An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Volumen2
J. Johnson, W. J. and J. Richardson, W. Otridge and Son, F. C. and J. Rivington, D. Ogilvy and Son, Leigh and Sotheby, T. Payne, [and 11 others], and J. Mawman, 1805 - 510 páginas
Comentarios de la gente - Escribir un comentario
No encontramos ningún comentario en los lugares habituales.
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
able agree agreement or disagreement allow answer appear apply argument assent authority believe body called cause certain certainty clear colour common complex idea conceive concerning connexion consequence consider consists demonstration depend determined discourse discover distinct doubt earth equal essence eternal evidence examine existence faculty faith farther figure follow give gold grounds hath ideas ignorance immaterial kind knowledge known language learned least ledge less light material matter meaning men's mind moral motion names nature necessary never objects observe opinions particular perceive perception perfect perhaps principles probability produce proofs propositions prove qualities question rational reach reason receive relations revelation rules sense serve side signification simple ideas sort soul sounds speak species spirit stand substance supposed taken things thought tion true truth understanding wherein whole words
Página 273 - Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.
Página 339 - I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a habit of reasoning closely and in train; not that I think it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that having got the way of reasoning, which that study necessarily brings the mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge as they shall have occasion.30 For in all sorts of reasoning every single argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration; the connection and dependence of ideas...
Página 163 - For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once.
Página 103 - We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think...
Página 356 - Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge ; it is thinking makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourselves with a great load of collections ; unless we chew thorn over again, they will not give us strength and nourishment.
Página 102 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
Página 41 - But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats...
Página 112 - ... the sciences capable of demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences.
Página 201 - ... deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels.