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CONSENT DECREE. See Appeal, 3; Practice, 7.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Contracts, 9-11 ; Illinois; Municipal

Bonds, 16, 17; Taxation, 5; Territory, Organization of'a.
1. Sect. 3113 of the Revised Statutes, which enacts that “every national

banking association, State bank, or banker, or association, shall pay
a tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any town, city, or
municipal corporation, paid out by them,” is not unconstitutional.

National Bank v. United States, 1.
2. The provision in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendinent to the

Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, contemplates
the protection of persons, and classes of persons, against unjust dis-
criminations by a State; it does not relate to territorial or munici-
pal arrangements made for different portions of a State. Missouri

v. Leicis, 22.
3. A State is not therefore prohibited from prescribing the jurisdiction

of its several courts, either as to their territorial limits, or the sub-
ject-matter, amount, or finality of their respective judgments or

decrees. Id.
4. Each State has full power to make for municipal purposes political

subdivisions of its territory, and regulate their local government,
including the constitution of courts, and the extent of their jurisdic.

tion. Ill.
6. A State may establish one system of law in one portion of its terri-

tory, and another system in another, provided always that it neither
encroaches upon the proper jurisdiction of the United States, nor
abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, nor deprives any person of his rights without due process of
law, nor denies to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-

tection of the laws in the same district. Id.
6. Subject to the limitations expressly or by implication imposed by the

Constitution, Congress has full and complete authority over a Terri-
tory, and may directly legislate for the government thereof. It may
declare a valid enactment of the territorial legislature void or a void
enactment valid, although it reserved in the organic act no such

power. National Bank v. County of Yankton, 129.
7. The Constitution of Tennessee, in force in 1838, declares that suits

may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts
as the legislature may by law direct." The statute of 1855 provid.
ing that actions might be instituted against the State under the
same rules and regulations that govern those between private citi-
zens, but conferring no power on the courts to execute their judg-
ment, was repealed in 1865. No other law was euacted prescribing
the manner or the courts in which the State could be sued. In a
suit subsequently brought by the State in 1872 against the Bank of
Tennessee and certain of its creditors, A., who was admitted a
defendant, filed a cross-bill, setting up that while the first statute
was in force the bank became indebted to him, and praying that


under the indemnity clause of its charter a decree be rendered
against the State for the amount of the debt. The cross-bill was
dismissed solely upon the ground that the State could not be sued in
her own courts. Held, that the repealing statute of 1865 did not im-
pair the obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the contract
clause of the Constitution of the United States. Railroad Company

v. Tennessee, 337.
8. As applicable to the government or any of its officers, the maxim that

the king can do no wrong has no place in our system of constitu-

tional law. Langford v. United States, 341.
9. The construction by the Supreme Court of Georgia of a statute of

the State under which a court made an exclusive grant of the
franchise of establishing and maintaining a toll-bridge within
certain limits, upon conditions which the grantee performed, is not
conclusive here upon the question whether a subsequent conflict-
ing grant impairs the obligation of a contract. Wright v. Nagle,

10. In 1867, the legislature of Mississippi granted a charter to a lottery

company for twenty-five years in consideration of a stipulated sum in
cash, an annual payment of a further sum, and a percentage of
receipts from the sale of tickets. A provision of the Constitution
adopted in 1868 declares that “the legislature shall never authorize
any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery-tickets be allowed, nor shall
any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets
therein to be sold.” Held, 1. That this provision is not in conflict
with sect: 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which
prohibits a State from “passing a law impairing the obligation of
contracts.” 2. That such a charter is in legal effect nothing more
than a license to enjoy the privilege conferred for the time, and on
the terms specified, subject to future legislative or constitutional

control or withdrawal. Stone y. Mississippi, 814.
11. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) commented

upon and explained. Id.
12. The legislature cannot, by chartering a lottery company, defeat the

will of the people of the State authoritatively expressed, in relation

to the continuance of such business in their midst. Id.
13 Railroad Company v. Tennessee (supra, p. 337) cited and approved.

Railroad Company v. Alabama, 832.
14. Where the statute of Alabama subjecting her to suit in her courts was

in force at the time when a contract with her was made and a suit
thereon brought, but their functions were essentially those of a board
of audit, and the plaintiff had no means of enforcing the payment of
a judgment or a decree in his favor, - Held, that the repeal of the
statute deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed, and is not in
violation of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United
States. Id.

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. See Municipal Bonds, 2.

CỌ TRACTS. See Constitutional Law, 7, 10, 14; Court of Claims, 2, 3;

Guaranty; Married Woman, Separate Estate of, 1, 2; Principal
and Agent, 2; Private Property taken for Public Use; Specific Per.

formance; Statules, Construction of, 2; Trade.
A., B., & Co., a firm engaged in selling live-stock on commission,
authorized a bank to cash drafts drawn on the firm by C., their
agent, who forwarded live-stock to them. Some controversy arising,
A., B., & Co. wrote to the bank as follows:

“Jan. 15, 1876.
“Hereafter we will pay drafts only on actual consignments. We can-
not advance money a week in advance of shipment. The stock must be
in transit so as to meet dr'ft same day or the day after presented to us.
This letter will cancel all previous arrangement of letters of credit in
reference to C.”
The cashier of the bank replied as follows:-

“Jan. 17, 1876.
“Your favor of the 15th received. I note what you say. We have
never knowingly advanced any money to C. on stock to come in. Have
always supposed it was in transit. After this we shall require ship’g bill.”
There was no further communication on this subject between the
parties. Two clerks of A., B., & Co. who were aware of this cor-
respondence became partners without the knowledge of the bank,
and the business was thereafter carried on in the same name. C.
continued to draw on the firm as before, and the bank, without
requiring bills of lading, to cash the drafts, all of which were ac-
cepted and paid by the firm. The bank acted in good faith. C.
absconded with the proceeds of two drafts, and the firm brought
this action against the bank to recover the amount. Held, 1. That
the letters constitute no contract, and the bank is not responsible to
the firm for cashing the drafts without bills of lading attached.
2. That if, however, a contract did arise from the cashier's unan-
swered letter of Jan. 17, 1876, it was with the then existing firm,
and ceased on the subsequent change thereof by the admission of
new members, without the knowledge or the consent of the bank.

National Bank v. Hall, 43.
2 March 1, 1876, A., by way of collateral security for his notes of even

date, payable four months thereafter, made an instrument in writing
assigning to B., the payee of them, a judgment against C., and
authorizing him to sell it, in case they should not be paid at matu-
rity, and apply the proceeds to the payment of thein. C., at said
date, had sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment. Ex-
ecution was issued June 19, but that property had been previously
exhausted by the levy of other executions. In a suit by B. against
A. on the notes, Held, 1. That B. was not bound by the terins of
the assignment to take steps for the collection of the judgment
before the maturity of the notes. 2. That, in the absence of acci-
dent, mistake, or fraud, evidence was not admissible to show his
parol agreement, made contemporaneously with the assignment and

CONTRACTS (continued).

as part of the transaction, to issue execution and collect the judg.

ment whenever the money could be made thereon. Bast v. Bank, 93.
3. A contract is contrary to public policy, and void, whereby, in consid-

eration of A.'s procuring B.'s appointment as special counsel in
certain causes against the United States, and aiding him in manag.
ing the defence of them, B. agrees that he will pay A. one-half of
the fee which he may receive from the government. Aleguire v.
Corwine, 108.
A gas company which contracted, for a valuable consideration, to
furnish a city with gas “ free of charge," paid thereon the tax im-
posed by sect. 94 of the Internal Revenue Act of June 30, 1864 (13
Stat. 264), as amended by the act of July 18, 1866. 14 id. 128.
Held, that the city is not liable to the company for the amount so

paid. Gas Company v. Pittsburgh, 219.
5. Where a corporation, organized pursuant to the provisions of a stat-

ute, but before its articles of association were filed with the county
clerk, entered into a contract for certain machinery to enable it to
carry on its business, Held, that its subsequent recognition of the
validity of the contract was binding upon it, although the statute
declares that a corporation so organized shall not commence business

before such articles are so filed. Whilney v. Wyman, 392.
6. The act of the General Assembly of South Carolina, passed June 9,

1877, entitled “ An Act to provide the mode of proving bills of the
bank of the State tendered for taxes, and the rules of evidence ap-
plicable thereto," created no new contract between the State and
the tax-payer or bill-holder, but merely provided a new remedy which
formed no part of the contract created by the charter of the bank.

South Carolina v. Gaillard, 433.
7. After that act was repealed, a party could not institute a proceeding

to avail himself of the remedy which it furnished, and all suits then
pending thereunder terminated, there being no saving clause as to

them. Id.
8. The terms of a contract under seal may be varied by a subsequent

parol agreement. Canal Company v. Ray, 522.
9. A company incorporated by a statute of Pennsylvania approved April

8, 1864, was authorized to construct a railway on certain streets of
Philadelphia, subject to the ordinances of the city regulating the
running of passenger railway cars. The charter requires, ainong
other things, that the “company shall also pay such license for each
car run by said company as is now paid by other passenger railway
companies" in said city. That license was $30 for each car. An
ordinance passed in 1867 increased the license charge to $50, and in
1868, by a general statute, the legislature provided that the passen-
ger railway corporations of Philadelphia should pay annually to the
city $50, as required by their charters, for each car intended to run
on their roads during the year, and that the city should have no
power to regulate such corporations unless authorized by the laws
of the State expressly in terms relating to those corporations. The

CUNTRACTS (continued).

company paid the increased charge until 1875. On its refusing to
pay it thereafter this suit was brought. Held, that the charter did
not amount to a contract that the company should never be required
to pay a license fee greater than that required of such companies at
the date when the company was incorporated. Railway Company

v. Philadelphia, 528.
10. In their widest sense, the words employed in the charter mean that

the company should not then be required by the city to pay any
greater charge as license than that paid by other companies possess-
ing the same privilege. Quære, without further legislation, could a

greater sum have been exacted from the company? Id.
11. Semble, that even if the charter were sufficient to import a contract,

the legislature, under the constitutional provision then in force
touching the alteration, revocation, or annulment of any charter in
such manner that no injustice be done to the corporators, had ample
power to pass the act raising the license fee from thirty to fifty

dollars. Id.
1. A claim to the exclusive property in a peculiar system of book-keep-

ing cannot, under the law of copyright, be maintained by the author
of a treatise in which that system is exhibited and explained. Baker

v. Selden, 99.
2. The difference between a copyright and letters-patent stated and

illustrated. Id.
CORPORATIONS. See Contracts, 5; Stockholders, Individual Liability

of, 1.
1. The powers of a corporation organized under a legislative charter

are only such as the statute confers; and the enumeration of them
implies the exclusion of all others. Thomas v. Railroad Com-

pany, 71.
2. While a corporation must dwell in the State which created it, its

existence may be elsewhere acknowledged and recognized. Its resi.
dence creates no insuperable objection to its power of contracting

in another State. Christian Union v. Yount, 352.
8. In harmony with the general law of comity among the States com-

posing the Union, the presumption is to be indulged that a corpo-
ration, if not forbidden by its charter, may exercise the powers
thereby granted within other States, including the power of acquir-
ing lands, unless prohibited therefrom, either in their direct enact.
ments or by their public policy, to be deduced from the general
course of legislation or the settled adjudications of their highest
courts. Id.
This court cannot presume that it is now, or was in 1870, against
the public policy of Illinois that one of her citizens owning real
estate there situate should convey it to a benevolent or mission-
ary corporation of another State of the Union, for the purpose of
enabling it to carry out the objects of its creation, since she

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