendant. On review, the court say: "It has been repeatedly held, that a parol agreement to ascertain and establish a boundary line between the owners of adjoining lands, which is in dispute and in some degree unknown and undefined, either directly by the parties themselves, or through the submission to an award of others, is not an agreement which extends to the title, and, therefore, not within the provisions of the statute of frauds." "But where the line is already well known and established; where it has been recognized and acquiesced in by the adjoining owners; and more especially where it is indicated and marked out by fences or other permanent monuments to which they have claimed and occupied for a sufficient length of time to bar an entry, a parol agreement to change it differs entirely in its effect from that to which I have before referred, and does extend to the title." A new trial was granted.

Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N. Y. 561, was an action of trespass involving a disputed division line. The plaintiff produced evidence that he and his predecessors had possessed the locus in quo more than twenty years, but the paper title was not given. The defendant gave evidence tending to show that the true line was elsewhere, and that the plaintiff's occupation was by special permission. It was also shown that the line was in dispute in 1846, and that then, as defendant claimed, an agreement was orally made that a surveyor should run and fix the line, and that the parties should abide by it, and put the fence on it. The plaintiff claimed that it was only one end of the line that was in dispute. The surveyor did run and fix the line, but it was a disputed question of fact whether he ran the whole line or not. The new line took some land in one place from the defendant, which the plaintiff availed himself of. In another place the line so run would deprive the plaintiff of land, and this he objected to, and when the defendant commenced, three years after, to move his fence to the new line, plaintiff brought this action. There was a verdict for plaintiff. The court held that it is the policy of the law to permit parties to settle and adjust doubtful, uncertain and disputed facts between themselves, and, when so settled upon a good consideration, not to permit them afterward to be brought into dispute. That a disputed, indefinite or uncertain boundary line between adjoining proprietors may be fixed by parol or arbitrament. But an agreement by parol to establish a new line, where the boundary is not indefinite or uncertain, is void. That the force of such agreement is by way of estoppel. Verdict sustained.

this:

A parol agreement between adjacent owners of land to fix a disputed division is valid and binding by way of estoppel in those cases where the grant is so indefinite, uncertain, or ambiguous that the true line is not ascertainable therefrom, but in no other.

ESTOPPEL.

We now come to consider the remaining branch of this doctrine, namely, the estoppel of the owner who has, with knowledge of his rights, suffered another to build on his land.

This doctrine seems to have arisen in East India Co. v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 82, A. D. 1740. Here Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, who generally got things about right, said, "there are several instances where a man has suffered another to go on with building on his ground, and not set up a right till afterward, when he was all the time cognizant of his right, and the person building had no notice of the other's right, in which the court would oblige the owner of the ground to permit the person building to enjoy it quietly and without disturbance." But this was obiter, for he continues: "But these cases have never been extended so far as where the parties have treated upon an agreement for building, and the owner has not come to an absolute agreement." The case under consideration.

In Niven v. Belknap, 2 Johns. 573, it appeared that N. applied to B. to buy a farm in B.'s possession, and was informed by him that C., who held mortgages executed by B. on the farm to nearly its value, had the disposal of it, and B. went with N. to C., and an agreement was made between N. and C., in presence and to the knowledge of B., for the absolute purchase of the farm, and C. therefore deeded it to N., who took possession as owner and made valuable improvements; ten years afterward B. conveyed the farm to his son, a neighbor of N.; N. filed a bill in chancery quia teniet against B. and his son, praying that they might be perpetually enjoined from asserting their title. The chancellor dismissed the bill, but the court of errors reversed his decision, and ordered a perpetual injunction.

In Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 343, It had been previously held in Terry v. Chandler, I. where a person having a conveyance of land keeps it

secret for several years, and knowingly suffers third persons afterward to purchase parts of the same premises from the grantor, who remained in possession and was the reputed owner, and to expend money on the land without giving any notice of his claim, he will not be permitted afterward to assert his legal title against such innocent and bona fide purchasers. In this case the fraudulent silence continued fourteen years.

In Higinbotham v. Burnet, 5 Johns. Ch. 184, A. D. 1821, E., a soldier entitled to a bounty lot, before the patent issued bound himself to deed it to S.; S. assigned the lot, bond, etc., to V., who sold them by indorsement, and all his right, etc., to C., to whom he delivered the original bond, patent, etc. Held, Held, that although for want of words of inheritance the assignment in law transferred only an estate for life, yet, as the intention was to convey a fee, a trust estate in fee was created, and this court would decree a legal conveyance in fee. Also, that V., having silently stood by for thirteen years after the death of C., and seen his heirs claiming to be owners in fee, and dealing with the land as owners, and making valuable improvements, was estopped, and all under him were estopped, from asserting his legal title.

G.

In Town v. Needham, 3 Paige, 545, G. and W., two brothers, were tenants in common of real estate; agreed to relinquish his interest in exchange for a quantity of medicines and the good will of his brother's business of physician; W. took possession and made improvements, and sold to T., who made valuable improvements. Held, that this was sufficient in equity to take the case out of the statute of frauds, and that T. was entitled to a conveyance of G.'s interest, and to a perpetual injunction against a suit which G. seventeen years after his transfer to W. had instituted to recover the premises.

Laverty v. Moore, 32 Barb. 347. In 1835 L. and G. entered into a written agreement by which L. undertook to fill in with earth certain lands, under water, owned by G., and in compensation G. covenanted to convey to him one-third of the lands in fee. L. went on with the work, having previously made a survey in which he was assisted by T., who owned the adjoining lands on the south. On such survey T. placed stakes and made a monument to indicate the boundary line between him and L., and L. filled in the lots to correspond with the stakes and monument. T. was repeatedly on the ground, but made no objection. Held, that the line between the two adjoining owners being thus established and located by the acts and acquiescence of the parties themselves, and L. having expended money and labor in making valuable and permanent improvements on the lots, in the faith and confidence that the line so marked out was the true line, it must be regarded as such, and that persons claiming title under T. were estopped from controverting the line as thus established and located. The defense of the statute of limitations was not set

up, but the case turned solely on the ground of estoppel.

In Corkhill v. Landers, 44 Barb. 218, it was held, that where a boundary line is fixed and settled by parol agreement between A. and B., adjoining owners, and B. afterward, with the knowledge of A., makes valuable and expensive improvements, without objection on the part of A., the latter is estopped from denying that the line thus fixed was not the true boundary line. "He who is silent when conscience requires him to speak, shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent."

Laverty v. Moore was affirmed in the court of appeals in 1865 (33 N. Y. 658), and must be regarded as settling this principle.

We therefore derive this rule:

If the boundaries in a grant are definite, certain and unambiguous, and adverse possession has not accrued; yet, if the division line between the lands granted and the lands of one adjoining has been differently fixed and located by agreement of the respective owners, and the real owner silently suffers the other to make improvements upon the land thus embraced, on the faith of such location; or if, without such agreement, but innocently, that other makes such improvements upon the land of the real owner, and the latter, with knowledge thereof, is thus silent, the latter, and all under him, shall be estopped from denying that the line thus fixed is the true line, and from asserting ownership to the land thus acquired.

AMERICAN REPORTS AND REPORTERS.

No. V. VIRGINIA.

George Wythe was the first reporter in this State, and published in 1795 a folio volume containing cases from 1790 to 1795.

In 1798, Bushrod Washington published two volumes of reports of cases decided in the court of appeals, from 1790 to 1796 inclusive. Daniel Call published, in 1801-1803, three volumes of decisions of the same court from 1797 to 1803. These were followed, in 1833, by three more volumes, containing scattering cases from 1799 to 1803, the regular series from 1804 to 1806, and then again scattering cases to 1818. Six decisions of the United States circuit court for Virginia are also contained in the sixth volume. William H. Hening and William Mumford published in 1809-1811, four volumes of the decisions of the court of appeals between October, 1806, and October, 1809, and William Mumford continued the series in six volumes, from 1810 to 1820.

Up to this time the reports had been issued as a private enterprise, without legislative authority or sanction; but in 1820 provision was made for the appointment, by the court of appeals, of a reporter, who was to report such decisions as any one judge might designate, and who was to receive a compensation of eighty-three and a third cents for every hundred

[graphic]

pages contained in each copy. By an amendment in 1829, the reporter was directed to secure the copyright to the commonwealth, and was forbidden to publish more than seven hundred copies.

Under the act of 1820, Francis W. Gilmer was first appointed, and reported the cases from April, 1820, to June, 1821, in one volume. He was succeeded by Peyton Randolph, who reported the decisions from November, 1821, to December, 1828, in six volumes. The fifth and sixth volumes contain also the decisions of the general court, which had hitherto been published separately. Mr. Randolph was succeeded by Benjamin Watkins Leigh, who reported the decisions of the court of appeals and general court, from 1829 to 1841, in twelve volumes.

We will here digress from the regular series to notice the scattering reports that had been heretofore issued. In 1815, a volume of cases decided in the general court, commencing in the year 1789 and ending in 1814, was published by Judges Brockenborough and Holmes. A second volume, containing the cases in the same court, from 1815 to 1826, was published in the latter year by Judge Brockenborough. These two volumes are cited as Virginia Cases. Since 1828, the decisions of the general court have been published with those of the court of appeals.

To return to the regular series: Mr. Leigh was succeeded by Conway Robinson, who reported in two volumes the decisions between the April term, 1842, and the April term, 1844. The first volume contains an interesting sketch of the judicial system of Virginia. Mr. Robinson resigned in 1844, and Peachy R. Grattan was appointed. His first volume began with the April term, 1844, and his last, so far issued, vol. 19, ends with the July term, 1870.

In 1848, the calendar of the supreme court of appeals had accumulated to such an extent that the average pendency of an appeal was seven years. To remedy the evil thus occasioned, a special court of appeals was appointed, 'similar in nature and power to the commission of appeals of this state. The decisions of this court were reported in two volumes, by John M. Patton and Roscoe B. Heath.

West Virginia became a separate state in 1863. A supreme court of appeals was organized, and John Marshall Hagan was appointed reporter. He has issued two volumes, commencing with the August term, 1863, and ending with the January term, 1868.

Francis Xavier Martin published the first volume of reports in this state. These cases are entitled Notes of a few Decisions in the Superior Courts of the State of North Carolina and in the Circuit Courts of the United States for North Carolina District, and are cited as Martin's Reports. The cases in the superior courts, from 1789 to 1806, were reported by John Haywood in two volumes.

In 1802 John Louis Taylor published one volume of the cases from 1799 to 1802, and in 1818 he published a second volume, containing decisions between the July term, 1816, and the January term, 1818. In 1805 Duncan Cameron and William Norwood reported in one volume the decisions of the court of conference, between 1800 and 1804, cited as Conference Reports. In 1805 the name of this court was changed to "the supreme court of North Carolina." Between 1804 and 1819 Archibald D. Murphy published the decisions in three volumes.

The Carolina Law Repository was begun in 1813 and published semi-annually to September, 1816. It contained, besides miscellaneous articles, reports of decisions in the supreme court from the July term, 1811, to July term, 1816, inclusive. The work is bound in two volumes and cited as the Carolina Law Repository. From the June term, 1820, to the June term, 1826, the decisions of the supreme court were reported by Francis L. Hawks, in four volumes.

Thomas P. Devereux continued the reports from 1826 to 1834, in four volumes, and the same gentleman, in connection with William H. Battle, continued the cases to the June term, 1839, in four volumes. The equity cases between 1828 and 1834 were reported in two volumes by Mr. Devereux, and between that year and 1840 by Devereux and Battle, in two volumes.

James Iredell reported the law cases between the June term, 1840, and the August term, 1852, in thirteen volumes, and the equity cases between the same periods, in eight volumes. He was succeeded by Perrin Busbee, who reported in one volume the cases between the December term, 1852, and the August term, 1853. This volume is called North Carolina Reports as are all reports subsequently issued. He also reported one volume of equity cases for the same period. Hamilton C. Jones followed, and published eight volumes containing the decisions at law between 1853 and 1862, and the equity decisions up to 1860. The next year Patrick Winslow issued one thin volume of law cases and one of equity cases, ending with 1864. During the year 1865 the court was not in session, owing to the war. In 1866 S. F. Phillips was appointed reporter, and has issued to date three volumes in law and two in equity. These volumes of law cases are numbered in a regular series counting from the first report published in the state, and the last is numbered 64,

SOUTH CAROLINA.

The earliest reports in this state are the two volumes of Elisha Hall Bay, one of the judges of South Carolina, published in 1809, 1811. The first volume contains cases in the superior courts of law from 1783 to 1795 inclusive. The second contains the decisions of the constitutional court on appeal between 1796 and 1804. The next in point of time were the four volumes of Chancellor Dessaussure, containing the decisions of the court of chancery from the revolution to December, 1813. The decisions of the constitu

tional court between 1812 and 1817 were published in four volumes, usually cited as South Carolina Reports. In 1820 and 1821 Henry L. Nott and Daniel J. McCord published the decisions of the same court between 1817 and 1820, and between 1821 and 1823 the decisions were reported by Mr. McCord in two volumes. In 1824 William Harper, afterward chancellor, reported the decision of the constitutional court in 1823, 1824, in two volumes, and the chancery decisions in one volume; after that time the cases at law were continued in the third and fourth volumes of McCord's reports, containing cases in the court of appeals to the April term, 1828; and in the two volumes of H. Bailey, containing the cases from the May term, 1828, to January, 1832 inclusive, and in the three volumes of W. R. Hill, containing case from 1832 to 1837. Mr. Riley also issued a volume of decisions of 1836 and 1837.

The chancery cases during these several periods were reported by the same reporters, as follows: from January, 1825, to May, 1827, by Daniel J. McCord, in two volumes; from 1830 to 1831, by H. Bailey, in one volume; from 1831 to 1832, by J. S. G. Richardson, in one volume; from 1833 to 1837 by Mr. Hill, in two volumes; and from 1836 to 1837, by Mr. Riley in one volume.

From 1837 to 1838 the cases in law were reported by C. W. Dudley, reporter, in one volume, and the cases in equity in one volume; from 1838 to 1839, the law and equity cases were reported by William Rice, each in one volume; from 1839 to 1840, the cases were reported by L. Cheves Jr., in one volume law, and one volume equity. McMullen reported both the law and equity cases from 1840 to 1842, adding two volumes to the former, and one to the latter series. R. H. Spears was reporter from 1842 to 1844, and published two volumes of law, and one of equity decisions. J. S. G. Richardson succeeded, and published three volumes of law, and two of equity cases, decided between 1844 and 1847. He was succeeded by James Strobhart, who published five volumes of law cases, decided between the November term, 1846, and the May term, 1850, and four volumes of chancery decisions between the same dates. Mr. Strobhart was in time succeeded by Mr. Richardson, who has reported the law decisions down to 1868, in twelve volumes, and the chancery decisions in eleven volumes.

GEORGIA.

Thomas U. P. Charlton, judge of the superior court, was the first reporter in this state, and published in 1824 the decisions of that court prior to 1810. In 1837 George M. Dudley published the decisions of the same court from the July term, 1831, to July, 1833, inclusive.

In 1838 Robert M. Charlton published in one volume the decisions made in the superior court of the eastern district of Georgia, and in the middle circuit, from the January term, 1811, to the July term,

1837. The decisions of the superior court in 1842, 1843 were reported by the judges in one volume.

Up to this time there had been no provision made by law for the publication of the decisions of the court, but in 1845 the judges were authorized to appoint a reporter for the term of six years, at a salary of $1,000 a year. James M. Kelly was appointed under this provision, and published the decisions of 1846 and 1847 in three volumes, and, with the assistance of Thomas R. R. Cobb, the decisions of 1848. Mr. Kelly having resigned, Mr. Cobb was appointed, and continued the series to 1856 in sixteen volumes. B. Y. Martin was next appointed, and reported the decisions from 1857 to 1860 in ten volumes. G. N. Lester succeeded, and reported the cases from 1860 to 1863 in three volumes. From 1864 to 1866 L. E. Bleckly was reporter, and issued two volumes. In 1866 N. J. Hammond, present reporter, was appointed, and has reported, thus far, five volumes. These reports, beginning with the first volume of Mr. Kelly, are entitled “Georgia Reports," the last of Mr. Hammond being volume forty.

ALABAMA.

The legislature of this state, in 1828, authorized the supreme court to appoint a reporter, with a salary of

$500 a year, and the profits arising from the sale of his reports, provided he should furnish the state with seventy-five copies free of charge. Henry Minor was appointed in 1829, and published a volume containing

the decisions of the court from 1820 to 1826. He was succeeded by George N. Stewart, who reported the decisions from 1827 to 1831 in three volumes. Mr. Stewart was succeeded in 1834 by Benjamin F. Porter, who published, from the manuscript of his predecessor, five volumes of cases decided between the January term, 1831, and the January term, 1834, cited as Stewart and Porter's Reports. From 1834 the reports were continued by Mr. Porter to 1839, in nine volumes.

From 1840 to 1847 the reports were prepared and reported by the judges in eleven volumes. These volumes were styled Alabama Reports, new series, which has been since followed. Volumes 12 to 15, containing the cases from 1847 to 1849, were reported by J. J. Osmond; volumes 10 to 18, by N. W. Cockis; volumes 19 to 21, by J. W. Shephard, being the decisions of 1851, 1852; volumes 22 to 24, containing the decisions of 1853, 1854, by the judges; volumes 25 to 41, by J. W. Shephard, bring the cases down to 1868; volume 42, by John L. C. Denver; and volume 43, the last issued, by Thomas G. Jones.

In 1864 John W. Shephard issued a volume of select cases, decided in 1861-1863 by the supreme court. This volume is cited as Alabama Select Cases.

Judge William Leigh, one of the most eminent jurists of Virginia during the last forty years, died in the county of Mecklenburg, in that State, on the 19th ult., at the age of eighty-eight.

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