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September 1975-May 1976: Acting Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.

June 1976-December 1976: Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.

January 1977-Present: Heading new Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES (SELECTED) August 1968–June 1969: Organizer and Coordinator, Latin American Study Group at Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

October 1972-June 1975: Chairman, Faculty Colloquium on National Development, Princeton.

February 1973–June 1973: Chairman, Peru Seminar, Center for Inter-American Relations, New York.

June 1974–September 1974: Special Consultant, Commission of U.S.-Latin American Relations.

June 1974-December 1974: Consultant and Research Project Director, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

July 1974–Present: Consultant, Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, The Ford Foundation.

December 1974-December 1975: Council, Caribbean Studies Association (resigned) ; Consultant, Martin Agronsky Evening Edition.

February 1974–Present: Member, Board of Editors, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs.


"The Dominican Intervention" (Harvard University Press, 1972) [To be published in Spanish in 1977.)

Editor and Contributor—"The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under Military Rule" (Princeton University Press, 1975).

Editor and Contributor—"Armies and Politics in Latin America" (Holmes and Meier, Inc., 1976).

Co-editor with Ernest R. May—"The United States and Latin America: The Politics of Policy-Making” (forthcoming). Articles

“Limits of American Power: The Lesson of the Dominican Republic,” Harper's (June 1964).

“The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in A. von Lazar and R. R. Kaufman, “Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics" (Allyn and Bacon, 1969); (reprinted twice in English and published also in Spanish).

“Alliance Rhetoric versus Latin American Reality," Foreign Affairs (April 1970); republished in Richard Gray (ed.), "Latin America and the United States in the 1970s" (F. E. Peacock 1971) and also in Bobbs-Merrill reprint series,

"Peru's Ambiguous Revolution," Foreign Affairs (July 1964). Published in Spanish in Foro Internacional (April 1975).

"Armies and Politics in Latin America," World Politics (October 1974). To appear in Spanish in 1976 in Estudios Internacionales (Buenos Aires).

"Toward a New Caribbean Policy," SAIS Review (Winter 1975).

"Cuba: Time for a Change," Foreign Policy (Fall 1975). (Excerpted in Miami Herald and in Puerto Rican newspapers.)

"The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1976).

“Ending the Feud with Castro's Cuba," The Washington Post, "Outlook" (January 9, 1977).

"It's Time to Talk Turkey with Cuba," The New York Times (July 13, 1977). "Cuba's African Adventure," International Security (Summer 1977).

"The United States and Panama: Confrontation or Cooperation ?" (with Milton L. Charlton) forthcoming in American Enterprise Institute's Defense Review (1977).


Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you very much, Senator McGovern.

It is an honor for me to be among those asked to testify on the question of the Panama Canal treaties now before your committee. Surely the role of the Senate in considering these proposed treaties makes these hearings among the most important the committee has held in recent years, and all of us want to be as helpful as possible to you.

I am speaking here, of course, not as a representative of the Wilson Center or as head of its new Latin American program, but as a student of Latin American United States relations.

May I say that it is a particular pleasure for me to be on a panel with Professor Dozer, whose book on Latin America and United States-Latin American relations was assigned in the first course I took on these questions.

Panama is for all of us, I think, a key issue, a test of U.S. policy toward the nations of this hemisphere. Proponents and opponents of the new treaties, as well as those--including some of the distinguished members of this committee—who have not yet made up their minds or announced their positions: All of us agree that the Panama issue is significant and that its time has finally come. I beileve we also agree that the issue is important beyond what is immediately at stake: How best to preserve secure access for the United States to a convenient waterway.


It is important, as well, for its symbolic significance, here in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. How the United States deals with the question of Panama will tell us, and the world, whether the United States is outgrowing its habits of thought in the past, what I call the “hegemonic presumption” about which I wrote in "Foreign Affairs" a year ago. I know that it is a pretentious phrase, but I could not think of a better one to get across my point. It will also tell us whether we in the United States are ready to deal on the basis of mutual respect even with the small and weak countries of the world. The outcome of the Panama debate will also tell us a good deal about the strength of our democratic institutions, and about the capacity of our constitutional system to deal wisely with complex issues on which passions sometimes outrun understanding.


I tried in a recent article in the American Enterprise Institute's “Defensive Review," which I am told was put into the record, I believe by you, Senator McGovern, in previous hearings of this committee

Senator McGOVERN. That's correct, Professor Lowenthal. It was, indeed.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. I tried to show why I think it is in the best interests of the United States to work together with Panama to replace the 1903 treaty with one grounded in today's realities and built on the principle of mutual respect and on the pursuit of shared aims. Rather than repeat that whole argument here, let me just summarize brietis why I hope the Senate will help the United States and Panama to reach agreement on the proposed new treaty relationship.

After doing so, I would like to take a few moments to emphasize one particular point, why the Panama issue is such an essential part of improving United States relations with Latin America.

Finally, I would like to make a brief comment on one of the issues which has come up already in the committee's deliberations, the question of the so-called "right of intervention."



It sems to me that the central question posed in Panama is whether U.S. interests in the canal require us to continue to treat Panama as less than a juridical equal, as we have done from the beginning.

Those who urge the United States to cling at all costs to the anachronistic terms of the 1903 Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty in the face of rising opposition from Panama, on the international scene, and even from within the United States are not, for the most part, unreasonable people, although some of them do approach this issue with an emotional zeal which is hard to analyze and deal with.

The opponents take their stance basically because they see no better way to protect this country's interests, even though they know that continuing and deepening conflict over Panama will result.

Those of us who favor replacing the 1903 treaty with a new set of agreements-negotiated carefully over many months and years, believe that the United States and Panama share the basic aims of keeping the canal open, secure, efficient, and neutral. We believe, therefore, that U.S. interests and Panama's dignity can be reconciled through an accord, like the one before your committee, which recognizes Panama's sovereignty and builds on the basis of the interests the two countries share.

Sticking with the 1903 treaty would assure an era of bitter and continuing confrontation between the United States and Panama, magnified and deepened by the effects of this struggle on C.S. relations with other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and even with other countries in the Third World and beyond.

Adopting a new set of mutually agreeable obligations promises closer cooperation, on the other hand, between Panama and the United States and offers the chance to turn the Panama issue from an example of North American intransigence into a sign that this country knows how to protect its lasting interests in a rapidly changing world.

When all is said and done, I think the essential choice posed by the proposed new treaties is just about that simple. There is no real doubt that the United States has significant, if no longer critical economic and military interests in Panama.

Few would argue, I think, that the United States has a positive legal obligation to modify its treaty relationships with Panama in order to protect those interests.

The real question is whether it is wise for the United States to base its continuing access to the Panama Canal on words alone, on the terms of a discredited treaty drafted under dubious circumstances of the bygone era of imperial expansion.

It seems to me that previous testimony before your committee has established well the case for constructing a new and more viable basis for protecting U.S. access to the canal, a basis founded not on mere words, but on shared responsibilities and benefits. In brief, the proposed new treaties should engage Panama's energies more positively in maintaining and defending the canal as that country's chief resource. They should decrease the threats to the canal from Panamanian bitterness. They should diminish the prospect that the United States could eventually be drawn again into a bloody military confrontation with a nationalist movement on its own territory. And, they would remove an irritant in U.S. relations with all the countries of the hemisphere, an irritant which Senator Church of the committee has aptly called a "bone in the throat” for Latin American nations in his appearance on television on Sunday.


Because my own research and writing has not concentrated mainly on Panama, but rather on broader issues of United States relations with Latin America, let me emphasize this last point: The larger significance of the Panama issue in hemispheric relations.

As the United States enters its third century of independence, the nature of our relations with our neighbors in Latin America and the ('aribbean is changing importantly. For many years, and especially in the immediate postwar period, the United States understandably treated Latin America and the Caribbean as its "sphere of influence." The United States wielded virtually unchallenged power, economic and military, and our political leadership in the hemisphere was unquestioned. We came to feel, or at least some of us did, that we could take for granted the loyalty and cooperation of our neighbors to the South. They would support U.S. initiatives, import U.S. goods, utilize U.S. weapons, welcome U.S. investment, and so on and so forth, pretty much in the nature of things.

During the last 10 years, however, the bases for this country's hegemonic presumption have eroded. No longer can we in the United States assume that the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean will automatically share U.S. interests and perceptions.

Objective and subjective trends of several types coalesce to produce a fact, that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean need to be taken seriously by the United States as independent countries, each able and eager to deal with the United States on a broad agenda of issues, regional and global. There are a number of issues on which ire in the United States need the support and cooperation of the Latin American countries and it will be necessary for us to deal with them in order to achieve it. As these various issues are faced, each Latin American country begins with a special sensitivity about U.S. paternalism and interventionism, about the legacy of the past, as they see it.

It is in that context that the Panama issue becomes so important in C.S.-Latin American relations.

United States relations with Panama, and especially the status of the Canal Zone itself, have long symbolized for many in Latin America all that was regrettable about some aspects of the so-called "special relationship" with the United States. All of the attempts by our Government to convince Latin Americans that we respect their rights and understand their interests would ring hollow if we could not bring ourselves to abandon the habits of thought and practice which have been epitomized by the status of the Panama Canal.

Sensitivity and respect are the key points here, I think. They are points which take on even more importance as the issues before this committee become better defined.

I am certainly no authority on artful terms like "expeditious passage" or on the likely course of world shipping patterns and how they will affect the economics of canal use. But you have a number of witnesses who are specialists on those kinds of questions.


But one thing I, or I think any student of U.S.-Latin American relations, can and should say is that the Senate should not consider asserting an explicit so-called "right" of "intervention" in Panama, or anywhere else.

The proposed treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal establishes a joint commitment by Panama and the United States to maintain the canal's permanent neutrality, notwithstanding the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty or of any other treaties entered into by Panama and the United States.

Senator McGOVERN. Excuse me, but I didn't quite understand you. Did you say that the United

States should never explicitly set forth the "right of intervention?” I was not quite sure of the point you were making.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. What I was saying, sir, is that we ought to be in a position of asserting a "right" to something we at the same time call

intervention.” It seems to me that the right of self-defense, or of protection of vital national interests may be one thing. But to call for a right of intervention, which I understand is something some people who have appeared before this committee have had in mind, seems to me to be an illustration of the problem and not a solution of it. I think that intervention is something toward which, given the historical record, the Latin American and Caribbean countries feel a special sensitivity.

As I was saying, I think it is understandable and proper that this committee should

want to make U.S. rights in the matter somewhat more explicit. But we should not be surprised nor upset that Panama's Government officials deny that the United States will have a right to "intervene," using that phrase, in Panama. It seems to me that that illustrates the problem of sensitivity and does not contribute toward resolving it.

Thank you very much for inviting my testimony. When the Senators so desire, I would, of course, be very glad to answer any questions that they may have.

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