TAXATION (continued).

4. In such case, on the payment or the tender of the sum which such
shares onght to pay under the rule established by that act, a court
of equity will enjoin the State authorities from collecting the re-
mainder. Id.

5. The Constitution of Ohio declares that "laws shall be passed taxing
by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks,
joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and also all the real and per-
sonal property, according to its true value in money." And the
legislature has passed laws providing separate State boards of equal-
ization for real estate, for railroad capital, and for bank shares, but
there is no State board to equalize personal property, including all
other moneyed capital. The equalizing process as to all other per-
sonal property and moneyed capital ceases with the county boards.
Throughout a large part of Ohio, including Lucas County, in which
A., a national bank, is located, perhaps all over the State, the offi-
cers charged with the valuation of property for purposes of taxation
adopted a settled rule or system, by which real estate was estimated
at one-third of its true value, ordinary personal property about the
same, and moneyed capital at three-fifths of its true value. The
State board of equalization of bank shares increased the valuation
of them to their full value. A. brought its bill against the treas-
urer of that county, praying that he be enjoined from collecting a
tax wrongfully assessed on those shares. Held, 1. That the statute
creating the board for equalizing bank shares is not void as a viola-
tion of the Constitution of Ohio, because if the local assessors would
discharge their duty by assessing all property at its actual cash value,
the operation of the equalizing board would work no inequality of
taxation, and a statute cannot be held to be unconstitutional which
in itself does not conflict with the Constitution, because of the in-
justice produced by its maladministration. 2. That the rule or
principle of unequal valuation of different classes of property for
taxation, adopted by local boards of assessment, is in conflict with
that Constitution, and works manifest injustice to the owners of
bank shares. 3. That when a rule or system of valuation for pur-
poses of taxation is adopted by those whose duty it is to make the
assessment, which is intended to operate unequally, in violation of
the fundamental principles of the Constitution, and when this prin-
ciple is applied not solely to one individual, but to a large class of
individuals or corporations, equity may properly interfere to restrain
the operation of the unconstitutional exercise of power. 4. That
the appropriate mode of relief in such cases is, upon payment of the
amount of the tax which is equal to that assessed on other property,
to enjoin the collection of the illegal excess. Cummings v. National
Bank, 153.

3. This court adhering to the construction given by the Supreme Court
of Iowa to the revenue laws of that State touching the time when
lands located or entered under the laws of the United States, or pur-
chased from the State, become taxable, holds that the lands, the title

TAXATION (continued).

whereto by the joint resolution of Congress approved March 2, 1861
(12 Stat. 251), passed to bona fide purchasers of that State, were not
subject to taxation prior to the year 1862. Litchfield v. County of
Webster, 773.

-

7. Where the State claimed adversely to the true owner a part of said
lands, and there was a controversy whether the title to the remainder
had passed from the United States, and, on that account, the proper
authorities of the State gave notice to the parties in interest that no
legal steps would be taken to enforce the collection of the taxes
until the title should be adjusted, — Held, that the statutory inter-
est, which is in the nature of a penalty, cannot be exacted for non-
payment of them within the time prescribed by law, where the
owner, on the adjustment of the title, offered to pay so much of
them as was actually due, with interest thereon at the rate allowed
by law for delay in the payment of ordinary debts, and his offer was
refused. Id.

8. A court of equity has, under such circumstances, the power to grant
relief by enjoining the collection of such statutory interest. Id.
TAX-PAYER, SUIT BY. See Equity, 1.

TENNESSEE. See Constitutional Law, 7.

TERNE PLATES. See Customs Duties, 1.

TERRITORY, ORGANIZATION OF A. See Constitutional Law, 8.
The statutes of Congress organizing a Territory within the jurisdiction
of the United States is the fundamental law of such Territory, and
as such binding upon the territorial authorities. National Bank v.
County of Yankton, 129.

TIN IN PLATES. See Customs Duties, 1.

TOLL-BRIDGE. See Georgia.

TRADE.

1. The word "trade" in its broadest signification includes not only
the business of exchanging commodities by barter, but that of buy-
ing and selling for money, or commerce and traffic generally. May
v. Sloan, 231.

2. Where, to effect a settlement of all his indebtedness to B. and C., who
eath held a mortgage upon his lands and personal property, A.
entered into an agreement in writing with them, containing sundry
provisions, by one of which C. stipulated "not to interfere with any
bona fide trades made by A., so far as any of the mortgaged property
is concerned, provided the trades have been carried out in good
faith and completed." Held, that a sale by A. to B. of a portion of
the lands, which was known to C., and evidenced by an instrument
under seal, was a trade within the meaning of the agreement. Id.
TRADE-MARKS.

1 Letters or figures affixed to merchandise by a manufacturer, for the
purpose of denoting its quality only, cannot be appropriated by him

TRADE-MARKS (continued).

to his exclusive use as a trade-mark. Manufacturing Company
Trainer, 51.

2. An injunction will not be granted at his suit to restrain another
manufacturer from using a label bearing no resemblance to the com-
plainant's, except that certain letters, which alone convey no mean-
ing, are inserted in the centre of each, the dissimilarity of the labels
being such that no one will be misled as to the true origin or owner-
ship of the merchandise. Id.

TRAFFIC. See Trade.

TRIAL. See Record.

TRUST. See Deed, Reformation of, 1; Equity, 3; Executor; Will.
Whatever may

be the terms creating a trust estate, its nature and dura-
tion are governed by the requirements of the trust. Young v.
Bradley, 782.

TRUSTEE. See Wife, Voluntary Settlement upon, 3; Will.

ULTRA VIRES. See Railroads.

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, DEVISE TO. See Charitable
Bequests.

VERDICT. See Feigned Issue, 1; Practice, 12.

VIRGINIA. See Charitable Bequests.

VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT. See Wife, Voluntary Settlement upon.
WAIVER. See Practice, 7.

WASHINGTON TERRITORY, ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OF
THE COURTS OF. See Admiralty.

WIFE, VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT UPON.

1. Unless existing claims of creditors are thereby impaired, a voluntary
settlement of property made by a husband upon his wife is not
invalid. Jones v. Clinton, 225.

2. The technical reasons of the common law arising from the unity of
husband and wife, which would prevent his conveying the property
directly to her for a valuable consideration, as upon a contract or
purchase, have long since ceased to operate in the case of his volun-
tary transfer of it as a settlement upon her. Id.

3 The intervention of trustees, in order that the property may be held
as her separate estate beyond his control or interference, though
formerly held to be indispensable, is no longer required. Id.
4. His reservation of a power of revocation or appointment to other uses
does not impair the validity or efficiency of the conveyance in trans-
ferring the property to her, to hold until such power shall be exe-
cuted; nor does it tend to create an imputation upon his good faith
and honesty in the transaction. Id.

5. Such a power does not, in the event of his bankruptcy, pass to his
assignee. Id.

WIFE, VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT UPON (continued)
6. Where property, conveyed to the wife under a valid settlement made
by the husband, was by their joint act afterwards appropriated to
the payment of one of his creditors, - Held, that subsequent cred-
itors and his assignee in bankruptcy could not rightfully complain.
Stewart v. Platt, 731.

A. died in 1867. By his last will and testament he devised his entire
estate to B., in trust, first, to set apart a certain house and its con
tents, together with one-third of the net income of his estate, to his
widow for her natural life; then to divide said estate into four
equal parts, and allot one to his son C., another to the children of
the latter, and the remaining two to his daughters D. and E. re-
spectively; then, upon the death of said widow, to set apart to D.
and E. the house occupied by her, the same being a charge against
their respective shares of the estate; next to hold the shares of said
D. and E., in trust, for their sole and separate use, free from the
control of their husbands, during their respective natural lives; but
in the event of either of them dying without issue her share should
go to the children of C. The will further provided that B. should
have the largest powers and discretion in taking charge of and man-
aging the estate, and authorized him to have, hold, direct, and con-
trol the aforesaid trust property, according to his best judgment,
and to sell and dispose of the same, or any parts thereof, from time
to time, subject only to the aforesaid trusts, and as freely as A.
could do if living; and also in all things to have the same powers,
rights, privileges, benefits, advantages as A. might have, if living,
in all and any contracts, bargains, agreements, companies, or other
compacts to which he, A., was a party. By consent of the parties
interested, no division or distribution of the estate was made. The
widow died in 1868, C. in 1869, and D. and E. in 1870, both of the
latter without issue. In 1871, B., as trustee, conveyed certain of
the real estate to F. Thereupon C.'s children filed this bill to have
the conveyance set aside as null and void, and for a decree entitling
them to the possession of the premises. Held, 1. That at the time
B. undertook to sell the property to F., the trust estate created in
him by the will of A. had become extinct. 2. That his powers as
trustee having ceased, his conveyance to F. was void.
Bradley, 782.

WRIT OF ERROR. See Jurisdiction, 4; Practice, 16, 17

Young ▼.