In his supplemental return filed herein on April 5, 1918, the defendant clerk states that, on the fourth day of April, 1918, he personally took said petition to the office of the county clerk of San Bernardino County and personally examined and from the records of registration ascertained whether or not said petition was signed by the requisite number of qualified electors; and thereupon he has made a new certificate, dated April 4, 1918, which certificate is set forth in the supplemental return, and wherein he certifies that the petition was signed by the requisite number of qualified electors. The certificate thus made on April 4, 1918, is entirely irrelevant to the case now before us. The writ issued by this court is a writ issued for the purpose of testing the jurisdiction of the clerk to make the certificate made by him on March 4, 1918. With his actions subsequent to that date we are not concerned.

The said certificate of March 4, 1918, is annulled.

James, J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2670. Second Appellate District.-April 6, 1918.] CITY OF WATTS (a Municipal Corporation), et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Respondents.

PROHIBITION-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN LOCAL OPTION ELECTION-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT QUESTION FOR TRIAL COURT.-In an action to enjoin a board of city trustees from submitting to the electors the question of licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors therein, it is for the superior court to say whether the complaint states a cause of action, and its decision is not subject to review by the appellate court on a petition for a writ of prohibition. INTOXICATING LIQUORS EXAMINATION OF ELECTION PETITION DECISION OF CITY CLERK FINAL.-Under the provisions of the act providing for the regulation of the traffic in alcoholic liquors by estab lishing local option (Stats. 1911, p. 599), as to all matters comprehended within the proper scope of the examination of the petition for an election committed to the city clerk, his decision thereon is final.

ID.-SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION FOR ELECTION-FRAUDULENT ACTS-INJUNCTION-JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURT.-The superior court, however, as a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a local option election, where certain signatures to the petition for the election were not made by the persons who purported to have signed the same, or where unauthorized forged additions have been made to the names as signed, or where addresses have been set opposite certain signatures, which addresses were not affixed thereto by the signers thereof, and such facts affect the number of signatures to the petition sufficiently to reduce it below the required number, since such matters are not apparent to the clerk in the course of his inspection of the petition, or in the examination of the great register of voters.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Prohibition originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District to restrain the Superior Court from proceeding further with the trial of an action and from entering any injunction therein.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

S. W. Odell, and Neighbours, Hoag & Burke, for Petitioners.

Paul W. Schenck, and Richard Kittrelle, for Respondents.

CONREY, P. J.-This is a proceeding whereby the plaintiffs ask that the defendant superior court be prohibited from proceeding further in the trial of an action entitled Van Zandt v. City of Watts et al., and from entering any decree or order of injunction therein. An alternative writ of prohibition was issued by this court. The defendant has responded thereto by a motion to quash the alternative writ, by a demurrer to the petition, and by an answer. The defendants in the injunction case are the city of Watts and its board of trustees and the members thereof. The city of Watts is a municipal corporation of the sixth class.

On or about the twentieth day of September, 1917, there was filed with Virgil R. Franklin, city clerk of the city of Watts, a petition which by its terms requested that the board of trustees of that city cause to be submitted in the manner provided by law to the voters of the city the proposition, "Shall the sale of intoxicating liquors be licensed in this

city?" This petition purported to be signed by residents and qualified electors of the city of Watts. On October 9, 1917, the said city clerk filed with the board of trustees the said petition, with his certificate attached thereto, whereby he certified "that I have examined the foregoing petition and have compared the names thereon with the Great Register oL file in the office of the Registrar of Voters of Los Angeles County, and find the said petition sufficient." Thereafter, on or about the twelfth day of March, 1918, the board of trustees of the city of Watts adopted and passed an ordinance relating to the general election to be held in that city on the eighth day of April, 1918, and further providing that the question of licensing or not licensing the sale of alcoholic liquors in that city be submitted to the electors thereof on the ballots to be used at the election to be held on said eighth day of April.

The several proceedings whereby it is proposed to submit this question to be voted upon at the election of April 8, 1918, have been conducted under the claim that they are in accordance with the provisions of a certain act to provide for the regulation of the traffic in alcoholic liquors by establishing local option, which act was approved on the fourth day of April, 1911. (Stats. 1911, p. 599; Act No. 1696 in Deering's General Laws.) Besides the facts above stated, the complaint in the injunction case alleges that the total number of purported signatures on said initiative petition with street and number address and date, purporting to have been affixed by said purported signers, was 553; that 59 names were rejected by the said city clerk for one reason or another; that the total number of purported signatures remaining was and is 494; that the total number of votes for all candidates for Governor in said city at the last general election was 960; that 25 per cent of said number is the required number of names on said petition; that the number of names required thereon is 240. Paragraph XVIII of the first count of the complaint in the injunction case reads as follows:

That the certificate of said Virgil R. Franklin, city clerk as aforesaid, is false, fraudulent and untrue, and that said petition is false, fraudulent, fictitious, altered, changed, mutilated and void; that plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon that ground alleges the fact to be that the said

certificate is false, fraudulent and untrue, and said petition false, fraudulent, fictitious, altered, changed, mutilated and void in the following particulars and for the following reasons, to wit:

"(1) That 8 names, together with the street and number address, appear twice on the said petition:

"(2) That 3 names appearing on said petition are not the names of registered voters in said defendant city.

“(3) That 3 names appearing thereon are the names of persons not registered in the precinct shown by the address affixed opposite their said names.

"(4) That 346 purported signers did not affix thereto opposite their purported signatures, or at all, the date of st.ch signing and that said 346 dates were affixed thereto by some person or persons other than the purported signers.

“(5) That 13 addresses set opposite 13 purported signatures were not affixed thereto by the purported signer thereof but were affixed by some person or persons other than the said purported signer.

"(6) That 58 names thereon do not correspond or conform to 58 similar names appearing upon affidavits of registration, in the Registrar's office, pertaining to said city.

"(7) That 5 names appearing thereon have additions made thereto by some person other than the purported signers of such names and which before such addition do not correspond to or conform with similar names appearing on the affidavits of registration in the registrar's office pertaining to said defendant city.

"(8) That one purported signer thereto appears by the affidavit of registration pertaining to him to be a person unable to write.

"(9) That 3 purported signatures thereon were not made by the person purported to have signed the same.

"(10) That 15 names appearing thereon have no date affixed thereto.

"(11) That 3 names appearing thereon have no street number affixed thereto.

"(12) That 42 names appearing thereon have no intelligible indication of the date of the purported signature opposite thereto."

In Baines v. Zemansky, 176 Cal. 369, [168 Pac. 5651, the supreme court of California had under consideration certai

questions relating to the power of the superior court to restrain the registrar of voters of the city and county of San Francisco from further action upon certain recall petitions which were then in his hands. In its decision the court said: "Under well-established principles of law it cannot be denied that, if the superior court has jurisdiction, upon any possible state of facts, to prohibit or enjoin the registrar of voters from proceeding with such recall petitions in the manner prescribed in the charter, the sufficiency of the petition or complaint upon which that court acts, so far as the facts stated therein are concerned, cannot be inquired into by this court in this collateral proceeding, but that, on the contrary, its writs and orders must be upheld so far as this case is concerned, and can only be questioned when presented by way of appeal after the final judgment of said court in the cause. If that court has jurisdiction, it may decide the wrong as well as the right in the matter, and its decision is binding on all other persons, officers, and courts, save upon an appeal to the court having appellate jurisdiction of the cause. The sole question for our consideration, therefore, is whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of said proceeding in prohibition and of said action. for an injunction. For the solution of this question we must look to the provisions of the city charter, the allegations upon which the writs and orders were issued, and the general principles of law applicable to the subject."

So here, the sole question for our consideration is whether or not the superior court is exceeding its jurisdiction in proceeding with the trial of said action for an injunction. And for the solution of this question we must look to the provisions of the statute, the allegations of the complaint in that action, and the acts of the superior court with respect thereto.

The matters really at issue in this proceeding are raised by allegations contained in paragraph XVIII, which we have quoted, of the first count of the Van Zandt complaint. The second and third counts of that complaint allege certain other facts, pleaded as furnishing a different basis of right to the demanded injunction. These counts 2 and 3 present questions, within the jurisdiction of the superior court, for its determination. It is for that court to say whether either of those counts is sufficient to state a cause of action, and we cannot in this proceeding review its decision.