that we should follow the course that now we have followed. I think that, if the strategy of not having to get congressional approval were to be successful, they believe they would have a better chance of getting ratification.

Senator HATCH. The President is, in my view, trying to pressure the American people into believing that we run great risk if the treaty is not ratified. What, if any, do you perceive to be those risks?

Governor REAGAN. I think we are talking about the possibility of disturbances, riots, sabotage, and so forth in the Canal Zone

Senator HATCH. I have another question in that, so you can answer it all at once.

Others, including myself, are advocating that, because of the diplomatic blunders here, we are likely to run some serious risks whether the treaty is ratified or not.

Governor REAGAN. That is right.

Senator HATCH. Please cover both sides of that question.

Governor REAGAN. I think that there will be trouble. I think some of those fomenting the trouble-I referred to a resolution of one student group. They have already implied that, while they are willing to have Torrijo sign the treaty, they will continue to make trouble as long as there is an American presence.

CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS

But I think the main question that we have to face is this. The treaty advocates cannot have it both ways. They cannot tell us that it is wise for us to sign the treaty-meaning getting out of the Canal Zone, getting out of the operation of the canal eventually--because there will be trouble if we don't. But then they promise us at the same time that it is all right because in the future, after we are gone, if anyone should in any way violate the treaty or hinder our use or neutrality, we have the right to go back in.

Can you picture an administration, once out, then suddenly mobilizing and sending the military forces of the great colossus of the North down to Panama because they have done something in violation of the treaty?

As I say, which way do they want that argument?

Senator HATCH. Do you think there is any possibility if we ratify this treaty that we will be shut out from the use of the Panama Canal? Governor REAGAN. I think the possibility is there. I do not think we have the guarantees of security that we have now.

Senator HATCH. If we are out of Panama in obedience to this treaty, what do you think the opportunities will be for us to come back in and enforce our rights?

Governor REAGAN. Well, I think they are much less; and I think there is a much greater danger there than there is for us if we stay right where we are.

Senator HATCH. Can you tell us why you think that's a great danger? Governor REAGAN. The past record of the canal. If you look at it, we have heard all sorts of stories about sabotage.

First of all, it is difficult for me to believe that the Panamanian Government itself would tolerate the sabotage of something that amounts to 25 percent of their gross national product. It is their greatest economic asset.

Second of all, we have gone through four wars. In each one of those wars, the enemy had every reason in the world to try and block that canal. The Germans in World War I were even able to come into New York Harbor and create the great Black Tom explosion in New Jersey. In World War II, with the Pacific Fleet virtually destroyed, it must have been very tempting to our enemies to try to close that canal.

In the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, we were using it—as has been testified before this committee by Admiral Moorer-for materiel shipment of the great bulk of war supplies. In a time of stress in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in the midst of the Vietnam war, it was the presence of the canal that allowed us to place our tonnage in our naval forces so that we could respond quickly to a crisis either in the Pacific or in the Mediterranean.

The fact that, in wartime, with enemies wanting to close it down, it never has been closed down, it does not seem to me the canal is that subject to sabotage.

Senator HATCH. One of the biggest arguments offered really comes down to basically this argument about student uprisings and other disorders. There are about 1,700,000 people with only 1,500 trained as soldiers.

How do you answer the argument that this will show, by giving this canal, the greatness of America and that we are ending the colonialism of the past?

Governor REAGAN. Well, I think one of the great things that is wrong with this is the whole timing. In this particular era, I do not think that it is going to be taken as a great, magnanimous gesture.

Panama happens to have received the highest per capita aid from the United States of any nation on Earth. If, after all we have done for the world, beginning with the Marshall Plan, we have not earned the love of these other nations yet, I do not think that just giving away a canal is going to do it.

I think that in the present era, in view of what we have done, there is a very grave danger that the world will not see this as a magnanimous gesture. It will see it--and with some justification-as, once again, the United States, faced with the possibility of confrontation, backing away.

I think there could be a time when the United States as I said here about alternatives-could negotiate from strength. But, we have not been negotiating. Ever since President Johnson's statement in 1964 in which he literally gave away everything, in his own opinion, to Panama, we have simply been conceding and trying to get by with conceding as little as we have to. But it has not been a negotiation such as a nation of this kind should make.

Senator HATCH. I have one more question. What about the argument about solidarity of the Latin American countries in favor of this treaty? This is one of the big arguments that is advanced by the proponents of the treaty. They say all Central and Latin American nations are in favor of this treaty, and therefore it would be good grace on the part of the United States to go along with their desires.

Governor REAGAN. I mention that in my statement; I do not believe it is true. I think there are too many instances of Members of the United States Senate who have had personal experience in talking to leaders in Latin American countries who have expressed their great concern as to what might happen at the canal if it is in the hands of

Torrijos and if the United States withdraws its control and its operation.

I know one Latin American ambassador who was more blunt. He simply expressed it to an American questioner of my acquaintance when he said, "Why doesn't your Government just say no?"

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Senator Scott?

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor, let me add my expression of welcome to you today. I commend you for coming this distance to testify before our subcommittee. We are certainly glad that you are here with us.

You mentioned a moment ago, in response to a question from Senator Hatch, that we had gradually been agreeing to give away our rights. Of course, that is terminated by the first paragraph of article I. It says that, upon its entry into force-this treaty's effective datethis treaty terminates and supersedes the 1903 treaty, the 1936 treaty, the 1955 treaty. Then, just as a catchall-I do not know what they mean here "all other treaties, conventions, agreements, and exchanges of notes between the United States and the Republic of Panama.”

So, I do not think we are going to give it all away by this treaty. We are not going to have to worry about any gradual erosion in the treaty.

GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE IN CUBA

Let me ask you, if you will, Governor. We have the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba. We are there under a treaty. By virtue of that treaty, we have complete jurisdiction and control. Yet, I am told that Cuba has not been accepting the annual payment in recent years.

Do you believe the ratification of this treaty with regard to the Panama Canal will have an effect on the future of the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba?

Governor REAGAN. Well, it could in this case.

Again, if what we do is seen as weakness, withdrawing in the face of trouble, it could. Guantanamo is a different situation in that we lease. My understanding is that it is a lease in perpetuity. It is true that 16 years ago Castro ordered us out. It is true also that there are land mines and guns points at each other and barbed wire between Cuba and the Guantanamo base.

Guantanamo is, however, sovereign Cuban territory. We are talking about a lease. But in 16 years not one move has been made to remove us. Evidently Castro knows that if he tried to remove us by force, with our forces there, he would be in a confrontation with the United States.

The difference is here, in this treaty, that we ourselves are going to phase out. There will come a point in which we will not have any forces. We would be faced with the awful choice of whether to try to send them back.

The only thing that I could see about Guantanamo, Castro might see this as an opportunity now by saying, "Well, I am willing to risk forceful ejection of the United States," with the belief that there would be no further trouble from us and we would withdraw.

Senator SCOTT. Governor, would you share your thoughts with us regarding the suggestion that has been made that our relationship with the Third World will be damaged if this treaty is not ratified.

by the Senate? Do you see any damage with our relationship with the Third World?

Governor REAGAN. Well, I don't know how it could be damaged more. I don't know of a single instance where they have voted with us in the United Nations. Their hostility seems to be pretty evident.

I do not think we should settle for that. I think this is part of a much greater problem. That is, what is the foreign policy of the United States? I think once we evolve a foreign policy that recognizes this particular situation in the context of our relationships with the Latin American nations and with the Third World, and we go at it from strength, then I think we could improve those relations.

Senator SCOTT. Governor, in your prepared remarks, you indicated you have not had an opportunity to see the treaty, although you have been briefed about it. We received copies yesterday.

Article 12 relates to a sea-level canal or a third lane of locks. It indicates that Panama and the United States may want to negotiate for a sea-level canal sometime in the future. It says that no new interoceanic canal shall be constructed in Panama during the duration of this treaty except in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.

Then it says that during the duration of the treaty that the United States shall not negotiate with third states for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route in the Western Hemisphere except as the two parties may otherwise agree.

In other words, this would bind the United States not to put a canal in Nicaragua or anyplace along the isthmus at all. But I do not read where Panama cannot authorize some other nation to put a canal in. The article is not clear on that point.

Do you feel there is any justification for the United States agreeing that it will not construct a canal anywhere within Panama without consent of Panama or anywhere outside of Panama without the consent of Panama? I spoke of quid pro quo a while ago. I just do not see any there. I would like your thoughts on this.

Governor REAGAN. As I say, I myself have thought highly of the third lock plan. I have been unable to understand the importance of talking about another canal that we would build when we are now being forced to give up the one we already built.

It seems that history is repeating itself on this canal outside the Panama aspect. Panama hastened to ratify the original treaty because they were fearful of a large body of opinion in the United States that the canal in the beginning should have been in Nicaragua. So, maybe they are just trying to make sure that they continue to have the monopoly there in Panama by preventing us from building one anyplace else.

Senator SCOTT. From the viewpoint of the United States, do we gain anything by agreeing that we will not build a canal outside of Panama?

TRANSLATION OF BETHAN COURT PRESS CONFERENCE

Governor REAGAN. No, Senator, we do not.

There is another thing that I think should concern us, since treaties have to be in two languages. I have received a translation of a press

conference that was held by Mr. Bethancourt in Panama recently. He was making claim to the press of their country; it is something that I think is kind of a bombshell.

He was making claim that there is no substance in the right of expeditious passage for U.S. ships in the future through the canal; that the word "expeditious" was used because the United States wanted "privileged" passage. He explained to their press that they settled for the word "expeditious" because they realized that here in this country the treaty advocates had to sell the treaty to the Senate and the Congress. Therefore they had that, but he made it very plain that "expeditious" did not mean that if an American warship, for example, asked for priority transit through the canal, it would get it. There would be no privileged transit provided for U.S. ships.

Senator SCOTT. You made some reference, Governor, in your principal remarks with regard to selling the American people. I wonder whether you want to elaborate on that in any respect. It just seems to me that, under our system of representative government, the ultimate will reside in the people of the country collectively. The sovereignty is not in the executive branch. It is not in the Chief Executive. The sovereignty is in the people.

Perhaps they could do a little educating of the President. Perhaps he will learn that before this action is taken by the Senate on this treaty. I have personal thoughts, but I would still like your thoughts.

Governor REAGAN. Senator, I think the violation of the sovereignty of the people has been evident over a period of 13 or 14 years. It was only last year in the campaign, and virtually by accident that the people of this country became aware that we had, over a period of years, been negotiating to give away the canal. Since then the secrecy factor has been gone.

You have to ask why. There must have been a feeling on the part of those who wanted to give up the canal that they must not let the people know about it too soon or the people would rise up in opposition.

Now, I believe that in some of the efforts to propagandize the result of the treaty there have been distortions of history given the American people. This is not a last vestige of colonialism, as it has been called. We did not engineer the revolution of Panama. I think the American people should know that we went down in good faith to negotiate with Colombia.

COLOMBIA WANTED $40 MILLION

Panama had wanted to free itself from Colombia for a long time. Colombia, on the other hand, was stalling because their contract with the French expired in 2 years. They knew that we were willing to pay the French $40 million for their rights in the French Canal Company. Colombia wanted the $40 million. They thought that, if they just held out for 2 years until France was out by termination of the contract, then they would get the $40 million.

They rejected the treaty. But, again, as I said, there was a large body of opinion in the Congress of the United States that the canal should be in Nicaragua. Panama saw its chance. Panama hastily, with no provision, militarily or otherwise, announced its secession from Colombia, hired a Frenchman as Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate