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ternal developments out of which the ongoing succession of social-political chaos and dictatorship must tend to prevail. In the course of later events, we might lament and denounce such political transformations of these nations, although our errors in foreign policy might have been a major contributing cause behind such unfortunate developments.

A proper United States foreign policy does not mean an unending flow of charitable donations. The entirety of modern history, in particular, demonstrates that the proper combinations of productive capital and increasing of the productive powers of labor generally means a growth in both gross and net produced wealth in industry and agriculture in excess of the growth of debt service incurred by capital formation. We cannot arrogate to ourselves the prerogative of imposing such technological development policies upon sovereign nations, but we can shape our foreign policies toward nations to the effect of fostering the choice of a humanist, technological progress policy by those nations. In point of fact, most of the nations of the world would readily cooperate with such a United States policy.

We cannot, of course, take total responsibility for affording nations the external capital they require, but we are a powerful force in world affairs to the purpose of creating a general climate favorable to a humanist policy.

Other critics of the signed draft treaty between the governments of Panama and the United States, including governments friendly to the United States in this hemisphere, have expressed emphatic concern respecting elements of the treaty which appear, in their estimation, to undermine the principle of sovereignty. There are two things to be done in response to that criticism.

We must, firstly, emphasize the included principle of the Monroe Doctrine, that the sovereignty of the republics of this hemisphere may be breached only by act of war. We must especially emphasize that point because the British Empire and its political cothinkers down to the present day have never accepted the principle of sovereignty for nations, especially not toward the nations of the southern portion of the globe. We must also emphasize that principle of the Monroe Doctrine because some influential voices within the United States itself have lately proposed that the United States participate in adoption of a doctrine of limited sovereignty.

We must, secondly, emphasize the nature of the problem giving rise to those features of the draft treaty which are the focal point of the complaints made. The Panama Canal Zone was established as an integral part of the procedures by which the nation of Panama was established, through United States' interests directly responsible for encouraging and generally making possible the separation of Panama from the nation of Colombia. At the outset, the nation of Panama was essentially a client state of the United States, and the Panama Canal Zone an integral arrangement for the very existence of that nation. To quote one influential United States figure, "We stole the Panama Canal fair and square.”

However, history moves on. The nation of Panama, originally virtually a mere puppet state of the United States, has evolved into a nation, and with the special circumstance that the ostensible prosperity of the Canal Zone abuts directly the Central American poverty of the majority of Panamanians. With the aid of certain busy bodies from outside Panama, that contrast between the modern standards of the Canal Zone and the poverty of most Panamanians has been for over a decade the specific obsession of a political ferment centered around “New Left"-type university and other students of Panama.

In this circumstance, two interests collide.

The Panama Canal remains a vital strategic economic and military interest of the United States. It is an important element of United States internal commerce. and without it the United States would be obliged to augment its naval and related forces most considerably.

At the same time, despite the efforts of the Panamanian government of Gen. Torrijos to maintain rational and friendly relations with the United States, he came into power in the sequel to student riots which destabilized and ended the lawful former government of that nation, and presides over a much enlarged student-led ferment of the same impulses. This unstable feature of the present internal situation in Panama, combined with a general destabilization among the countries of Central America, prompts the United States government and leading forces of the United States population to be concerned with the possibility and consequences of an overthrow of Gen. Torrijos's government by forces associated with the student "New Left."

Although we do not propose to intervene in the internal affairs of Panama, we have the right and obligation to take into account what effect internal forces such as those of the student-led ferment might have on the policies and practices of a future Panamanian government. It is our right and indeed our obligation to speak plainly on the subject of that student-centered ferment. It is essentially a sansculottist demagogues' movement in the tradition of the movements of Danton and Marat, a violent "New Left" formation of the philosophical-radical variety, of that variety which at one moment represents itself as "ultraleft" and at another proves to be a new variety of the fascist movements associated formerly with Adolf Hitler ad Benito Mussolini, a movement essentially characterized by irrationalism.

If those forces were to succeed in coming into power, the identified vital strategic interests of the United States would be indeed threatened. Moreover, wherever with the case of governments with whom we have differences, but which are committed to a rational perception of vital national interests, satisfactory negotiations will usually solve problems, with a government of forces which are essentially irrational, no such avenues of negotiations exist as efficient remedies. Consequently, the majority of United States citizens, to the extent their spokesmen inform them of such facts, will not accept a simple relinquishment of the United States' rights in the Panama Canal Zone.

As long as that problem persists, the United States has no practical alternative but to establish treaty rights which establish protection of vital United States' interests in the operation of the Canal.

For related reasons, some political currents in the United States may miss the valid kernel in the objections put forth by the government of Mexico.

It could rightly be observed that the proposed treaty increases the effective Sovereignty of the government of Panama in respect to the Canal Zone, as against no treaty at all. The point is nonetheless made that the treaty implicitly sets forth a doctrine of limited sovereignty, reaffirms that as an acceptable prinsiple at this present time. Worse, that feature of the treaty is asserted at the same time that a significant number of influential voices are proposing the promulgation of a doctrine of limited sovereignty, and that the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, among others, have gone to new extremes in arrogating a principle of external limitations on the sovereignty of debtor nations. It is not that the draft treaty lessens the sovereignty of Panama; it accomplishes the exact opposite. It is that the inclusion of specifications with the effect of limited sovereignty in a current treaty is deemed an offensive act of policy at this present time.

This is also an important point among Latin Americans because of current efforts in some influential quarters to foment what is sometimes termed a "Second War of the Pacific" among Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and other nations, and related matters in Central America, including the threatened outbreak of a Guatemalean-based adventure against Belize. The proposal of a Bolivian outlet to the Pacific and Ecuadorian access to the headwaters of the Amazon River are connected to the cited features of the Panama treaty in not only the minds of some leading Latin Americans.

How do we, then, resolve this matter?

First, at the moment, relinquishing the vital interests of the United States in the Canal is, at best, a difficult proposition. Furthermore, as long as the threat of student-led overturns of the present government of Panama persist, going further in concessions than the treaty proposes is probably unacceptable to the relevant institutions of the United States.

However, we can significantly mitigate the difficulties involved in two ways. First, we can avow, as a ruling doctrine of United States policy, that the practical features of the current draft treaty with Panama are in no sense a precedent for a doctrine of limited sovereignty, and specifically disavow any United States support for forcible adjustment of the borders of Ecuador and Bolivia.

Second, we can respond to the viable criticisms of the treaty concerning the internal economic development of Panama. Those critics rightly point toward the fact that the present draft treaty will not work. U.S. Senate ratification of the treaty will not avoid a threatened destabilization of the present government of Panama; a general destabilization of Panama and adjoining nations of Central America is already underfoot and will continue whether or not the treaty is ratified. We must therefore supplement the treaty with measures within our

proper means to aid the government of Panama in isolating and otherwise neutralizing the antihumanist, student-led irrationalist forces in Panama. We must aid Panama in neutralizing and isolating the irrationalist forces of destabilization by arranging economic development programs of the sort which inspire and sustain that quality of humanist outlook for which the American Revolution was fought and the establishment of federal republic and constitution was effected.

The approach to the reassertion of the essential content of the Monroe Doctrine identified here is the appropriate road toward proper relations within the Americas, including further steps toward full solution of the problems interlinked with the Panama Canal.


Nelson Rockefeller's Commission on Critical Choices for Americans lays out the following scenarios for Panama in its 1977 volume, Latin America: Struggle for Progress. (Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass.) The Panama Canal could well be this country's most intractable problem in Latin America. A ratified treaty may not end the matter while security questions may go unanswered.

Opposition to any treaty will be great-a matter which is already reflected in the United States Senate. Moreover, the likely mood of the country after Vietnam and Angola will be to view such a treaty as another surrender to men who wish the United States no good. The fact that General Omar Torrijos has cultivated a close relationship with Fidel Castro will only fuel that suspicion. Without foreign or official Panamanian support, guerrilla warfare would not resemble Vietnam's but the urban terrorism that once fluorished in countries like Brazil and Uruguay. Robberies, kidnappings, bombings, and assaults on police and civilian functionaries in the Zone and Panama proper may well occur. U.S. military and police units would find it tempting to chase terrorist groups into Panamanian territory, thus provoking nationalist outcries in Panama.

On a lower scale of violence there is the danger of sabotage of Canal facilities. This is more plausible because the Canal is vulnerable. A small group reasonably proficient in explosives could do serious damage. The possibility would place a heavy strain on the police and military forces within the Canal Zone. Although the exact nature of the possible violence is not clear, the official Panamanian reaction is. Panama's government will double its efforts to solicit worldwide support. The United States can expect heavy criticism in the OAS, the United Nations but such attacks are not likely to create a favorable climate for a new treaty.

But despite the bleakness of the prospect, it should, nevertheless be turned into an opportunity. A rejected treaty would give (American officials) the chance to review our policy.

In economic terms are we prepared to accept a Panamanian imposed increase in toll rates? In an increasingly economically interdependent world are we prepared to accept a closing of the Canal by the Panamanians for whatever reason? Do we as a superpower have a special role in protecting the economic interests of other major users of the Canal?

How important is the Canal in military terms for the next quarter-century? It may well be by 1977 that the United States would find a canal of greater importance than many previously assumed.

In political terms, would the eventual return of the Canal to Panama without any restrictions create a precedent for other American facilities in the Caribbean? Would it merely reinforce the image of America-in-decline?



Prior to his appointment as Secretary of State. Vance was a founding member of David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission, vice-chairman of David Rockefeller's New York Council on Foreign Relations, and chairman of the board of the Rockefeller Foundation. This foundation has funded for years the Instittue for Policy Studies which runs terrorist operations in Latin America.

His corporate links come by way of his law practice. Vance was an attorney with Simpson, Thatcher and Bartlett, a Wall Street firm whose major clients are

Lehman Bros., Pan American World Airways, and Gulf and Western Industries Inc.-a U.S. based conglomerate which purchased the largest and choicest sugar landholdings in the Dominican Republic subsequent to the U.S. 1965 invasion into the Dominican civil war and Vance's mediation in the conflict as Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Vance was a director of the Rockefeller-controlled New York Times, and of IBM, whose chief executive officer, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., is a fellow trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Vance is a high-level Rockefeller "Our Crowd" policy advisor and implementer with long established ties to British intelligence circles of the Lord Beaverbrook pedigree. He participated in the planning and implementation of the joint Rockefeller and Rothschild Trilateral Commission coup d'etat process that imposed Trilateral Commission member Jimmy Carter as President.

Vance, as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Lyndon Johnson, personally ran the 1967 "Operation Prometheus" Greek coup; in 1968 he coordinated the U.S. Army invasion of Detroit, Michigan during the summer riots, and ordered the creation of "Operation Garden Plot"-the 1948-style domestic surveillance and computer dossier system set up by the Defense Department. As U.S. negotiator to the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam in 1968-69, he and fellow negotiator Averell Harriman aborted effective negotiations.

In testimony during Vance's confirmation hearings in the U.S. Senate, former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry identified Vance as the mastermind behind the 1964 Brazilian coup against Goulart and the 1973 Chile coup against Dr. Calvador Allende.


Linowitz is a director or trustee of almost every Rockefeller policy-making group for Latin America-the Council of the Americas (which former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry cited as the base of operations against the Allende government), the Center for Inter American Relations and its subgroup the Commission on U.S. Latin American Relations (the "Linowitz Commission") of which Linowitz is chairman. The executive director of the Linowitz Commission is a member of the terrorist Institute for Policy Studies and the affiliated Transnational Institute's subgruop-the two main centers for deployment of Rockefeller-run "left" terrorism.

Linowitz is the senior partner at the Wall Street law firm Coudert Bros. This law firm is noted for its arch reactionary views. In the 1940s it represented the fascist Vichy French Government. It represents Buckley family oil interests in Latin America, and in 1965 partner Frederick Coudert headed the Buckley for Mayor Committee in New York City. Coudert Bros. partner Richard Gardner, as Ambassador to Italy, is currently directing the destabilization of the Andreotti government.

Well-known as the chairman of the Xerox Corp., Linowitz served on Nelson Rockefeller's Commission on Critical Choices. He is a member of David Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations; a co-founder of David Rockefeller's International Executives Service Corp.-a Businessman's Peace Corp.-a trustee of Averell Harriman's American Assembly- a policy making group based at Columbia University in NYC; a trustee of the CIA-funded Institute for International Education.

Linowitz was appointed to his present position from his post as U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States (1966-69).


Bunker was the chairman of the board of National Sugar Refining Co. from 1948 to 1951. He had been a director since 1927 and president since 1940. This company has long been controlled by the Havenmeyer family-a family closely associated with the Rockefellers and with interests in Chemical Bank, a Rockefeller-Kuhn Loeb preserve. Previous to the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the corporation had interests there.

Bunker's ambassadorial credentials are certified by his long standing membership in David Rockefeller's New York Council on Foreign Relations and its subsidiary Foreign Policy association.

He was U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, 1952, to Italy 1952-53, to India, 195661, simultaneously to Nepal, 1956-59, and notoriously U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 1967 onwards in 1962 he was mediator in the Dutch-Indonesian

dispute over control of West New Guinea, in 1963 consultant to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the U.S. representative on the council of the Organization of American States, 1964-66, and ambassador-at-large 1966-67.


Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

I wanted to be clear on a couple of points. Is the statement you have submitted and which you have summarized the statement of Lyndon LaRouche, the national chairman or is it the statement of the Labor Party?

Mr. SMALL. It is the statement of the Labor Party as written and proposed by Mr. LaRouche, but it is adopted by the Party.

Senator SARBANES. What does it mean to say "adopted by the party?" What is the process for that?

Mr. SMALL. Discussed in executive session of the national executive committee of U.S. Labor Party and approved on that basis which has occurred.

Senator SARBANES. How large in size is the national executive committee of the U.S. Labor Party?

Mr. SMALL. Approximately 10 to 12 individuals, elected at our most recent conference which was held in New York City this year. Frankly, I do not remember the date.

Senator SARBANES. Elected by the membership of the party to serve on the national committee?

Mr. SMALL. On the national executive committee, yes.

Senator SARBANES. Are you, yourself, a member of the national executive committee?

Mr. SMALL. No; I am a member of the national committee. The national executive committee is the executive body consisting of slightly less than a dozen members, elected by a delegated representative body from the U.S. Labor Party, selected by region which, as I said, met earlier this year. The national committee is a larger body of approximately 240 members, throughout the United States, that have other responsibilities in terms of leadership-I am not a member of the national executive committee, however.

Senator SARBANES. This statement, make sure I understand this distinction was approved by the national executive committee? Mr. SMALL. That is right.

Senator SARBANES. The group of, did you say, 10 members?

Mr. SMALL. That is not the exact number. I think it is 9 or 10, I am not positive.

Senator SARBANES. And they were chosen by representatives of the party at a national conference?

Mr. SMALL. That is right, the delegated conference by region, held in New York City. Those delegates voted and elected a national committee and a national executive committee.

Senator SARBANES. When was this statement adopted by the national executive committee as the statement of the Labor Party?

Mr. SMALL. I do not know the exact date. It was adopted shortly after it was written by Mr. LaRouche. I would say in the next week, towards the end of September. It was written September 22.

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