general tax law. We regard the rule laid down in the cases cited as salutary and just, and, if the facts in this case admitted of the application of that rule, we should apply it with great satisfaction to ourselves. For although, as will be shown later, we feel constrained to hold that the basis adopted for assessment was erroneous, and therefore jurisdictionally defective, yet we are left in doubt as to whether the complainant's cestuis que trustent have really suffered any substantial injury by reason of this departure. We find, however, in this case, an admission of record that the complainant had no knowledge of these proceedings until long after they were taken, and feel that we cannot, in view of this admission, ignore jurisdictional defects without doing violence to established principles. We need discuss but one defect in the proceedings. Act No. 313, Local Acts 1895, § 2, provides: "That all lateral and connecting sewers may be constructed at the cost and expense of the lands, tenements, and premises adjacent thereto and benefited thereby, and the cost thereof may be levied on and assessed against such lands, tenements, and premises, and collected from the owners thereof, by foot frontage, according to benefits, or by land values, as the common council shall or may determine by ordinance." The record shows that the assessment was made on the basis of the value of each parcel, "exclusive of improvements erected thereon." While it was doubtless competent for the legislature to have authorized an assessment on a basis which would exclude the value of improvements (Cooley, Tax'n [2d Ed.], 649), the statute in question does not do so, but authorizes an assessment based upon the value of the land. Land, of course, includes the structures and improvements thereon. 2 Bl. Comm. 18. It follows that the basis adopted was unauthorized, and the assessment was jurisdictionally defective. The assessment must be set aside, but without prejudice to a reassessment, if the city shall be advised that one may be lawfully made. Complainant will recover costs against the city. The other Justices concurred. THOMAS v. CRAWFORD. DEEDS MENTAL INCAPACITY-GRANT TO MARRIED WOMAN-CON SIDERATION. Complainant, an aged woman, incapable, from grief over the recent death of her husband, of understanding the nature of business transactions, gave to defendant a deed of her property, in consideration of her support during life and burial at death. The grantee was a married woman, and, while her husband participated in the negotiations, he did not obligate himself to fulfill the wife's agreement as recited in the deed. No separate instrument binding defendant was executed, and the deed did not correctly represent the bargain which defendant's own testimony showed was made. Held, that it should be set aside. Appeal from Hillsdale; Peck, J., présiding. Submitted June 17, 1898. Decided September 27, 1898. Bill by Mary Thomas against Lucinda Crawford to set aside a deed. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Frankhauser & Cornell, for complainant. MONTGOMERY, J. Bill filed to set aside a conveyance on the grounds of undue influence and mental weakness. The court below granted the relief prayed, and defendant appeals. The complainant is a widow, and at the date of the con veyance was 74 years old. The evidence shows that she, as Dr. Howard, a witness for the defendant, expressed it, "is a nervous, fidgety woman, troubled with nervous prostration at times." About a week after her husband's decease the conveyance in question was made, transferring all the real estate which the complainant had to the defendant, who is not a relative. The deed recited a consideration "of her [grantor's] support during her natural life, and her burial at death, by said second party." It was accompanied by no separate agreement. The complainant's testimony tends to show that she was, at the time this deed was made, so overcome by grief that she was incapable of understanding the transaction, and did not, in fact, understand that she had conveyed away the fee of the land. The testimony on the part of the defense indicates that the negotiations were conducted with defendant and her husband, and no satisfactory reason is shown why the husband was not obligated in some way to fulfill the engagement to care for complainant. The circuit judge was of the opinion that the deed did not protect the complainant, or correctly represent the bargain which defendant's testimony shows was made, and that the complainant did not understand the legal effect of the convey ance. We are fully satisfied that the circuit judge reached the correct result. The case, in many of its features, is similar to Crips v. Towsley, 73 Mich. 399. The court found that defendant had been fully compensated for the care of complainant for the time she remained with her, and in this we also concur. The decree will be affirmed, with costs. The other Justices concurred. HOOKER v. BOND.1 1. TAXES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Certain objections to the constitutionality of the tax law of 1893 are overruled upon the authority of Ball v. Ridge Copper Co., ante, 7. 2. SAME-VALIDITY OF SALE-IRREGULARITIES. Under former decisions, a tax sale is not void because (1) No demand was made for the payment of the tax, nor effort made to collect the same from personal property. (2) The land was not assessed to the owner. (3) No order pro confesso was entered. (4) The decree was not entered in the record book of decrees, did not contain a description of the property, and was not enrolled. 3. SAME-DECREE-TIME OF ENTRY - DIRECTORY PROVISIONS OF STATUTE. The provision of section 66 of the tax law of 1893, that decree shall be rendered "at least 10 days prior to the time fixed for the sale," is directory merely, a failure to observe which does not invalidate the proceeding. 4. SAME CURATIVE PROVISIONS. Furthermore, such a defect is clearly within the curative provision of the act (section 99). 5. SAME-TAX RECORD-APPEAL-OBJECTIONS NOT RAISED BELOW. An objection that a certified copy of the decree in a tax proceeding was not annexed to the tax record, as required by section 67 of the tax law, will be disregarded on appeal, where the fact is not clearly shown by the record, and the objection does not appear to have been raised in the court below. Appeal from Wayne; Donovan, J. Submitted June 7, 1898. Decided September 27, 1898. Petition by Joseph Hooker against William G. Bond, Estella C. Murgittroyd, and Elanson S. Murgittroyd, for 1 Rehearing denied June 28, 1899. From an order a writ of assistance under a tax deed. Charles C. Stewart, for petitioner. Albert J. Chapman, for respondents. GRANT, C. J. The petitioner, Joseph Hooker, presented his petition to the court below for a writ of assistance under a tax deed issued to him for delinquent taxes for the year 1892. The court denied the writ. The defendant Estella C. Murgittroyd is the owner of the original title. The validity of the proceedings under which petitioner obtained his deed is attacked for the following reasons: 1. The tax law of 1893 is unconstitutional, in that it permits landowners to be deprived of their property without due process of law. 2. The provision authorizing the issuance of the writ of assistance is void. 3. No demand for the payment of the taxes was made of the person liable to pay them. 4. The property was not assessed to the owner. 5. The collector did not seize and sell personal property to pay the tax. 6. No order pro confesso was ever entered. 7. No decree was made and entered of record in the proper book in the office of the register in chancery. 8. The decree does not contain a description of the property. 9. No certified copy of the decree was annexed to the tax record in the county treasurer's office. 10. The decree was not enrolled. 11. The decree was not rendered 10 days before the day fixed for the sale. The first and second objections are disposed of by Ball v. Ridge Copper Co., ante, 7. All the other objections, except the eleventh and ninth, are controlled by former decisions of this court. Muirhead v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487; Auditor General v. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574; Mersereau v. Miller, 112 Mich. 103; Jenkinson v. Auditor General, 104 Mich. 37; Iron Star Co. v. Wehse, 117 |