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AGREEMENT IMPLIED BY ACCEPTANCE OF GRANT.
bailee, having the possession and right to control the stand what demonstrate means;' and I left my situaproperty until the completion of the contract, and a tion in Springfield, went home to my father's house, lien upon it for the contract price of his work. That and stayed there until I could give any proposition in such a conversion is not larceny is well settled; and the six books of Euclid. I then found out what demnow, if it be true that it is not embezzlement, it is onstrate meant, and went back to my law studies.” entirely out of the category of criminal offenses, and employers will hereafter be left to a civil proceeding against delinquent employees of this kind.
DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT. * The papers and people of Wyoming appear to be engaged in the apotheosis of Mr. Chief Justice Howe H. conveyed to the defendants by deed-poll an easeof that Territory, on account of his women's rights ment in certain lands owned by him. The deed condecisions and principles. The Wyoming Tribune says
tained the following clause: “It is understood and
agreed that the grantees shall remove the present river that his “decisions are always just,” and that he
wall easterly upon a new line, as the said H. shall seems to have remembered that sublime sentiment of
direct, and shall rebuild the same without any cost to Shakespeare, grander than any inspired thought, the the said H., his heirs or assigns.” The defendants quality of mercy is not strained,'” etc. It seems that accepted the deed and placed it on record. H. afterthe chief justice has recently had occasion, or has
ward conveyed the premises to F., and F. to E., neither taken occasion, in a decision, to express the opinion
of the deeds containing any reference to the defend
ants' agreement. Soon after E. and H. joined in a that, under the fourteenth amendment, women are
written demand upon the defendants for the removal entitled to enjoy the same civil and political rights as of the wall, with directions as to the line where it the male bipeds, and thereat the same paper gushes should be rebuilt. Afterward ll. made a written forth in limpid streams of eulogy. We can very well assignment of the defendants' agreement to F., and E. endure the decision, but we implore the chief justice
thereupon notified the defendants to remove the wall to issue an order restraining the gushings of the Trib
to the place designated in the previous notice. In an action of assumpsit brought by E. for the non-performance of the agreement by the defendants, it was
held, 1. That the defendants, by accepting the deed The value of the higher mathematics as a study is
from H., agreed to remove the wall in the manner pronot fully settled, but as a preparatory or discipline for vided in the deed. 2. That the conveyance of the the study of the law, there ought to be but one opinion. property in fee by JI. to F. did not discharge the We were once informed by a lawyer, whose success defendants from their agreement. 3. That if the agreein the profession entitled his opinions to much weight,
ment was to be regarded as running with the land, then
F. and E. acquired the rights of H. under it by virtue that he seldom argued an important case without
of their deeds. 4. That if it was to be regarded as a first having deroted several hours to Euclid or Legen
personal contract merely, then it was a chose in action dre. The advocates of mathematics are making use resting in H., which could be assigned by him. 5. That of the following, alleged to be words of Mr. Lincoln: it was no objection that by the agreement the wall was
"I'read law,' as the phrase is, that is, I became a to be rebuilt as II. should direct, and that H., by partlawyer's clerk in Springfield, and copied tedious doc
ing with the land, had ceased to have any interest in
the matter, since H. and E. had concurred in directing uments, and picked up what I could of law, in the
as to the location of the wall, and the defendants could intervals of other work. But your question reminds
not be harmed by the fact that H. had no interest. me of a bit of education I had, which I am bound in 6. That, under the statute giving a right of action to honesty to mention. In the course of my law read an assignee of a chose in action, E. could maintain an ing, I constantly came upon the word . demonstrate.' action of assumpsit for breach of the agreement. EltI thought at first that I understood its meaning, but
ing v. ('linton Mills Co. soon became satisfied that I did not. I said to myself,
ARBITRATION. What do I mean when I demonstrate, more than A submission to arbitration of a matter in suit prowhen I reason or prove? How does demonstration
vided that the costs in the suit should be taxed accorddiffer from any other proof?' I consulted Webster's
ing to law in favor of the successful party. Held, to
mean that the arbitrators were to be governed by legal dictionary. That told of 'certain proof,' 'proof be
rules in estimating the amount of the costs, and not yond the possibility of a doubt;' but I could form no
that the costs were to be taxed by the court independidea what sort of proof that was. I thought a great ently of the arbitrators. Averill v. Buckingham. many things were proved beyond the possibility of a
BANK. doubt, without recourse to any such extraordinary
1. A bank organized under the United States curprocess of reasoning as I understood demonstration
rency act as a national bank had failed to redeem its to be. I consulted all the dictionaries and books of
notes, and the comptroller of the currency, under the reference I could find, but with no better results.
provisions of the currency act, had appointed a reYou might just as well have defined blue to a blind ceiver, who had taken possession of its assets, and its man. At last I said to myself, 'Lincoln, you can
*From John Hooker, Esq., state reporter, and to appeai never make a lawyer of yourself if you do not under in 36 Conn.
affairs were being wound up. A creditor presented a been or shall be given by the general assembly or by claim against the bank to the receiver, who disallowed any town or person for the maintenance of the ministry it, and the creditor thereupon brought suit upon it of the gospel, or for any other public and charitable against the bank. Held, that the proceedings of the use, shall forever remain and be continued to such comptroller had not produced a forfeiture of the fran use, and shall be exempt from the payment of taxes. chise of the bank and a dissolution of the corporation, Held, that this statute did not constitute a contract and that, therefore, the suit would lie against it. Pah between the State and either the donors or the donees quioque Bank v. Bethel Bank.
of such charitable gifts, that the property so given 2. The presentation of a claim against a national should forever be exempt from taxation, and that bank in the hands of a receiver, and the disallowance therefore a statute making it taxable in certain cases of the claim by the receiver, is not conclusive in respect was not unconstitutional. Lord v. Town of Litchfield. to the validity of the claim, and is no bar to an action 2. If to be regarded as such a contract, a lease of the at law by the creditor. Ib.
property for 999 years for a gross sum, without a 3. The claim of a creditor bank against a national reservation of rent, would be such a violation of the bank in the hands of a receiver was for notes and bills condition of the contract that the State would no longer sent by the plaintiffs to the cashier of the defendant be bound by it. Ib. bank for collection. The plaintiff bank was a holder 3. The present suit was brought by the owner of lands of the paper for collection, but had paid its full amount claimed to be exempt from taxation under the act of to other banks from which it was received. The cash 1702, to recover money compulsorily paid for such tax. ier of the plaintiff bank had given notice to the cashier The land in question was the same land held in the of the defendant bank to protest and return all paper case of Landon v. Litchfield to be exempt from taxation not paid, but the paper of one S., which had been sent under that statute, and the sole question in the present by the plaintiff bank to the cashier of the defendant case was as to its liability to taxation. An act had bank for collection and charged to the latter, and been passed in 1859, since that decision, making such posted in the account against the defendant bank, lands taxable where conveyed to other parties and no was not paid by S., and was not protested or re longer productive of income to the original donee, as turned, or any notice of its non-payment given to was the case with the lands in question. Held, that the plaintiff bank. A semi-monthly statement of the the judgment in the case of Landon v. Litchfield did account was sent the cashier of the plaintiff bank to not estop the defendants from claiming the lands to be the cashier of the defendant bank and its correctness taxable: lst. Because the record in that case did not acknowledged by the latter. Held, that the plaintiff | show that that precise point was decided; and, 2d. bank had a right, after reasonable time had elapsed Because the act of 1859 made the question a different without notice of non-payment or a return of the one, it then being as to the liability of the land to taxpaper, to charge the amount to the defendant bank, ation under the law of that time, and now as to its liaand to recover in assumpsit for an account stated. Ib. bility under the law of the present time. Ib.
4. By collusion of the cashier of the defendant bank with S. in fraud of his bank, the paper of S. in the
HIGHWAY. hands of the cashier was not paid, nor entered upon 1. A highway surveyor may make such reasonable the books of the defendant bank, nor brought to the changes in a road-bed, within the limits of the highknowledge of the directors, and the drafts of third
way, by widening it or altering its location, as in his persons furnished to the plaintiff bank to provide for judgment the interests of the public require, without the payment of the balance due from the defendant
being liable in damages to the adjoining proprietors. bank, and which in large part were not paid, were Munson v. Mallory. furnished by S. through the defendant's cashier. 2. Where highway surveyor widened a road-bed Held, that, as the cashier of the defendant bank
ten feet, upon his own judgment as to the necessity of received the paper sent by the plaintiffs for collection, such an improvement, it was held that the court could and hal ostensibly the power usually given to cashiers not, as a matter of law, regard the act as a wrong to an of banks, he made the defendant bank liable to the adjoining proprietor. Ib. plaintiff bank for the amount of the paper of S. which 3. Where a highway surveyor agreed to pay a person he retained without collection, protest or notice. Ib. living on the road a certain sum for repairing it, and 5. In such a case the plaintiffs could not be affected
the person employed told the surveyor at the time that by the fraud of the cashier of the defendant bank
he should widen the road-bed at the point in question, unless knowledge of it at the time could be brought and the surveyor assented to its being done, it was held home to them. Ib.
that the act of the person widening the road was to be BANKRUPT ACT.
regarded as the act of the surveyor. Ib. 1. The levy of an execution on the property of a 4. In an action of trespass by an adjoining propriebankrupt within four months before the institution of tor for an injury done to the soil of a highway in front proceedings in bankruptcy under the United States of his land, the defendant under the general issue may bankrupt act is not vacated by such proceedings, give in evidence an authority from the highway suralthough the judgment may have been rendered in a veyor to do the act complained of. Ib. suit brought within the four months. Beers v. Place. 5. In an ordinary case of trespass to land a mere entry
2. An assignee in bankruptcy represents the creditors constitutes a trespass, and a justification must be set of the bankrupt as well as the bankrupt himself, and up by a special plea or in a notice under the general can take advantage of any remedy which would have issue; but in the case of trespass, brought for an injury been open to an attaching creditor. Ib.
to land belonging to a highway, such entry is not of
itself a trespass, and it is incumbent on the plaintiff to CHARITABLE USES.
prove, as a part of his case, special wrongful acts of the 1. The statutes of 1702 with regard to gifts for chari defendant, and the general issue sufficiently denies the lable uses provides that all lands and estates that have unlawful character of such acts. Ib.
unpaid dividends were not to be deducted from the The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 28, § 1) provides that
cash capital in ascertaining the amount which was to all contracts of which the consideration is in whole or
be the basis of the tax. Ib. part money won at a horse race shall be utterly void. 5. The company also owed at the time a large amount A. and B. agreed to race their horses for a purse of $500,
of ascertained unpaid losses. Held, that the amount each to put half that amount into the hands of the of these should be deducted from the amount of the defendant as stakeholder, and the whole to belong to cash capital. Ib. the winner. Each deposited $250 with the defendant,
6. The statute provides that the treasurer and compand he deposited in the bank $125 in bills received by
troller of the State shall be a board to examine and him of B., the same being placed to his credit in bank
correct all statements returned to the comptroller for with his other private funds. B. won the race and the purpose above mentioned, and that if such return demanded the $500 of the defendant. A. forbade the should not be made or should in the opinion of the payment, but the defendant delivered to B. the money
board be incorrect, the board shall, within ten days in his hands, $375, and gave him his own check on the after the time limited for making such return, make bank for $125, payable to bearer. Held, that the plain out such statement upon the best information they can tiff, to whom B. transferred the defendant's check for obtain; that a copy of each statement approved, cora valuable consideration, could not recover upon the
rected, or made out by the board shall be sent by them check. Conklin v. Roberts.
to the corporation interested; and that their decision
shall be final as to the value and amount of the propINSOLVENT LAW.
erty of such corporation. The defendants made a 1. Where a conveyance of property was made by an retum on the first day of October, 1865, in the words insolvent within sixty days before his going into insol following: “Total amount of cash capital (less $3,134,vency, but was made in pursuance of an agreement 0:26 United States and state bonds), $1,994,799.” It did entered into several months before, and upon a con not appear by the record whether any action had been sideration then received, and for a purpose then in taken by the board with regard to the return, but it tended, it was held, that the conveyance should be appeared that the defendants had paid the tax to the treated as if made at the time of the agreement, and treasurer upon the basis of the return as made. Held, that therefore it was not affected by the insolvent pro 1. That there was no presumption that the board had ceedings. Marvin v. Bushnell.
exercised its jurisdiction in the matter and that the 2. But where a trustee in insolvency held certain burden of proof upon the point lay upon the defendproperty which the debtor had equitably assigned to a ants. 2. That any approval of the return by the board surety who was insolvent, but the surety had not paid which might be inferred was to be regarded as an apthe debt for which he was holden, and it was neither proval of the statement with regard to the whole alleged nor found that certain security already held by amount of the cash capital, and was not to be taken as him was not adequate, the court refused to decree the
an approval of any deductions therefrom, a statement property to him. Ib.
of such deductions not being an appropriate part of CORPORATION.
such a return. 3. That the provision of the act with 1. A dissolution of corporation by forfeiture can regard to the sending of a copy of the approved or coronly be effected by judicial proceedings against the rected statement to the corporation was merely directcorporation, taken for that purpose, a hearing or an ory, and the sending of such copy not essential to the opportunity for a hearing had, and a judgment of for validity of the proceedings. Ib. feiture had thereon, Pahquioque Bank v. Bethel Bank.
INSURANCE. 2. A dissolution of a corporation by winding up, or
Where an insurance company has an agent in another other act of its stockholders, or by limitation, or in
State upon whom service of suit can be made as any mode except legislative repeal or judicial decree,
required by the law of such State, it cannot revoke the does not affect the rights of creditors. Ib.
authority or representative character of such agent 3. The act of 1865 provides that mutual insurance
(having no other such agent within the State), and companies chartered by this State shall every year
thus prevent the service, while it has contracts of make return under oath to the State comptroller of the
insurance outstanding in such State. Semmes v. City total amount of cash capital belonging to them on the
Fire Ins. Co. first day of October, and that it shall be their duty to
LANDLORD AND TENANT. pay to the treasurer of the State a sum equal to one 1. The plaintiff leased certain premises to A., who per cent on such capital. Held, that the tax was upon covenanted to pay the rent, and the defendant became the franchise of the corporation and not upon its prop his surety. In a suit on the guaranty against the deerty as such, and that, therefore, such a corporation was fendant, he claimed in his defense that the plaintiff, by not entitled to deduct from the amount of its capital receiving an order drawn by A. on P. for the rent, and so to be returned, the amount of bonds of the State and accepted by the latter, discharged the defendant from of the United States held by it which were by law his suretyship. The court below found that neither exempt from taxation. Coite v. Connecticut Mutual the plaintiff nor A. understood the receiving of the Life Ins. Co.
order as releasing A. from any of the obligations of his 4. The defendants were a mutual life insurance com lease. Held, that A.'s obligation to pay the rent was pany, and on the first of October were chargeable with not affected, nor the liability of the defendant as his a considerable amount of declared dividends. These surety. Burnham v. Ilubbard. dividends were intended to be paid by applying them 2. The express covenant of A. to pay the rent could on premium notes, of which the company held a larger not be discharged by any mere collateral matter and amount, and it was their practice to apply the divi by nothing short of a mutual agreement. Ib. dends in this way at the maturity of the notes. The 3. A receipt by a lessor of rent from an under-tenant premium notes were not included in the return of its of his lessee is not necessarily an acknowledgment of cash capital made by the company. Held, that these the under-tenant as his own tenant. Ib.
5. A mortgagee has a right to the whole mortgaged N., who had for many years been a local agent of a
premises as security for his debt, and cannot be comlife insurance company, held a policy of the company
pelled to take a portion of the premises either as on his own life in the name and for the benefit of his
security or payment, nor to submit to the uncertain wife. Renewal certificates signed by the secretary of
result of a sale made by order of the court. The only the company were placed in his hands to be used in remedy of any person holding or interested in the receiving payment of premiums upon policies held in equity of redemption is to redeem by paying the his vicinity, all of which contained a provision that
mortgagee the full amount of his debt in money. Ib. they should not be valid until the premium was paid
OUSTER. and they were countersigned by N. as agent. Upon the
The receipt of rents and profits from real estate is payment of the premium upon the policy in question,
not of itself such a possession as to prove an ouster of in 1866, such a renewal certificate was taken by N., but
the party holding the legal title, and to render void a was not countersigned by him as agent. N. died in
conveyance by him, but is consistent with the suppo1867, and after his death a similar receipt was found
sition of a possession in some way subordinate to the among his papers for the premiums due in 1867, but
title of the owner. Averill v. Sanford. was not countersigned by him. Held, in a suit by his widow on the policy, that the court committed no error
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. in charging the jury that the receipt, under the cir
1. The plaintiff sold certain goods to the defendants cumstances, was prima facie evidence of the payment
through F., their general agent, who was fully authorof the premium. Norton v. Phænix Mutual Life
ized to make the purchase. Afterward, upon the repIns. Co.
resentation of F. to the plaintiff that it was necessary MORTGAGE.
to send a receipted bill to the defendants in order to 1. The parties in a foreclosure suit agreed upon a
obtain payment of it, the plaintiff receipted the bill of time for redemption to be limited by the decree, but
the goods and delivered it to F. F. presented the bill, by mistake the time was inserted in the decree. The
thus receipted, to the defendants, who paid the amount mortgagor failed to redeem within the time agreed,
to him, they having no knowledge of the circumstances and the mortgagee, supposing his title to be absolute,
under which the receipt was given. The money so retook possession and continued in possession for three
ceived by F. was never paid to the plaintiff. Held, in years, making extensive improvements, the mortgagor,
an action of an assumpsit, brought against the defendduring that time, occupying a portion of the prem
ants for the amount of the bill, that the plaintiff was ises as his tenant. The premises were worth at
entitled to recover. Willard v. Buckingham. the time of the decree but little more than the in
2. F. being the general agent of the defendants, and cumbrance, but during the three years nearly doubled
authorized to purchase the goods, he was acting in the in value, aside from the improvements. At the end of
whole matter within the scope of his authority, and the three years the mortgagor, discovering the mistake
his acts and declarations were to be considered as the in the decree, brought a petition to redeem, to which
acts and declarations of the defendants, and his knowlthe mortgagee filed a cross-bill praying the court to
edge of the circumstances under which the receipt was amend the decree in accordance with the original agree
given as their knowledge. Ib. ment. The court decreed that the amendment be
3. And held that it could not be inferred from the made, and dismissed the petition. Held, to be no error.
facts that the plaintiff had made F. his own agent in Colwell v. Warner.
the matter. Ib. 2. The mortgagor, upon the hearing of his petition to redeem, offered evidence to show that the mortgage
RECOGNIZANCE, CRIMINAL. note was without consideration. His petition con A prisoner gave bond, with sureties, for his appeartained no averment to that effect. Held, 1. That the ance at the next term of the court, and before such evidence was inadmissible for want of such averment. next term was arrested in the State of New York upon 2. That it was inconsistent with the admissions of his a governor's requisition from the State of Maine, for a petition in which he offered to pay the amount that crime previously committed in the latter State, and should be found due upon the note. 3. That it was not was taken to that State and there imprisoned, and was rendered admissible by the allegations of the cross-bill actually in prison there at the time his appearance was with regard to the mortgage note, the cross-bill pray demanded in court in this State. A motion for a coning only for an amendment of the original decree and tinuance of his case was made by his counsel, and dea contirmation of the mortgagee's title under the same, nied, and his bond was called and forfeited. Held, and the mortgagor having filed no answer thereto. Ib. that the facts constituted no defense to a suit on the
3. A second mortgagee foreclosed the mortgagor and bond. Taintor v. Taylor. afterward redeemed the first mortgage. Held, that the mortgagor had no right to redeem the first mort
STATUTE. gage. The equity of redemption, upon which alone A statute that prescribes that a thing shall be done the mortgagor could stand to redeem, was extinguished in a particular way carries with it au implied prohibiby the foreclosure and his title had become absolutely tion against doing it in any other way. City of Nero vested in the second mortgagee. Ib.
Haren v. Whitney.
TAXATION. 4. A creditor of a mortgagor levied an execution on the equity of redemption and had an undivided part A New York corporation, having its principal office of it set off to him thereon. The mortgaged premises and business in that State, owned and occupied certain were appraised at more than sufficient to pay both the real estate in B. in this State which became taxable on mortgage and execution debts. Held, that the levying the 1st day of October. On the 11th September, the creditor could not sustain a petition for the sale of corporation having shortly before been adjudged a the mortgaged premises and a division of the proceeds bankrupt in the State of New York, the bankrupt among the parties interested. Spencer v. Watermun. court assigned to an assignee all their property, includ
ing the real estate in B. On the 27th September, the of the land. 2. That this interest could not be reached assignee took possession of said real estate, but the by an attachment of the land and levy of execution assignment was not recorded in the land records of B. upon it. 3. That a bill in equity against the trustee, until the 19th of December. In November, no tax list by a creditor of G. who had levied on the land, to comhaving been handed in by the corporation or the pel him to pay over the accruing rents and profits to assignee, the assessors, not knowing of the bankrupt the creditor, could not be sustained. 4. That rents assignment, filled out a list in the name of the corpora and profits in the hands of the trustee could be taken tion and put said real estate therein, and added ten by any creditor of G. by foreign attachment, and that per cent to the actual valuation of the same, such there was no way in which a creditor could secure the additional valuation being authorized by law in the future rents and profits. Easterly v. Keney. case of resident tax payers who failed to file their lists. Held, 1. That the tax list was lawfully made in the name of the corporation. 2. That the corporation 1. A master of a vessel is presumed to continue such could not be regarded as a resident tax payer, and that until some overt act or declaration of the owners distherefore the ten per cent valuation was not lawfully places him from that station. Fox v. Holt. added by the assessors. Jones y. Town of Bridgeport. 2. The enrollment which describes him as master is
evidence of the fact till the contrary is sbavn. Ib. TRADE-MARK.
3. A bill of lading signed by the master binds the A decree enjoined the respondents from selling my vessel, although the word “master” is not appended britannia spoons in packages with certain described
to his signature. Ib. labels and numbers, which were found to be a violation
4. A master taking on board cargo for carriage binds of the petitioners' trade-mark, or with labels and
his vessel to deliver it, whether he signs a bill of lading numbers so nearly like those of the petitioners, which
or not. Ib. were particularly described in the decree, as to be cal
5. The owners, and the master as their agent, have culated to induce purchasers to believe the spoons to
a lien on the cargo carried in their ships for the freight be the manufacture of the petitioners. On a writ of
money, and can retain the same until the freight is error brought to reverse the decree on account of its
paid or the payment secured by the consignee. Ib. uncertainty, it was held, 1. That the respondents could
6. A master can bind his owners for necessary repairs clearly understand from the decree that they were
and supplies furnished in a foreign port, or a port of enjoined against using the particular labels and num
another State, but such supplies must relate to the conbers described in it, and that so far the decree was free
dition, or the use and employment of the ship. Ib. from uncertainty. 2. That if, beyond this, the decree
7. If the master is owner pro hâc vicê, he cannot was so indefinite that the respondents could not know
bind the owners, but his contracts for necessaries may with reasonable certainty what they were prohibited bind the ship and constitute a lien on her. Ib. from doing, their remedy was by way of application to
8. In case of pressing necessity, where the master the superior court to modify the decree, and not by a
cannot conveniently and readily communicate with his writ of error. Boardman v. Meriden Britannia Co.
owners, he may bind them and the ship in a home TRUSTEE
9. A master can in no case bind the ship or owners A will gives property to a trustee for the benefit of a daughter of the testator, the income to be paid to her
for his private debts, or for supplies furnished his annually until she should reach the age of twenty-five
family. Ib. years, at which time the property was to be conveyed
10. A mortgagee of a ship, or the holder of a conto her absolutely, with a right on the part of the trus
ditional bill of sale, out of possession, is not liable for tee in his discretion to convey all the property to her
supplies and repairs. Ib.
11. Where a consignee refuses to pay the freight on a before reaching that age, and with a bequest over to other relatives of the testator in case the daughter
cargo, or properly secure the payment, it is the duty of should die without issue before the property was so
the master to store the same at the port of delivery in conveyed to her. The daughter died without issue
care of a third party, in some convenient place, subject
to the order of the owner or consignee on payment of before arriving at the age of twenty-five years. Prerious to her death the trustee bad delivered to her a
the freight money. Ib. small portion of the trust estate. Held, that the trus
12. In case no one will receive the cargo on storage tees under the provision authorizing him to convey to
at the port of delivery, the master may leave it at the her all the property in his discretion before she should
nearest convenient port. Ib. reach the age of twenty-five, had a right to deliver to
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. her such portion of the property as he thought best. Sellew's Appeal from Probate.
1. The defendant, at the request of R., to whom he
was indebted for money previously received, made two TRUST ESTATE.
notes for the amount of the debt, payable one to the A will contained the following devise:—“I give to defendant's wife, and the other to his daughter, and K. (certain real estate, describing it) in trust for my delivered them to R., who at once delivered them to nephew G., and I direct said trustee to pay to said G. the defendant's wife and daughter, they giving no conthe rents and profits of said estate exclusive of all other sideration therefor. R.'s assets, at this time, were persons, to be paid to him or upon his written order insufficient to pay his debts without these notes, but made annually, and this devise is not to inure in any more than sufficient with them. In an action brought manner for the benefit of any creditors of said G., but by the administrator of R. against the defendant, for is intended to be for the only use and benefit of said G. the amount of the notes, it was held,-1. That the gift and for such use and purpose only as he shall annually of the notes by R. to the wife and daughter of the deappoint.” Held,-1. That the interest of G. in the fendant was not good against his creditors. 2. That devise was a vested life estate in the rents and profits | judgment ought to be rendered for the plaintiff for the