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with Panama. They probably would go along with a treaty something like this if they felt that we could depend upon the government of Panama. Because of the instability there and because of the political complexity of the present regime, that is why they have grave reservations.
NEGOTIATING TREATY GIVEN INSTABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS AND
Senator SARBANES. How would you ever solve that? That is an interesting point and I was interested in how we would solve it.
In your statement, you make the point that the Torrijos regime is not trustworthy and, therefore, that enters into your thinking in terms of judging the validity of such agreements.
But then you go on and say even if it were, there is no assurance that a new government will not come in. If you start with that as a premise, how would you negotiate any agreement?
Mr. BOEHM. I would agree that if you started with that as a premise in all cases, you would never negotiate a treaty. However, I think you can draw a distinction as to the politics in particular areas.
If we make a treaty with Switzerland or
Senator SARBANES. With respect to Panama, would we ever be able to negotiate a treaty with Panama, with that as a premise in the Panama situation?
Mr. BOEHM. I think given that as a premise in the Panamanian situation, I think we would have to wait to see if they become stable.
There are always areas that go from stability to instability and back again and I think, if we had a stable government down there, and I do not view the Torrijos government as stable because of their economic situation, and in part because of the history of the country, I think if we had this situation then, I think the members of our group would feel more inclined toward a new treaty. At the present time, I should indicate that we feel there could be some adjustment in our relationship, but giving away the canal we think would be too risky.
ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING WIRE TAPPING INCIDENT
Senator SARBANES. The one final question I had is on your next to the last page. I notice you use the word “allegations" with respect to the wiretapping incident. The Senate Intelligence Committee has studied the matter and concluded that there is no reason to believe that U.S. negotiators had been under any pressure in their negotiations. I wondered whether you had any reason to doubt that conclusion.
I noticed you used the word "allegation" so I guess that would lead in the direction that you don't, but I want to be sure whether you have any reasons to doubt that conclusion of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Boehm. That was the reason I used the word "allegation," because certainly nothing has been proved. I would say though I do not think the American public has a full understanding of exactly what went on. There was a question of a particular U.S. Army official who
has not yet stepped forward to testify, and there are some doubts I think in the public mind about that situation.
As I say, it is an allegation.
Senator SARBANES. I guess I ought to just read into the record at this point the statement of the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Inouye of Hawii, where he concluded that the committee has no evidence or reason to believe or conclude that U.S. Intelligence activities have in any way affected the final results of the Panama Canal treaties.
That concludes my questioning.
Senator GRIFFIN. I just want to say for the record, since the record will show that I am sitting here, that I am not satisfied with the statement of the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee as a disposition of the matter for this committee.
I have indicated at other sessions, when Senator Sparkman was in the Chair, that I believe that this committee should have access to all of the information, perhaps in executive session, that the Intelligence Committee had. Then we will be in a position to evaluate whether or not that has been thoroughly investigated.
I do no want to get into the matter between you and the witness, but I do not want the record to show me sitting here without saying that I want to be sure this committee goes into it thoroughly and completely and that we make a judgment as to whether or not the allegations of whether wiretapping in fact took place, and if so, whether it had any bearing or relationship to the negotiations and the product of negotiations.
Senator SARBANES. I think it is a reasonable observation given the seriousness of the matter in which we are engaged that members of this committee want to be in position to make an independent judgment and not simply accept the conclusion of some other part of this institution, although, obviously, I would assume it has some weight. In that regard, though, I do note that Chairman Sparkman has written to Senator Inouye concerning this matter and asked him to provide us with any information they developed in the course of their study. I am informed that the Chairman Inouye is now clearing that matter with members of the Select Committee on Intelligence pursuant to their rules and requirements. So I think we will probably move on to do what you have suggested.
What I was particularly interested in here was, I noted the word "allegations” and I wanted to be clear whether that was the extent of the assertion or whether you had some other information or some other reason other than the reports about the incident that would be helpful to the committee in that regard.
Mr. BOEHM. No; the main reason I mentioned that in the context of surrounding paragraphs and so forth was its impact on young people. I think young people regardless of whether they are liberal, conservative, moderate, wherever they stand on the spectrum, are very turned off by wiretapping, particularly conservatives and liberals and I think the fact that it was brought up in conjunction with the talks about ratification that it was a further turnoff about the situation.
Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much.
CANDIDATE CARTER'S STATEMENT ABOUT NEVER GIVING UP CANAL CONTROL
Senator GRIFFIN. Do you have any documentation for that statement about candidate Carter saying he would never give up control of the Panama Canal ?
Mr. BOEHM. There is an item in the August 22 Time magazine. I also have four references from newspapers in 1976, newspapers around the country, one from Baltimore on that. I will be glad to send them to the committee for inclusion in the record.
Senator GRIFFIN. Quoting Mr. Carter?
The one in the August 22 Time magazine is the one I was relying on primarily.
Senator GRIFFIN. Thank you.
Senator SARBANES. Our concluding witness for today is Dennis Small, National Committee member of the U.S. Labor Party.
Mr. Small, you can proceed as you see fit. We have your statement. It is this printed statement; is that corret?
STATEMENT OF DENNIS SMALL, NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEMBER
OF THE UNITED STATES LABOR PARTY
Mr. SMALL. That is correct.
With your permission and the permission of other members of the committee I would like to read the introductory statement, which summarizes our party position and briefly gives the arguments that are presented in the remaining section.
Senator SARBANES. Fine, the statement in its entirety will be included in the record.
Mr. SMALL. Thank you.
Mr. SMALL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in the name of the United States Labor Party, I would like to present as our party's testimony on the issue of the new Panama Canal treaties a statement issued on September 22 by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., National Chairman of the United States Labor Party.
TWO SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS IN EXISTING TREATIES
In that statement Mr. LaRouche returns to the "American System" tradition of foreign policy established by John Quincy Adams, of fostering the conditions necessary for the emergence and growth of sovereign, industrially-developed republics. From that standpoint, LaRouche takes note of two significant shortcomings in the existing treaties that must be addressed and resolved by the U.S. Government.
First as the Mexican and other governments have correctly protested, the existing treaties might be interpreted to establish a dangerous precedent of "limited sovereignty” for Latin American nations. Second, Ronald Reagan and other national political leaders have justifiably charged that the treaties do not adequately consider Panama's
need for a climate of technological progress and industrial development, in which stability and political security for the canal and surrounding region can be guaranteed.
To correct these defects, Mr. LaRouche has proposed two addenda to the existing treaties. First, it is in the national interest that the C'nited States issue a new policy doctrine statement which elaborates on the positive kernal contained in the later distorted Monroe Doctrine of 1823. And which proclaims categorical American rejection of the monetarist doctrine of limited sovereignty.
We must avow that the practical features of the current draft treaties with Panama are in no sense a precedent for a doctrine of limited sovereignty.
Second, legitimate U.S. interests in maintaining the security and neutrality of the Panama Canal are best served by fostering the kind of climate for intensive capital formation in Panama to which Mr. Reagan has referred. It is under these circumstances that monetaristcontrolled terrorist and ultra-leftist provocateurs who might othervise destabilize the region can best be isolated and contained.
It is the United States Labor Party's hope that these proposed addenda will cut through much of the confusion and disorientation now surrounding the national debate on the canal issue, a debate which thus far has shed far more heat than light on the matter and permit the national political debate to focus on the more pressing and productive issues of nuclear energy development, the export of high technology to the developing sector, and the reform of the international monetary system necessary to accomplish these national goals.
Proceeding to summarize the text of the LaRouche amendments, I would like to emphasize three points.
MONROE DOCTRINE AND QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
First, with regard to the Monroe Doctrine and the question of sovereignty, limited sovereignty and so on.
The historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by the U.S. Government in 1823, its presentation as a unilateral U.S. policy statement, came in the context similar to circumstances existing today in which British monetarist interests were doing everything in their power to obtain for themselves unilateral looting rights and intervention rights throughout Latin America and other parts of the Globe as well but for the purposes of this statement we will refer to Latin America.
Under these difficult circumstances in which the British held clear international Heathrow money, the existing government in the United States under the recommendation of John Quincy Adams then Secretary of State, rejected the British Foreign Minister Cannon's proposal of unilateral rights of intervention and adopted instead the Monroe Doctrine which had a crucial distinction from the British position. That distinction was a categorical statement on the part of the United States that it respected the sovereigny of Republics throughout the Americas. In fact it was committed to the creation of such sovereign republican forms of government.
One example I believe is to point out what I am talking about. In the case of Mexico in the 1860's, when the government of Benito Juarez
had declared a moratorium on its debts, the Hapsburg under British control sent Maximilian to abrogate the sovereignty of the Mexican Republic, imposed Maximilian as Emperor and guaranteed the debt payments would continue. This should be sharply counterposed to what is effectively a U.S. foreign policy, that originated out of the Monroe Doctrine, of complete and total respect for sovereign republics and for further creating the conditions under which those sovereign republics can in fact survive.
Those conditions, to identify it very briefly, are the rejection of monetaristic principles of debt payment at all costs, and instead concentration on heavy capital formation, industrial development, increased education and skilled levels of working class and so on.
Under these conditions, actual republican forms of government and actual sovereignty can and have flourished in the past.
QUESTION OF SECURITY FOR PANAMA CANAL NEUTRALITY
This brings me to the second point which is the question of security for the neutrality of the Panama Canal.
It is unquestionable that the United States has legitimate interests in the Panama Canal. It is unquestionable that the Panama Canal is an important part of internal U.S. commerce at this point as well as of international commerce.
The problem as I understand it is to guarantee that the canal will continue to function and serve those national interests as well as other international interests.
The fundamental difficulty that has been addressed by various other witnesses today and has been addressed extensively in the national and international media is instability in the Central American region and especially instability within Pånama.
Many have identified the danger of guerrilla warfare, terroristic activities, sabotage of the canal, and so on.
I would like to identify two points with regard to this kind of instability.
First, in almost every single known international case such instances of terrorism, sabotage, and instability of that sort are directly fomented and encouraged by, among other bodies, the Institute for Policy Studies based in Washington, D.C., which can perhaps more accurately be classified as the left CIA, which is known and we have documented and it has been documented elsewhere, has extensive controlling links to terroristic organizations throughout the world, including the Baader-Meinhof gang, in the Red Army faction, and so on and so forth.
The Institute for Policy Studies also has links into the Panama situation which we have documented in our literature and is available.
I can refer in particular to the TLSL in Panama. Recognizing that the legitimate interest of the United States recognizing the danger that actually does exist in terms of the stability of the region and security for the region it is necessary to counterpose, however, the appropriate policies for dealing with that.
The appropriate policies are precisely those of industrial development of the region, which will create the circumstances in which the