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bailee, having the possession and right to control the property until the completion of the contract, and a lien upon it for the contract price of his work. That such a conversion is not larceny is well settled; and now, if it be true that it is not embezzlement, it is entirely out of the category of criminal offenses, and employers will hereafter be left to a civil proceeding against delinquent employees of this kind.

The papers and people of Wyoming appear to be engaged in the apotheosis of Mr. Chief Justice Howe of that Territory, on account of his women's rights decisions and principles. The Wyoming Tribune says that his "decisions are always just," and that "he seems to have remembered that sublime sentiment of Shakespeare, grander than any inspired thought, 'the quality of mercy is not strained,'" etc. It seems that the chief justice has recently had occasion, or has taken occasion, in a decision, to express the opinion that, under the fourteenth amendment, women are entitled to enjoy the same civil and political rights as the male bipeds, and thereat the same paper gushes forth in limpid streams of eulogy. We can very well endure the decision, but we implore the chief justice to issue an order restraining the gushings of the Trib

une.

The value of the higher mathematics as a study is not fully settled, but as a preparatory or discipline for the study of the law, there ought to be but one opinion. We were once informed by a lawyer, whose success in the profession entitled his opinions to much weight, that he seldom argued an important case without first having devoted several hours to Euclid or Legendre. The advocates of mathematics are making use of the following, alleged to be words of Mr. Lincoln:

stand what demonstrate means;' and I left my situation in Springfield, went home to my father's house, and stayed there until I could give any proposition in the six books of Euclid. I then found out what demonstrate meant, and went back to my law studies."

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT. *

AGREEMENT IMPLIED BY ACCEPTANCE OF GRANT.

H. conveyed to the defendants by deed-poll an easement in certain lands owned by him. The deed contained the following clause: "It is understood and agreed that the grantees shall remove the present river wall easterly upon a new line, as the said H. shall direct, and shall rebuild the same without any cost to the said H., his heirs or assigns." The defendants accepted the deed and placed it on record. H. afterward conveyed the premises to F., and F. to E., neither of the deeds containing any reference to the defendants' agreement. Soon after E. and H. joined in a written demand upon the defendants for the removal of the wall, with directions as to the line where it

should be rebuilt. Afterward II. made a written assignment of the defendants' agreement to F., and E. thereupon notified the defendants to remove the wall to the place designated in the previous notice. In an action of assumpsit brought by E. for the non-performance of the agreement by the defendants, it was held, 1. That the defendants, by accepting the deed from H., agreed to remove the wall in the manner provided in the deed. 2. That the conveyance of the property in fee by H. to F. did not discharge the defendants from their agreement. 3. That if the agreement was to be regarded as running with the land, then

F. and E. acquired the rights of H. under it by virtue

of their deeds. 4. That if it was to be regarded as a

personal contract merely, then it was a chose in action resting in H., which could be assigned by him. 5. That it was no objection that by the agreement the wall was to be rebuilt as H. should direct, and that H., by part

"I 'read law,' as the phrase is, that is, I became a lawyer's clerk in Springfield, and copied tedious doc- ing with the land, had ceased to have any interest in

uments, and picked up what I could of law, in the intervals of other work. But your question reminds me of a bit of education I had, which I am bound in honesty to mention. In the course of my law reading, I constantly came upon the word 'demonstrate.' I thought at first that I understood its meaning, but soon became satisfied that I did not. I said to myself, 'What do I mean when I demonstrate, more than when I reason or prove? How does demonstration differ from any other proof?' I consulted Webster's dictionary. That told of 'certain proof,' 'proof beyond the possibility of a doubt;' but I could form no idea what sort of proof that was. I thought a great many things were proved beyond the possibility of a doubt, without recourse to any such extraordinary process of reasoning as I understood demonstration to be. I consulted all the dictionaries and books of reference I could find, but with no better results. You might just as well have defined blue to a blind At last I said to myself, 'Lincoln, you can never make a lawyer of yourself if you do not under

man.

the matter, since H. and E. had concurred in directing as to the location of the wall, and the defendants could not be harmed by the fact that H. had no interest. 6. That, under the statute giving a right of action to an assignee of a chose in action, E. could maintain an action of assumpsit for breach of the agreement. Elt

ing v. Clinton Mills Co.

ARBITRATION.

A submission to arbitration of a matter in suit provided that the costs in the suit should be taxed according to law in favor of the successful party. Held, to mean that the arbitrators were to be governed by legal rules in estimating the amount of the costs, and not that the costs were to be taxed by the court independently of the arbitrators. Averill v. Buckingham.

BANK.

1. A bank organized under the United States currency act as a national bank had failed to redeem its notes, and the comptroller of the currency, under the provisions of the currency act, had appointed a receiver, who had taken possession of its assets, and its

*From John Hooker, Esq., state reporter, and to appear in 36 Conn.

affairs were being wound up. A creditor presented a claim against the bank to the receiver, who disallowed it, and the creditor thereupon brought suit upon it against the bank. Held, that the proceedings of the comptroller had not produced a forfeiture of the franchise of the bank and a dissolution of the corporation, and that, therefore, the suit would lie against it. Pahquioque Bank v. Bethel Bank.

2. The presentation of a claim against a national bank in the hands of a receiver, and the disallowance of the claim by the receiver, is not conclusive in respect to the validity of the claim, and is no bar to an action at law by the creditor. Ib.

3. The claim of a creditor bank against a national bank in the hands of a receiver was for notes and bills sent by the plaintiffs to the cashier of the defendant bank for collection. The plaintiff bank was a holder of the paper for collection, but had paid its full amount to other banks from which it was received. The cashier of the plaintiff bank had given notice to the cashier of the defendant bank to protest and return all paper not paid, but the paper of one S., which had been sent by the plaintiff bank to the cashier of the defendant bank for collection and charged to the latter, and posted in the account against the defendant bank, was not paid by S., and was not protested or returned, or any notice of its non-payment given to the plaintiff bank. A semi-monthly statement of the account was sent the cashier of the plaintiff bank to the cashier of the defendant bank and its correctness acknowledged by the latter. Held, that the plaintiff bank had a right, after reasonable time had elapsed without notice of non-payment or a return of the paper, to charge the amount to the defendant bank, and to recover in assumpsit for an account stated. Ib. 4. By collusion of the cashier of the defendant bank with S. in fraud of his bank, the paper of S. in the hands of the cashier was not paid, nor entered upon the books of the defendant bank, nor brought to the knowledge of the directors, and the drafts of third persons furnished to the plaintiff bank to provide for the payment of the balance due from the defendant bank, and which in large part were not paid, were furnished by S. through the defendant's cashier. Held, that, as the cashier of the defendant bank received the paper sent by the plaintiffs for collection, and had ostensibly the power usually given to cashiers of banks, he made the defendant bank liable to the plaintiff bank for the amount of the paper of S. which he retained without collection, protest or notice. Ib. 5. In such a case the plaintiffs could not be affected by the fraud of the cashier of the defendant bank unless knowledge of it at the time could be brought home to them. Ib.

BANKRUPT ACT.

1. The levy of an execution on the property of a bankrupt within four months before the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy under the United States bankrupt act is not vacated by such proceedings, although the judgment may have been rendered in a suit brought within the four months. Beers v. Place. 2. An assignee in bankruptcy represents the creditors of the bankrupt as well as the bankrupt himself, and can take advantage of any remedy which would have been open to an attaching creditor. Ib.

CHARITABLE USES.

1. The statutes of 1702 with regard to gifts for charitable uses provides that all lands and estates that have

been or shall be given by the general assembly or by any town or person for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel, or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain and be continued to such use, and shall be exempt from the payment of taxes. Held, that this statute did not constitute a contract between the State and either the donors or the donees of such charitable gifts, that the property so given should forever be exempt from taxation, and that therefore a statute making it taxable in certain cases was not unconstitutional. Lord v. Town of Litchfield. 2. If to be regarded as such a contract, a lease of the property for 999 years for a gross sum, without a reservation of rent, would be such a violation of the condition of the contract that the State would no longer be bound by it. Ib.

3. The present suit was brought by the owner of lands claimed to be exempt from taxation under the act of 1702, to recover money compulsorily paid for such tax. The land in question was the same land held in the case of Landon v. Litchfield to be exempt from taxation under that statute, and the sole question in the present case was as to its liability to taxation. An act had been passed in 1859, since that decision, making such lands taxable where conveyed to other parties and no longer productive of income to the original donee, as was the case with the lands in question. Held, that the judgment in the case of Landon v. Litchfield did not estop the defendants from claiming the lands to be taxable: 1st. Because the record in that case did not show that that precise point was decided; and, 2d. Because the act of 1859 made the question a different one, it then being as to the liability of the land to taxation under the law of that time, and now as to its liability under the law of the present time. Ib.

HIGHWAY.

1. A highway surveyor may make such reasonable changes in a road-bed, within the limits of the highway, by widening it or altering its location, as in his judgment the interests of the public require, without being liable in damages to the adjoining proprietors. Munson v. Mallory.

2. Where a highway surveyor widened a road-bed ten feet, upon his own judgment as to the necessity of such an improvement, it was held that the court could not, as a matter of law, regard the act as a wrong to an adjoining proprietor. Ib.

3. Where a highway surveyor agreed to pay a person living on the road a certain sum for repairing it, and the person employed told the surveyor at the time that he should widen the road-bed at the point in question, and the surveyor assented to its being done, it was held that the act of the person widening the road was to be regarded as the act of the surveyor. Ib.

4. In an action of trespass by an adjoining proprietor for an injury done to the soil of a highway in front of his land, the defendant under the general issue may give in evidence an authority from the highway surveyor to do the act complained of. Ib.

5. In an ordinary case of trespass to land a mere entry constitutes a trespass, and a justification must be set up by a special plea or in a notice under the general issue; but in the case of trespass, brought for an injury to land belonging to a highway, such entry is not of itself a trespass, and it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove, as a part of his case, special wrongful acts of the defendant, and the general issue sufficiently denies the unlawful character of such acts. Ib.

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The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 28, § 1) provides that all contracts of which the consideration is in whole or part money won at a horse race shall be utterly void. A. and B. agreed to race their horses for a purse of $500, each to put half that amount into the hands of the defendant as stakeholder, and the whole to belong to the winner. Each deposited $250 with the defendant, and he deposited in the bank $125 in bills received by him of B., the same being placed to his credit in bank with his other private funds. B. won the race and demanded the $500 of the defendant. A. forbade the payment, but the defendant delivered to B. the money in his hands, $375, and gave him his own check on the bank for $125, payable to bearer. Held, that the plaintiff, to whom B. transferred the defendant's check for a valuable consideration, could not recover upon the check. Conklin v. Roberts.

1. Where a conveyance of property was made by an insolvent within sixty days before his going into insolvency, but was made in pursuance of an agreement entered into several months before, and upon a consideration then received, and for a purpose then intended, it was held, that the conveyance should be treated as if made at the time of the agreement, and that therefore it was not affected by the insolvent proceedings. Marvin v. Bushnell.

2. But where a trustee in insolvency held certain property which the debtor had equitably assigned to a surety who was insolvent, but the surety had not paid the debt for which he was holden, and it was neither alleged nor found that certain security already held by him was not adequate, the court refused to decree the property to him. Ib.

1. A dissolution of corporation by forfeiture can only be effected by judicial proceedings against the corporation, taken for that purpose, a hearing or an opportunity for a hearing had, and a judgment of forfeiture had thereon. Pahquioque Bank v. Bethel Bank. 2. A dissolution of a corporation by winding up, or other act of its stockholders, or by limitation, or in any mode except legislative repeal or judicial decree, does not affect the rights of creditors. Ib.

3. The act of 1865 provides that mutual insurance companies chartered by this State shall every year make return under oath to the State comptroller of the total amount of cash capital belonging to them on the first day of October, and that it shall be their duty to pay to the treasurer of the State a sum equal to one per cent on such capital. Held, that the tax was upon the franchise of the corporation and not upon its property as such, and that, therefore, such a corporation was not entitled to deduct from the amount of its capital so to be returned, the amount of bonds of the State and of the United States held by it which were by law exempt from taxation. Coite v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.

4. The defendants were a mutual life insurance company, and on the first of October were chargeable with a considerable amount of declared dividends. These dividends were intended to be paid by applying them on premium notes, of which the company held a larger amount, and it was their practice to apply the dividends in this way at the maturity of the notes. The premium notes were not included in the return of its cash capital made by the company. Held, that these

unpaid dividends were not to be deducted from the cash capital in ascertaining the amount which was to be the basis of the tax. Ib.

5. The company also owed at the time a large amount of ascertained unpaid losses. Held, that the amount of these should be deducted from the amount of the cash capital. Ib.

6. The statute provides that the treasurer and comptroller of the State shall be a board to examine and correct all statements returned to the comptroller for the purpose above mentioned, and that if such return should not be made or should in the opinion of the board be incorrect, the board shall, within ten days after the time limited for making such return, make out such statement upon the best information they can obtain; that a copy of each statement approved, corrected, or made out by the board shall be sent by them to the corporation interested; and that their decision shall be final as to the value and amount of the property of such corporation. The defendants made a return on the first day of October, 1865, in the words following: "Total amount of cash capital (less $3,134,026 United States and state bonds), $1,994,799." It did not appear by the record whether any action had been taken by the board with regard to the return, but it appeared that the defendants had paid the tax to the treasurer upon the basis of the return as made. Held, 1. That there was no presumption that the board had exercised its jurisdiction in the matter and that the burden of proof upon the point lay upon the defendants. 2. That any approval of the return by the board which might be inferred was to be regarded as an approval of the statement with regard to the whole amount of the cash capital, and was not to be taken as an approval of any deductions therefrom, a statement of such deductions not being an appropriate part of such a return. 3. That the provision of the act with regard to the sending of a copy of the approved or corrected statement to the corporation was merely directory, and the sending of such copy not essential to the validity of the proceedings. Ib.

INSURANCE.

Where an insurance company has an agent in another State upon whom service of suit can be made as required by the law of such State, it cannot revoke the authority or representative character of such agent (having no other such agent within the State), and thus prevent the service, while it has contracts of insurance outstanding in such State. Semmes v. City Fire Ins. Co.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. The plaintiff leased certain premises to A., who covenanted to pay the rent, and the defendant became his surety. In a suit on the guaranty against the defendant, he claimed in his defense that the plaintiff, by receiving an order drawn by A. on P. for the rent, and accepted by the latter, discharged the defendant from his suretyship. The court below found that neither the plaintiff nor A. understood the receiving of the order as releasing A. from any of the obligations of his lease. Held, that A.'s obligation to pay the rent was not affected, nor the liability of the defendant as his surety. Burnham v. Hubbard.

2. The express covenant of A. to pay the rent could not be discharged by any mere collateral matter and by nothing short of a mutual agreement. Ib.

3. A receipt by a lessor of rent from an under-tenant of his lessee is not necessarily an acknowledgment of the under-tenant as his own tenant. Ib.

LIFE INSURANCE.

N., who had for many years been a local agent of a life insurance company, held a policy of the company on his own life in the name and for the benefit of his wife. Renewal certificates signed by the secretary of the company were placed in his hands to be used in receiving payment of premiums upon policies held in his vicinity, all of which contained a provision that they should not be valid until the premium was paid and they were countersigned by N. as agent. Upon the payment of the premium upon the policy in question, in 1866, such a renewal certificate was taken by N., but was not countersigned by him as agent. N. died in 1867, and after his death a similar receipt was found among his papers for the premiums due in 1867, but was not countersigned by him. Held, in a suit by his widow on the policy, that the court committed no error in charging the jury that the receipt, under the circumstances, was prima facie evidence of the payment of the premium. Norton v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.

MORTGAGE.

1. The parties in a foreclosure suit agreed upon a time for redemption to be limited by the decree, but by mistake the time was inserted in the decree. The mortgagor failed to redeem within the time agreed, and the mortgagee, supposing his title to be absolute, took possession and continued in possession for three years, making extensive improvements, the mortgagor, during that time, occupying a portion of the premises as his tenant. The premises were worth at the time of the decree but little more than the incumbrance, but during the three years nearly doubled in value, aside from the improvements. At the end of the three years the mortgagor, discovering the mistake in the decree, brought a petition to redeem, to which the mortgagee filed a cross-bill praying the court to amend the decree in accordance with the original agreement. The court decreed that the amendment be made, and dismissed the petition. Held, to be no error. Colwell v. Warner.

2. The mortgagor, upon the hearing of his petition to redeem, offered evidence to show that the mortgage note was without consideration. His petition contained no averment to that effect. Held, 1. That the evidence was inadmissible for want of such averment. 2. That it was inconsistent with the admissions of his petition in which he offered to pay the amount that should be found due upon the note. 3. That it was not rendered admissible by the allegations of the cross-bill with regard to the mortgage note, the cross-bill praying only for an amendment of the original decree and a confirmation of the mortgagee's title under the same, and the mortgagor having filed no answer thereto. Ib. 3. A second mortgagee foreclosed the mortgagor and afterward redeemed the first mortgage. Held, that the mortgagor had no right to redeem the first mortgage. The equity of redemption, upon which alone the mortgagor could stand to redeem, was extinguished by the foreclosure and his title had become absolutely vested in the second mortgagee. Ib.

4. A creditor of a mortgagor levied an execution on the equity of redemption and had an undivided part of it set off to him thereon. The mortgaged premises were appraised at more than sufficient to pay both the mortgage and execution debts. Held, that the levying creditor could not sustain a petition for the sale of the mortgaged premises and a division of the proceeds among the parties interested. Spencer v. Waterman.

5. A mortgagee has a right to the whole mortgaged premises as security for his debt, and cannot be compelled to take a portion of the premises either as security or payment, nor to submit to the uncertain result of a sale made by order of the court. The only remedy of any person holding or interested in the equity of redemption is to redeem by paying the mortgagee the full amount of his debt in money. Ib.

OUSTER.

The receipt of rents and profits from real estate is not of itself such a possession as to prove an ouster of the party holding the legal title, and to render void a conveyance by him, but is consistent with the supposition of a possession in some way subordinate to the title of the owner. Averill v. Sanford.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. The plaintiff sold certain goods to the defendants through F., their general agent, who was fully authorized to make the purchase. Afterward, upon the representation of F. to the plaintiff that it was necessary to send a receipted bill to the defendants in order to obtain payment of it, the plaintiff receipted the bill of the goods and delivered it to F. F. presented the bill, thus receipted, to the defendants, who paid the amount to him, they having no knowledge of the circumstances under which the receipt was given. The money so received by F. was never paid to the plaintiff. Held, in an action of an assumpsit, brought against the defendants for the amount of the bill, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Willard v. Buckingham.

2. F. being the general agent of the defendants, and authorized to purchase the goods, he was acting in the whole matter within the scope of his authority, and his acts and declarations were to be considered as the acts and declarations of the defendants, and his knowledge of the circumstances under which the receipt was given as their knowledge. Ib.

3. And held that it could not be inferred from the facts that the plaintiff had made F. his own agent in the matter. Ib.

RECOGNIZANCE, CRIMINAL.

A prisoner gave bond, with sureties, for his appearance at the next term of the court, and before such next term was arrested in the State of New York upon a governor's requisition from the State of Maine, for a crime previously committed in the latter State, and was taken to that State and there imprisoned, and was actually in prison there at the time his appearance was demanded in court in this State. A motion for a continuance of his case was made by his counsel, and denied, and his bond was called and forfeited. Held, that the facts constituted no defense to a suit on the bond. Taintor v. Taylor.

STATUTE.

A statute that prescribes that a thing shall be done in a particular way carries with it au implied prohibition against doing it in any other way. City of New Haven v. Whitney.

TAXATION.

A New York corporation, having its principal office and business in that State, owned and occupied certain real estate in B. in this State which became taxable on the 1st day of October. On the 11th September, the corporation having shortly before been adjudged a bankrupt in the State of New York, the bankrupt court assigned to an assignee all their property, includ

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ing the real estate in B. On the 27th September, the assignee took possession of said real estate, but the assignment was not recorded in the land records of B. until the 19th of December. In November, no tax list having been handed in by the corporation or the assignee, the assessors, not knowing of the bankrupt assignment, filled out a list in the name of the corporation and put said real estate therein, and added ten per cent to the actual valuation of the same, such additional valuation being authorized by law in the case of resident tax payers who failed to file their lists. Held, 1. That the tax list was lawfully made in the name of the corporation. 2. That the corporation could not be regarded as a resident tax payer, and that therefore the ten per cent valuation was not lawfully added by the assessors. Jones v. Town of Bridgeport.

A decree enjoined the respondents from selling my britannia spoons in packages with certain described labels and numbers, which were found to be a violation of the petitioners' trade-mark, or with labels and numbers so nearly like those of the petitioners, which were particularly described in the decree, as to be calculated to induce purchasers to believe the spoons to be the manufacture of the petitioners. On a writ of error brought to reverse the decree on account of its uncertainty, it was held, 1. That the respondents could clearly understand from the decree that they were enjoined against using the particular labels and numbers described in it, and that so far the decree was free from uncertainty. 2. That if, beyond this, the decree was so indefinite that the respondents could not know with reasonable certainty what they were prohibited from doing, their remedy was by way of application to the superior court to modify the decree, and not by a writ of error. Boardman v. Meriden Britannia Co.

A will gives property to a trustee for the benefit of a daughter of the testator, the income to be paid to her annually until she should reach the age of twenty-five years, at which time the property was to be conveyed to her absolutely, with a right on the part of the trustee in his discretion to convey all the property to her before reaching that age, and with a bequest over to other relatives of the testator in case the daughter should die without issue before the property was so conveyed to her. The daughter died without issue before arriving at the age of twenty-five years. Previous to her death the trustee had delivered to her a small portion of the trust estate. Held, that the trustees under the provision authorizing him to convey to her all the property in his discretion before she should reach the age of twenty-five, had a right to deliver to her such portion of the property as he thought best. Sellew's Appeal from Probate.

A will contained the following devise:-"I give to K. (certain real estate, describing it) in trust for my nephew G., and I direct said trustee to pay to said G. the rents and profits of said estate exclusive of all other persons, to be paid to him or upon his written order made annually, and this devise is not to inure in any manner for the benefit of any creditors of said G., but is intended to be for the only use and benefit of said G. and for such use and purpose only as he shall annually appoint." Held,-1. That the interest of G. in the devise was a vested life estate in the rents and profits

of the land. 2. That this interest could not be reached by an attachment of the land and levy of execution upon it. 3. That a bill in equity against the trustee, by a creditor of G. who had levied on the land, to compel him to pay over the accruing rents and profits to the creditor, could not be sustained. 4. That rents and profits in the hands of the trustee could be taken by any creditor of G. by foreign attachment, and that there was no way in which a creditor could secure the future rents and profits. Easterly v. Keney.

VESSEL.

1. A master of a vessel is presumed to continue such until some overt act or declaration of the owners displaces him from that station. Fox v. Holt.

2. The enrollment which describes him as master is evidence of the fact till the contrary is sbown. Ib.

3. A bill of lading signed by the master binds the vessel, although the word "master" is not appended to his signature. Ib.

4. A master taking on board cargo for carriage binds his vessel to deliver it, whether he signs a bill of lading or not. Ib.

5. The owners, and the master as their agent, have a lien on the cargo carried in their ships for the freight money, and can retain the same until the freight is paid or the payment secured by the consignee. Ib.

6. A master can bind his owners for necessary repairs and supplies furnished in a foreign port, or a port of another State, but such supplies must relate to the condition, or the use and employment of the ship. Ib.

7. If the master is owner pro hac vicê, he cannot bind the owners, but his contracts for necessaries may bind the ship and constitute a lien on her. Ib.

8. In case of pressing necessity, where the master cannot conveniently and readily communicate with his owners, he may bind them and the ship in a home port. Ib.

9. A master can in no case bind the ship or owners for his private debts, or for supplies furnished his family. Ib.

10. A mortgagee of a ship, or the holder of a conditional bill of sale, out of possession, is not liable for supplies and repairs. Ib.

11. Where a consignee refuses to pay the freight on a cargo, or properly secure the payment, it is the duty of the master to store the same at the port of delivery in care of a third party, in some convenient place, subject to the order of the owner or consignee on payment of the freight money. Ib.

12. In case no one will receive the cargo on storage at the port of delivery, the master may leave it at the nearest convenient port. Ib.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.

1. The defendant, at the request of R., to whom he was indebted for money previously received, made two notes for the amount of the debt, payable one to the defendant's wife, and the other to his daughter, and delivered them to R., who at once delivered them to the defendant's wife and daughter, they giving no consideration therefor. R.'s assets, at this time, were insufficient to pay his debts without these notes, but more than sufficient with them. In an action brought by the administrator of R. against the defendant, for the amount of the notes, it was held,-1. That the gift of the notes by R. to the wife and daughter of the defendant was not good against his creditors. 2. That judgment ought to be rendered for the plaintiff for the

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