full amount of the notes, and that he would hold the balance. not needed for the payment of debts, in trust for the wife and daughter of the defendant. Freeman v. Burnham.

2. It was found by an auditor that R. was indebted at the time of the delivery of the notes, and that his estate was still indebted for the same debts, and that without the notes his estate was insufficient to pay the debts in full. Held, to be the fair import of the finding that R.'s estate, at the time the notes were delivered, was insufficient without the notes to pay his debts in full. Ib.

WAR.

1. A state of war, recognized as such by and between belligerent parties, suspends all contracts in existence between citizens of the respective belligerents at the time war commences. Semmes v. City Fire Ins. Co.

2. At the termination of the war such contracts are revived, and the remedies for their enforcement are restored. Ib.

3. The late war between the United States and the so-called Confederate States suspended all contracts between the citizens of the respective parties thereto. Ib.

4. A treaty of peace usually marks the time at which a war ceases and contracts between the belligerents are revived. Tb.

5. But the late war was not, and could not, be terminated by a treaty of peace, as the so-called Confederate States were politically annihilated, only one party to the contest surviving. Ib.

6. The question when a war begins or terminates is a political and not a judicial one, and courts must, in ascertaining whether a state of war exists, look to the action of those departments of the government in which that subject is confided by the constitution. The action of those departments, when within the authority conferred by the constitution, is conclusive and binding on the courts as well as on the citizens. Ib. 7. The proclamation of the president of the United States, of June 13th, 1865, declaring, among other things, "that all restrictions upon internal, domestic and coastwise intercourse and trade, heretofore imposed on the territory of the United States east of the Mississippi river, are annulled, and I do hereby direct that they be forthwith removed," was a valid exercise of executive power, the effect of which was to revive all contracts and remedies thereon between citizens of the rest of the United States and those of the seceding States east of the Mississippi river, which had been suspended by the war. Ib.

WATER-COURSE.

1. The petitioners were mill owners on Westfield river. Prior to 1826, Strap brook was a tributary of that river. In that year the brook was lawfully taken by the Farmington canal company under powers conferred by its charter and by a new channel transferred from its old bed into the canal and through the canal into Farmington river. The canal company, in 1848, abandoned its canal and practically ceased to exist, but the brook thus diverted had ever since continued to flow toward Farmington river. The petitioners purchased their mill sites and established their mills after the brook had thus been diverted and while the canal company was in existence and operation. The question as to their right to a restoration of the brook to its original channel as against riparian owners upon the new channel, discussed but not absolutely decided. Agawam Canal Co. v. Edwards.

WILL.

1. A testator gave the use of one-half his property "to L., and H. his wife, during their natural lives." Held, to mean L. and H. and the survivor of them. Jacobs v. Bradley.

2. A legacy was given to "the Episcopal society in Hamden. Held, to be a good legacy to "Grace church," that being the only Episcopal society in Hamden. Ib. 3. A pecuniary legacy was made payable at the expiration of the lives of certain persons to whom, by the preceding bequests, the testator had given the life use of most of his estate. This legacy was followed by sundry other pecuniary legacies, in most of which no time of payment was specified. Held, that the provision with regard to the time of payment of the legacy first mentioned did not apply to the other legacies. Ib. 4. A legacy to a school district contained the following condition: "Provided the school-house shall be located one-half mile from where it now stands." The school district, after the death of the testator, voted to build a new school-house where the old one stood, and were proceeding with the construction of the same. Held, that the legacy should be treated as lapsed. Ib.

5. The will gave "all articles of furniture in the house to H., so long as she or her husband shall occupy the house and use the same." "" Held, to be a bequest of the use of the furniture, under the limitation stated, to H. and her husband, and the survivor of them. Ib.

WITNESS.

A party requested the court to charge the jury that, where a witness soon after a transaction had given a version of it materially conflicting with his testimony in court, his evidence must be regarded as impeached. The court charged that the testimony of the witness in such a case was entitled to little if any credit, but that testimony as to such conflicting statements was often very unreliable and likely to be colored by the feelings of the listeners. Held, to be unexceptionable. Thorp v. Town of Brookfield.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
JUNE DECISIONS, 1871.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Judgment under: how reviewed.-The judgment upon award, under the statute, can only be reviewed in this court by writ of error. Proceedings under the revised statutes relating to arbitrations are expressly excluded from the operation of the code and the remedies given by it. Turnbull v. Martin. Opinion by Allen, J.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

Employment of attorney by one of jointly interested parties.-An agreement whereby the several subscribers undertake to contribute to a common fund to maintain, by litigation, a general right asserted by them, upon which their separate interests depend, gives no right to any one of those subscribing to employ counsel in behalf of the whole; and where such counsel is employed by some subscribers, representing themselves as a committee, he cannot recover from the others without some proof of their assenting to such employment, or of the proper appointment of such committee. Smith v. Duckhardt. Opinion by Andrews, J.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Draft on bank as to subsequent deposits.- A draft drawn upon a savings bank, where the depositor has

1. Effect of stipulation in bill of lading: how far available to carrier.—The plaintiff, at Louisville, placed certain goods in the possession of the Jeffersonville Railroad Company, they agreeing to transport such goods to New York and to deliver them to plaintiff's consignee there. The Jeffersonville railroad extends only to Indianapolis, and had necessarily to send the goods over connecting lines to execute its contract. At the time of making the shipment the plaintiff accepted a bill of lading, in which it was stated that the company would not be liable for loss by "unavoidable accident of the railroad and fire in the depot," and after other specifications were the words, etc., "all rail, P. R. R." The defendant, a corporation having a line running from Philadelphia to New York, included in which are twenty miles of water transportation, received the goods, and while in its possession, in a place used by it for the deposit of merchandise to be transported, were destroyed by fire. There were from Philadelphia to New York all rail routes, with the exception of a ferry across the river at New York. Held, that the Jeffersonville railroad, having taken the goods for transportation at a special rate, and delivered at the time a bill of lading, which was accepted by the plaintiff, he is bound by the exemption from liability inserted in the bill, and the Jeffersonville railroad would not be liable for loss occurring within the exception. Magee v. Camden and Amboy Railroad, etc., Co. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the defendant and other connecting lines in the transportation of the goods were acting in the employ of the first company, and under the same liability as provided in the bill of lading. Ib.

3. A railroad company may bind itself by a contract beyond the termination of its own road. Ib.

4. If, however, the first company should make with the connecting lines any contract as to liability more favorable than the one made by the shipper with it, that contract would, at his election, inure to his benefit. Ib. 5. The words "all rail," inserted in the bill of lading, constituted a direction by the owner to transport the goods by that mode, and the carriage of the goods in a different manner, as by a route which is partly by water, and which was not necessarily taken, renders the party undertaking such carriage an insurer, and he caunot avail himself of any exception. Ib.

6. The defendant, having undertaken to carry the goods in violation of the contract, lost the benefit of the exemption from liability, and is liable for their loss. Ib.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Act for collection of claims against vessels: constitutionality of.-Any State law which attempts to provide for the enforcement of a maritime claim or contract, by any but a common-law remedy, infringes upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over that class of cases. Brookman v. Hamill. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. So far as State laws create liens and provide remedies for claims not maritime, and over which the courts of admiralty have no jurisdiction, they are perfectly valid and operative. Ib.

3. Where process in rem is refused by the United States courts, on the ground of want of jurisdiction over the cause of action, such cases must be left to the State tribunals. Ib.

4. Cases arising from claims for material or supplies furnished to vessels in foreign commerce, though at the home port, or to domestic vessels not engaged in purely internal navigation of the waters of a State, are of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Ib.

5. All State statutes which attempt to confer on State courts a remedy for marine torts or marine contracts, by proceedings strictly in rem, are void. Ib.

6. Wharfage demands have been, from very early times, treated as one class of well-recognized maritime demands, and are cognizable only in United States courts. Ib.

7. And a bond given to discharge a vessel from an attachment issued by a State court, in pursuance of the act to provide for the collection of demands against ships and vessels (Laws of 1862, chap. 482), where the claim was for wharfage, is void, and an action cannot be maintained thereon. Ib.

CONTRACTS.

1. Effect of contract to assume perils of navigation: negligence. The plaintiff, owning a canal boat, engaged the defendant to tow it from Albany to New York, and paid him the agreed price therefor. It was agreed that the service should be done at the risk of the owner of the boat. The boat was detached from the towboat, and abandoned a short distance from Albany. Held, that the defendant was not a common carrier, and that the contract made by the parties, exempting the defendant from liability to be incurred in the performance of his duties, was valid. Woodin v. Austin. Opinion by Grover, J.

2. The defendant was, by the agreement, exempted from liability for damage arising from the perils of navigation, but not for that arising from his own negligence, whether gross or ordinary. Ib.

3. The correct rule is, that such a contract creates no exemption for injuries sustained by negligence of any degree, for the reason that such exemption was not in the contemplation of the parties, and is not embraced in the contract. Ib.

See Common Carriers.

CORPORATIONS.

Subscription for shares in unorganized.—The plaintiff subscribed for certain stock of an oil company about organizing, on the faith of a prospectus, which stated that "the company's property now comprises almost 270 acres in fee simple," etc., and then proceeds: "Whereas, G. A. B.," etc., "and their associates, propose to organize a company, to be known as the N. L. O. Co.," etc.; "whereas, said company intend to purchase certain oil and mineral lands," etc. The name of the plaintiff and other subscribers for stock were affixed to this prospectus. The company was organized and went into operation. Eight of the parcels of land named in the prospectus were purchased; two other parcels named were not purchased, because a good title to the land could not be given; but one parcel not named, but believed to be of equal value to one of the unpurchased parcels, was purchased in its place. The plaintiff brought action to recover for the amount he had paid for his stock. Held, that the prospectus, properly construed, gave no assurance that the land described was already acquired, but only of an intention to purchase. That the company having acted in

good faith, and having purchased the land intended to be acquired, so far as a satisfactory title could be obtained, the failure to acquire all the proposed lands was a misfortune that must be shared by all the stockholders in common, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the money paid by him for stock, on the ground that it was impossible for the company to carry out its objects. Kelsey v. Northern Light Oil Co. Opinion by Grover, J.

DAMAGES.

On failure to comply with condition in lease. -The plaintiff, as assignee of the lessor, brought this action to recover damages for a failure on the part of the lessee of certain premises to sink a well as required by a condition in the lease. Held, that in such a case the proper measure of damages is not the amount required to sink the well, but the amount in which the plaintiff is injured by the default of the defendant, and if he receives no injury he is entitled only to nominal damages. Chamberlain v. Parker. Opinion by Andrews, J. See Deeds, 5.

DEEDS.

1. Construction of covenants in.-A deed given by defendant to plaintiff contained this clause: "Reserving always a right of way, as now used, on the west side of the above-described premises, for cattle and carriages, from the public highway to the piece of land now owned by Samuel B. Reeves, lying north of and adjoining the premises herein conveyed." Reeves had used the right for more than twenty years, and had established it by suit against the plaintiff. Held, that while a reservation is always of some right to be used by the grantor, issuing out of the estate granted, a deed must be so construed as to give effect to the design of the parties manifested by the language used. That the reservation in question cannot be construed to be a right to the grantor, but from the expression "as now used," etc., must be understood to be appurtenant to the land owned by Reeves, and that the establishment by action against plaintiff of such right of way in Reeves was not a violation of defendant's covenant for quiet enjoyment. Bridger v. Peerson. Opinion by Grover, J.

5. Stipulation in, not to carry on certain business: practice: damages.-There was a contract not to erect or permit on the premises in question "any manufactory of gunpowder," etc., "distillery," etc., or other noxious or dangerous trade or business." Held, that a manufactory of parafine oil, though not a distillery, within the strict meaning of that word, if the business is noxious or dangerous it is equally within the prohibition. The words "noxious" and "dangerous" here are to be construed in the light of the previous specifications, upon the maxim noscitur a sociis. Atlantic Dock Co. v. Libby. Opinion by Church, C. J.

3. The covenant was lawful. Ib.

4. The direct finding by the referee that the business is dangerous is a finding of fact, although contained in the conclusions of law. Ib.

5. No damages were recovered in the action, though an injunction was sustained. The referee certified that the value of the defendants' property affected was upward of $50,000, and an order allowing $500 extra allowance to plaintiff granted. Held, error. There is nothing to show that defendants' premises were not as valuable as before, and their title is not affected or impaired by the judgment. Ib.

(To be continued.)

VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT.

It was long ago settled that a man who has executed a voluntary settlement cannot maintain a suit for specific performance against a subsequent purchaser for value. Smith v. Garland, 2 Mer. 123. The court will not impede the sale by which he seeks to get rid of it (Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 84), but neither will it assist him. It will not interfere in any manner respecting it, and, therefore, he has no equity to support a bill against an unwilling purchaser, who refuses to complete, on the ground that there is a prior settlement affecting the property. This is a good ground of refusing to complete, because a voluntary settlement may be made good by matter ex post facto, of which the purchaser has no notice. Johnson v. Legard, Turn. & Russ. 294.

On the other hand, a contract to sell the subjectmatter of a voluntary settlement will be enforced at the suit of the purchaser, because the conveyance by the vendor defeats the prior voluntary settlement by the operation of the statute, and there is no equity in the beneficiaries to prevent a sale. Buckle v. Mitchell, 18 Ves. 112.

In Smith v. Garland (sup.) the bill was filed by the vendor against an unwilling purchaser, who repudiated the benefit of the statute of Elizabeth. In Peters v. Nicolls, 19 W. R. 618, the defendant alleged that he was a willing purchaser provided a good title could be made; but as the only objection to the title was the voluntary settlement, and he refused the plaintiff's offer to rescind, the vice-chancellor held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance.

The case was one of a very peculiar character, but it deserves a passing notice, from its bearing on one of the most anomalous branches of our law, viz.: that a voluntary settlement, however free from actual fraud, is, by the operation of 27 Eliz., deemed fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration, even where the purchase has been made with full notice of the prior voluntary settlement; though it is not easy to persuade one's self, as Sir William Grant remarked, in Buckle v. Mitchell (sup.), how a purchaser can be defrauded by a settlement, of which he has notice before he makes his purchase.-Solicitor's Journal.

CORRESPONDENCE.

DEFENSE OF A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY TO AN ACTION ON A JUDGMENT.

CINCINNATI, O., August 24, 1871.

Editor of the Law Journal:

Dear Sir-It occurs to me that the profession at large would be interested in having their attention called to decisions promulgating doctrines at variance with the current belief and opinion, and, as I think, against the weight of authority, especially when they are selected for publication or notice in a legal periodical of so extensive a circulation and influence as that of the JOURNAL.

In the last number of the JOURNAL (No. 4, August 19), page 61, is found the syllabus of the decision in Bradford v. Rice, by the supreme court of Massachusetts, taken from the 102 Mass. 472, to the effect that a "certificate of discharge in bankruptcy is no defense to an action on a judgment recovered upon a debt provable in bankruptcy after the debtor had been adjudged a bankrupt." It is true, that the court, in

the opinion delivered by Gray, J., say, that “the ruling of the court below was in accordance with a series of decisions of the supreme court of that State," yet it is evident the court were influenced, to a considerable degree, by the decision of Judge Shipman in the district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut (In re Williams, 2 Bank. Reg. 79), where it was held, "that a creditor, by taking a judgment in common form after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, loses the right to prove in bankruptcy." And thereupon Judge Gray pertinently remarks "we have been referred to no opposing decision of the federal courts." Whatever may have been the fact as to opposing decisions," at the time the decision in Bradford v. Rice was rendered, it is now well known that there exists a number of such, and it is to these that I desire to call attention in this communication. The first case was that of In re Brown, 3 Bank. Reg. 145, where the identical question passed upon by Judge Shipman (In re Williams, supra), came before Judge Blatchford, in the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, where the second sentence of his decision reads as follows: "I have examined the decision of the district court for the district of Connecticut in the case of In re Williams, 2 Bank. Reg. 79, and am compelled to dissent from it." The next case is that of In re Vickery, 3 Bank. Reg. 171, where the same question came up before Judge Withey, United States district judge for the western district of Michigan, and he emphatically says, in deciding the point, "I dissent entirely from the rule laid down in In re Williams, and fully concur in the decision in In re Brown, supra." ." The third and last decision that I have seen reported is that of Judge Longyear, in the United States district court for the eastern district of Michigan, who dissents from Judge Shipman's decision in the case in question, and asserts that it originates in a mistaken theory, viz.: "that the debt is extinguished by the judgment.' To which Judge Longyear responds, that "the debt is not extinguished. The instrument, contract or obligation upon which the debt arose is extinguished, but not the debt. The debt remains. If this were not so, the judgment would destroy itself by extinguishing the very foundation upon which it is built. The debt was founded on contract; it is now founded on judgment, but is, nevertheless, the same debt. A judgment operates to extinguish a debt only when it produces the fruits of a judgment." Citing, 14 Pet. 19, 32; 1 Blatch. C. C. 326, 328, 329; and 3 Com. 216.

Judge Longyear's decision in this case, and Judge Withey's in In re Vickery, supra, were almost simultaneously rendered, and it is probable that neither knew of the other's decision until both had been given. At all events, no reference is made in either to the other. I have given but a very short extract of the decision in In re Crawford. It is well worthy of a careful perusal, as it strikes me as the most forcible, consistent and logical decision of any that has been published or reported on the question involved. It is apparent that the decision in Bradford v. Rice cannot be supported, if the views taken and held by Judges Blatchford, Withey and Longyear, in opposition to those of Judge Shipman, be correct. The ruling in that case hinges upon the construction and effect given to a judgment obtained by a creditor of a bankrupt after his adjudication upon a debt provable against him. For the court say "That if, after the institution of proceedings in insolvency or bankruptcy, judgment is re

covered upon a debt provable under those proceedings, the original debt is merged and extinguished in the judgment, and the judgment is not provable against the estate of the debtor nor discharged by the certificate." Clearly showing that if the court had adopted the views expressed in In re Crawford, In re Vickery and In re Brown, referred to, the decision would have been otherwise. I have not attempted to criticize the decision in Bradford v. Rice, neither was it my object or intention so to do, except so far as to refer your readers to the cases which are in conflict with the reasoning of that case. But I may venture to express the opinion that the decision is an unfortunate one, and will work hardship to honest and confiding debtors, and discriminate unjustly in favor of cunning and relentless creditors, as it is fair to assume that judgments of this class are and will be obtained more through the inadvertence or oversight and omission of the bankrupt or his assignee than through any good faith on the part of the creditor.

J. W. JOHNSON.

DISTRIBUTION OF WIFE'S PERSONAL ESTATE. ANGELICA, August 26, 1871.

Editor Law Journal:

Dear Sir-Your JOURNAL of 10th June, 1871, Vol. III, p. 375, gives notes of a case entitled "Personal estate of the wife; to whom it goes at her death."

The revised laws of 1813, chapter 65, section 17, says: "Nothing in this act contained respecting the distribution of intestates' estates shall be construed to extend to the estates of femes covert that shall die intestate, but that their husbands may demand and have admiuistration of their rights, credits and other personal estate, and recover and enjoy the same as fully as they might have done before the passing of this act." Referring in the margin to 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 10, and 29 Car. II, c. 30. By the revision of 1830 there were three sections that either directly or by implication recognized this right of the husband. 2 R. S. (3d ed.), 138; § 30 (sec. 29), § 31 (sec. 30) next page, and § 83 (sec. 79), p. 161. The last-named sections read as follows: "The preceding provisions respecting the distribution of estates shall not apply to the personal estates of married women, but their husbands may demand, recover and enjoy the same, as they are entitled by the rules of the common law."

This section was amended by the eleventh section of the act of 1867, as follows:

The 79th section of chapter 6, title 3, of the 2d part of the revised statutes is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

"§ 79. The preceding provisions respecting the distribution of estates shall apply to the personal estates of married women dying, leaving descendants them surviving; and the husband of any such deceased married woman shall be entitled to the same distributive share in the personal estate of his wife to which a widow is entitled in the personal estate of her husband by the provisions of this title, and no more."

It would seem that so far as married women dying leaving no descendants them surviving, the husbands would still be entitled to enjoy the personal estate in the same manner as if the act of 1867 had not been passed. Should not the act of 1867 have repealed both the thirtieth and thirty-first sections referred to, to have the effect the court seems to have given it?

As I have received much useful instruction from your valuable journal, I have taken the liberty, although an entire stranger, to send you this.

Yours respectfully,

J. G. COLLINS.

NOTES AND QUERIES,
CORTLAND, Aug. 22, 1871.

Editor of Albany Law Journal:
Sir-Will some of your readers please answer the
following questions?

A. recovers judgment in justice's court against B. for $40. B. appeals to the county court upon questions of law. In his notice of appeal B. does not state in what particular the judgment should have been more favorable to him, nor does he ask for a reversal of the judgment.

Has A. any remedy before argument?

If, upon argument, B. should succeed in reversing judgment, who should costs be taxed against?

Yours respectfully,

BOOK NOTICE.

J. S.

A Treatise on the Law of Fire Insurance. By Henry Flanders, author of a "Treatise on Maritime Law, "The Law of Shipping," etc. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 1871.

It is only within a few years that the law of insurance has come to form an important department of jurisprudence-so few, indeed, that its principles have scarcely yet been reduced to a system. This fact renders the latest treatise and the latest decisions on the subject of more importance than they would otherwise be entitled to.

Mr. Flanders says that he has endeavored to "systematize the principles deducible from the numerous decisions of our courts upon the complex subject of fire insurance," and it may be fairly said that he has, in the main, fulfilled his endeavor. He seems to have been a very careful and industrious student of the cases, and has displayed good judgment in extracting and stating their principles; but, according to his own admission in the preface, his work is not the highest type of a "treatise." "He has been sparing," he says, "of adverse criticism, as in the practical business of the profession it is more important to know what the law is, than what, in the opinion of the writer, it should be." This is quite true as it reads, but it impliedly admits, what a close examination of the book shows, that the author has seldom thought it necessary to give more than the gist of the decisions, whether harmonious or conflicting. Now, the true province of the treatise writer is, to make himself such a master of the subject that he may be able to give the underlying principles even where the decisions are conflicting, and to indicate the rule that should prevail. This is asking much of a text writer, but no more than many of them have given, and not to the detriment of the practical value of their works either.

But among the treatises of the day this of Mr. Flanders is entitled to a very respectable rank. It is the best work on fire insurance with which we are acquainted, because it is the latest, and is reasonably accurate and exhaustive. The author has not noticed all the cases, which was, perhaps, not to be expected, but he ought not to have omitted such an important decision as that of Burbank v. Rockingham Ins. Co., 24 N. H. 550 on the question as to whether the death

of the assured and the succession of the heir operated as an "alienation," as that term is usually used in policies. Indeed, the entire subject of alienation or change of title by death is either omitted or only incidentally referred to. If there is any soundness in the decision in Lappin v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 58 Barb. 325, the subject is worthy of discussion.

But errors of omission and commission will occur in every work, and this is no worse, in that respect, than the majority of our text-books, while in many other respects it is decidedly better. We should say that the author had scarcely reached the level of a professional book-maker, and has therefore done his work more honestly and conscientiously than he otherwise might have done, as the professional book-maker is, at best, a sorry cobbler.

There are from twenty-five to thirty Hindoos studying for the bar in London.

The law department of the congressional library contains 27,170 volumes.

A London letter states that at one time in his checkered career Tichborne or Orton was a convict on Cockatoo Island, Australia.

Governor Geary, of Pennsylvania, has removed Assistant Attorney-General McClure, for his complicity in irregularities in connection with the collection of certain war claims.

At the recent commencement of St. John's College, Annapolis, Md., the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws was conferred upon Hon. James L. Bartol, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and Hon. Richard I. Bowie, the former chief justice.

A curious and antique document of twelve foolscap pages, containing copies of the wills of Francis, Henry and Thomas Layton, executed in England in 1652, 1657 and 1671, was found in a dirt barrel, in Boston, a few weeks ago, by employees of the health department. Mr. Douglass, the acting commissioner of internal revenue, in a circular to his subordinates, says: From information at hand, I am led to believe that subordinate officers, in some few districts, have engaged in the preparation and prosecution of claims against the government. The law for the punishment of an United States officer who shall act as agent or attorney for the prosecution of any claim against the governernment is very stringent (section 98 of the internal revenue act of July 28, 1868), and should be enforced with vigor against all offenders. It will be readily seen that such offenses afford peculiar embarrassment in the administration of the laws.