We think, therefore, that the mingling together of persons sentenced for criminal offenses, and those who, so far as the law is concerned, are only unfortunate, is a mistake that operates to the prejudice of the individual whom it is designed to benefit, by destroying his reputation, and inflicts an injury upon the public, by rendering all movements for the rescue and reform of abandoned children unpopular.

There is another cause why very many of these institutions have accomplished so little. This has been the introduction of religious instruction. In speaking concerning the point, we desire to cast no reflection on the intentions of those who have labored so zealously for the welfare of our unfortunate classes. But it has seemed to us that they have sometimes carried on their work in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose for which it was begun. The main end sought has been claimed to be, the making of good citizens from persons liable to make themselves bad ones. For this, laws have been passed, and public moneys appropriated. If this end is gained public opinion will be satisfied. Whatever may be demanded in other countries, the theory of our government forbids the inculcation by public authority of religious tenets. Yet we find, in almost all these institutions, the teaching of doctrinal dogmas a prominent feature in their course of instruction. As men do not all agree on the same dogmas, it has been found necessary to multiply reformatories, so that each faith shall be accommodated; thus the State becomes a religious educator. All this would do little harm if the tendency was not in taking care for the spiritual welfare to overlook the temporal, seeking to fit the individual for the life hereafter, and forgetting the no less essential duty of fitting him for the life here.

A third reason why reformatories have done less than they ought may be found in the methods of manual labor usually adopted in them. The pretense of their managers is, that a child committed to their care will be instructed in some useful trade, whereby he may afterward earn an honest livelihood. But for the most part, this pretense is wholly false, the child being generally taught only to perform some single simple mechanical process, and this not that he may be better able to support himself when he grows up, but in order that certain work for which the institution gets pay may be accomplished. Tasks, monotonous and laborious, are given out, and their performance enforced by penalties. The character and effects of this system are fully set forth in the report of the commission on prison management, made to the legislature last winter. While there may be difference of opinion as to the policy of abolishing the contract system in our State prisons, we cannot see how any unprejudiced person can favor its retention in places where the only inmates are children. To do so makes consignment to a reformatory equivalent, in fact, to imprisonment at hard labor, and it is so regarded by a large portion of the people.

ON THE TRANSMISSION OF BILLS OF LADING AND OTHER NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS BY TELEGRAPH.

As the subject described in the heading to this article will probably be new to most of our readers, it will, perhaps, be best for us to arrange the various points involved in the consideration of it in the order in which they first occurred to us.

The question was first suggested to us by a case in the court of chancery, respecting bills of lading, and as, possibly, some of our readers may not be familiar with these documents, we will commence by stating, shortly, what a bill of lading is. A bill of lading is a receipt given by the master of a ship for goods placed on board her. Its form is liable to be varied, at the desire of the shipper, but it will be generally found to contain an accurate description of the goods, with an acknowledgment by the master that they have been placed on board his ship, and an undertaking by him to deliver them at the port of destination, to the shipper, or such person as he may order. The shipper then generally sends this bill to the person to whom he wishes the goods to be delivered at the port of destination, indorsing on it an order that they are to be delivered to that person, and the person indicated then takes the bill to the ship, when it arrives, and claims the goods. It is not, however, necessary that the goods should be claimed by the person immediately named by the shipper. A bill of lading is negotiable, like a bill of exchange, and may be indorsed any number of times, and the right to receive the goods always passes with it. By means of it, therefore, the goods may be sold before they have arrived, and without it the intended consignee cannot make a title to the goods at all, and a valid security upon the goods may, therefore, be created by a deposit of the bill of lading. We may mention, also, in view of some remarks we shall have to make at a later stage, that a bill of lading is generally signed in triplicate. The object of this is to enable it to be transmitted safely by post. The first and second parts are sent independently to the consignee, just as a bank note is often sent in two halves, and the third part is kept ready to be sent in case of a miscarriage happening to either of the first two parts. With these preliminary remarks, we will state, shortly, the circumstances of the case in the court of chancery, which suggested to us the subject of this article.

A merchant had ordered goods to be sent to him from some distant country; he had been informed by telegraph of their shipment; and, being in want of money, he obtained a loan on giving a promise, in writing, to repay the money out of the produce of the goods, and, for security, to hand over the bills of lading to the lender as soon as they arrived. He was then adjudicated bankrupt; the bills of lading fell into the hands of his assignee, and the question was,

whether the person who made the loan was entitled to the produce of the goods, or whether they belonged to the assignee for the benefit of the general creditors.

we might oust misplaced credit altogether from the field, and relieve ourselves of all further fears of bankruptcies and panics, and the losses caused by them. We cannot, of course, hope to arrive at this state, but we may make some efforts to come a little nearer to it than we are at present, and diminish the frequency and intensity of the evils caused by misplaced commercial confidence. A scheme by which the consignee of goods could make a title to them, the moment he was apprised by telegraph of their shipment, would, we conceive, be a step in this direction.

Without stopping to discuss the question in whose favor this point ought to have been decided, we will at once call attention to the thought that it suggested to us, that is to say, that it is most desirable that a merchant, to whom goods have been shipped, should have the power of giving a good security upon them, as soon as they have been actually consigned to him. A moment's reflection will show that this end would not be obtained by merely deciding the case we have mentioned in favor of the lender. Supposing such a security as that there given to be good against the borrower's assignee or trustee in bankruptcy, what is to prevent the merchant from borrowing in the same manner from half a dozen different persons, on security of the same goods, and what will then become of the security? Clearly, all the lenders but one would find their security worthless, and if, when the bills of lading arrived, the borrower did not keep any one of his promises, but sold the bills to some third party, all the former lenders would be excluded altogether. It may safely be affirmed, therefore, that at present there is no mode by which the consignee of goods can raise money upon the security of them until he receive the bills of lading, and this must necessarily be long after the shipment, and, perhaps, even after the arrival of the goods. If, therefore, he requires money during this interval, he may find himself unable to raise it at all, or only able to raise it at a very high rate of interest; and that, although he is possessed of property far more than sufficient to repay the loan he requires. His property being at sea, he may find himself financially at sea also. Now, if we could devise a method whereby, as soon as the shipment of the goods was announced to the consignee by telegraph, he could sell them or give an effectual security upon their proceeds, he would be able at once to raise money upon favorable terms, to an amount differing only by a slight margin from the full value of the goods themselves. The money thus raised might then be employed in some other commercial adventure, which could not now be undertaken at all, and the man's money might be turned over, as the saying is, much more rapidly than can be done at present. Thus we should stimulate trade, by extending legitimate credit, that is to say, by enabling credit to be given where it deserves to be given, which increases, in fact, the available capital in the world. The more certain also we make credit, that is to say, the more we enable all persons worthy of credit to show their title to it, so much the more difficult do we make it for persons who do not deserve it to obtain it under false pretenses, and defraud their neighbors of their money. If we could but devise a simple and certain method of supplying every person with a title deed to all credit that he really deserved,

We will assume, therefore, that the law ought to enable a man, to whom goods have been shipped, to give a good security upon them as soon as their shipment is intimated to him by telegraph. We then have to consider next what provisions it would be necessary to make in order to enable this to be done. First, then, in order to make one security effectual, we must deprive the man making it of the means of giving another. That is to say, it will not be sufficient that he should show the telegram to the lender, and give a charge in writing on the goods or their proceeds, for he might repeat that process to half a dozen people, but he must also give up the telegram to the lender, and the possession of it must be essential to the validity of the security. For the same reason we

must take care that our borrower shall not obtain more than one copy of the same telegram, and our law must, in fact, forbid the issuing of these telegrams in duplicate. Again, we must provide measures for preventing the correspondent in the foreign country from sending more than one telegram relating to the same goods, or sending a telegram when there are no goods at all. And for this purpose it would seem that it ought not to be left to the private individuals to send the telegrams, but that an office, under the control of the government, should be established, in order that its messages might be known to be au

thentic.

There is also another consideration which will lead us to this same conclusion, and that is, that ordinarily the bills of lading carry the right to the goods; supposing, therefore, a loan to have been effected on some goods, of which the shipment was notified by telegraph, still, when the bills of lading arrived the recipient of them might, as he may now, raise money on a deposit of them, or sell the goods by their means, notwithstanding the previous security effected on the telegram. It might, also, happen that the shipper of the goods, after sending the telegram, might, himself, transfer the bills of lading to another person, mortgaging them to a bank, say, in his own country, and the bank would then send them to their correspondent at the port of destination, who would clearly have a title to the goods. Our law should, of course, provide for these emergencies, and the best means of doing so would seem to be the institution of a responsible office, which should examine the bills of lading, and stamp or write upon them, in the lan

guages of both the countries of shipment and destination, a short note, saying that the rights originally annexed to them had been disannexed by telegraph. This cancellation of the bills of lading, be it observed, is the vital point in our scheme. It should, of course, be a criminal act for any person to present fictitious documents for the official stamp, and the officer should have power to require proper proof from any person presenting documents, that he was really entitled to the rights which they purported to confer. The best means of defraying the expense of the public offices would, probably, be by charging a small fee for stamping the documents and for announcing the fact by telegraph to the person to whom the message was to be sent. It might be desirable, at the same time, as a further precaution against fraud, that one of the copies of the bill of lading should be left at the office to be transmitted by post to the person indicated.

We have hitherto spoken only of bills of lading, but the considerations we have entertained may very well lead us to go a step further, and inquire whether the same system might not be extended, with advantage, to bills of exchange, promissory notes, bank notes, and other documents. The general effect of such an extension would be to enable all mercantile matters to be transacted by telegraph, which can now be done by post.

The expense of transmission by telegraph would, of course, be greater than that by post, so that recourse would not be had to the former, unless the saving of time would more than compensate for the extra expenditure. If we had space to enter into the details of commercial matters, we could easily show that this would often be the case, and that a system which provided for the instantaneous remittance of money would enable many dealings to be effected more advantageously than at present, and many others to be undertaken which cannot now be transacted at all. In particular, we may point out, that, in the dealings which take place between banks in different parts of the world, a means of transmitting money almost instantaneously would be found of very great practical utility. People often require to have a remittance of money made to them in less time than the interval required for the delivery of letters by post. This can be done at present only in the following way: A., at London, say, telegraphs to B., at New York, to remit a sum of money to him; B. then pays it into a bank at New York; that bank telegraphs to its correspondents in London, and they give A. credit for the sum. This appears satisfactory enough, but let us observe, that, in order to enable the transaction to be completed, it is necessary that the bank at B.'s locality should have a correspondent in A.'s locality, who would be willing to give it credit for the sum to be remitted. If, instead of supposing New York and London to be the termini of the operation, we took two provincial towns in England and America, this would rarely be the case, and the remittance could then only be made by the help of

one or two more intermediaries, whereby time would be lost and expense incurred, for a commission would often be charged on such a remittance, and the risk would be run of putting a weak link in the chain. Now, if the system we are advocating were in operation, no bank would find any difficulty in obtaining credit on an emergency from another bank, at a distant town, since it would only have to transmit an approved security of the amount for which credit was required; or a remittance might be made, without risk of loss, direct from one individual to another without the intervention of banks at all, and without the necessity of paying any commission.

Considering it, then, to be both desirable and practicable that the rights annexed to the documents we have mentioned should be transmissible by telegraph, it would, of course, be requisite to enable the transferee to obtain from the telegram all the benefits which he would derive from the original documents themselves. We have then to consider what conditions have to be fulfilled in order that this may be done. First, then, it should seem that the transferror should indorse the original documents, if necessary, to the transferee, and do all other things which might be required for perfecting his title; next, that the telegram should set out the whole of the document, and give official notice that the document set out had been stamped with a telegraph stamp, and the rights annexed to it transferred to the person mentioned. And it would be best that the telegram should be addressed, not to the transferee himself, but to the public officer of the telegraph office nearest to his abode. Then, at the receiving office, a fair copy should be made of the document transmitted, on good paper, to be stamped at the cost of the transferee with the stamp which it would have been necessary to affix to the original document if it had arrived in the ordinary way, and also, probably, with an extra stamp to cover the expenses of the department. This document might be conveniently called a certified telegram. A clause should be printed in the paper, with blanks to be filled up in each particular case, certifying that an official telegram had been received from the place whence it was sent, stating that a document in the words thereon written had been stamped with a telegraph stamp, and the rights annexed to it transferred to the transferee. This document should, then, to all intents and purposes, represent the original document which had been stamped in the distant country. It should be transferable by the same means; it should impose the same obligations on an indorser; it should authorize all payments made on the strength of it, and be receivable in evidence in all courts of justice. It should carry, in fact, all the rights belonging to the original document, with the right to possession of that document superseded. It might also be included in the list of documents, whose rights could be transmitted by telegraph.

It would not, in the first instance certainly, be

necessary to have a department for the purposes we are considering annexed to every telegraph station, or any thing near it. It would probably answer all purposes if there were one in every great port or great commercial town in every country. The persons desiring to make remittances by telegraph would probably reside in the neighborhood of these towns; and if they did not do so, they would find little difficulty in getting their business done for them by means of agents, who would spring up as soon as they were required. With respect to the receipt of remittances, the same remark also applies; but if, in any case, a remittance had to be made to a person living at a distance from any of the centers, it might be effected by sending the certified telegram to the person indicated by post. A similar system is, I believe, often adopted now in the transmission of telegrams, that is to say, a direction is sent to the master of the office at which a telegram is received, to send it on by post, instead of resorting to the more expeditious, but more costly, process of employing a special messenger.

A QUESTION UNDER THE BANKRUPT ACT

Does the bankrupt's discharge authorize a State court, upon a motion by the bankrupt, to order a perpetual stay of proceedings on a judgment against the bankrupt?

To one familiar with the provisions and the theory of the act, this question might not appear to be necessary; but, strange as it may seem, the point has been presented at a special term in the fourth department, and decided in the affirmative.

On the 5th of September, 1863, Huber recovered a judgment in the New York supreme court against Ely, on contract for $680.61, debt and costs, upon which execution was issued and returned unpaid.

On the 26th day of February, 1868, the defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy, and such proceedings were thereupon had, that, on the 27th day of October, 1868, he received his discharge in due form.

At the special term held in Livingston county, July 31, 1871, the bankrupt, upon an affidavit setting forth the above facts, and representing that the judgment remaining on record was a hindrance to him in carrying on active business, and in buying and selling real estate, etc., moved the court for an order, directing the county clerk to satisfy or cancel the judgment, or for a perpetual stay of proceedings. The court "took the papers," and, after due deliberation, delivered the following opinion:

"The motion in this case, I think, must be granted. In the opinion of Judges Hurlbut and Bronson in Clark v. Rawling, 3 Comstock, 221 and 227, it is held that the relief in such cases, formerly obtained by audita querela, is now obtained by motion, and that the party has no other remedy. In Thompson v.

Hewitt, 6 Hill, 254, it was conceded that the remedy by motion in such cases was proper, and the motion in that case would have been granted had it not appeared that the judgment was entered upon a cognovit given as a compromise for a less sum than was due. The motion in that case was for a perpetual stay of execution upon the judgment. Such is this motion, and I think it must be granted; but as it is granted as a favor to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to appear and oppose, it must be upon payment of costs of opposing, $10. So ordered."

Upon a careful examination of the whole report in Thompson v. Hewitt, I find no intimation by court or counsel as to what the court would have done with the motion had it not appeared that the judgment was the fruit of a compromise. But it does appear that the judgment was a compromise for a less sum than was claimed to be due, and was recovered intermediate the presenting of the petition and the granting of the discharge in bankruptcy, and, consequently, not cut off by the discharge; and it also does appear, in the closing sentence of Justice Bronson's opinion, that, "if there is any way in which he can set up his discharge as a legal answer to the judgment, he does not want our assistance." Now, in this case of Huber v. Ely, the judgment was recovered before the presentation of the bankrupt's petition, and of course was cut off by the discharge, and of course, there was a "way in which he could set up his discharge as a legal answer to the judgment," and of course he did not need the court's "assistance" on this motion, and clearly "it should not have been granted. The case of Clark v. Rawling is, if possible, less pertinent. It was an ordinary judgment creditor's bill, to which the defendants interposed their bankrupt's discharge, to which the plaintiff replied that the judgment was recovered after the presentation of the bankrupt's petition; to this the defendants responded, that the judgment was recovered upon an old debt, and the court very properly held that the debt, existing at the time of the presentation of the petition, was cut off by the discharge, and dismissed the complaint, and this is all that was "held" in that case.

What Judges Hurlbut and Bronson said, in regard to the relief which was formerly obtained by audita querela, being now obtained by motion, is based on a position stated by Bronson, J., on page 226, that "when the case is such that defendant ought to have the relief, his remedy is a direct proceeding to get rid of the judgment, either by setting it aside or obtaining an order for a perpetual stay of proceedings.' If, for instance, before or after judgment, something is done which pays or otherwise satisfies the debt, then it may with propriety be said, that "the defendant ought to have the relief;" and the court will grant the relief on motion. But a bankrupt's discharge does not pay or otherwise satisfy the debt.

The difficulty in applying this practice to the case of Huber v. Ely is, that Ely ought not to have the

relief asked for, at the hands of any court, for the reason that he already has in his hands all that the act of congress authorizes him to have, viz.: his bankrupt discharge, which is, in and of itself, a perpetual stay of execution of this judgment, and which he can set up as a legal answer to any action or other proceeding to enforce it; and, therefore, he does not need, and ought not have, the "assistance" of this or any other court on such a motion.

It may not be improper to add, that if the plaintiff in the judgment should institute any executive proceeding to enforce collection of the judgment, such, for instance, as issuing execution, or instituting proceedings supplementary to execution, then it would be proper for the defendant to make a motion (not for a general stay of all proceedings on the judgment, but) for an order vacating or setting aside such executive proceeding, on the ground that, as against such proceeding "he had no other remedy," and the motion, to that extent, would be granted, with costs, upon the theory that the discharge is, itself, a stay of any executive proceeding to enforce collection of the judgment, and of which the plaintiff is bound to take notice at his peril. But in case the judgment creditor or any other creditor should commence an action at law or in equity, upon the judgment or upon any other debt, cut off by the discharge, the only way in which the bankrupt could avail himself of his discharge would be to plead it in bar according to the provisions of the thirty-fourth section of the act. But in no case is it proper or right for the bankrupt to ask for, or for any court to grant, a general stay of proceeding on judgments or debts, simply because the debtor has obtained a bankrupt's discharge; such an order, if of force, would prevent the commencement of an action, and if one should be commenced, would authorize a motion for its discontinuance, while the thirty-fourth section clearly implies that such an action may be commenced, and the defendant plead his discharge in bar of it.

CURRENT TOPICS.

There is prevalent among our people a notion that the liberty of even the meanest individual is guarded with exceeding care in this country. Perhaps it is, theoretically, but those familiar with the inside working of our public establishments know that very many things are done by the officials in charge that are hardly in accordance with the supposed protecting care of the law. It is not uncommon to arrest a suspected person and lock him up for some days, giving him no opportunity for a judicial hearing or access to his friends, and, while he is so deprived of justice and friendly aid, subject him to severe cross-examinations, and endeavor to obtain from him by threats, promises and false representations, a sort of admission of his own or some other's connection with the offense charged. We believe the ends of justice would be

better served if police officials were fordidden, under penalties, to converse with a person under arrest concerning the alleged crime for which he is held.

Much of this harassing prisoners springs from a custom that has become too common, of offering rewards for the conviction of parties supposed to have committed a felony or misdemeanor, involving injury to person or property. In order to stimulate the police to greater diligence on some extraordinary occasion, a special inducement may be necessary, but

the offer of a reward in most cases is an absolute

injury. It demoralizes the officer by causing him to neglect his general duties and devote his attention to those particular matters in which he may chance to receive extra compensation, and when the reward is contingent upon the conviction of some person, prosecuting attorney and court, and, sometimes, upon often leads him to intrude upon the province of the

that of the prisoner's counsel. The offer of a reward, payable in the event of conviction, should be forbidden as much as gambling or selling lottery tickets.

The recent fire in Chicago has taught the American people a terrible lesson concerning the danger of building wooden cities. While our large towns have many elegant and expensive structures, they have very few fire-proof ones, the pretended fire-proof buildings being for the most part humbugs. We think a little legislation concerning the matter, if in the right direction, would do no harm. In places of over ten thousand inhabitants, wooden buildings should not be and in thickly built localities, allowed to be built; buildings over thirty feet in height should be required to be perfectly fire-proof. Besides this, the abortions pretending to be mansard roofs, should be kept within limits, as to style and material. While private taste, as a rule, is entitled to exhibit itself as it pleases, it should always be in subordination to public safety.

It is a questionable point whether further precautions ought not to be taken to insure the responsibility of insurance companies. Although in New York the statute requires a large deposit from both life and fire companies, yet how many of those who then held fire policies felt on the evening of October 9th that the indemnity against loss was of any great value. To be sure, the fire in Chicago was unprecedented in modern times; but these unprecedented events are getting to be very common. As our cities are daily growing more combustible, the pavements being of kindling wood, the sidewalks of tar, and the buildings fire-proof, and all very largely of pine timber, it would be well to be certain that those who, for a consideration, take upon themselves the risk of all this will be able, beyond all reasonable probability, to make good their promises when the time of need

comes.