On a trial before a jury, she recovered a verdict of $104.50, and defendant brings error. The policy was issued December 3, 1896, and the assessment for that month paid. The assured died on the 14th of January, 1897, after the second monthly payment became due, and while the amount remained unpaid. The plaintiff was therefore not entitled to recover unless the default in making this payment is excused. The plaintiff introduced testimony tending to show that, at the time the policy was taken out, the agent of the company stated to plaintiff that the company would send a collector to the house of the assured between the 1st and 10th of each month, and that payments could and should be made to such collector; that the deceased had the money ready for such collector, but that none came; and that no notification was received that the dues should or might be paid elsewhere. Plaintiff's husband was taken sick, and died on the 14th, and the plaintiff afterwards, learning that the company had an agent in the city, tendered the dues to him, but he refused to receive them. The circuit judge instructed the jury, in substance, that, if they found this claimed state of facts to exist, the policy did not lapse because of the delay in making payments. We think this instruction a correct statement of the law. If the plaintiff's testimony on this point was true,-and the jury so found, it would be a gross injustice to permit the company to profit by its own default in calling for the dues. The place of payment was the home of the assured, and no other was known to plaintiff. Even when the right to make payment at the residence depends upon custom, good faith requires that this custom should not be discontinued, and payment required at the office of the society, without notice to the assured. Nibl. Acc. Ins. & Ben. Soc. (2d Ed.) § 299. Defendant sought to show that the plaintiff had made certain misrepresentations and warranties at the time the policy was issued. The circuit judge ruled out this testimony as not admissible under the pleadings. The plea was simply the general issue, and the ruling was clearly right, under paragraph d, Cir. Ct. Rule No. 7. The defendant, after the main testimony for the defense had been introduced, asked leave to amend. No showing under oath was made, but counsel stated that the defense was first made known by the cross-examination of the plaintiff. It appeared, however, by some of the questions propounded on cross-examination, that some thought of such a defense must have been entertained before the trial, and some preparation made along these lines. Besides this, other considerations may have influenced the action of the trial judge, the fact that the amount involved was small, and that the refusal to pay the loss had been put upon the single ground that the policy had lapsed. Under these circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that the refusal to permit an amendment was such a clear abuse of discretion as justifies us in reversing the case. Wayne Circuit Judge, 41 Mich. 727. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. The other Justices concurred. King v. WALBRIDGE v. BARRETT. - 1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT ACTION FOR SERVICES- PREMATURE COMMENCEMENT. Plaintiff, an attorney, agreed to perform certain services for defendant in and about a suit at law, for which he was to receive no pay until a judgment was obtained and the case settled. After judgment in the client's favor, the money was placed by the adverse party in the hands of attorneys, to be paid over to the judgment creditor. A dispute having arisen meantime over the amount of plaintiff's claim, he brought suit. Held, that it was not premature. 118 MICH.-28. 2. SAME COMPENSATION CONTINGENT ON SUCCESS. The fact that services rendered by an attorney under an agreement to charge what they are actually worth are performed with the further understanding that, unless he recovers judgment in his client's favor, he is to receive no compensation at all, has no bearing in determining the amount to which he is entitled if successful. 3. SAME ATTEMPTED SETTLEMENT HEARSAY. Evidence tending to show that an attorney, before bringing suit against a client for professional services, attempted to bring about an adjustment of their differences, is inadmissible in such suit; and the introduction of proof, as tending to show such attempted adjustment, of the declarations, brought home to the client by the plaintiff, of the judge in whose court the services were rendered, that the attorney ought to have half of the judgment recovered before him as compensation for his services, is prejudicial error. 4. EVIDENCE-OFFER OF JUDGMENT-WITNESSES. A defendant who has testified, on cross-examination, that he never tendered a certain amount in court, cannot be shown an unaccepted written offer of judgment, and asked if he ever made an offer of such amount, since such a proceeding places the writing before the jury as effectually as if it were read in evidence, in contravention of 2 How. Stat. § 7372, which provides that such an offer, if unaccepted, is to be deemed withdrawn, and "cannot be given in evidence." 5. SAME ATTORNEY'S SERVICES-VALUE--INSTRUCTIONS. Refusing an instruction, in an action by an attorney against his client to recover for services rendered, that the opinions of lawyers who testified as to the value of the services are not conclusive, is erroneous, where there was other evidence bearing upon the question of such value. Wood v. Barker, 49 Mich. 295, distinguished. Error to superior court of Grand Rapids; Burlingame, J. Submitted October 5, 1898. Decided November 1, 1898. Assumpsit by Edward L. Walbridge and James T. McAllister against Ervin E. Barrett for services as attorneys at law. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant brings error. Reversed. Bundy & Travis, for appellant. J. Byron Judkins (Henry E. Walbridge, of counsel), for appellees. GRANT, C. J. Plaintiffs are attorneys, bringing suit to recover for their services rendered for defendant in and about a suit brought by him against the Grand Rapids Veneer Works. Defendant was defeated in that suit in the circuit court, appealed it to this court, and obtained a reversal. Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6. The case was again tried in the circuit, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $6,198.40, and costs, taxed at $646. Defendant disputed plaintiffs' claim, and this suit followed. Plaintiffs obtained a verdict and judgment for $1,130.50. The testimony, so far as is material, will be stated in connection with the points determined. 1. Defendant requested the court to direct a verdict for him, on the ground that the action was prematurely brought. This request was based upon the contract for services as stated by plaintiffs,-that they were to receive no pay for their services until a judgment was obtained and the case settled. A settlement of the case was made on May 17, 1897, and a check of the veneer company for the amount given to its attorneys, to be paid to Mr. Barrett. Meanwhile the dispute arose over the amount of plaintiffs' claim for services. Plaintiffs had employed other attorneys, and were endeavoring to obtain the Under these circumstances, the request was money. properly refused. 2. There was evidence tending to show that plaintiffs refused to take the case upon commission, but agreed to charge nothing unless they obtained a judgment, and, if they obtained a judgment, were to receive what their services were worth. Several witnesses were asked to state what would be a reasonable charge for plaintiffs' services, rendered "with the express understanding that, unless they finally recovered judgment in the case, they were to get nothing." This testimony was incompetent. They agreed to charge what their services were worth. They were worth no more and no less because of the agreement to charge nothing unless they were successful. A carpenter or plumber or machinist who agrees to do a certain piece of work upon the agreement that, if he does not accomplish the purpose in view, he shall receive nothing, but, if he does, he is to receive what his services are worth, can recover no more than their actual worth. The value of his services is not enhanced or lessened by the contingency. An agreement made by a lawyer stands upon no different basis. 3. The case of Barrett against the veneering company was tried before Judge Adsit. Plaintiff Walbridge was permitted to testify that he told Barrett that Judge Adsit had told Mr. McAllister that plaintiffs ought to have half of the judgment as a compensation. The sole ground upon which plaintiffs defend the competency of this evidence is that they had a right to show what inducement and influence they had used with defendant to bring about an adjustment without litigation. We cannot concur in this view. It was immaterial what efforts had been made to adjust their differences. The attempt had failed, and the sole questions were, What was the agreement, and how much were their services worth? The opinion of the judge who tried the case, though hearsay, might have great influence with the jury. 4. On cross-examination defendant testified that the balance due the plaintiffs was about $350. He was asked if he had not claimed it to be $526. He replied that he had not, and denied that he had ever tendered "that amount in court." Plaintiffs' counsel then handed him a written offer of judgment filed in the case, made under 2 How. Stat. § 7372, which provides: "If the notice of acceptance be not given, the offer is to be deemed withdrawn, and cannot be given in evidence," and asked if he ever made them an offer of $526. After objection and exception the witness replied: "Under certain circum |