the premises of the Paine Lumber Company. If such pickets were placed about the premises of the Paine Lumber Company on the part of the alleged conspirators to accomplish any of the unlawful objects set forth in the information, then the persons so combining can not justify the placing of such pickets upon the theory that they had the right to watch the workmen go to and from such factory. The streets and highways of a city can not be used in that manner for the purpose of accomplishing unlawful purposes.

On the other hand, if pickets were used for the purpose of carrying out lawful purposes, they have the right to use the streets and highways, so long as they do not interfere with the use of such streets as public highways, and so long as they do not interfere with the rights of others. They have no right to interfere with or intentionally obstruct a man in the conduct of his lawful business, nor have they the right to interfere or obstruct persons going to and from their work and insist upon talking to them against their will. All persons have the right to the use of the public streets and highways, so long as such use is reasonably consistent with the lawful rights of others.

UNITED STATES.

The United States circuit court, northern district of Illinois, considered the question of the punishment of strikers for contempt of court in the case of Secor v. Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Railway Company (7 Bissel, 513), decided in 1877, and held as follows:

Property held in trust by the court for the purpose of protecting it pending its foreclosure, and over which a receiver has been appointed, is in the possession of the court, and any interference with it is punishable as a contempt. Where a railroad is in the hands of a receiver, and the employees of another road who have struck, or any other persons prevent the employees of the receiver from working, they commit a contempt of court and are to be treated in as summary a manner as if the contempt were committed in the actual presence of the court.

In the same year, 1877, this same question was considered by the United States circuit court, district of Indiana, in the case of King et al. v. The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company (7 Bissel, 529), and the following is a synopsis of the court's decision:

Several railroads were placed in the hands of receivers in June, 1877. During the strikes of the latter part of July, the trains of these various railroads ceased for a time to run-a mob of strikers and others combining to stop them by force. The court on information of these facts, issued orders to the marshal, in aid of the receivers, requiring him to prevent all disturbance of their possession, and to use his authority, as marshal, under the law, to enable them to operate the roads, and due notice was given of the fact that these railroads were in the custody of the court and that there must be no interference with their possession. Several persons were, on complaint duly made, attached as for contempt of the authority of the court, and disobedience of its orders and

a hearing took place. The facts occurring were substantially as follows: A crowd or mob of strikers and others assembled at the depot, took possession, and during a part of a week, by force and intimidation arrested the running of trains. The defendants were punished for contempt and in its opinion the court held substantially as follows: A receiver being an officer of the court, whose duty it is to protect the property and operate the roads under the direction and order of the court, and the property thus placed in his possession is considered as property belonging to the court, and entitled to its protection. In proceedings for a contempt, the court can proceed in a summary manner, and the accused is not, of right, entitled to a trial by jury. Where the offense is clearly proved the court will proceed summarily to punish an offender. Interference with the running of railroad trains is an offense public in its character.

The same question again arose in the case of United States v. Kane (23 Federal Reporter, 748), decided in 1885 by the United States circuit court for the district of Colorado. Its decision was, in effect, as follows:

Where employees of a railroad company in the hands of a receiver appointed by the court are dissatisfied with the wages paid by the receiver, they may abandon the employment, and by persuasion or argument induce other employees to do the same; but if they resort to threats or violence to induce the others to leave, or accomplish their purpose without actual violence, by overawing the others by preconcerted demonstrations of force, and thus prevent the receiver from operating the road, they are guilty of a contempt of court, and may be punished for their unlawful acts.

In the same year, 1885, this question came before the United States circuit court for the western district of Missouri in the case entitled In re Wabash Railway Company (24 Federal Reporter, 217), and the syllabus of its decision reads as follows:

A writer, signing himself chairman, sent the following notice to the various foremen of the shops of the Wabash Railway Company during a strike organized to resist a reduction of wages, the railroad being at that time in the hands of a receiver appointed by the United States circuit court:

"OFFICE OF LOCAL COMMITTEE, June 17, 1885. -, Foreman:

"You are requested to stay away from the shop until the present difficulty is settled. Your compliance with this will command the protection of the Wabash employees. But in no case are you to consider this an intimidation."

Held, that this was an unlawful interference with the management of the road by the receiver, and a contempt of court, for which the writer should be punished.

The case entitled In re Doolittle et al., Strikers, (23 Federal Reporter, 544) involved the same question of contempt of court and was heard in the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Mis

souri in 1885. The facts in the case and the decision rendered are shown in the following statement:

The facts seem to be that certain persons while engaged in a strike against the Missouri Pacific Railroad interfered with the management and control of the engine and freight cars under the control of the receivers of the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway, and prevented the agents and employees of said receivers from operating portions of the property of said Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway in their custody, by spiking and blocking the tracks, drawing water from engines, inciting the agents and employees of said receivers to quit work, and threatening them with violence if they continued in the service of the receivers. The engine and cars of the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway, the operation of which was obstructed, were at the time in the yards of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, certain of whose employees were engaged in a strike. An order was issued on two prominent strikers to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt in interfering with property in the hands of the receivers of the court. As a result of the hearing they were found guilty of contempt and punished therefor. In its opinion the court held as follows: When the employees of a railroad company whose property is in the custody of the court, by concert of action quit work and take possession of and obstruct the movement of engines and cars on the tracks of said company, and while so doing also take possession of or obstruct the operation of engines or cars in the custody of receivers of the court, it is the right and duty of the court to punish such latter acts as contempt of its authority. If a party engaged in a lawful undertaking unintentionally interferes with or obstructs the officers of the court in the discharge of their duties, the court is not tenacious of its prerogative; but it is otherwise where parties, while engaged in an unlawful act, obstruct the officers of the court, although intending no contempt. The court is open to hear any just ground of complaint against its receivers. Employees of the receivers may present their grievances, and the court will instruct its officers in the premises. For this reason the court will be prompt to punish men who interfere with its receivers in the custody and control of property committed to them by law. A simple "request" to do or not to do a thing, made by one or more of a body of strikers under circumstances calculated to convey a threatening intimidation, with a design to hinder or obstruct employees in the performance of their duties, is not less obnoxious than the use of physical force for the same purpose. A "request" under such circumstances is a direct threat and an intimidation, and will be punished as such.

This subject, contempt of court, was again considered in 1886 by the United States circuit court for the northern district of Texas in the case entitled In re Higgins et al. (27 Federal Reporter, 443). The syllabus of its decision, as given in the Reporter, is in language as follows:

In proceedings for contempt on part of certain strikers on the Texas and Pacific Railway Company an insolvent corporation in the hands of receivers, the court held that it is well-settled law that whoever unlawfully interferes with property in the possession of a court is

guilty of contempt of that court, and it seems equally well settled that whoever unlawfully interferes with officers and agents of the court, in the full and complete possession and management of property in the custody of the court, is guilty of a contempt of court; and it is immaterial whether this unlawful interference comes in the way of actual violence or by intimidation and threats. The employees of the receivers, although, pro hac vice, officers of the court, may quit their employment, as can employees of private parties or corporations, provided they do not thereby intentionally disable the property; but they must quit peaceably and decently. Where they combine and conspire to quit with or without notice, with the object and intent of crippling the property or its operation, they thereby commit a contempt; and all those who combine and conspire with employees to thus quit, or, as officials of labor organizations, issue printed orders to quit, or to strike, with an intent to embarrass the court in administering the property, render themselves liable for contempt of court. Labor organizations are lawful and generally laudable associations, but they have no legal status or authority, and stand before men and the law on no better footing than other social organizations, and it is preposterous that they should attempt to issue orders that free men are bound to obey; and no man can stand in a court of justice and shelter himself behind any such organization from the consequence of his own unlawful acts. It is a part of this case, and has been established by evidence taken under the direction of the court, that among all the employees of the receivers in operating over 1,500 miles of railway there was no complaint made to the receivers, or to the court, by an employee, of bad treatment or insufficient wages or other grievances; and yet orders were issued from a secret organization to all their employees to quit work, to strike, to cripple the operations of a great thoroughfare for travel and commerce; and many employees, confederating and combining, did quit, and induced and forced others to quit, and did hinder and delay the operation of the railway, and did damage the property in the possession of the court many thousand dollars. This action was a gross contempt of court, wholly unreasonable and unjustifiable. The court has learned, through the newspapers, etc., that these wrongs were committed because the agents of the receivers had discharged as incompetent, and for absence without leave, a certain employee, and refused to reinstate him at the demand of a secret labor organization which claimed that this discharge was in violation of an agreement forced upon the managers of the road prior to the receivership. However this may be, if true, the reason is impertinent, and such demands can not be tolerated.

The United States circuit court for the southern district of New York rendered its decision in 1887 in the case of Old Dominion Steamship Co. 2. McKenna et al. (30 Federal Reporter, 48). The questions of conspiracy and boycott were involved, and the application of the New York statute on conspiracy (Penal Code, sec. 168; Birdseye's Revised Statutes and Codes, 1896, p. 587, sec. 1, see post, p. 1017) was consid ered. A brief of the decision follows:

The procurement of workmen who are employed upon terms as to wages which are just and satisfactory to quit work in a body for the purpose of inflicting injury and damage upon the employer, by persons who are not in his employ, and until the employer should accede to demands of such outside persons, which he is under no obligation to

grant, constitutes in law a malicious and illegal interference with the employer's business, which is actionable.

Declaring and attempting to enforce a boycott for the purpose of compelling an employer to pay such a rate of wages to his employees as the boycotters who are not in his employ might demand, are acts rendering the boycotters liable in damages, and are also misdemeanors at common law, as well as by section 168 of the New York Penal Code. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combinations or associations, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex, or annoy them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the skillful and to the unskillful, to the diligent and the lazy, to the efficient and to the inefficient, and all associations designed to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed to abridge these rights, are pro tanto illegal combinations or associations; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such means, and accompanied by damage, are actionable.

The United States circuit court for the district of Idaho rendered a decision in 1892 in the case of the Coeur d'Alene Consolidated and Mining Company v. Miners' Union of Wardner et al. (51 Federal Reporter, 260), arising out of a strike, to the effect that:

An injunction may be granted to restrain labor unions and members thereof from entering upon complainant's mines, or interfering with the working thereof, by force, threats, or intimidation, preventing complainant's employees from working the mines, where the threatened acts are such that their frequent occurrence may be expected, and the defendants are insolvent.

Sections 4466a to 4466d of the Annotated Statutes of Wisconsin of 1889 (now sections 4440a and 4466a to 4466c of the statutes of 1898, see post, pp. 1031, 1032) were construed as to their application in a strike. case by the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Wisconsin. The case is known as the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (60 Federal Reporter, 803), and the decision rendered in 1892 is in effect as follows:

These sections are declaratory of the common law, and wholly condemn all conspiracies to injure or oppress, or to interfere with the rights of others. Their efficacy is in no degree impaired by any statutory recognition of the right of organization for the purpose of promoting the welfare of labor. A court of equity having charge of a railroad through its receivers has authority to restrain the formation and execution of a conspiracy among the employees to quit the service in a body with the design and intent of crippling the property in their custody, or embarrassing the operation of the road. A strike is a combination among workmen to compel the master to the concession of a certain demand by preventing the conduct of his business untii com