1917E, 312, L. R. A. 1917B, 595, 160 Pac. 150], thus: "The injury arises out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury."

The conditions under which the work here was required to be performed took Roberts upon the street. He was subjected to the perils of the street in the course of such employment in exactly the same manner as that in which a factory hand is subjected to the dangers of the factory while in the course of his employment. There is a direct causal connection here between the fact that the man was on the street and the fact that he was injured. The accident was a natural incident of his work resulting from the exposure occasioned by the necessity of his going upon the street while performing such work. He was not exposed to this danger of the street "apart from his employment." The causative danger was peculiar to the work in that had he not been upon the street in the course of his duty he would not have been injured.

Petitioner cites the English cases as opposed to this view, and also cites some California cases. Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, [L. R. A. 1916F, 1164, 158 Pac. 212], and Fishering v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 690, [158 Pac. 215], are not in point, because there the applicant for compensation was injured by the sky-larking of a fellow-employee-an injury which did not arise out of his employment in any manner, and to which an agency not in any manner connected with his employment contributed, namely, the agency of a fellow-employee engaged in horse play.

Neither do the English cases, we think, support the contention of the petitioner when the facts of those cases are carefully examined-at least most of them do not do so. As an instance, take the case of Andrew v. Industrial Society, [1904], 2 K. B. Div. 32, where an employee was killed by being struck by lightning. He might have been struck by lightning had he been on the street or in his home or any other place. He was not struck by lightning because of the fact that he was engaged in a peculiar kind of work, while Roberts was run down and injured while in the performance of an act in the course of his duty, and was placed in his

position of peril by that very performance. The person injured by the dropping of a stone in a railroad cab while the engine was passing under a bridge, and the woman injured while attempting to ward off a cockchafer that flew into the open window of the place where she was employed-the other English cases cited-are upon the same footing as the California cases cited by petitioner. And so of the case of Kelly v. Los Angeles County, 3 Decisions of the Industrial Accident Commission, 539, where a laborer was struck by a stray bullet from a boy's gun.

On the other hand, it seems to us that the case of Kimbol v. Industrial Accident Commission, above cited, in principle covers this case completely. In the case of Balboa Amusement etc. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com., 35 Cal. App. 793, [171 Pac. 108], the injured person was not in the course of his duty when injured. While waiting for an assignment as a movingpicture actor he crossed the street to change his coat, and on his way back stopped to talk with another employee. Manifestly, while so stopping he was not in the line of his duty.

The petitioner contends that because Roberts was exposed only to the ordinary perils of the street to which any other person on the street is exposed, he does not fall within the rule which awards compensation for an injury arising out of the employment of the injured man. When the logical result of the application of the rule for which petitioner is contending is considered, the justice of treating this case as one arising out of Roberts' employment is apparent. Consider the case of a messenger boy. He is in no greater peril on the street than any other person there. He carries perhaps his message in his pocket, leaving his arms disengaged and perfectly free to move about. But he is on the street constantly in the course of his employment. To hold that Roberts is not entitled to compensation would be to hold that this messenger boy would likewise not be entitled to compensation for an injury caused to him by the perils of the street. The illustration might be extended further to truck-drivers, teamsters, and numerous other classes of employment whose followers use the streets in the regular course of their duty, and whose peril on the streets is no greater than that of any other person, but who would not be injured but for the fact that their duty takes and keeps them on the street. It does not seem to us that the legislature

ever intended that these persons should be excluded from the benefit of industrial accident compensation.

The petition is denied.

Lennon, P. J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on April 16, 1918.

[Civ. No. 2072. Second Appellate District.-February 18, 1918.] BLOCHMAN COMMERCIAL & SAVINGS BANK (a Corporation), Respondent, v. L. Y. KETCHAM, Appellant. APPEAL TYPEWRITTEN TRANSCRIPT-ASSUMPTION AS TO RECORD.-On an appeal from a judgment taken under the alternative method, where only a typewritten transcript is filed, the appellate court will assume that the parties have printed in their briefs such portions of the record as they desire to call to the attention of the court, and the court's statement of facts will be confined to matters thus brought to its attention. PROMISSORY NOTE-PLACE OF PAYMENT FILLING IN OF BLANK SPACE BY HOLDER-IMMATERIAL ALTERATION.-Where the place of payment of a promissory note is left blank, and the blank space is preceded by the word "at," there is an implied authority given to the holder to fill in the blank by designating a place of payment at his election, and the act done by him under such authorization is not a material alteration of the instrument.

ID. NOTE EXECUTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRY-FILLING IN OF PLACE OF PAYMENT AS CALIFORNIA-GOVERNING LAW.-In view of section 1646 of the Civil Code which provides a contract is to be interpreted according to the law of the place where it is to be performed, or if it is does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law of the place where it was made, where a promissory note was made in Mexico, with the place of payment left blank, preceded by the word "at," and the payee filled in the place of payment as California, the note is enforceable as a commercial instrument in California, though not enforceable under the laws of Mexico.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. C. N. Andrews, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Shreve & Shreve, and Harry W. Horton, for Appellant. Sam Ferry Smith, and Laurence H. Smith, for Respondent.

CONREY, P. J.-The defendant appeals from the judg ment. The action is based upon an alleged promissory note dated at Ensenada, Mexico. The case is presented upon printed briefs and without oral argument. Appellant contends that as to certain matters the evidence does not sustain the findings, and as to other matters that the court erred in its ruling at the trial. On both sides the briefs discuss portions of the evidence without furnishing us any quotations therefrom. Only a typewritten transcript on appeal has been filed. In such cases the rule is that we will assume that the parties have printed in their briefs such portions of the record as they desire to call to the attention of the court, and that our statement of facts should be confined to matters thus brought to our attention. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 953c; Jones v. American Potash Co., 35 Cal. App. 128, [169 Pac. 397]; Stewart v. Andrews, 35 Cal. App. 230, [169 Pac. 397].) Therefore, we shall discuss on the merits only those points which are illustrated by quotations from the transcript and those assertions of fact made by one party and definitely admitted on the other side, as being shown by the record.

The note as dated and delivered at Ensenada, Mexico, read, in part, as follows: "Six months after date, without grace, I promise to pay to the order of myself at One Thousand Dollars, in Gold Coin of the United States of America, of the present standard value." After the note had been delivered and after it came into the possession of the plaintiff, the plaintiff inserted in the blank line left therein, after the word "at," the words "Blochman Commercial & Savings Bank of San Diego, San Diego, California." The defendant claims that this was a material alteration in the instrument and that for that reason no recovery can be had thereon. He further claims that had no place of payment been inserted in the note, questions concerning its execution and meaning would be determined according to the law of Mexico, under which, he asserts, he would be entitled to the equitable defenses set up in the answer. For the reason above suggested, he has not

properly brought before us those equitable defenses or the rulings of the court. We find, however, in the respondent's brief, a quotation from the record which shows that at the trial the attorney for defendant stated: "I do not expect to go into that fraud proposition." We presume that this referred to those equitable defenses, whatever they were.

Section 1700 of the Civil Code provides that, "The intentional destruction, cancellation, or material alteration of a written contract, by a party entitled to any benefit under it, or with his consent, extinguishes all the executory obligations of the contract in his favor, against parties who do not consent to the act." Appellant relies upon certain decisions made in other states and upon Pelton v. San Jacinto Lumber Co., 113 Cal. 21, [45 Pac. 12]. In the Pelton case it does not appear that any blank was left in the note with words indicating an undesignated place of payment. After its execution it was altered by adding thereto a stated place of payment in the state of New York, although the note was made in California. It was held that this alteration of the note was material. As it read before its alteration it was payable only in this state, but thereafter it was made payable at a designated bank in the state of New York. We are of the opinion, however, that where, as in the case at bar, there is a blank in the note preceded by the word "at," there is an implied authority given to the holder to fill that blank by designating a place of payment at his election. The act done. by him under that authorization does not constitute a material alteration in the instrument. In the interpretation of contracts the intention of the parties, so far as ascertainable and lawful, will control. (Civ. Code, secs. 1636, 3268.) The modern trend of authority seems to be that where the place of payment is inserted in a blank of the kind above described, left in the note at the time it was signed or indorsed by the prior party sought to be charged, the holder will be permitted to recover. Some cases base this rule upon the doctrine of estoppel, but the doctrine of implied authority is also fully admitted; it being recognized, however, that an express understanding that no place of payment is to be inserted will in any event negative the implied authority. (Diamond Distilleries Co. v. Gott, 137 Ky. 585, [31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, 126 S. W. 131].) That case is also reported in 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, where the authorities are collected in an exten