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common pleas reports, in four volumes, contain the decisions of that court from 1850 to 1861.

F. Carroll Brewster began, in 1869, reports of "equity, election, and other important cases," decided principally in the courts of Philadelphia. The cases began with October, 1856, and the third volume, recently published, contains cases as late as 1871.

and has continued the series to the thirty-second volume.

The reports of the cases decided in the high court of chancery were published by Theodoric Bland in three volumes, containing the cases from 1811 to 1832. The decisions of Chancellor Johnson, between the years 1846 and 1854, when the court was abolished, were reported in four volumes, cited as the Maryland Chancery Decisions.

The act of 1845 is substantially the law now, as to the reporter, except that his reports may be bound in sheep and sold at $4.50 instead of $4.00. The pro- The existing laws of Maryland provide for the apvision, also, that minority opinions shall not be pub-pointment of a reporter by the judges of the court of lished, has been abolished, so far as relates to constitu- | appeals for the term of four years, at a salary of one tional questions.

DELAWARE.

In February, 1837, it was made the duty of the judge of the superior court, residing in Kent county, to prepare reports of the decisions of the superior court, court of oyer and terminer, and court of errors and appeals. Samuel L. Harrington, associate justice, in pursuance of this act, published five volumes, commencing with the spring session of 1832, and ending in 1855. In 1866, a volume of reports was published by John W. Houston, associate judge, containing the cases between the spring of 1855 and the fall of 1858. Since that time there has been no volume issued in the state.

MARYLAND.

The four volumes of reports published by Thomas Harris and John M'Henry, between 1809 and 1818, were the earliest reports published in this state. They contain the cases decided in the provincial court and court of appeals, of the then province, from 1700 to the American Revolution, and in the general court and court of appeals of the state from 1780 to 1799. These reports were succeeded by the reports of Thomas Harris and Reverdy Johnson, numbering seven volumes. The first volume contains the decisions of the general court and court of appeals from 1800 to 1805, inclusive. The general court having been abolished, the remaining six volumes contain only the decisions of the court of appeals down to 1826. Following in regular succession these reports are the two volumes of Thomas Harris and Richard W. Gill, containing the decisions down to 1829. From 1829 to 1843 the cases in the court of appeals were reported in twelve volumes by Richard W. Gill and John Johnson. Mr. Gill continued the reports from that time to 1851.

In 1851 A. C. McGruder was appointed state reporter under a provision of the legislature, and began the series known as the Maryland reports with the December term, 1851. He published two volumes ending in the latter part of 1852. Volumes 3-18 of the Maryland reports were reported by Oliver Miller, and contain the cases between December, 1852, and June term, 1862, inclusive; from nineteen to twenty-six of the series Nicholas Brewster, Jr., held the office. Mr. J Schaaff Stockett succeeded him,

thousand dollars' per year. He is to report all decisions of the court of appeals, designated by said court to be reported, within six months after their delivery. Each volume is to contain at least six hundred pages, and is to be sold at $5.00 a volume. The reporter owns the copyright and pays the expense of publishing. The state takes two hundred copies at $6.00 a volume.

MISTAKES OF LAW.

(Continued from Vol. III, p. 448.)

The question was much discussed by the supreme court of Alabama, in the case of Jones v. Watkins, 1 Stew. 181, and the court expressed themselves strongly against relieving from mistakes of law, but the point was neither necessarily nor properly before the court. There the plaintiffs, years before, had given their notes, stipulating therein to pay a large rate of interest, in the belief that under the statute they might lawfully stipulate for any rate of interest that the parties should agree upon. When the notes matured they paid some of them voluntarily, and suffered judgment to be taken by default on the others. Some years afterward the courts decided, that the statute in question limited the rate of interest in cases like this to a sum much smaller than plaintiffs had paid. Thereupon plaintiffs filed their bill to recover the overpayment. There were several reasons why they were not entitled to relief. One was, that their remedy, at least at law, was barred by the statute of limitation before their bill was filed. Another was, that they had a good legal defense at the time to the actions brought on the notes, but had failed to make it; again, there was no fraud shown, but the notes were paid in exact conformity to the original intention of the parties; or, in other words, they had paid what the law would not have compelled them to pay, but what, in equity and conscience, they ought. The case did not, therefore, call for the interference of the court.

In Pinkham v. Gear, 3 N. H. 163, Chief Justice Richardson regarded it as well settled that no man can avoid his contracts by an allegation that he made it under a mistake of law. This nobody will dispute, for it is clear that the mistake must be not only alleged, but proved. The case of Peterborough v.

Lancaster, 14 N. H. 382, is in no proper sense an authority, one way or another. There, a town not chargeable with the support of a pauper agreed with a town by whom the pauper had been maintained, to pay for the future support for a specified time, and paid a portion of said agreed sum, to recover which action was brought. It did not appear, as the court expressly declared, whether it was a mistake of law or of fact, and while they gave no uncertain indication of how they would decide in a case presenting the point, this case was decided on other grounds.

In Kentucky, it has been uniformly held that courts of equity can grant relief in case of mistake either of law or fact. In Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana, 309, and Ray v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 B. Monroe, 510, the court of appeals of that state ably and fairly discussed, on general principles, the question as to the effect of mistakes of law, and the conclusion at which the court arrived was, that if a man, without any other motive or consideration than an erroneous opinion respecting his legal rights and obligations, release a right, pay money or undertake to do an act, he should be held entitled to relief equally as if he had acted under a mistake of fact, and for the same reason, namely, that the contract was not such as the parties, or one of them at least, really contemplated. "And such," they said, "we understand to be the rational and consistent doctrine of the common law established in Kentucky." See to the same effect, Fitzgerald v. Peck, 4 Litt. 125; Gratz v. Reed, 4 B. Monroe, 190.

In South Carolina, where the question has frequently been before the courts, the doctrine is well settled in harmony with the cases in Kentucky. In the first case presenting the question, the defendant had sold a wharf, and for a part of the purchase-money had taken seven bonds, to secure the payment of which he held a mortgage on one-half the wharf. He assigned two of these bonds on which the plaintiffs were sureties, together with so much of the mortgage as related to them, and, on their maturity, the plaintiffs were compelled to pay the assignee the amount due on them. The plaintiff recovered judgment on the five other bonds, and the mortgaged premises were sold under the judgment and without any foreclosure of the mortgage, and were purchased by the defendant. Both he and his counsel intended to sell the fee simple of the property, and the sheriff so offered the premises for sale, but in fact only the equity of redemption passed by the sale. The plaintiffs filed their bill, claiming to have the proceeds of the mortgaged property applied to pay them in proper proportion, and insisted that the premises in the defendant's hands were liable to them as mortgage creditors, thereby claiming to hold the defendant accountable for the sum he had bid for the property under the supposition that he was buying the fee, yet allowing him only the equity of redemption. The court held the defendant not bound by the purchase, the effect of the sale being to pass a less interest than that which he believed he

was purchasing. The case turned solely on the question of mistake of law, and was decided on that point. The court remarked that it was "well established, that relief is given in cases where the mistake has been clearly one of law," and they thought "the authorities relied on put the matter beyond all doubt, if, indeed, it could be doubted at this day."

The next case, that of Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bail. 623, resembled in its main features that of Bingham v. Bingham, cited in the first of these articles. The defendant was the devisee of certain lands, but the heir at law interposed a claim that the devise was illegal. The defendant was advised by counsel that he could not hold the real estate, because when the will was made he was not a naturalized citizen. Desiring to become the owner of the property, he procured the heir at law to execute a deed of assignment of all his interest therein in favor of the defendant, who, in consideration thereof, issued a bond which was afterward assigned to plaintiff, and on which this action was brought. This bond was executed under a clear mistake of law, as the devise to defendant was effective and legal, and the land already his when he purchased it. The case was very ably and elaborately argued on both sides, and the court, in a learned opinion, held that contracts founded on a plain and palpable mistake of law ought not to be enforced, and that there was no difference in principle between the cases of recovering back money, and of enforcing a contract founded on such a mistake.

These two cases having been somewhat doubted by the chancellor in a subsequent case (Hopkins v. Mazyack, 1 Hill Ch. 242), the court of appeals took oceasion, when the case came before them, to express their decided adherence to the rule laid down. The court said that Lawrence v. Beaubien was decided on much consideration, and the more they had reflected on it since the more they were confirmed of its correctness.

In Wheaton v. Wheaton, 9 Conn. 96, the mistake was simply that the plaintiff mistook the legal effect of a plain note of hand; or, as the court said, the plaintiff ignorantly supposed a note payable by the terms of it in three years to be in law a note payable at the death of the obligee, and then not actually to be paid, but to be delivered up. The court thought that it would be difficult to prove such a mistake, and held that parol proof was not admissible to show a mistake of law.

But this decision is substantially overruled by a later decision in the same court, in the case of Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, in which the question is fairly met and decided in favor of relieving such mistakes. In that action the plaintiffs, as executors, had paid to defendant's wife in his presence, the sum of $500, under the supposition that she was entitled to it under the | will. The fact was, that she was in no wise entitled to the money, and defendant knew it when it was paid, but did not disclose it. Action of indebitatus assump

sit to recover the money was brought against the husband, who, in legal effect, had received the money. The executors had paid the money under a mistake, not as to the contents of the will, but as to its construction. It was, therefore, clearly a mistake of law, and was so treated in the argument and by the court. In delivering the opinion, the chief justice said: "We do not decide that money paid by a mere mistake in point of law can be recovered back, as if it had been paid by an infant, by a feme covert, or by a person after the statute of limitation has barred an action, or when any other merely legal defense exists against a claim for the money so paid, and which might be honestly retained. But we mean distinctly to assert, that where money is paid by one under a mistake of his rights and his duties, and which he was under no legal or moral obligation to pay, and which the recipient has no right, in good conscience, to retain, it may be recovered back in an action of indebitatus assumpsit, whether such mistake be one of fact or of law; and this, we insist, may be done both upon the principle of christian morals and the common law." And so do we assert it. In Stedwell | v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139, the above decision was re-affirmed.

In Culbreath. v. Culbreath, 7 Geo. 64, the plaintiff, an administrator of an intestate's estate, out of mistake as to the law of distribution, divided the estate among the brothers and sisters of the intestate to the exclusion of the children of a deceased sister. These children subsequenty recovered their proportion of the administrator, and he brought this action against the distributees to recover back the amount overpaid. It was conceded that the mistake was purely one of law, and the question was argued and decided on that ground. The court held that the plaintiff could recover, laying down the same doctrine expressed in Northrop v. Graves, supra.

The case of Lammott v. Bowley, 6 Har. & Johns. (Md.) 500, is a strong authority in favor of granting relief from mistakes of this character. Bowley, the defendant, was the devisee of certain lands, but supposed that he was not entitled to them until the happening of certain contingencies mentioned in the will. And before the happening of those contingencies, a part of the lands were sold to Lammott with the knowledge of Bowley. Several years afterward it was discovered that the true construction and legal effect of the will was to give the lands to Bowley absolutely on the death of the testator, and he brought an action of ejectment for the lands thus sold. Lammott filed a bill for an injunction. The question, as stated by the court, was simply whether a man who has title to land, but who is ignorant of his right, forfeits his title by concealing his right when he knows that another is about to purchase the land of a third party. It was held that he did not, and it was said to be the true doctrine and well supported by authorities, that a person acting under a plain and acknowl

edged mistake of his legal rights should not thereby be deprived of those rights.

(We shall conclude this subject in one more article.)

CURRENT TOPICS.

We have ever advocated the formation of local bar associations, in the hope that out of them would grow a state association, which should exert a powerful and benignant influence in elevating the character of the profession, in maintaining the honor and dignity of the judiciary, and in purifying and harmonizing legislation. But there is little prospect that such a consummation is likely to be effected by local organization. If effected at all, and we believe that it can and will be, it must be done by and through the Bar Association of the city of New York. That association is thoroughly organized, and is steadily gaining influence and strength to accomplish the work it has undertaken. If the lawyers of the state will unite with it, and give it their influence and coöperation, it will directly become, in fact, a state association, powerful for good both to the profession itself and to the entire commonwealth. By a provision in the constitution of this association, members of the profession in the state, neither residing nor practicing in the city of New York, may become members of the association on payment of the admission fee of fifty dollars, and such members are exempt from the payment of any annual dues whatever.

The following extract from a circular letter of the Bar Association is commended to the attention of the profession: "This association, which was organized little more than a year ago, 'to maintain the honor and dignity of the profession of the law, to cultivate social intercourse among its members, and to increase its usefulness in promoting the due administration of justice,' has been incorporated under a recent act of the legislature of this state. It already numbers about five hundred members, and is receiving constant accessions to its numbers. It owns a building in the city of New York and a large and constantly increasing library. It holds meetings once in every month during the winter months, for the purpose of considering questions affecting the rights and interests of the bar. It has contributed in one striking instance, by earnest protest and effort, to the protection of those interests when menaced by the improper action of the legislature. It solicits the cooperation of every member of the bar of this state who sympathizes with its objects, and who desires to see the bar of this state occupy again the position of dignity and influence which it once held, and to which it is entitled."

It has not unfrequently happened that bad cases have made good laws, and if the arrest and imprisonment of a woman in the city of New York for inability to pay her hotel bill shall result in striking from the

statute book the law making such an outrage possible, we shall not have occasion to regret the occurrence. This lady claimed to be, and from aught that appeared to the contrary was, the wife of Judge Henry Watson, a prominent resident of California. She was alone in the city of New York and a guest at the Coleman House. Her husband furnished her with money to defray her expenses, at regular intervals, by means of an express company, but for some unexplained reason the last regular remittance failed to reach her in time for her to pay her hotel bill when presented. Thereupon she was arrested and taken before Judge Shandley, who sent her to the penitentiary for two months. No wonder "she swooned on hearing the sentence." Giving a fair construction to her statements and proceedings so far as reported, we are unable to discover any thing amounting to fraud or intent to defraud. Every civilized state has long ago abolished as barbarous laws allowing imprisonment for debt, and if there is any sufficient reason why they should be retained for the benefit of hotel keepers we shall be glad to have it explained. Very likely they are more liable to be deceived than other traders, but if so, they have the remedy in their own hands without the aid of a statute-by requiring pre-payment in case of any doubt. The law in question is a disgrace to the state and ought to be expunged from the statute book.

Now that Mr. Heard has given us the "Curiosities of the Law Reporters," will not somebody do us a like service in regard to the "Curiosities of the Statutes?" Unless we greatly mistake, the mine is a rich one and well worth the working. We have already made mention of the statute allowing deductions of a certain number of days to be made, on account of good behavior, from the term of imprisonment of convicts, and wherein it was gravely provided that the act should not apply to a person sentenced for the term of his natural life. The act providing for the construction of the present capitol in this city (laws 1804, ch. 67) is something of a curiosity in its way. It is entitled "An act making provision for improving Hudson's river, below the city of Albany, and for other purposes." The "other purposes" decidedly preponderate, as nothing is said about improving "Hudson's river." A lottery is, however, provided for, from the proceeds of which the building was to be erected. Very like this is chapter 110 of the laws of 1814, which bears the title "An act to raise money to build a bridge over Allen's creek, in the town of Le Roy, and for other purposes." The last section of this act relates exclusively to medical societies in the state. What possible association could the conscript fathers have discovered between a bridge and a doctor? unless it was that both help us "( over the river." This dangerous style of legislation is happily now done away with by the constitution, but occasionally its ghost will appear in some statute, as witness the

appropriation act and the smuggled clause to extend the court of appeals' publishing contract.

It is now about the time when the greater portion of those who intend to enter the legal profession are making preparation for the beginning of their studies. With the fall months the law schools commence their sessions, and most of the lawyers the business of the year; consequently there are at present a large number of young men about to study for the bar, who are anxiously considering how and where they shall be educated. We are frequently asked which is the better place to prepare for the practice of the law an office or a law school; and our uniform answer is, that neither the one nor the other will properly train the student. The routine of the office is necessary to explain and fix the teachings of the school, and the training of the school to systematize the instruction of the office. Whatever may have been done in the past, it is not possible to-day, in the United States at least, to acquire by solitary reading and the performance of clerical duties a comprehensive knowledge of legal science. By such means the student may become familiar with the details of practice, and what is known as case law, but if he desires to understand the fundamental principles of which these are but the outgrowth, he must seek instruction from those who teach law as a department of knowledge and not as a mechanical trade. But the school will not fit one for practice, and should never claim so to do. The office and the school can, together, give a thorough education; apart, each will produce only half lawyers.

OBITER DICTA.

Short-sighted-A draft payable on demand.

A lawyer's favorite pudding is said to be-suet.

A correspondent in Michigan is responsible for the register of deeds office were thrown into convulsions in this wise: A

following: The clerks of the K

young lawyer, who had very recently thrown out his shingle and was glorying in his first land case, went to that office to look up the title. In running it through, he came not unfrequently upon the words "W. Oak,"

especially in the field notes and plat of the government around so often, he addressed the register and inquired if he was acquainted with W. Oak, and if he was yet alive, for he seems to have entered a large amount of land hereabouts, and must have been one of the oldest settlers." The register, perceiving the young gentleman's mistake, politely informed him that "W. Oak " stood for white oak, a tree well known, and referred to as a land mark, etc. "Ah! just so," said the young man, glancing over his shoulder to the clerks hiding their faces in the liber they were working over; “and, continued he, "Mr. Register, I would like to get you to make for me an abstract of the title of the land," etc., which the register at once undertook to do, and our young friend withdrew directly from the office without venturing another look at the suffocated

survey. Somewhat surprised that W. Oak should be

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GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.

FIRST DEPARTMENT. SUPREME COURT-JUNE TERM.

APPEAL. See Practice. ATTACHMENT. See Partnership.

BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS.

Forged indorsement.-Lamb, Quinlan & Co. drew a draft on the plaintiffs, who were indebted to them, for seven hundred and seventy-one dollars and fortyfive cents, to the order of one Ford, and forwarded it by mail, addressed to Ford at St. Louis. The draft never reached Ford. The letter containing it was taken from the post-office by some unauthorized person, and the indorsement of the name of the payee was a forgery. The draft, with the forged indorsement, was placed by one Newton in the hands of the defendants for collection, and they presented it to the plaintiffs, who, being ignorant of the theft and forgery, paid the amount to the defendants, who did not notify them that, in making the collection, they were acting as agents. The defendants paid over the proceeds to the principal, for whom they made the collection, before any demand upon them by the plaintiffs. On appeal from judgment against defendants, held, that the judgment should be affirmed. The case is directly within the authority of The Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill, 287. In that case it was held that though the defendants were innocent of any intended wrong, yet they had obtained the money of the plaintiffs on an instrument to which they had no title, and they were therefore bound to refund the amount, although they had no notice of the forgery until two months after they had transmitted the money to their principals. It was also held that the defendants, though in point of fact acting as agents, might be regarded and treated as principals, because in the transaction of presenting and collecting the draft, they had acted as if they were principals, and had not disclosed that they were agents. This is precisely this case, and is decisive of it. Kingston Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y.; Union Bank v. Sixth National Bank, 1 Lansing, also cited. Holt v. Ross, as President, etc. Opinion by Cardozo, J.

See Husband and Wife.

BURIAL PLOTS. See Mortgages.

CASES CRITICISED. See Husband and Wife. CONTRACTS. See Life Insurance. Also, see Husband and Wife.

Resulting from injunction: counsel fees.-On granting an injunction in this case an undertaking was filed, which was in the usual form, and was conditioned that the plaintiff "will pay to the defendant so enjoined such damage," etc. The referee thereafter allowed, as damages recoverable under the undertaking, a counsel fee of $20 to defendant's attorney for drawing the affidavit on the motion to dissolve the injunction; also a counsel fee of $50 upon the motion (although the motion was denied), and a further fee of $125 for services on the trial of the action. Plaintiff excepted to the report allowing the above items. The exceptions were overruled at special term, from which this appeal. Held, that as the motion to dissolve the injunction was denied, and the residue of the sum allowed was for

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Whether a voluntary conveyance, by way of gift, can be set aside at the suit of subsequent creditors, depends upon the intent with which it was made; and the intent is a fact to be proven in the case. The law does not, simply from the conveyance, draw the inference of a fraudulent design, but it must be proven as a fact. When there is proof that a person engaged in business has stripped himself of all his property by a voluntary conveyance to his family, without consideration, and that he nevertheless retained the possession of the property, obtaining credit on the faith of it, and the conveyance was made with the intent to continue and contract a future indebtedness in his business, and that this was done to avoid the payment of his debts, a case showing the fraudulent design is made out, justifying the court in holding that the dishonest intention existed when the deed was made. That was the substance of the case in Savage v. Murphy, 34 N. Y. 50S, and the special term having, from the facts, drawn the inference of fraudulent intent, the judgment was properly sustained. This differs from the case at bar. There is proof here, and upon conflict on that point the judge has found that the defendant, Peter Valentine, was not in business when the conveyance was made, and that he only acted as agent in the transactions out of which his liability arose. We cannot say that the judge, on all the facts, should have drawn any different conclusion than he did. Judgment below in favor of defendant affirmed. Woodruff et al. v. Valentine et al. Opinion by Cardozo, J.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. Contracts in contemplation of marriage.-The plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife. Prior to their marriage, the note in suit was executed by the defendant. After having, on her direct examination, testified generally that the consideration of the note was a marriage contract between her and the defendaut, the plaintiff, on her cross-examination, further said that the defendant told her, that if she would be his wife, he would give her his note for $5,000, and she "agreed to have him at that time" - agreed that she "would marry him." The referee ordered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the note, and the defendant appealed. On appeal, held, that it seems from the evidence that the note was given in considerution of plaintiff's promise to marry the defendant, and that therefore the note was made upon, and for, a sufficient and valuable consideration. Undoubtedly this contract (the note) would, at common law, have been extinguished by the marriage; but that rule was changed by the statute of 1849 (ch. 375), by which ($ 3) it was enacted that "all contracts made between persons in contemplation of marriage shall remain in full force after such marriage takes place." The subsequent marriage of these parties did not, therefore, affect or destroy the note. It was a contract to pay, made in contemplation of marriage, and by force of the statute remains in full force after the marriage. Curtis v. Brooks, 37 Barb. 476, contains no reasoning

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