« AnteriorContinuar »
REBELLION, THE (continued).
sition as might thereafter be made of them by the decisions of tho
proper tribunals. Id.
8. A lessee who was dispossessed by the military authorities under suck.
circumstances, and deprived of the use and control of the demised
premises, is discharged from liability to his lessor for rent accru
ing during the period of such dispossession. Id.
RECORD. See Feigned Issue, 2.
A statement in the record that an issue was “ called for trial by the
court, the jury having been waived in writing,” is, in the absence
of any thing to the contrary, conclusive that the requisite agreement
for such a trial was made. Fleitas v. Cockrem, 301.
REFEREE. See Estoppel, 3; Practice, 18, 19.
REISSUED LETTERS-PATENT. See Letters-patent, 1, 2
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See Causes, Removal of.
RES JUDICATA. See Causes, Removal of, 3, 4.
1. A judgment in assumpsit, brought by a husband and wife, on a con-
tract by a carrier of passengers to carry her safely, for injuries to
her while being carried, is a bar to another action of assumpsit on
the same contract, by the husband alone, to recover for the same
injuries. Pollard v. Railroad Company, 223.
2. A different rule prevails when the action is in tort against the carrier
for a breach of his public duty, except, perhaps, in States where, as
in New Jersey, the husband, in such an action, may by statute add
claims in his own right to those of his wife. Id.
8. A., although out of possession of certain lands in Mississippi, filed
his bill under a statute of that State to remove a cloud upon his
title to them. The question of title was directly raised and liti-
gated by the parties. The court being of opinion that he was not
entitled to any relief in the premises, dismissed the bill. A. there-
upon brought ejectment against B., the defendant in the former
suit. lleld, that the decree did not render the main controversy res
judicata, as the court merely decided in effect that the bill would
not lie. Phelps v. llarris, 370.
4. A. filed his bill claiming that he, as a creditor of a commercial firm,
all the members of which were insolvent, had a prior lien or privilege
upon the partnership property which had been transferred by them
in payment of their individual debts, and seeking to subject that
property to the payment of his debt. The bill, on a final hearing
upon the pleadings and proofs, was dismissed. A. thereupon com-
menced a suit for the same cause of action against the same parties,
alleging, in addition to the matters set forth in his former bill, that
he had recovered a judgment at law against the partnership for the
debt, and that an execution issued thereon had been returned nulla
bona. Helil, that the former decree is as res judicata a bar to the
suit. Case v. Beauregard, 688.
REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
Sect. 5597 of the Revised Statutes saves all rights which had accrued
under any of the acts repealed by sect. 5596. Bechlel v. Unitea
The following sections referred to and explained: –
Sect. 1000. See Supersedcas, 1.
Sect. 2501. See Customs Duties, 6; Persia, Treaty with.
Sect. 2503. See Customs Duties, 1.
Sect. 2504. See Customs Duties, 1.
Sect. 3218. See Internal Revenue, Collector of, 1.
Sect. 3413. See Constitutional Law, 1; Taxation, 1.
Sect. 3425. See Evidence, 3.
Sect. 4920. See Letters-patent, 12.
SAINT LOUIS COURT OF APPEALS. See Missouri, Constitution of.
SALE. See Executor; Public Lands, 1.
Salvors cannot in the same libel proceed in rem against a vessel and in
personam against the consignees of her cargo. The “ Sabine," 384
SEPARATE ESTATE. See Married Woman, Separate Estate of.
SET-OFF. See Claims against the United States ; Internal Revenue, Col-
lector of, 1, 3.
An executor's settlement of his accounts, although adjudicated by the
proper court, binds only the parties thereto. Butterfield v. Smith,
SOLICITOR, ASSENT OF, TO A DECREE. See Appeal, 3.
SOLICITOR, PURCHASE BY. See Judicial Sale.
SPECIAL VERDICT. See Practice, 19.
A. and B. in November, 1846, entered into an agreement under seal,
providing for the settlement of long standing and disputed accounts.
A balance from B. to A. was ascertained, and the mode of payınent
and security agreed upon. A. released property of B. from the lien
of judgments. B. among other things stipulated that he would ob-
tain partition of certain lands wherein he had an undivided interest,
and convey in fee the part assigned to him in severalty to A. at such
price as should be adjudged by three appraisers, one to be appointed
by A., one by B., and one by the other two. Such price to be credited
on the judgments held by A. against B., and that the latter would
give good security for the balance remaining due. B. died in 1819.
There was no partition until 1866, when it was effected by his
devisees, a fact not known to A. until 1872. They have made to A.
no conveyance of the part of said lands assigned to them in severalty.
8l'ECIFIC PERFORMANCE (continued).
A. filed his bill in 1876, alleging that he had performed all the stipu-
lations on his part to be performed, and that $40,000 of the original
debt with accruing interest remains unpaid, and praying for such
a conveyance, for the ascertainment of the balance under the order
of the court, and for general relief. The devisees demurred. Held,
1. That upon the case made by the bill A.'s remedy was not barred
by the lapse of time. 2. That A. having under the agreement
parted with rights, and B. received value, the consideration of which
was in part the stipulation concerning the lands, the agreement for
the conveyance can be specifically enforced, and the court will, if it
be necessary, provide a mode for ascertaining the value of the lands.
Gunton v. Carroll, 426.
STATE COURTS, JURISDICTION OF. See Constitutional Law, 2–5.
STATE STATUTES, CITATION OF. See Practice, 8, 9.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See Frauds, Statute of.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See Limitations, Statute of.
STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.
1. Statutes are not to be construed as altering the common law, or ag
making any innovation therein, further than their words import.
Shaw v. Railroad Company, 557.
2. The settled judicial construction of a statute, so far as contract rights
were thereunder acquired, is as much a part of the statute as the
text itself, and a change of decision is the same in its effect on pre-
existing contracts as a repeal or an amendment by legislative enact-
ment. Douglass v. County of Pike, 677.
STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
The following, among others, referred to, commented on, and es.
1841. Sept. 4. See Des Moines River. Grant, 1, 3, 4.
1846. Aug. 8. See Des Moines River Grant, 1, 3, 4.
1850. Sept. 27. See Donation Act, 1; Land Department, Decisions
of the Officers thereof, 6.
1853. March 2. See Admiralty.
1856. May 15. See Des Moines River Grant, 1.
1860. June 22. See Private Land Claims, 1.
1860. June 30. See Private Land Claims, 4.
1861. March 2. See Customs Duties, 3.
1861. March 2. See Des Moines River Grant, 3, 4; Taxation, 6.
1861. March 2. See Municipal Bonds, 5.
1862. July 12. See Des Moines River Grant, 3, 4
1864. June 30. See Contracts, 4.
1864. June 30. See Evidence, 3.
1864. June 30. See Succession Tax.
1865. March 3. See Cashier, Acts of.
STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES (continued).
1866. July 13. See Internal Revenue, 1.
1866. July 26. See Canal and Ditch Owners.
1867. Feb. 26. See Customs, Collector of, 1.
1869. March 3. See Municipal Bonds, 5.
1870. May 20. See Lease, 1.
1870, July 8. See Letters-patent, 10.
1871. March 3. See Des Moines River Grant, 6.
1872. May 27. See Municipal Bonds, 5.
1872. June 6. See Customs Duties, 6; Persia, Treaty with.
1875. Feb. 16. See Feigned Issue, 3.
1875. March 3. See Jurisdiction, 5.
STOCKHOLDERS, INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF.
1. Creditors of an incorporated company who have exhausted their
remedy at law can, in order to obtain satisfaction of their judg-
ments, proceed in equity against a stockholder to enforce his lia-
bility to the company for the amount remaining due upon his
subscription, although no account is taken of the other indebtedness
of the company, and the other stockholders are not made parties;
although, by the terms of their subscriptions, the stockholders were
to pay for their shares “ as called for" by the company, and the
latter had not called for more than thirty per cent of the subscrip-
tions. Hatch v. Dana, 205.
2. Pollard v. Bailey (20 Wall. 520) and Terry v. Tubman (92 U. S. 156)
distinguished from the present case. Id.
8. Where a bank charter provides that on the failure of the bank “each
stockholder shall be liable and held bound . . . for any sum not
exceeding twice the amount of ... his ... shares," — Held, 1. That
a suit in equity by or for all creditors is the appropriate mode of
enforcing the liability incurred on such failure. 2. That one cred.
itor cannot maintain an action at law against two stockholders.
Terry v. Little, 216.
4. Poilard v. Bailey (20 Wall. 520) cited and approved. Id.]
SUB-CONTRACTOR. See Lien, 10.
A., who died in October, 1846, devised his real estate to his daughtor
for life, with remainder in fee to her son B., should he survive her.
She died in September, 1865. B. was duly notified to make the
return required by sect. 14 of the Internal Revenue Act of June 30,
1864 (13 Stat. 226), and on his refusal to do so was summoned in
June, 1867, to appear before the assessor of the proper district. He
appeared and claimed “ that the estate was not liable to assessment
for a succession tax." Thereupon the assessor assessed a tax of one
per cent upon the full value of the property, and added thereto a
penalty of fifty per cent and costs, — all of which B., July 20, 1867,
paid under protest to the collector. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, to whom B. appealed, rendered a decision adverse to his
SUCCESSION TAX (continued).
claim, July 3, 1873. B. brought this action, June 24, 1875, against
the collector to recover the amount so paid. Held, 1. That the
action was not barred by the Statute of Limitations. 2. That the
tax was properly assessed and the penalty erroneously imposed.
Wright v. Blakeslee, 174.
SUPERSEDEAS. See Supersedeas Bond, Liability of Parties thereto.
1. Where an appeal has been taken to this court, the condition of the
bond that the appellants “ shall duly prosecute their said appeal
with effect, and, moreover, pay the amount of costs and damages
rendered and to be rendered in case the decree shall be affirmed in
said court,” meets all the requirements of sect. 1000, Rev. Stat.
Gay v. Parpart, 391.
2. In such a case the court will not entertain a motion by the appellee to
affirm the decree appealed from. Id.
SUPERSEDEAS BOND, LIABILITY OF PARTIES THERETO.
A., against whom a judgment in favor of B. was rendered in the District
Court, sued out of the Circuit Court a writ of error which was a
supersedeas, by his giving the requisite bond. The judgment hav-
ing been affirmed, another bond for a supersedeas was executed and
the cause removed here. The judgment of the Circuit Court was
affirmed. The original judgment remaining unpaid, this action
against the sureties to the first bond was brought. Held, 1. That
their liability was fixed by the judgment of the Circuit Court, and
was not diminished by the subsequent proceedings. 2. That they
are not chargeable with the costs incurred by reason of those pro-
ceedings. 3. That the issue of an execution against A. was not
essential to B.'s right to recover. Babbitt v. Finn, 7.
SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JURIS
DICTION OF. See Equity, 2.
SURETY. See Lien, 12, 13.
TAGGER'S TIN. See Customs Duties, 1.
TAXATION. See Succession Tax.
1. Sect. 3413 of the Revised Statutes enacts that “every national bank-
ing association, State bank, or banker, or association, shall pay a
tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any town, city, or
municipal corporation, paid out by them.” Held, that the tax thus
· laid is not on the notes, but on their use as a circulating medium.
National Bank v. United States, 1.
2. Veazie Bank v. Fenno (8 Wall. 533) cited and approved. Id.
8. Although for purposes of taxation the statutes of a State provide for
the valuation of all moneyed capital, including shares of the national
banks, at its true cash value, the systematic and intentional valua-
tion of all other moneyed capital by the taxing officers far below
its true value, while those shares are assessed at their full value, is
a violation of the act of Congress which prescribes the rule by which
they shall be taxed by State authority. Pelton v. National Bank, 143.