tional power to negotiate treaties with reference to it and to give those treaties the force and effect of law of the land becomes perfected. At the present moment, I am informed from reliable sources, an agreement is in process of negotiation with the Dominion of Canada which will have for its purpose the extension of the provisions of the recent Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Law to the case of birds passing from Canada. It would be difficult to distinguish such a treaty in principle from one of the sort mentioned at the opening of this paper, for the State's police power with reference to its wild game is well settled.22 The precedent will be the more precious from its origin with a State-rights Administration. 22 See e.g., Geer v. Conn. 161 U. S. 519. Mr. Henry Chase in his recent volume on Game Protection seems to think that while the Weeks-McLean Act is possibly unconstitutional as invading the police powers of the States, a treaty covering the same matter would not be open to this objection. That is a great mistake. If the reserved powers of the States restrict Congress in the exercise of its powers, then also do they restrict the national treaty-making power in its capacity to make “law of the land". My Own belief is that the Weeks-McLean Act is perfectly constitutional as an act "necessary and proper" to protect the federal timber reserves. The act is analogous to congressional legislation intended to repress crime within districts subject to Congress' exclusive power of legislation. The authors of crimes committed within such districts, forts, arsenals, etc., are often tried outside them, within State territory. But if a resident of a State should attempt to rescue the culprit in such a case he would be subject to federal law. Likewise, if a resident of a State should withhold information with reference to a crime committed within a district subject to Congress' exclusive power, he would be guilty, under the act of Congress, of misprision of felony, and punishable therefor. And examples might be multiplied: Cohens v. Va. 6 The whole question, then, is wrapped up in the phrase "genuine international concern," and this, as I have indicated, is a thing ever advancing and developing. What with cable, steamship, wireless telegraphy, and inter-oceanic canals, the world to-day is astonishingly small and the consequence is that the nations can no longer live unto themselves in the way that was earlier possible. The rise of an international police power and of an international power of eminent domain, exercisable by the fitter members in the Family of Nations, is a development clear and palpable before our eyes. The development of uniform national legislation of social character, in pursuance of international agreement, is but another phase of the broader development of international solidarity. And it is the fundamental contention of this paper that the United States is competent to march abreast of this development.23 Wheat. 264, 424-30. Congress, whatever of its powers it happens to be exercising at any particular moment, is always the national legislature, and capable as such of giving its acts nation-wide operation,—so that they be passed in exercise of its constitutional powers. The only question with reference to the Migratory Bird Act is, then, whether its nation-wide operation is a necessary and proper measure for the protection of national property of great value. Certainly, there can be no dispute about that. The efforts of the advocates of the law, however, to bring it within the "commerce" clause seem to me rather far-fetched. 23 For further discussion of the questions above considered, see the writer's National Supremacy (Holt and Co., N. Y., 1913); also, his article on the Treaty-Making Power in the North Am. Rev. for June, 1914. INDEX (The list of cases indexed is incomplete.) Acts of Congress: Alien and Sedition Laws, 55; Judiciary Act Blackstone, Sir Wm.: Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Breckenridge, Sen. Jno.: States doctrine of departmental con- Buchanan, Pres.: Participation of, in the Dred Scott decision, Calhoun, Jno. C.: Theory of the Union and the Constitution, 60-1. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 99, 161-2. Martin v. Mott, 67, of Assistance Case, 29-32. Chase, C. J.: See Hepburn v. Griswold Regards principle of separation of powers as merely Chase, J. Catron, J.: Action in procuring the decision in Scott v. San- Citizenship: Source of, under the Constitution (1857), 154-5. Common Law: As a source of national jurisdiction, 55. Constitutional Reaction (1780-87): Phases and characteristic Constitutions: Basis of, in revolution, 34-5. Convention of 1787: Purposes of, 37-8, 164; see Judicial Review Curtis, J. Dissenting opinion of, in Scott v. Sanford, 151-2, Departmental Construction of the Constitution: reviewed and criticized, 18-26, 66-8. Departmental Discretion: Doctrine of, 60-1, 67. Doctrine of, Dred Scott Case: Statement of facts in, 129-30; before the |