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AFFIDAVITS See ATTACHMENT; TAXES (32).

AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AMENDMENTS.

Refusal of the trial judge to permit an insurance company, in
an action against it on its policy, to amend its plea of the
general issue, on the statement of counsel that a special de-
fense was first made known by the cross-examination of the
plaintiff, is not an abuse of discretion, where, from the ques-
tions propounded on the cross-examination, it is apparent that
some thought of such defense must have been entertained,
and preparation made therefor, before the trial, and the re-
fusal to pay the loss, which was small, was based upon an
entirely distinct claim. Baker v. Michigan Mutual Protective
Ass'n, 431.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4); DEPOT COMPANIES (1); EQUITY
PRACTICE (1); GARNISHMENT (2); RAILROAD COMPANIES (9);
TAXES (22).

APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. Statements by the prosecuting attorney in his argument, al-
though improper as shown by the reporter's minutes, will not
be so considered, where affidavits as to the exact language
used, made by the attorney and several of the jurors, indicate
an entirely proper statement,-especially where no objection
was made to the language used until the reporter's minutes
were written out. People v. Swartz, 293.

2. An objection that the evidence shows the verdict to have
been a compromise verdict cannot be considered on appeal
where the record does not purport to contain all the evidence.
Stevenson v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 651.

3. Where a chancery case turned entirely upon the credibility of
the witnesses for the respective parties, whose proofs were in
direct conflict, the finding of the circuit judge, who saw and
heard the witnesses, was not disturbed. Birdsall v. Birdsall,
658.

4. Where, in an action between landlord and tenant, the claim is
made that a payment of certain moneys under the lease was
through mistake, and the case is presented to the jury upon
that theory, the further claim that the payment was under
duress, asserted for the first time on appeal, cannot be
considered. Lamb v. Rathburn, 666.

See HIGHWAYS (1, 2); INJUNCTIONS (1–3); INSANE PERSONS (2);
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; MANDAMUS; NEW TRIAL; PRACTICE
IN CIRCUIT Court (2); RECEIVERS (1); TAXES (21, 22, 26).

APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS-See PAYMENTS; USURY.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD-See CONTRACTS (3); FIRE INSUR-
ANCE (2); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (11).

ASSAULT.

A conviction under respondent's own testimony might properly be had, in a prosecution for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, where such testimony is to the effect that he, with no reasonable provocation, knocked the complainant down and kicked him in the head several times, and repelled with a knife the efforts of bystanders to interfere. People v. Williams, 692.

ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-See CHATTEL MORTGAGES (2).

ASSUMPSIT - See ACTIONS (2); BAILMENT; PLEADING (1, 2); TELEGRAPH COMPANIES (1).

ASYLUMS-See INSANE PERSONS.

ATTACHMENT.

An affidavit for attachment, which sets up the surreptitious transfer from defendant's place of business to a private residence of a portion of a stock of goods purchased from plaintiff on credit, the disposition of others to personal friends financially irresponsible, the mortgaging of the stock to its full value, and the false representation to other creditors that plaintiff's claim had been paid,-is sufficient to authorize the issuance of the writ, under 3 How. Stat. § 8016a, before the maturity of the debt. E. H. Chase & Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 358.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. An attorney's undertaking to "secure" for his client her rights in a decedent's estate, in consideration of a stipulated interest in the property so secured, is fulfilled, so as to entitle him to the agreed compensation, where he performs all services necessary to the establishment of his client's rights, although the estate acquired vests in the client by operation of law. Moran v. L'Etourneau, 159.

2. Plaintiff, an attorney, agreed to perform certain services for defendant in and about a suit at law, for which he was to receive no pay until a judgment was obtained and the case settled. After judgment in the client's favor, the money was placed by the adverse party in the hands of attorneys, to be paid over to the judgment creditor. A dispute having arisen meantime over the amount of plaintiff's claim, he brought suit. Held, that it was not premature. Walbridge v. Barrett, 433.

3. The fact that services rendered by an attorney under an agreement to charge what they are actually worth are performed with the further understanding that, unless he recovers judgment in his client's favor, he is to receive no compensation at all, has no bearing in determining the amount to which he is entitled if successful. Id. 434.

4. Evidence tending to show that an attorney, before bringing

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Continued.

suit against a client for professional services, attempted to
bring about an adjustment of their differences, is inadmissible
in such suit; and the introduction of proof, as tending to
show such attempted adjustment, of the declarations, brought
home to the client by the plaintiff, of the judge in whose
court the services were rendered, that the attorney ought to
have half of the judgment recovered before him as compensa-
tion for his services, is prejudicial error. Id.

5. Refusing an instruction, in an action by an attorney against
his client to recover for services rendered, that the opinions
of lawyers who testified as to the value of the services are
not conclusive, is erroneous, where there was other evidence
bearing upon the question of such value. Id.

6. The Supreme Court will not take judicial notice that the
complainant in a bill to enforce a judgment is the same per
son as one bearing the same name who is an attorney of the
court, upon a demurrer which sets up the statute (2 How.
Stat. § 7185) prohibiting attorneys from purchasing claims
for the purpose of instituting suit thereon. Belden v. Black-
man, 448.

7. Nor. conceding the identity of the parties, will the court
assume, from the fact that the bill demurred to was filed
three days after the purchase of the judgment by complain
ant, that the purchase was for the purpose prohibited by
the statute. Id.

ATTORNMENT-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (2).

AUDITORS-See ACCOUNTING (2).

BAILMENT.

One who leaves property with a bailee, who converts it to
his own use, may waive the tort, and sue in assumpsit to re-
cover its value. Newman v. Olney, 545.

BALLOTS-See ELECTIONS (4, 5).

BANKRUPTCY-See MORTGAGES (4).

BANKS AND BANKING.

A bank holding certificates of deposit issued by another bank, in
which it has not actually deposited the moneys thereby repre-
sented, but to which it has given credit for the amount on its
own books, against which checks or drafts have been drawn, is
not a depositor, within the provision of 3 How. Stat. § 3208e5,
creating an individual liability of stockholders to depositors.
State Savings Bank of Detroit v. Foster, 268; American Trust
& Savings Bank of Chicago v. Foster, 280.

See GARNISHMENT (3).

BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-See MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS.

BIBLE READINGS.

1. Judicial notice may be taken of the practice, which has obtained for many years in the public schools, of reading from the Bible and offering prayer in the presence of the pupils. Pfeiffer v. Board of Education of Detroit, 560.

2. The use in the public schools, for 15 minutes at the close of each day's session, as a supplemental text-book on reading, of a book entitled "Readings from the Bible," which is largely made up of extracts from the Bible emphasizing the moral precepts of the Ten Commandments, where the teacher is forbidden to make any comment upon the matter therein contained, and is required to excuse from that part of the session any pupil upon application of his parent or guardian, is not a violation of the State Constitution, article 4, § 41, prohibiting the legislature from diminishing or enlarging "the civil or political rights, privileges, and capacities of any person on account of his opinion or belief concerning matters of religion." Id.

3. Nor is it a violation of article 4, § 40, providing that "no money shall be appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious sect or society, theological or religious seminary, nor shall property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such purposes.'

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Id.

4. Nor is it a violation of article 4, § 39, providing that "the legislature shall pass no law to prevent any person from worshiping Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience, or to compel any person to attend, erect, or support any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion." Id.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-See NEW TRIAL.

BILL OF REVIEW-See TAXES (31).

BOARDS OF REVIEW-See TAXES (1, 41).

BOARDS OF SUPERVISORS-See HIGHWAYS (4, 5).

BONA FIDE PURCHASER-See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (3); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (3).

BONDS-See EQUITY JURISDICTION (4); PRINCIPAL AND SURETY; TAXES (19).

BOOKS OF ACCOUNT—See EVIDENCE (1); TRIAL (1).

BOUNDARIES.

1. Where disputed boundary lines have been established by express agreement, or under such circumstances that an agreement will be implied, and the parties have for any considerable time recognized them, they will be upheld, though title

118 MICH.-45.

BOUNDARIES-Continued.

by adverse possession could not be maintained. Pittsburgh,
etc., Iron Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 109.

2. Evidence that one of two companies owning land bordering
upon a lake requested the other to deed to it such of the land
under the waters of the lake as would be included within its
subdivision of the section if its lines were projected through
the lake, and that the request was refused on the ground that
the boundary between the properties should be determined
with reference to the rules of riparian ownership, shows that
the boundary was in dispute. Id.

3. The statute of frauds, which operates to forbid the acquiring
of title to land by estoppel, has no application to voluntary
adjustments of disputed boundaries, to which, therefore, the
doctrine of estoppel may be applied. Id.

See CORPORATIONS (2).

BOYCOTT-See EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYÉ (3–6).

BRICK, MEASUREMENT OF-See CONTRACTS (2, 3).

BRIDGES.

1. Notice to the contractor of a township bridge that it is being
built of defective material is not notice to the township.
Moore v. Township of Hazelton, 425.

2. One may properly presume, in the absence of any knowledge
or indication to the contrary, that a township has repaired a
weak and shaky bridge after the lapse of a year from the
time that it was known to be in that condition. Id.

3. The question whether a thresher, who sustained damages by
reason of such a bridge, had such knowledge, or opportunity
of knowing, of the continuance of the defect as would ren-
der him guilty of contributory negligence in driving his
machine upon the bridge, was for the jury, under proper
instructions. Id.

4. In an action against a township for damages caused by the
giving way of a bridge under a threshing outfit, the plaintiff,
who had knowledge the year before the accident that the
bridge was weak and shaky, was properly asked on cross-
examination whether he did not think it was an act of care-
lessness to attempt to cross the bridge without first examin-
ing it to see whether, in his judgment, it was strong enough
to sustain the weight of the machinery. Id.

5. While townships must construct bridges sufficiently strong to
meet the ordinary requirements of travel in the community,
they are not obliged to provide structures that will sustain
loads that could not reasonably be anticipated. Id.

6. Whether a ten-horse traction engine and tank full of water
was such a load was a proper question for the jury. Id.

BROKERS-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (1).

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